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Abstract 
Assisted dying is a significant issue in Aotearoa New Zealand given the continued controversy 
over the End of Life Choice Bill (2017), Act (2019) and forthcoming referendum. However, the 
views of people approaching the end of life are largely missing from the public debate and New 
Zealand research. My PhD research is an open enquiry into the perspectives of people with 
approximately one year’s life expectancy who would have considered an assisted death (if it were 
available). Fourteen participants and six family members were interviewed.  
  
My thesis focuses on the socio-cultural values that dying people used to explain their views on 
assisted dying. The conceptual framework incorporates both the sociology of death and dying and 
the ‘wish to hasten death’ literatures. The discursive and assemblage methodological approaches 
were chosen because of their analytic power to illuminate the dynamism, the contextual and 
relational elements of the wish to hasten death, overlooked by much of the literature.  
 
Identifying an assemblage of medicalised dying demonstrated that participants were not passive 
recipients of medicalisation; rather they rejected, co-opted and embraced it. I illustrate how 
participants strategically re-medicalised dying by framing their dying, death and suffering as 
activities that require medical intervention to achieve the good death that ‘medicine’ had promised 
them. 
 
Assisted dying appealed because it offered individual control and mitigated the risk of dying badly. 
Yet any regime of assisted dying reinforces health professionals as in control of dying and 
increasingly controls freedom. Within this paradox of control, I argue there is still scope for choice, 
activism and an ethical making of the self, although limited by the biopolitical regime, that equates 
to a degree of freedom for participants.  
 
Participants contested normative discourses about life, dying and death. I show how participants 
sought to expand the boundaries of acceptable dying and to normalise assisted dying. Foucault’s 
principles of exclusion, rarefaction and games of truth shed light on the power structures that 
privilege some discourses, ideologies and groups over dying persons’ experiences.  
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Participants described being disenfranchised by medicine’s rejection of assisted dying as a 
legitimate option at the end of life. In the face of this perceived epistemic injustice and uncertainty, 
assisted dying offered a technique of certainty against the risk that dying badly posed for their 
ontological security. My research suggests participants exercise agency through their attempts to 
‘strategically negotiate’ and re-medicalise dying, and contest normative discourses of dying and 
longevity for their own aims. These three concepts—strategic negotiators, contesting normative 
dying, and freedom within the paradox of control—constitute the original contributions of this 
research. 
 
If the debate in Aotearoa New Zealand on assisted dying is to be moved forward, attention must 
be paid to the contextual reasons people would consider choosing assisted dying. The wish to have 
the option of assisted dying is a manifestation of a new paradigm of dying that reflects changing 
individual, societal and ideological concepts about: what is a good life, what is a good death and 




Assisted dying is an important issue in Aotearoa New Zealand with the ongoing controversy 
over the End of Life Choice legislation. The public debate on assisted dying was about whether 
the proposed change would be right or wrong for New Zealand. But the views of dying people 
were mostly missing from the debate. So to help bring their views into the debate, my PhD 
research interviewed 14 dying people who might have chosen an assisted death if it were 
available to them. I also interviewed six of their family members.  
  
My research looks at the ideas and values that dying people used to explain their wish for 
assisted dying. I found that the participants in the study felt that while medicine promises ‘a 
good death’, they also felt it was not going to be able to deliver on the promise to relieve their 
suffering. They argued that medicine should help them to die peacefully because assisted dying 
guaranteed what they understood as a good death.  
 
It was having the option of assisted dying available if they needed it that appealed to people. 
They felt it would bring them some personal control over dying because there was a risk they 
would die badly. While the End of Life Choice Act allows doctors to have the final say if 
someone meets the strict criteria for assisted dying or not, the participants thought that being 
able to choose the timing and way they died was important. They saw the tight controls on 
assisted dying as a good thing, they wanted it to be safe for everyone. 
 
Participants challenged common beliefs about life, dying and death. They talked about how 
living a meaningful life was more important than living a long life because there were some 
ways of living that were worse than death. They also felt that dying would be difficult for their 
families if it took too long and they themselves would know best if and when it would be the 
right time for them to die. They felt that medicine and religion shouldn’t get to decide what’s 
right as they didn’t know what it was like for them to approach the end of life. Almost all 
participants disagreed with the idea that an assisted death was suicide because they were, in 
fact, already dying. 
 
 v 
If the debate in Aotearoa New Zealand on assisted dying is going to move forward, we need to 
think about the reasons why people might choose assisted dying, not just whether it is right or 
wrong. Assisted dying reflects changing societal ideas about: what is a good life, what is a good 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
This thesis does not consider whether AD is morally or ethically right or wrong nor does it focus 
on the pro et contra of legalising AD, though I briefly detail these positions in the next chapter. 
Instead, this thesis explores sociologically why 14 New Zealanders, in the face of a life-limiting 
illness, would consider hastening their death with AD (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Feely, 2019; 
Foucault, 1972, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1997; N. Fox & Alldred, 2015; N. Fox & 
Ward, 2008). This research took place at the historical juncture of the protracted Aotearoa New 
Zealand (ANZ) debate in on the End of Life Choice Bill (2017), now the End of Life Choice Act 
(2019),1 and this inevitably informed the present study. It was surprising to me that we might go 
ahead with a bill and yet there was no research with dying people on the issue. Thus, one of the 
overarching aims of this thesis is to bring the views of people approaching the end of life into the 
ANZ debate on legalising assisted dying (AD) because they were noticeably absent from the 
research and public dialogue. This research represents a timely contribution to the debate from 
the perspectives of those who it affects most directly, those with life-limiting illnesses,2 and 
brings their views into the debate. 
 
Participants’ reasons for considering AD, if it were available to them, were personal, embodied, 
existential, relational, political and ideological. Power and agency were implicated in 
participants’ reasoning and this research explores how these forces interact around AD. I argue 
that AD epitomises the intersection of power and agency, normative and counter discourses, and 
illustrates the paradoxes within contemporary society. The inherent contradictions and shifting 
experiences of what it means to want to hasten death are central to this thesis. As I will explain 
further in Chapter Three, this project is grounded by a relativist ontology and a subjectivist 
epistemology that is informed by a social constructionist paradigm. I draw on two 
methodological approaches—Foucauldian discourse analysis and assemblage theory—to analyse 
the in-depth interviews. For the participants in this study, the risk of dying badly (cf a good 
 
1 I have referred to the End of Life Choice Bill if the reference was made prior to it passing and referred to it as an 
Act otherwise.  
2 People with non-life-threatening illnesses and disabilities were not included in the present research as they were 
not eligible under the End of Life Choice Bill. 
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death) was attenuated by the option of AD. However, the exclusion of AD by ‘medicine’3 as a 
legitimate option on the basis that the wish to hasten death (WTHD) is ameliorable or 
pathological constitutes an epistemic injustice towards patients that exacerbates the uncertainty 
in dying that participants faced. This research speaks to the broader sociological questions of 
what is a good life, what is a good death and I emphasise the important transition, what is 
undesirable dying. I conclude that the WTHD is a reflection of societal changes relating to 
individual, medicine and norms. 
  
In this introductory chapter I begin by stating the research aims, questions and scope and then 
discuss my own views on assisted dying. I describe the language I have chosen to use and 
distinguish AD from other end-of-life practices. The next section contextualises the research 
within the recent history of AD in ANZ. I briefly outline the international context and the socio-
political ideologies that inform AD. I conclude this chapter by outlining structure of this thesis.  
 
Research Aims and Questions 
I was motivated to conduct this research when I learned that all research conducted in ANZ on 
AD had been with healthy adults; there was no research with people approaching the end of life 
(Young, Egan, Walker, Graham-DeMello, & Jackson, 2019). The main aim of this thesis is to 
explore the perspectives and reasoning of New Zealanders approaching the end of life who want 
or who would consider choosing an assisted death, if it were available. With these findings, I 
seek to bring their views into the debate on AD and add nuance. The research questions are 
informed by the context of the End of Life Choice Bill, the conceptual framework, as well as the 
methodologies outlined in Chapter Three. I also identified these questions from the gaps in the 
relevant literature as discussed above.  
 
The research questions driving this thesis are: 
1. What does assisted dying mean to people (and their family) who are approaching end 
of life and would consider choosing assisted dying if it were available to them? 
 
3 In writing ‘medicine’ and other terms in scare quotes, I am seeking to alert the reader to the amorphous nature of 
meaning or contested nature of such terms. I will not continue to use them every usage for ease of reading. 
Sometimes single quote marks are used to indicate a phrase. 
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2. What socio-cultural values do they draw upon to frame their experience? 
3. How do these values inform their perspectives? 
 
These serve the larger question of why 14 New Zealanders, in the face of a life-limiting illness, 
would consider hastening their death with AD? The intellectual gap I am seeking to address is in 
what ways is it possible to die in ANZ today and what are the discursive explanations? 
 
These research questions are consistent with a specifically sociological approach to AD which 
seeks to locate it within a general social, cultural, economic and political context. The scope of 
this research topic crosses several disciplinary boundaries, notably bioethics and palliative care, 
which are the traditional homes of WTHD research. I take liberties to draw on ideas from 
philosophy, namely epistemic injustice and Foucault’s work, and other disciplines such as 
bioethics, when this augments the analysis or helps to explain a concept. However, the project is 
grounded within the discipline of sociology and overlaps with critical medical anthropology 
which align with my worldview and research training, as well as being a good fit with the data. 
 
My Position on Assisted Dying 
It is important to situate myself and the ways in which my own views inform the research 
process. A position on AD was asked of me by participants and by some journalists. To the 
attuned, the language I chose to use to describe AD suggests my position. I considered how 
much I should disclose to participants about my views of AD and how I should go about doing 
this. Sharing my views was important because it affected my relationship with the participants. 
Because I recruited people who already want or would consider assisted death, my views are less 
likely to ‘lead’ and influence them. However, what I said (and the questions I asked) influenced 
how participants perceived me, how much they trusted me and shared with me. This led me to 
speak honestly with participants, by acknowledging that I think there should be a regulated 
robust system for assisted dying, for certain people in particular circumstances. 
  
While I am clear about the axiological positioning of this research, I am also aware of the risk 
that stating such a position may invite questions over bias and objectivity. The desire for 
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researchers to be objective seems to be even more exaggerated when researching controversial 
topics. However, no research is neutral or objective. As part of the reflexivity process, I 
discussed my views, the data I collected and my interpretations regularly among my supervisory 
team who had varied beliefs and professions. 
  
Conducting a similar study, N. Richards (2012) positioned herself as agnostic on the issue at the 
beginning of her interviews. Her primary reasons for this were because this is how she genuinely 
felt and it encouraged deeper explanation from participants, as they could not assume she had 
prior knowledge. Richards’ agnosticism was met with some suspicion and participants attempted 
to “solicit and scrutinise my personal beliefs in order to penetrate what they assumed to be my 
guise of neutrality” (N. Richards, 2012, p. 12). I agree is it important to be honest about one’s 
views; by not disclosing my views, it would have felt dishonest and may have become a 
distraction from the soliciting participants’ views. Participants appreciated that I agreed with 
them and that they did not need to justify their view to me. Many were able to express concerns 
about AD, not just full unfettered support, and I also shared concerns with them. 
  
When I first started reading about AD, I was very supportive of a legislation change. The more I 
studied the issue of AD, the more complicated I realised it is in practice. While other values are 
also part of this position, at a fundamental level, I believe in autonomy (unless causing harm to 
others). I want people who want the option to hasten their death to have that choice available to 
them because I believe we should be able to decide what we do with our lives and bodies. I do 
not think there is anything inherently immoral with wanting to relieve suffering by hastening 
death for those who are already approaching death. I am motivated by compassion and social 
justice. 
  
My views on access to AD are that it should only be made available to people who have freely 
made this decision, have access to, or at least offered, the option of care that meets their needs, 
and who have a sustained wish to hasten their death. An AD system also needs to be able to 
ensure that coercion or implicit pressure, lack of choice or support are not the reasons for seeking 
AD. My position is informed by the jurisdictions that have created sufficient safeguards. For 
example, Oregon and the Netherlands have demonstrated no ‘vulnerable’ groups are 
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overrepresented in those who access AD (Battin, van der Heide, Ganzini, & van der Wal, 2007). 
Major reviews conclude there is “no widespread spread abuse” of AD (E. J. Emanuel, 
Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Urwin, & Cohen, 2016, p. 88) or negative impacts on ‘vulnerable’ 
populations (Battin et al., 2007).4 If anything, AD may exacerbate the gap between those who 
have access to care and those who do not. I can understand health professionals’ reluctance to be 
responsible for detecting coercion, and to become arbitrators of who is and is not a candidate for 
AD. At a minimum, an AD system requires medical expertise to attest to someone’s health status 
as terminal. 
  
This study is not just about me and what I think, its aim was to learn about the perspectives of 
people who are diagnosed as approaching the end of their life. I approached this issue as a naïve 
enquirer and my interest in AD is theoretical or academic rather than pragmatic as it was for 
participants. I was mindful of my excellent health status in trying to gather and understand the 
experiences of dying people. I am, however, trained to listen and to be open to others’ 
experiences. I argue that healthy people are in less of a position to know how they feel about AD 
until they are faced with their own mortality. Healthy adults speaking on the issue of AD are 
coming from a position of ‘health privilege’. Privilege is an invisible system that confers 
dominance of one group over others (P. McIntosh, 1988). I return to this idea in the discussion 
chapter. 
 
Definitions and Terminology 
Terminology in this field, and the important practical and philosophical differences between 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, are often misunderstood or the subject of disagreement 
(Macleod, Wilson, & Malpas, 2012). Meanings of and preferences for the terms used are affected 
by culture and beliefs. Much of the theorising around definitions is about differentiating or 
distancing the acts of euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide and suicide from each other for 
philosophical or political reasons (N. Richards, 2017b). Therefore, it is important to articulate 
my choice of terms and their meanings. This section will describe the various terminology used 
 
4 For a critique of the Battin et al. study, see Finlay and George (2011). 
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in this area and justify the adoption of particular terms over others, namely the use of the term 
‘assisted dying’ (AD). I briefly distinguish AD from other end-of-life practices to ensure clarity 
over what is and is not AD. 
  
There are a range of terms for describing the act of choosing to hasten death including some 
enshrined in legislation which permit AD: Death with Dignity, Aid in Dying (USA); Medical 
Assistance in Dying (Canada); Voluntary Assisted Dying (Victoria, Western Australia, 
Australia). Other terminology includes facilitated aid in dying and administered aid in dying 
(Gavaghan & King, 2016), requested death (McInerney, 2000), self-euthanasia (Weaver, 2014), 
elective death (Prado, 2003), self-chosen death (van Wijngaarden, Leget, & Goossensen, 2016), 
and medically-procured death (ten Have & Welie, 2005). This is by no means an exhaustive list. 
The root of the word euthanasia comes from ‘eu’ meaning good and ‘than’ meaning death (Van 
Hooff, 2004). For some people euthanasia means dying with dignity and represents a 
compassionate act whereas others see it as killing on request. The European Association for 
Palliative Care Ethics Task Force recommended adopting the following terms and definitions: 
Euthanasia is killing on request and is defined as: A doctor intentionally 
killing a person by the administration of drugs, at that person’s voluntary and 
competent request. Physician-assisted suicide is defined as: A doctor 
intentionally helping a person to commit suicide by providing drugs for self-
administration, at that person’s voluntary and competent request (Materstvedt 
et al., 2003, p. 98). 
The distinction pertains to whether the lethal dose is self-administered or if it requires the drugs 
to be administered by someone else, usually a health professional. Both actions differ from 
allowing someone to die because they cause death. 
 
In contrast to the European Association for Palliative Care’s recommended terms, although I 
agree with the general definitions whilst objecting to the term ‘killing’, I adopt the term ‘assisted 
dying’. I occasionally use euthanasia to refer to the specific act of a health professional 
administering a drug to bring about death. I use AD as a generic term to encompass euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide for several reasons. First, to emphasise that the people with a life-
limiting illness, such as the participants in this study, are already known to have a life-limiting 
condition with a prognosis of less than one year as opposed to choosing to die, as is often 
inferred from the term suicide. Most importantly, as will be discussed in Chapters Four – Six, the 
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term AD appeals because almost all participants in the present study rejected the idea that what 
they wanted was suicide. As Goldney (2012, p. 186) states, “although ‘suicide’ may be 
etymologically strictly correct, it hardly conveys the usual situation in which death occurs in 
those who die by suicide, particularly in relation to the almost invariable presence of psychiatric 
illness”. The American Association of Suicidology (2017) affirmed that the death by aid-in-
dying is distinct from suicide. In order to differentiate suicide from aid-in-dying for people with 
terminal illness from people with mental illness, Pearlman et al. (2005) suggest using the term 
hastened death. I agree with this term conceptually and it is a synonym for what I am discussing, 
but hastened death is not a widely recognised term nor immediately comprehendible. Second, 
AD is commensurate with the language used in some literature (Goldney, 2012; Hendry et al., 
2013) and in the End of Life Choice Bill and Act. Third, as opposed to physician-assisted dying, 
AD keeps the focus on the person rather than the physician. As well, AD is a more inclusive term 
because nurse practitioners are able to participate under the End of Life Choice Act. Fourth, the 
general term AD is accurate because both euthanasia and a self-administered death are permitted 
by the Act. Fifth, it is more morally neutral. In a study on attitudes towards euthanasia in 
advanced cancer patients, Johansen, Hølen, Kaasa, Loge, and Materstvedt (2005) avoided using 
terms such as ‘suicide’ and ‘kill’ because they are morally contestable and can invoke negative 
associations for patients. I have tried to adopt the language participants preferred to use in their 
interviews. 
  
It is important to note that in ANZ it is legal to allow death to occur (or hasten death, depending 
on one’s view). The right to refuse to undergo medical treatment under any circumstances is 
ordained in section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990), even if it is thought that the 
treatment would prolong life. Other legal options (of last resort) include voluntary stopping 
eating and drinking (VSED) and suicide but these are not easily attainable. VSED often requires 
palliation and burdens the dying person with the act of a slow death (LiPuma & DeMarco, 2016). 
This is distinct from the cessation of eating and drinking that can naturally happen at the end of 
life as the body begins to shut down (Zitter, 2017). 
  
Other distinctions between end-of-life practices, although contested, are active and passive 
euthanasia; palliative sedation and slow or indirect euthanasia; voluntary, involuntary and non-
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voluntary euthanasia; rational and irrational suicide. I discuss each of these in turn. As defined as 
above, active euthanasia is when a patient is given a lethal injection whereas passive euthanasia 
is defined by the withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment with the intention of hastening death 
because dying sooner rather than later is in the person’s best interests (Garrard & Wilkinson, 
2005; Rachels, 1975). The European Association for Palliative Care argued that passive 
euthanasia is an unhelpful and contradictory term because it does not specifically cause death 
(Materstvedt et al., 2003). Clinicians state that withdrawing medical intervention allows the 
person to die from their underlying disease process (Gillett, 2017). It is the intention to hasten 
death that separates some withdrawal of medical intervention from other interventions (Garrard 
& Wilkinson, 2005). 
  
This brings us to the principle, rule or doctrine of double effect (DDE). The DDE is credited to 
Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274) and is applied to war, abortion and murder (McIntyre, 2019). 
According to Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics, the criteria for the 
doctrine are as follows: 
1. The nature of the act. The act must be at least morally neutral (independent 
of its consequences). 
2. The agent’s intention. The agent intends only the good effect. The bad 
effect can be foreseen, tolerated, and permitted, but it must not be intended. 
3. The distinction between the means and effect. The bad effect must not be a 
means to the good effect. If the good effect were the direct causal result of 
the bad effect, the agent would intend the bad effect in pursuit of the good 
effect. 
4. Proportionality between the good effect and the bad effect. The good effect 
must outweigh the bad effect. That is, the bad effect is permissible if a 
proportionate reason compensates for permitting the foreseen bad effect. 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p. 129). 
In medical ethics, the DDE is most relevant at the end of life during palliative sedation. The 
DDE relies on the intention of the doctor in the administration of potentially life-shortening 
medication. Palliative sedation involves the titration of medications to reduce consciousness to 
relieve intractable suffering at the end of life in a manner ethically acceptable to patients, their 
families and healthcare providers (Cherny & Radbruch, 2009). Palliative sedation has been 
labelled slow or indirect euthanasia by some (Billings & Block, 1996; Humphry, 2002; Orfali, 
2011). The disagreement over palliative sedation as euthanasia rests on the doctrine. Medical 
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associations assert that “it is permissible, at least in some cases, to withhold treatment and allow 
a patient to die, but it is never permissible to take a direct action designed to kill the patient” 
(Rachels, 1975, p. 75). Research shows the DDE can be used by doctors to hasten death (C. 
Douglas, 2009; C. Douglas, Kerridge, & Ankeny, 2008; Kuhse, Singer, Baume, Clark, & 
Rickard, 1997; Malpas, Mitchell, & Koschwanez, 2015; Miccinesi et al., 2005; Mitchell & 
Owens, 2003, 2004; Neil, Coady, Thompson, & Kuhse, 2007; Seale, 2006; Trankle, 2014). The 
DDE will be discussed in Chapter Six. It is recognised that some general practitioners (GPs) and 
other health professionals draw on the ethical principle of double effect in their care for palliative 
patients by supplying or administering drugs explicitly for the purpose of relieving suffering, that 
has the unintentional (but known) effect of hastening death (Malpas et al., 2015).5 Of the ANZ 
GPs who responded to international standardised surveys (Malpas et al., 2015; Mitchell & 
Owens, 2003, 2004) between 4.5% and 5.6% (and nurses under their instruction) are 
intentionally hastening death regardless of the legality.6,7 
  
Euthanasia can be further distinguished as voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary 
euthanasia is when the competent person has made a voluntary request to die; non-voluntary 
euthanasia is when the person is unable to make their wishes known, due to for example being in 
a coma; involuntary euthanasia is when the patient is competent but their views are disregarded 
(Garrard & Wilkinson, 2005). These distinctions have been critiqued as ambiguous because non- 
and involuntary euthanasia is essentially medicalised murder when there is no consent (see also 
Garrard & Wilkinson, 2005; Materstvedt et al., 2003). 
  
Another distinction in the AD field is whether a competent person who makes a decision to die 
can be considered rational or irrational (Cowart, 1995; Werth, 1999). Rational suicide refers to 
“ending one's own life for considered reasons, as opposed to emotional or psychological ones” 
 
5 Gavaghan and King (2016) argued that in some circumstances the provision of AD can meet the criteria of the 
DDE. 
6 These findings should be interpreted alongside research that suggests one third of ANZ doctors may not answer 
AD research honestly due to perceived legal implications, professional disapproval, and suspicion about the intent of 
the research (Merry et al., 2013). 
7 Similarly, some family members are willing to break the law, which has been termed altruistic offending (Feigin, 
Owens, & Goodyear-Smith, 2017). 
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(Humphry, 2002, p. 178).8 If life is deemed to lack purpose and meaning, and the decision to die 
aligns with one’s values then it can be considered rational (Battin, 1999 cited in N. Richards, 
2017b). This idea will be discussed in the following analysis chapters. Regardless of the 
phenomena that rational suicide is describing, N. Richards (2017b) points out that the binary 
between rational and emotional is incorrect and inadequately describes decision-making. Right-
to-die movements distance themselves from old age rational suicide for political expediency 
because the decision to die is more morally acceptable if the person is already dying (N. 
Richards, 2017b). It is estimated that 5-8% of all suicides in ANZ between 1950 and 2000 were 
by people with terminal or irremediable illness (Weaver, 2014). This estimate did not include 
“people who evaluated their physical quality of life as severely diminished as a result of a 
degenerative disease, stroke, emphysema, or spinal accident” (Weaver, 2014, p. 104). A more 
recent study found 10% of suicides among older New Zealanders were by those with terminal 
cancer (Cheung, Douwes, & Sundram, 2017). This cohort were less likely have a depression 
diagnosis or contact with a mental health service than non-cancer suicides. The authors 
concluded their motives were suggestive of rational suicide rather than underdiagnosed 
depression.  
  
Some health professionals and commentators have argued that involving health professionals is 
unnecessary because people can complete suicide themselves (e.g. Malpas & Mitchell, 2017; 
McBride, 2017). Suicide may be impractical for those nearing the end of life who do not have 
the means or physical capacity necessary to be effective. Further harm can result from a failed 
 
8 Werth (1999, p. 5) proposed the following criteria for rational suicide: 
The person considering suicide has an unremitting “hopeless” condition. Hopeless conditions include, but are not 
necessarily limited to, terminal illnesses, severe physical or psychological pain, physically or mentally debilitating 
or deteriorating conditions, or a quality of life no longer acceptable to the individual.  
1.  The person makes the decision as a free choice (i.e., is not pressured by others to choose suicide).   
2.  The person has engaged in a sound decision‐making process. This process should include the following: 
a.   Consultation with a mental health professional who can make an assessment of mental 
competence (which would include the absence of treatable major depression); 
b.  Nonimpulsive consideration of all alternatives;   
c.   Consideration of the congruence of the act with one’s personal values;   
d.  Consideration of the impact on significant others;   




attempt. In order to avoid implicating family, suicide must be carried out alone and often, in 
secret. It can come as a shocking surprise for those who find the dead person as well as for the 
family left dealing with a suicide (Gemmell, 2017). 
  
In sum, the language around euthanasia and AD is loaded and carries moral implications, hence 
the need to reduce ambiguity by defining key terms. I have chosen to use the term of AD. It is 
important to distinguish AD from other legal and non-legal acts and from suicide, although 
debate over these distinctions continues. 
  
Contextualising the research 
In this section I outline the recent legislative history of AD in ANZ and the research conducted 
to date. As well I provide a brief overview of the international contexts where some form of AD 
is legal and the socio-political ideologies that inform AD, namely neoliberalism and 
individualism. 
  
Recent History and Future of Assisted Dying in Aotearoa New Zealand  
From 2015 there was Member of Parliament (MP) David Seymour’s (ACT Party) Members’ bill 
in the ballot. The End of Life Choice Bill (selected in 2017) was a piece of draft legislation that 
would allow people with a terminal illness and less than six months to live or people with a 
‘grievous and irremediable medical condition’9 the option of requesting a lethal medication to 
end their life.10 The draft Bill defined a person eligible for AD as someone who: 
• is aged 18 years or over; and 
• has New Zealand citizenship or is a permanent resident; 
suffers from: 
• a terminal illness likely to end their life within 6 months or has a 
grievous and irremediable medical condition; and 
• is in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability; and 
 
9 The term grievous and irremediable was adopted from the Canadian legislation referring to a serious illness, 
disease or disability (Government of Canada, 2019). It was removed through a supplementary order paper 259 from 
the Bill’s sponsor David Seymour, as discussed on p.15. 
10 The Bill and the Act do not allow AD to be requested through advance directive unlike a previous bill in the 
ballot. 
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• experiences unbearable suffering that cannot be relieved in a manner that he 
or 
she considers tolerable; and 
• has the ability to understand the nature and consequences of assisted dying 
(End of Life Choice Bill, 2017, pp. 3-4). 
 
The Bill presented an opportunity to conduct research that would inform the public debate on 
AD with research about why people would consider hastening their own death. Therefore, I set 
out to interview people who would be eligible for the End of Life Choice Bill. 
  
In addition, the two widely publicised cases of young women with aggressive brain cancers, 
Brittany Maynard in California who moved to Oregon to have an assisted death in 2014 (Bever, 
2014) and Lecretia Seales in ANZ in 2015 (Macfie, 2015; Vickers, 2016), piqued my interest in 
how the issues around AD were being discussed. I was curious about who was being portrayed 
as having power and agency over individuals’ bodies. 
 
Seales took her case to the High Court to test two claims (Vickers, 2016; Seales v Attorney-
General, 2015). The first related to the Crimes Act (1961) and the application of culpable 
homicide (s 160(2)(a)) (where a drug is administered by a doctor) and aiding/abetting the 
commission of suicide (s 179(1)(b)) (where a drug is prescribed but taken by the patient); and the 
second, to her right to life under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990). Seales’ case 
claimed that, when interpreted correctly, AD was not prohibited under the Crimes Act. Her 
lawyers argued that there was no definition of suicide in the Crimes Act and that what she 
wanted (assistance to die) was not suicide and therefore her doctor would not be breaking any 
laws. In relation to culpable homicide, her lawyers argued that administering AD was not an 
unlawful act because her doctor’s intention was to relieve suffering, not to take a life. As to the 
second part of the case, Seales argued that, if the Court considered that AD was prohibited under 
the Crimes Act, such a prohibition infringed on her right to life under the Bill of Rights because 
she would be forced to take her own life sooner while she still had the physical capacity and 
having an assisted death available to her would allow her to live longer. Seales’ lawyers also 
argued she had the right not to be subject to cruel, degrading treatments which the lack of AD 
laws essentially forced on her. In terms of relief, Seales sought a declaration from the court that 
her doctor would not be prosecuted under the Crimes Act, or, in the alternative, a declaration that 
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the Crimes Act would be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act. Unlike Carter v Canada (2015) 
which tested a similar case under their Charter of Rights and Freedoms,11 Seales’ case was 
unsuccessful. Justice Collins concluded that AD was unlawful under the Crimes Act, rejecting 
Seale's lawyers’ interpretation. In relation to the second argument, while he noted that Seales’ 
right to life was engaged, he ultimately concluded there was no breach of the Bill of Rights 
(looking at the original intent of the Crimes Act provisions and whether the prohibitions were 
overly broad). He ruled it was for Parliament to pass legislation amending the Crimes Act. 
Nevertheless, Justice Collins made two critical finding after hearing evidence from both sides, 
including from experts. First, he found that the current state of the law causes a small number of 
terminally ill patients to suffer unbearably despite the best available palliative care. Second, he 
found that, to avoid this suffering, some patients take their lives earlier than they might otherwise 
have, had AD been available to them. Justice Collins also concluded claims of AD exposing 
vulnerable people to harm were unsubstantiated and that Lecretia's wish for AD was a rational 
and intellectually rigorous response to her circumstances. 
  
David Seymour’s End of Life Choice Bill was drawn from the ballot in June, 2017. I had just 
commenced data collection and conducted two interviews when the first reading of the End of 
Life Choice Bill took place, passing 76-44 votes in December 2017 (Ministry of Justice, 2019b). 
The question of whether or not legalisation would pass formed a backdrop for the interviews. It 
was discussed by participants and thus, in the chapters that follow. At the time, this was the 
furthest an AD bill had ever progressed in Parliament. There were three previous unsuccessful 
attempts, all through private Members’ bills: in 1995, the ‘Death with Dignity’ Bill (MP Michael 
Laws, National Party) was voted down 61–29; in 2003 another ‘Death with Dignity’ Bill (MP 
Peter Brown, NZ First) failed by 60–58 votes; in 2012 a third bill (MP Maryan Street, Labour), 
‘End of Life Choice’ Bill was in the ballot but withdrawn in 2013 for strategic reasons (Bellamy 
& MacBean, 2019).  
  
After passing the first reading of the End of Life Choice Bill, written and oral public submissions 
were called for. The Justice Committee received 39,159 submissions from groups and 
individuals and heard oral submissions from 1,350 people (77 organisations and 1,273 
 
11 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
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individuals) (Ministry of Justice, 2019b). Hearings for the End of Life Choice Bill were held 
around the country with sub-committees and, where possible, live-streamed to the Committee’s 
Facebook page. The number of submissions broke the previous record which was to the Health 
Select Committee, also on the public attitudes towards the introduction of legislation which 
would permit medically-assisted dying in the event of a terminal illness or an irreversible 
condition which makes life unbearable (Health Committee, 2017). The Health Committee 
enquiry was in response to a petition signed by almost 9000 New Zealanders in 2015 (Health 
Committee, 2017). Anti-euthanasia lobby group the Care Alliance analysed both sets of 
submissions and found 77% and 90% were opposed respectively (Care Alliance, 2019b). This is 
diametrically opposed to the public attitudes of whom on average 68.3% support legalisation 
(range 63-82%), while 15.7% (range 5–25%) are neutral or unsure and 14.9% (range 12–24%) 
oppose legalisation (Young et al., 2019).  
  
Strong opposition to AD and the End of Life Choice Bill came from professional medical bodies 
and related organisations such as the Care Alliance, ‘a coalition to oppose euthanasia and 
assisted suicide’ (Care Alliance, 2019a). In ANZ, the general and speciality medical associations 
reject AD as unethical (Australian & New Zealand Society of Palliative Medicine, 2017; New 
Zealand Medical Association, 2018; Palliative Care Nurses New Zealand, 2012), except for the 
Royal New Zealand College of General Practitioners (2018) and the New Zealand Nurses 
Organisation (2018) which took a neutral position on the End of Life Choice Bill to reflect the 
diversity of members’ views. The ‘official’ position of medicine in ANZ has been portrayed as 
vehemently opposed (Doctors Say No, 2019; New Zealand Medical Association, 2018), despite 
Doctors Say No only representing 9% of all registered doctors. Although some individual 
healthcare professionals do support the practice: doctors (37%), GPs (46%), geriatricians (24%), 
palliative care (7-9% depending on administration method) and the outlier, nurses (67%) (Havill, 
2015; Munday & Poon, 2020; Oliver, Wilson, & Malpas, 2017; Sheahan, 2016; Taylor, 2015; 
Young et al., 2019).12 
 
12 In terms of a functioning system of AD that relies on doctors’ participation, 12% of Australasian geriatricians 
would be willing to prescribe to an appropriate patient (Munday & Poon, 2020) and 2% of Australasian palliative 
care doctors would participate in euthanasia and 4.5% in AD (Sheahan, 2016). In a literature review, Young et al. 
(2019) calculated (and confirmed with authors) that of the total sample of ANZ doctors (n = 298), 34.5% would be 
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However, much of the debate overlooked those people directly affected by the Bill—those at the 
end of life or with a grievous and irremediable medical condition. The disability community was 
represented in the media by the Disability Rights Commissioner, Paula Tesoriero, as strongly 
opposed to the Bill (New Zealand Human Rights Commission, 2019; see also Not Dead Yet 
Aotearoa, n.d.).13 No such organisation apart from the End-of-Life Choice Society spoke 
publicly on behalf of people at the end of life (End-of-Life-Choice Society of New Zealand, 
2017). In their submission they advocated for a broader Bill to meet the needs of all people at the 
end of life by including provisions for assisted dying to be consented to by advance directive and 
for people with dementia (who cannot consent at the time of administration) to access assisted 
dying. 
  
After a 16-month consultation process, the Justice Select Committee could not come to a shared 
position on the proposed Bill and did not recommend any substantial changes. The Committee’s 
report noted on issues that are conscience votes, previous “committees have recommended 
amendments that left the policy content of the Bill largely intact” (Ministry of Justice, 2019b, p. 
1). The Justice Committee suggested minor, technical, and consequential amendments only. 
Instead, Seymour and his political staffer Brooke van Velden recommended significant changes 
to the Bill in a supplementary order paper (House of Representatives, 2019a) which passed in 
late 2019 between the second and third readings in the Committee of the Whole House. The 
major amendments were: restricting AD to people with a terminal illness (6 months prognosis) 
only; including explicit declarations that a person is not eligible based on age, disability or 
mental illness alone; incorporating a new ‘gag clause’ (Moore, Hempton, & Kendal, 2020) that a 
health professional cannot initiate a conversation about AD; adopting a definition of competence 
(use, weigh up and retain information); including a clause that if coercion is suspected the health 
practitioners must stop the process; and further defined the medical practitioners’ right to refuse 
to participate in the process for conscience reasons (see also D. Seymour, 2018). 
 
willing to prescribe the lethal medication, and 28.5% would administer the medication if it was legal to do so (Oliver 
et al., 2017). 
13 Her position then was criticised by an MP, who is the father of an intellectually disabled man, on the grounds that 
“You have to be careful - because it’s almost like you’re saying, ‘Leave disabled people over here, because they’re 
not capable of the same... mental capability’” (McCulloch, 2018).  
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In November 2019, the third reading took place where the End of Life Choice Bill passed 69-51 
and became the End of Life Choice Act (New Zealand Parliament, 2019). The New Zealand First 
Party’s nine MPs agreed to bloc vote for the Bill, but only if it contained a provision requiring 
that a majority of the public approve the Act at a referendum before coming into force. At the 
time of writing, there is an outstanding public binding referendum to take place at the 2020 
election. It will ask the question “Do you support the End of Life Choice Act 2019 coming into 
force?” to which citizens can vote yes or no (or abstain) (House of Representatives, 2019b). 
  
The future of AD in ANZ is contingent on the referendum passing by 50% or more at the 2020 
general election. Recent polling suggests the population still supportive (1 News, 2020) while the 
medical professional bodies remain against (Morning Report, 2019a) and show increasing 
numbers joining the anti-AD group ‘Doctors Say No’ (Doctors Say No, 2019). Given this 
context, I have called for the importance of balanced information to communicate to the public 
the complexity of the legislation (Jancic, 2019). The Justice Committee is providing information 
for voters ahead of the election to ensure the choices are understood (New Zealand Government, 
2019). 
  
The potential legislative change means that research exploring terminally ill New Zealander’s 
desire for AD is timely. However, there is a paucity of research with New Zealander’s 
approaching the end of life (Young et al., 2019) who are the potential candidates of the End of 
Life Choice Act.  
  
Assisted Dying Around the World 
Through social media, there has been a global spread of ideas and rhetoric both supporting and 
opposing legalisation of AD. This speaks to the internationalised nature of the debate. 
AD is increasingly being legalised around the world; although instances of uptake relatively 
remain rare and primarily involve patients with cancer (E. J. Emanuel et al., 2016). There are 
various models of legalisation under specific circumstances around the world. AD policy is 
centred around the idea of relieving unbearable suffering through the involvement of doctors and 
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life-ending medication (End of Life Choice Act, 2019; Dees, Vernooij-Dassen, Dekkers, Vissers, 
& van Weel, 2011; Government of Canada, 2019; Karsoho, Fishman, Wright, & Macdonald, 
2016; Ruijs, Kerkhof, van der Wal, & Onwuteaka-Philipsen, 2012; Van Tol, Rietjens, & van der 
Heide, 2012). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to outline the nuances of eligibility and 
safeguards around the world. Briefly, at the time of writing, some form of AD is permitted in 
Netherlands; Belgium; Luxembourg; Canada; Columbia; Oregon, Washington, Vermont, 
California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawai’i, Maine and New Jersey, USA; Victoria and 
Western Australia, Australia (Dyer, White, & García Rada, 2015; E. J. Emanuel et al., 2016). 
Assisting suicide is decriminalised in Switzerland.14 Switzerland is well-known for suicide 
tourism (N. Richards, 2017a) including three New Zealanders between 1998-2018 (Dignitas, 
2019). 
  
Data from jurisdictions with AD suggests that between 74-87% of people who died by AD were 
receiving hospice or palliative care services as well (E. J. Emanuel et al., 2016). The most 
comprehensive data on why people seek AD has been collected in Oregon. The reasons recorded 
(by health professionals and for successful applicants only) for seeking AD are concerns about 
loss of autonomy (91%), reduced ability to participate in activities that make life meaningful 
(89%), loss of dignity (74%), being a burden on others (45%), loss of bodily functions (44%), 
anticipated or inadequate pain control (26%), and financial implications of treatment (4%) 
(Oregon Public Health Division, 2019; see also Wiebe, Shaw, Green, Trouton, & Kelly, 2018). 
  
Socio-Political Landscape 
The aforementioned examples of legislation are each situated within a particular socio-political 
context and are informed by ideology. The present research does not exist within a cultural 
vacuum either; it is situated within a ‘Western’ worldview and I am also influenced by the 
prevailing attitudes and norms. This subsection outlines some of the key ideas and changes that 
serve as a background to this research. In particular, it describes the two primary ideologies 
informing AD: neoliberalism and individualism. To understand the current context, it is 
 
14 A death must be reported to the police and investigated, and if the investigation finds the assistance to die was not 
given ‘for selfish reasons’ then it is considered legal (Dyer et al., 2015). 
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important to understand the genealogy of the current episteme, to use Foucault’s terms 
(O'Farrell, 2005). 
  
The Enlightenment thinkers constructed an individual’s ability to reason as the basis for 
individual freedom. Ideologies supporting individualism arose as a critique of feudal societies 
and oppressive governments (Spicker, 2013). Individualism bestowed inalienable individual15 
rights to life, liberty and property, independent from government or authority (Harvey, 2005; 
Steger & Roy, 2010). According to Spicker, individualism presupposes individuals are 
independent and self-determining, and have rights by virtue of being human to be treated as 
such. In turn, rights create the possibility for challenges to the state. Individuals, according to 
individualism, are in the best position to decide what is best for them; this is the self-interest 
thesis. Collectivist critiques of individualism argue that it creates competition which undermines 
communal bonds and solidarity, and fosters self-interest at the expense of care for the vulnerable 
in society (Marshall, 1998). The critiques are a comment on the unfettered pursuit of self-
interest. Classical liberalism rose alongside Enlightenment thinking and later developed into 
neoliberalism in the 1980s in the West (Steger & Roy, 2010). 
  
Neoliberalism escalated the long-standing commitment to individualism. Neoliberalism is both a 
political-cultural-economic project and a form of governmentality (Guthman & DuPuis, 2006). 
Neoliberalism refers to the discursive rationality where individuals are responsiblised and 
become self-governing by avoiding risk, balancing self-control and the exercising of choice in 
the free market (Cairns, 2013; Cairns & Johnston, 2015; see also Trnka & Trundle, 2014). 
Simultaneously, the state’s responsibility is minimised, framing structural problems as individual 
problems (Cairns, 2013; Cairns & Johnston, 2015). Commentators suggest ANZ adopted 
neoliberalism quickly and unreservedly in a way that was unique (see for example Kelsey, 1995). 
Under neoliberal policies, people are treated as isolated individuals (Steger & Roy, 2010). 
Neoliberal ideology values individualism, empowerment of self and, as an expression of 
autonomy, personal responsibility and choice (McNay, 2009; Steger & Roy, 2010). As Harvey 
(2005, p. 176) writes, “undoubtedly, the neoliberal insistence upon the individual as the 
foundational element in political-economic life opens the door to individual rights activism”. 
 
15 Although these rights only applied to men for a long time. 
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However, rights must be granted by the state (Harvey, 2005). While religious interpretations 
frame AD as sin, Nettleton (2013, p. 95) points out that “euthanasia is not so much a sin as a 
crime against the state”. One of the tensions that frames my own research is between the 
neoliberal state and individuals over the right to die. Chapter Five explores and applies these two 
ideologies in more depth. 
 
Thesis Structure 
Chapter One introduces the topic and guiding research questions. Here I discuss my own 
relationship to assisted dying. Key terms are defined. I describe and situate the research in recent 
ANZ history, the international and socio-political contexts.  
 
In Chapter Two I provide a rationale for my research on the WTHD in ANZ and describe the 
conceptual framework used for this research. It is primarily based around bringing together the 
sociology of death and dying and the WTHD literatures. Chapter Three details the methodology 
and discusses my position on AD. I cover the ontological, epistemological and methodological 
assumptions of this research and detail how I collected the data in an ethical manner and describe 
the participants I interviewed. I also outline the theoretical toolkit I am using to analyse the data, 
namely discourse analysis and assemblage theory.  
  
In terms of the answering the research questions, each analysis chapter (four – six) examines the 
objects of analysis, the WTHD and AD, from multiple angles. These chapters bring together both 
the individual meanings (micro-level) of AD to participants and the socio-cultural values (macro-
level) to explore how participants used these to explain their reasons for wanting AD. These 
chapters report on participants’ views as well as my own analysis. I present the findings and a 
discussion together in each analysis chapter.  
 
In Chapter Four, I draw on assemblage theory to look at some of the comprising elements of 
medicalised dying. While there is a movement to de-medicalise dying, I demonstrate how 
participants used their agency to re-medicalise dying to their own advantage. Continuing with the 
theme of agency, in Chapter Five I explore the aporia of individual agency and social control and 
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apply concepts of biopower, freedom and technologies of the self to illustrate the paradoxes 
inherent within AD. I argue that although legalised AD is more highly regulated and monitored, 
minimising freedom, there is still some freedom for the dying person to choose how to ethically 
make the self. Another way participants enacted ethical subjectivities was to subvert discourses 
to reflect their socio-cultural value systems. Chapter Six looks at the normative discourses that 
surround AD and illustrates how participants contested normative ideas about death and dying. I 
argue that participants sought to expand normative dying to include AD by engaging with the 
dominant discourses and putting forward counter discourses. 
  
The discussion (Chapter Seven) pulls the threads of the previous analyses together around the 
themes of power, agency and contradictions. Epistemic injustice and un/certainty are two further 
themes that are discussed. I argue AD is an agentic choice that is limited by the power structures, 
in particular by the institution of medicine’s rejection of AD as a legitimate option at the end of 
life. I revisit assemblage theory and depict some of the key elements of an assemblage of AD as 
it presently formed and compare it to the WTHD models. Here, I also discuss my reflexivity 
about the research and the strengths and limitations of the project.  
 
In the final chapter I recap the thesis and draw together the key original conceptual, empirical, 
methodological, theoretical and philosophical contributions. Here I suggest future research 
avenues. The thesis concludes that the wish to have the option of AD can be understood in a 
more nuanced way, by thinking of AD as a reflection of societal changes relating to the 
individual, medicine, morality, as well as changing understandings about what is a good life, 
what makes a good death and the important experience in between, and what is undesirable 
dying in late modern16 society. 
 
 
16 Late and post-modernity refer to the social condition where mass culture, corporate capitalism and consumerism 
are dominant; the privileged Enlightenment objectives (such as Truth, Justice, Reason and Equality) dissolve or are 
rendered irrelevant; and new technological transformations pervade daily life (Elliott, 2001). A dislocated, de-
centred, contradictory, fluid self with no essential core emerges that is fragmented across different contexts and 
technologies (Elliott, 2001). 
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Conclusion 
It appears the acceptability of AD is increasing as jurisdictions around the world pass legislation; 
as evidenced locally where attitudes have been stable over the last 20 years (Young et al., 2019) 
and the passage of End of Life Choice Act (subject to a public referendum). However, no WTHD 
death studies have been conducted in ANZ and one of the effects is that the views of people 
approaching the end of life with a WTHD are missing from the debate on AD. Research that 
explores New Zealander’s explanations and motivations for considering an assisted death, is 
necessary to shed light on our unique local context and inform societal and political debate. 
 
This chapter described the study aims and research questions, and situated the present study 
within the local, international and socio-political contexts. I also situated myself in relation to the 
subject and described the terminology adopted in this research. The next chapter describes the 





Chapter Two: Literature Review   
 
This chapter outlines the conceptual framework: the sociological concepts of structure and 
agency, the sociology of death and dying and the WTHD literatures. I delve into the literatures 
that I research draw upon and focus on changes in approaches to death and dying, primarily 
related to the developments in medicine. These include the relatively new branch of palliative 
care, evolving ideas of the ‘good death’ and patient autonomy. I argue these changes have 
culminated in the demand for AD. I review the previous ANZ research on AD, demonstrating 
gaps and the need for research with people approaching the end of life which the present research 
contributes to. Then I describe and situate this research within the WTHD literature. Lastly, I 
discuss the three key theoretics for this thesis: medicalisation, control and discourse and how 
relate these to the WTHD. Other theoretical resources are discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
This research is situated broadly in the sociology of death and dying, and informed by the 
WTHD literature. Underpinning the conceptual framework are the foundational concepts of 
structure and agency. My conceptual framework coheres around three key theoretics for this 
research: medicalisation, control and discourse. The conceptual framework serves the overall 
purpose of understanding the perspectives of those New Zealanders approaching the end of life 
who want or who would consider choosing an assisted death if it were available; as well it serves 
to contextualise their reasons for considering AD. The conceptual framework informs the 
analytic framework (Rallis & Rossman, 2012). The analytic framework, discourse analysis and 
assemblage analysis, will be discussed in the following Methodology chapter. This structure 
reflects a pragmatic decision to provide the necessary framing for each chapter. The sociological 
theoretics of biopower, technologies of the self/ethopolitics, freedom, rarefaction, exclusion and 
games of truth also inform the analytic framework and direction for this inquiry. These theoretics 
will be explained in the chapter they pertain to.  
  
Here my purpose is to frame the analyses and discussion in the subsequent chapters. I begin by 
outlining structure and agency. I then move to describe changes in death and dying. Changes 
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primarily related to developments in the practice of medicine; notably informing the patient that 
they are dying so they can move towards the normative goal of accepting death and die a good 
death, and the emergence of hospice and palliative care and patient autonomy. I then follow with 
a discussion of the sociological literature on AD before moving to the WTHD literature. Finally, 
I discuss the three theoretics and their relationships to AD and the WTHD. By reviewing these 
literatures, I establish the rationale for the approach taken in this research. 
  
Structure and Agency 
Structure and agency are at the foundation of this thesis and the sociological study of death and 
dying (Howarth, 2007). “Agency refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to 
their capability of those things in the first place (which is why agency implies power)” (Giddens, 
1984, p. 9). Giddens defined structure as organised sets of rules and resources drawn on and 
reconstituted in interactions. Structure is simultaneously enabling and constraining, providing the 
basis of action and delimiting the possibilities of it. A core question for sociology is to what 
extent do individuals have agency and control over their lives or are they constrained by society? 
The answer is both, they are dialectical and neither structure nor agency can be considered 
without the other (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). 
  
Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory moves beyond a dualist position to hold both social 
structure and human agency (or action) in recursive relationship to each other in what he referred 
to as ‘a duality of structure’. That is, there is an intrinsic relationship between structure and 
agency (Giddens, 1979). The connections with Foucault’s work will be explained in the next 
chapter. There is a ‘dialectic of control’ between social systems and agents. Society is comprised 
of individuals and is continued through these individuals reproducing societal structures and 
norms; simultaneously people’s actions are enabled and constrained by societal rules that they 
reproduce (Giddens, 1979). Social practices are actively produced and reproduced by individuals 
over space and time and taken together, comprise structure, institutions and systems. Agents 
(individuals) have the possibility to, and are skilled at, reflexively monitoring their own and 
others’ conduct. By taking action, an agent is able to transform events or affairs. While 
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transformation is possible, actions are limited by the conditions of structure and what is 
sanctioned by the rules, including formalised laws and informal norms. 
  
Structuration has been critiqued for under-theorising the role of context and the emotions of 
human agents in their reflexive self-formation (Seale, 2001). Another interpretation of Giddens’ 
account of individual agency is that “what Giddens takes as a sign of reflexive agency is, in fact 
a form of social control” (Elliott, 2001, p. 41). That is to say, he attributes too much agency to 
agents. Further, individuals do not have equal access to change structure and thus some have less 
agency than others (Held & Thompson, 1989); although there are shared structures such as 
government, they act differently on individuals and thus individuals experience societal 
structures in varying ways. This point will be demonstrated in Chapter Six. 
  
Changes in Approaches to Death and Dying 
The sociology of death and dying casts health, illness and dying as social constructions rather 
than immutable facts (Howarth, 2007). Experiences of health and illness, death and dying, are 
embedded within and therefore framed by our social and cultural worlds (Seale, 1998). 
Ideological changes, along with societal changes, changes in medicine, and generational and 
demographic changes, have influenced the way we think about death and what is considered a 
good death (T. Walter, 2017). This subsection describes how death morphed from an existential 
event into a medical event and the attendant changes in the dying role (Broom, 2015). Selecting 
historical moments is somewhat artificial and involves a reconstruction, however, in order to 
understand contemporary death and dying, a brief and selected account of how it came to be is 
necessary. I discursively trace the critical junctures in history reminiscent of Foucault’s 
archaeological method, in order to write a ‘history of the present’ (O'Farrell, 2005). 
  
Generally speaking, before the advent of modern medicine, death in the West was viewed as the 
domain of God, guided by religious representatives; it was an existential event that usually took 
place in the dying person’s home surrounded by people (Ariès, 1974; T. Walter, 1994). Although 
many have critiqued Ariès as offering a romanticised view of history (e.g. T. Walter, 1994), 
reflecting on perceptions of death in ANZ, T. McIntosh (2001) argues Ariès’ work on eras of 
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death in Christian Europe still has currency. Large scale societal changes including 
secularisation, colonisation, medicalisation and the emergence of individualism took place over 
centuries and reshaped the meaning of death (Howarth, 2007; T. Walter, 1994). More recent 
family, economic and occupational changes have influenced who cares for the dying too (James 
& Field, 1992). Another major change was demographic, with increasing (but varying) life 
expectancy. Death became knowable, measurable and preventable with the advent of 
demography, public health and pathology (Howarth, 2007). Shifts from communicable to non-
communicable disease, improvements in public health and nutrition, and life-extending 
treatments have increased longevity as well as longer dying (T. Walter, 2017). Different 
generational expectations of individualism and choice, often attributed to baby boomers, have 
also contoured the culture of death and dying (T. Walter, 2017; Winnington, Holroyd, & 
Zambas, 2018). 
  
As medicine (in the broadest sense of the word including healthcare systems and provision, 
technologies and practitioners) became able to intervene in many kinds of acute deaths, 
“substituting sickness for death” (Ariès & Murchland, 1974, p. 6), there was a medicalisation of 
death and the establishment of medical authority. Doctors became the guides for end of life and 
the dying person became a patient. Dying began to be sequestered in medical institutions (Mellor 
& Shilling, 1993); this medical mode of dying still largely dominates with many people dying in 
hospitals even though dying at home is assumed to be a high priority (Gott et al., 2017).17 At the 
same time witnessing death became rarer. As medicalisation is a focus of this research, I will 
discuss it in more depth below. Developments in technologies that were kept in hospitals also 
influenced the sequestration of death to institutions (Ariès, 1974; James & Field, 1992). Seale 
(1998) noted that sequestration was functional and not psychological repression, as is proposed 
in the death taboo thesis (see also Gorer, 1965; Kellehear, 1984). The death taboo thesis posits 




17 There are also critical accounts of the idealised death at home (e.g. Gerber, Hayes, & Bryant, 2019; Hoare, Morris, 
Kelly, Kuhn, & Barclay, 2015). 
18 See Kellehear (1984); T. Walter (1991); Zimmermann (2007) for detailed critique.  
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In this context according to Walter’s (1994) trichotomy model, the individual is the authority on 
dying in late and post-modern society, first replacing religion and then medicine. The dying 
person’s self-awareness played a central role in ritual as individualism emerged from the 
Enlightenment onwards (T. Walter, 1994). From the 17th century, in contrast to the Middle Ages, 
many patients were not told they were dying which Ariès (1974) attributes to the family 
becoming involved in serious decisions. The dying person, and sometimes the family, became in 
need of protection from the truth about dying as a result of the rise of medical paternalism. Death 
awareness is the subject of the next subsection.  
 
Death underwent a ‘revival’ where individuals, both dying and bereaved, shaped the culture of 
death in late and post-modern society, in response to societal changes such as the individualism, 
rationalisation and medicalisation of death (T. Walter, 1994). Revivalist discourse enables 
bereaved individuals to reclaim membership in an imagined human community (Seale, 1998; T. 
Walter, 1994). Revivalism privileges the inner experience and individuals are encouraged to 
engage in private practices such as psychotherapy (Seale, 1998; T. Walter, 1994). In this current 
era, death is not taboo so much as impolite, embarrassing or inappropriate for public 
conversation (Elias, 2001; Kellehear, 1984; T. Walter, 1991). McNamara (2001) found a 
growing willingness in Australia to discuss death. The public debate on the End of Life Choice 
Bill would suggest the same (Jaye, Lomax-Sawyers, Young, & Egan, 2019). 
  
Some theorists argue the decline of mourning rituals and structures that render death as 
existentially meaningful are a result of societal changes such as industrialisation, the decline of 
religion and the rise of individualism in late and post-modernity (Ariès, 1974; Gorer, 1965; 
Mellor & Shilling, 1993; T. Walter, 1991). This interpretation does not take into account the 
wide variety of death rituals (Lee, 2008) including personalised post-mortem practices of ANZ 
Pākehā funerals (Schäfer, 2007), tangihanga (Māori mourning and funeral rituals) of Māori (T. 
McIntosh, 2001) and emergent AD rituals (goodbye parties).19 Generally, death and dying rituals 
 
19 Specifically in ANZ, tangihanga (Māori funeral and mourning rituals) affirm the collective identity, connect 
Māori with their ancestors and culture, and reaffirm the living (T. McIntosh, 2001). McIntosh concludes some Māori 
elements, such as having the body at home/marae (meeting place), have been incorporated into non-Māori death 
customs. Tangihanga comprise a unique death system (Kastenbaum, 1988) in which public expression of feelings is 
expected (Dancey, 1981 cited in T. McIntosh, 2001). 
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have become personalised as an expression of the self in contemporary society (Schäfer, 2007; 
Seale, 1998; T. Walter, 1994). This focus on the individual overlooks the communal aspects of 
dying (Revell-Dennett, 2018; N. Richards & Krawczyk, 2019). 
  
Death Awareness and Acceptance 
Another significant change in death and dying was related to awareness. To accept death or to 
consider hastening it, an individual must be aware that they have a limited life expectancy. The 
foundational ethnographic study of hospitals in the United States by Glaser and Strauss (1965) 
identified patients’ awareness of their impending death varied across different wards. In ‘closed 
awareness’ patients were not told by their physicians or nurses that they were dying. Staff 
members understood that the patient was dying, but cooperated with each other to maintain the 
fiction that the dying patient might recover. In a ‘mutual pretence’, everyone knows the patient is 
dying but maintains the fiction. In ‘suspicious awareness’, patients may suspect they are dying 
and seek to find out. In ‘open awareness’, patients, family members and staff all acknowledge 
the patient will not recover. Some of the contexts of awareness rely on the health professionals 
acknowledging impending death and choosing to share this information. Timmermans (1994, p. 
322) elaborated on this typology suggesting three types of open awareness: 
In the suspended open awareness context, the patient or kin ignores or 
disbelieves the message communicated by the physician. In the uncertain 
open awareness context, the patient or family member dismisses the bad parts 
of the message and hopes for the best outcome. In the active open awareness 
context, the patient or relative accepts the impending death and prepares for 
it. 
Medicine, in Western countries, has shifted from a paradigm of closed to open awareness of 
dying (Seale, Addington-Hall, & McCarthy, 1997) and it is possible to speak the truth about 
death (Armstrong, 1987). However, even in the era of open awareness, studies reveal that some 
patients and families remain uncertain about dying. Explanations include: the specialisation and 
fragmentation of care (Stacey, Pai, Novisky, & Radwany, 2019); reluctance on the patients’ part 




despite having been informed of their prognosis, patients may not understand what it means 
(Singh et al., 2017). 
  
Researching in the same era as Glaser and Strauss and also in the United States, Kübler-Ross 
(1969) constructed a theory of death and dying as experienced by terminally ill patients in 
hospital. The five stages were denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance.20 
Acceptance in Kübler-Ross’s (1969) final stage of grieving is “an existence without fear or 
despair” (p 130), “almost void of feelings” (p. 124). This theory was part of a revivalist discourse 
to humanise medicine and acknowledge dying (T. Walter, 1994). However, it receives little 
empirical support as grief is not experienced as linear stages (Corr, 2019). However, the end goal 
of acceptance is still a powerful guide for end-of-life care (Zimmermann, 2012). 
  
Hospice and Palliative Care 
Open awareness and acceptance of death are promoted by hospice and palliative care (N. 
Richards et al., 2013; Zimmermann, 2012; Zimmermann & Rodin, 2004). In this subsection I 
provide an overview of hospice and palliative care philosophy and outline some of the critiques 
sociologists have made of the field. Hospice and palliative care have a central role in the present 
research as half of the participants were accessing hospice or palliative care at the time of 
interview. 
  
The hospice movement that was forming in the 1960s in the United Kingdom and elsewhere 
around the world saw itself as operating outside of medicine as a counter to the high-technology 
deaths in hospital and medicalisation (Clark, 2002; Howarth, 2007). Hospice promotes death as 
part of everyday life rather than a failure of medicine (Twycross, 1992 cited in Lawton, 2000). 
The six basic tenets of hospice care are that it: provides holistic care, involves interdisciplinary 
teams, is non-hierarchical, is not rule bound, work is seen as a vocation, and is committed to 
education and research (Howarth, 2007). Out of the hospice movement, which now cares for 
patients at the very end-of-life, grew a broader field of palliative care which is beneficial for 
 
20 More recently a sixth stage of grief, finding meaning, has been added (Kessler, 2019). I have been unable to 
source this book at this time due to COVID-19 restrictions. 
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anyone with serious illness. Palliative care21 is defined as an approach that “improves the quality 
of life of patients and their families facing the problem associated with life-threatening illness, 
through the prevention and relief of suffering by means of early identification and impeccable 
assessment and treatment of pain, and other problems, physical, psychosocial and spiritual” 
(Palliative Care Subcommittee & NZ Cancer Treatment Working Party, 2007, p. 1; World Health 
Organisation, 2019). The focus on quality of life by palliative care helps to acknowledge that 
although technology to extend life is available, it is not always to the benefit of the patient to 
deploy every technology. Natural and technological deaths are returned to in Chapters Four and 
Six. 
  
Hospice and palliative care operate from a holistic model based on Dame Cicely Saunders’ 
concept of total pain (Clark, 1999). Saunders is attributed as the charismatic (James & Field, 
1992) founder of the United Kingdom Hospice movement (C. Richmond, 2005). Her most well-
known quote expresses a philosophical legacy that has guided the hospice and palliative care 
movement, “you matter because you are you, and you matter to the end of your life. We will do 
all we can not only to help you die peacefully, but also to live until you die” (Ratcliffe, 2016, 
para. 3). Total pain recognises the pain has physical, emotional, social and spiritual dimensions. 
It broadly corresponds to Te Whare Tapa’s dimensions of hauora (health), taha tinana (physical), 
taha wairua (spiritual health), taha whānau (social health) and taha hinengaro (mental health) 
(Durie, 1998) that informs the ANZ palliative care strategy (Ministry of Health, 2001).  
 
A major facet of hospice and palliative care’s philosophy (or ideology) is promoting death 
awareness and helping patients and their families come to terms with mortality through open 
discussion and becoming more comfortable with death (Howarth, 2007). Patient management is 
easier with open awareness (Field, 1984 cited in Seale, 1998). Open awareness is linked with the 
good death by hospice and palliative care (N. Richards et al., 2013) and policy (Ministry of 
Health, 2001). A discourse analysis by a professor of palliative care suggested palliative care 
benefits from the idea of society and individuals as death-denying because it provides a reason 
and a moral imperative for its existence (Zimmermann, 2007). An alternate interpretation is that 
 
21 A distinction is made between palliative care and palliative medicine. The former is a philosophy and the latter is 
a medical speciality (Seale, 1998). 
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palliative care does not benefit from a death-denying society because the symptoms of death 
(like symptoms of birth) are easier to manage when the medical supports are available at the 
appropriate times. I return to the role of hospice and palliative care in the following subsection 
on ‘a good death’. 
  
A central philosophy of hospice and palliative care is to ‘neither postpone nor hasten’ death 
(World Health Organisation, 2019). Saunders justified the opposition to AD on the basis that 
with good pain control and a positive attitude, there is no need for AD (Seale, 1998). Such a 
belief persists today among palliative care professionals and research (e.g. Australian & New 
Zealand Society of Palliative Medicine, 2017; Back & Pearlman, 2001; Breitbart et al., 2000; 
Hospice New Zealand, 2017; Mak & Elwyn, 2005; Palliative Care Nurses New Zealand, 2012; 
Rodin et al., 2007). This means AD is unacceptable within most palliative care paradigms and 
opposed by most hospice and palliative care organisations (Inbadas, Zaman, Whitelaw, & Clark, 
2017). For example, the International Association for Hospice and Palliative Care recently stated 
that no jurisdiction should legalise AD until there is universal access to palliative care and 
medication (De Lima et al., 2016), a sentiment echoed in ANZ (Australian & New Zealand 
Society of Palliative Medicine, 2017; Hospice New Zealand, 2017; Palliative Care Nurses New 
Zealand, 2012). Where AD is legal, relationships between palliative care and AD are generally 
reticent if not oppositional, and range from “supportive, neutral, coexisting, not mutually 
exclusive, integrated, synergistic, cooperative, collaborative, opposed, ambivalent and 
conflicted” (Gerson, Koksvik, Richards, Materstvedt, & Clark, 2020, p. 1). 
  
Hospice and palliative care have been interpreted by some scholars of death and dying studies as 
not delivering on its holistic, person and family-centred philosophy. For example, it is charged 
with the inevitable bureaucratisation and routinisation of care, and being subject to quality 
indicators rather than the patients it serves (James & Field, 1992), even if such drivers are from 
external pressures. Ethnographic research in Australian (McNamara, 2001) and English (Lawton, 
2000) hospices also noted the disparities between hospice rhetoric and the realities of care. 
Hospice and palliative care have been critiqued for their role in contributing to the medicalisation 
of dying (though this not without positive consequences too) (Clark, 2002; McNamara, 2001). 
Clark (1999) has argued the consequence of total pain may have been paradoxically, total 
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medical control (see also Armstrong, 1995; Foucault, 2012). Even if death is natural, there is still 
a goal to control the (natural) symptoms of dying at all costs. One analysis suggested the 
reconfiguration of “hospice care as palliative care represents not an incorporation of an idealistic 
alternative, but a further colonisation of a greatly weakened modernist system of medicine by the 
psychologist complex” (Seale, 1998, p. 117). Along similar lines, Broom (2017) proposed that 
palliative care, in extreme cases, is expansionist, reductive and denying of its ideological basis. 
  
Another criticism of hospice care is that it reflects white, middle class, Christian values and 
serves these populations well but not others (Frey et al., 2013; Gunaratnam, 2015; Howarth, 
2007; Moeke-Maxwell, Mason, Toohey, Wharemate, & Gott, 2019). This is problematic for 
people belonging to minority groups who are not provided with culturally appropriate care (Frey 
et al., 2013; Gunaratnam, 2015; Howarth, 2007; Moeke-Maxwell et al., 2019). Hospices in ANZ 
are ostensibly making efforts to embrace multi-culturalism (Hospice New Zealand, 2018). 
Moeke-Maxwell et al. (2019, p. 298) concluded “there is an urgent need to redress the occlusion 
of ANZ’s indigenous peoples’ fundamental cultural customs within the health care system to 
ensure that their protective values and care practices are supported during the end of life 
process”. As well, hospice has traditionally served people dying of cancer22 well but other 
illnesses less well (Hospice New Zealand, 2018). Palliative care is becoming more aware of its 
equity issues (Stajduhar, 2019). 
 
A Good Death 
Sociologists as well as clinical researchers have examined what constitutes a good death. I focus 
on the former who are writing from a Western context. Conceptions of a good death vary across 
cultures and histories (Ariès, 1974; Kellehear, 2007; Seale, 1998). In Western thought, the 
concept has been around at least since the late Middle Ages when the art of dying (well) 
(according to Christianity at the time) was outlined in the popular book Ars Moriendi (Seale, 
1998). Ars Moriendi emphasised the desirability of control over the dying process. A good death 
in the modern sense involves some degree of control and choice with regards to location and 
 
22 Cancer tends to have a more predictable trajectory than other life-limiting illnesses (Lunney, Lynn, Foley, Lipson, 
& Guralnik, 2003). 
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timing (Howarth & Jefferys, 1996; R. Smith, 2000). Control is a central theme in the present 
research, it is discussed with respect to the WTHD literature below. 
  
The good death is culturally constructed according to a particular context. In other words, the 
good death is a prescribed way of understanding death that reflects and reinforces the social 
order (Bradbury, Farr, & Rauter, 1999). For example, a good death is in old age, which serves to 
construct a youthful death as a bad death. At its most basic level, a good death is a culturally 
acceptable way of dying (Lawton, 2000) or successful dying (Meier et al., 2016). Kellehear 
(2007) suggested two criteria for a good death that both have historical roots. First, the notion of 
‘dying well’ relates to the physical qualities at the end of life. Second, the notion of ‘dying 
nobly’ relates to social preoccupations with being prepared for dying. A good death most often 
entails awareness and acceptance, open communication, preparing for death by managing 
emotions, finishing business, ensuring the survivors will be looked after, dignity, privacy, 
autonomy, self-control, peacefulness and comfort (E. J. Emanuel & Emanuel, 1998; Goldsteen et 
al., 2006; Proulx & Jacelon, 2004).  
  
One of the goals of hospice and palliative care is to try to facilitate patients and their 
family/whānau to experience a good death and quality of life during dying (E. J. Emanuel & 
Emanuel, 1998; McNamara, 2004; R. Smith, 2000). The good death ideology of the original 
hospice movement proposed a manner of dying in which open communication was actively 
encouraged so the patient and family can move towards the normative goal of acceptance 
(Zimmermann, 2012). However, each member of the patient-family-health professional triad 
may have different conceptions about what a good death is. As a United Kingdom study found: 
Patients’ descriptions of a ‘good’ death were diverse and included: dying in 
one’s sleep, dying quietly, with dignity, being pain free and dying suddenly. 
In comparison, staff characterised a ‘good’ death in terms of adequate 
symptom control, family involvement, peacefulness and lack of distress, 
while a 'bad' death was described as involving uncontrolled symptoms, lack 
of acceptance and being young (Payne, Langley-Evans, & Hillier, 1996, p. 
307). 
McNamara (2001, p. 42) argued that hospice and palliative care professionals have “constructed 
a purposeful ideology of a good death”. The notion of what a good death is has shifted over time 
as the hospice and palliative care philosophy adapted to societal changes (McNamara, 2004). 
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More recently, the ‘good enough death’ has been put forward as an analytic to capture how 
palliative care accommodates more patient autonomy and consumer choice (albeit within a 
largely Western biomedical model (Moeke-Maxwell et al., 2019)), a model that prioritises 
physical symptom management (McNamara, 2004). Lofland (1978) described the hospice and 
death acceptance movements as the ‘happy death movement’ with a prescribed way to confront 
death. They have the power to define the good death discourse (Zimmermann, 2007). 
  
Patient Autonomy and Choice 
Another paradigm shift in medicine, related to patients’ awareness of death, is the rise of patient 
autonomy (Howarth, 2007; Nettleton, 2013; Seale, 1998; T. Walter, 2017). While much of the 
sociological literature refers to autonomy, few definitions are offered. Autonomy generally refers 
to an individual’s right to make their own choices, underpinned by the value of freedom.23 
Patient autonomy and choice have begun to replace medical paternalism where the doctor knows 
best and acts according to their view of the situation without consulting the patient (Nettleton, 
2013). Patients (and their whānau) are now presented with options and asked to choose 
themselves in the name of patient-centredness. Having said that, the ideal health professional 
works alongside the person to help interpret the options in light of the person’s priorities 
(Gawande, 2014). Medicine now recognises the person in context with unique priorities that may 
not include extending life at any costs. Life at any cost has arguably been the modus operandi of 
modern medicine (Howarth, 2007; Seale, 1998; Warraich, 2017; Zitter, 2017). The weakening 
paternalism of doctors and their recognition of patient autonomy/preferences has enabled the 
questioning of curative medicine. 
  
Doctors are used to professional autonomy—clinical,24 political and economic—and state 
support is crucial for securing medical autonomy (Dew et al., 2016; Nettleton, 2013). 
Professional control and patient autonomy are often described as mutually exclusive but a more 
accurate description is that they are continually negotiated in each situation (McNamara, 2001). 
 
23 In order for an action to be considered autonomous, it must satisfy the three conditions of intentionality, 
understanding and ‘non-control’ according to a bioethics interpretation (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). 
24 Doctors are increasingly held accountable to evidence-based medicine (Dew, Scott, & Kirkman, 2016). 
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While the principle of patient autonomy is privileged in many situations, it is “always tempered 
by other aspects of the biomedical, organisational and moral culture of the institutions in which 
people die” (McNamara, 2001, p. 106; see also Kaufman, 2005). One such influence on patient 
autonomy is neoliberal political ideology. Neoliberalism is implicated in the patient autonomy 
movement (Dew et al., 2016). The emphasis on individual choice is connected with late capitalist 
consumerist ideologies (Nettleton, 2013). There is also a shift from talking about patients as 
persons, clients or consumers, where the latter implies choice in a late capitalist model of 
medicine. 
  
Dying generally entails a loss of bodily control and therefore autonomy, according to an 
operational definition whereby one can physically act in the world to realise one’s self-interest. 
Bodily containment, that is the ability to do and act, is essential for personhood status (Lawton, 
2000). Individual autonomy is difficult to maintain once bodily boundaries erode and the 
individual loses their ability to alter the self and the environment (Lawton, 2000). Instead, 
conceptualising individuals as having relational autonomy (Karlsson, Milberg, & Strang, 2012a; 
Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000), discussed in Chapter Five, may be more useful. Autonomy is never 
truly exercised in isolation but always within reference to impact on others and within the 
bounds of relationships and community (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000), particularly in te Ao Māori 
(Barclay, 2005). 
  
Autonomy and choice are thematics that are woven throughout this thesis. Attention to autonomy 
and choice is salient because fear of the loss of autonomy is a primary reason for seeking AD (E. 
J. Emanuel et al., 2016) and part of the unbearable suffering experienced with the WTHD (Dees 
et al., 2011). Moreover, New Zealanders are characterised as valuing autonomy and 
independence (Fischer, 2012; Rae, Johnson, & Malpas, 2015). There are mixed views on 
whether AD promotes or hinders patient autonomy as it bestows more power on doctors who 
could misuse it by providing biased information (Karlsson et al., 2012a). What one person 
considers an autonomy enabling situation may be experienced as constrained by another person 
in similar circumstance (Oliver, 2013). The discourse of autonomy serves to mask some aspects 
of choice and also produces particular subjectivities (Howarth, 2007; McNamara, 2001; Mol, 
2008; Winnington, 2016). Winnington (2016) argued individual patient choice is an idealised 
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and illusory construct that is unachievable because of the control and power that medicine 
maintain over the end of life. As noted above, patient choice about AD is still considered deviant 
by the medical institution (Winnington, 2016). Having said that, Colburn argues that the choice 
of AD, even if one chooses not to take it, increases the nature and range of choices as a whole 
(Colburn, 2019). 
  
Assisted Dying  
One of the ways people seek a good death and to express their autonomy is by considering AD. 
In this subsection I briefly touch on the reasons people support and oppose AD and then delve 
into the sociological understandings of AD. I am taking a sociological approach to AD because 
the ways in which we die reflect societal values. Rather than a de-contextualised approach, the 
debates about the morality of AD need to be situated within social changes described above as 
well as the ageing population, increasingly constrained healthcare resources, and the fear of 
dying badly. Although discussions around the practice of hastening death has been written about 
since Roman times (Van Hooff, 2004), the modern iteration of AD, within a regulated 
medicalised regime, is a cultural artefact of the changes in society and the management of the 
process of dying over the last 50-100 years. 
  
AD research spans many fields that at times overlap. The range of issues surrounding AD have 
been written about extensively in bioethics, law, medicine, mental health, philosophy, history, 
religion, and public health, among many others (e.g. Ahdar, 2016; Buchbinder, 2017; Doyal & 
Doyal, 2001; E. J. Emanuel, 1994; Geddis, 2017; Kious & Battin, 2019; LiPuma & DeMarco, 
2016; Macleod et al., 2012; Magnusson, 2004; Malpas & Owens, 2016; Materstvedt et al., 2003; 
Ohnsorge, Keller, Widdershoven, & Rehmann-Sutter, 2012; Raus & Sterckx, 2015; D. E. 
Richmond, 2014; Sjostrand, Helgesson, Eriksson, & Juth, 2013; Van Hooff, 2004; Willmott, 
White, Ko, Downar, & Deliens, 2019). Further, AD has also been the subject of government 
reports (for example in ANZ Health Committee, 2017; Ministry of Justice, 2019b) and other 
commissioned reports (Gillett, 2017). The arguments have stayed relatively stagnant (E. J. 
Emanuel, 1994) and the ANZ debate closely follows the international one (Walker, Egan, 
Young, Jaye, & Jackson, 2020). Concerns expressed around AD include: the wider effects on 
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society; the ‘slippery slope’; the burden on health professionals; the doctor-patient relationship; 
the meanings of suffering; the sanctity of human life; religious prohibition; it’s wrong to kill 
another human; responsibility to protect life; vulnerable populations may feel pressure or be 
forced to end their life; hastening death conflicts with basic principles of medicine/nursing (see 
for example Finlay & George, 2011; Gillett, 2017; Golden & Zoanni, 2010; D. E. Richmond, 
2014). Conversely, proponents argue for: the right to die on the basis of respect for autonomy 
and self-determination; compassion; a duty to relieve suffering; the limited effective treatments 
for doing so; promoting a dignified death; a choice (not a compulsion); the risks being managed 
with safeguards; and individuals being trusted to make their own decisions (see for example 
Battin et al., 2007; Humphry, 2002; Malpas & Owens, 2016). A simplistic framing of AD as 
either right or wrong does little to advance our understanding of why someone would consider 
AD. 
  
AD is embedded in a particular set of functions governed by the accepted social norms for 
dealing with death and dying in any given society. AD has become part of some Western modern 
‘death systems’ (Kastenbaum, 1988; N. Richards & Krawczyk, 2019) that explains how one 
should think, feel and act about death and dying. Norwood (2018) argues AD is a response to an 
emerging ‘new normal’, fuelled by media representation of unrealistic dying and promises of 
miracle cures. It has been suggested that AD legislation is the “formal manifestation and 
legitimation of a cultural desire to shorten the dying phase” because the process of dying is 
increasingly seen as a ‘redundant’ stage of life (N. Richards & Krawczyk, 2019, p. 1). This 
might be because dying is not valuable to biographical fulfilment in a secular society. The desire 
for AD reflects ideas about the late modern self as seeking psychological fulfilment through the 
exercising of choice, asserting autonomy and maintaining control over one’s life (Seale & 
Addington-Hall, 1994). 
  
Kubiak (2015) considered whether AD is an expression of individual power or an indirect 
exertion of state power over the individual; Chapter Five also explores these ideas. AD is framed 
as a manifestation of individualism and loss of collectivism (N. Richards & Krawczyk, 2019), 
emblematic of neoliberalism (Ryan, Morgan, & Lyons, 2011) and reflective of discourses of 
autonomy, liberty and medicalisation (Karsoho et al., 2016). Karsoho et al. (2016) examined the 
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Carter v. Canada case’s using key informant interviews and documentation and analysed the 
proponents’ of AD discursive tactics to argue for the moral imperative of AD because palliative 
care cannot always address the problem of suffering in dying. They argued “that proponents’ 
articulation of suffering with the role of medicine constitutes a discourse through which different 
configurations of end-of-life care come to be rejected or accepted within the larger framework of 
the medicalization of dying” (Karsoho et al., 2016, p. 189). Although the participants in the 
present study were not formal advocates and experts as the informants were, they used similar 
arguments which are discussed in Chapter Four. Also studying advocates, Gandsman (2016) 
observed that opponents have shifted from morality arguments to focus on the risks of AD to 
vulnerable groups as they seek more persuasive arguments against AD. 
  
One sociological explanation of AD is that it brings social and biological death together, which 
facilitates the maintenance of social relationships as per the revivalist discourse (defined above) 
(T. Walter, 1994). Social death is when the person is treated as if they are already dead 
(Borgstrom, 2017). On the other hand, hospice aims to delay social death so it coincides with 
biological death (T. Walter, 1994). For some, AD is seen as an idealised good death related to 
the “aesthetics of how they wanted to die”, which is defined as “the attachment of values to the 
physical and practical experience of that event” (N. Richards, 2017a, p. 349). Perhaps related to 
the aesthetics of death, AD is purposefully differentiated from suicide to avoid the connotations 
of moral sin (Hannig, 2019; Wiebe, Shaw, Kelly, & Wright, 2019). Richards also discussed the 
concept of rational suicide (N. Richards, 2017b) and the activism of people seeking to die (N. 
Richards, 2012) that have informed my own research. These issues of a good death, in relation to 
suicide, are considered throughout my thesis. 
  
So far in this section about the changes in approaches to death and dying I have argued that 
beliefs about ways in which we should die reflect socially constructed values. I have briefly 
reviewed some of the major concepts that are central to understanding the phenomenon of AD 
including death awareness, acceptance, a good death, autonomy and choice as well as 
neoliberalism and individualism. Other useful sociological concepts are introduced where 
relevant throughout the thesis. The socio-cultural values of awareness, acceptance and autonomy 
in medicine have changed over time with an increasing recognition of the role of the individual 
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in determining what healthcare is right for them and what their own version of a good death 
entails. The changes outlined above in ideologies of the individual, medicine and economic 
rationality have changed the Western cultural norms around dying have culminated in the public 
demand for AD. These changes form a backdrop to the wish to hasten death. The next section 
drills down and reviews the ANZ literature on AD. 
 
New Zealand Research on Assisted Dying 
The extant ANZ research on AD can be broadly grouped into attitudinal research (including 
extensive polling) among the public and health professional groups and qualitative research that 
examines the social issues surrounding AD through interviews, social media analyses, one focus 
group study and one citizens’ jury.25 While many commentaries, editorials, ethical and legal 
arguments, and position statements have been written and contribute to the wider debate, here I 
am focussing on the empirical research conducted to-date because the former tend to focus on 
whether AD should be allowable or not. The polling, carried out mostly by telephone with some 
postal and online methods of data collection, and data collected from social media may have 
incidentally included people with life-limiting illness and/or disabilities. However, all in-depth 
studies of AD have been conducted only with healthy adults (Malpas, Mitchell, & Johnson, 
2012; Malpas, Wilson, Rae, & Johnson, 2014) and (healthy) health professionals (Malpas & 
Mitchell, 2017; Oliver et al., 2017). Given this limitation, I briefly outline the key ANZ studies 
to provide a rationale for my study with people knowingly approaching the end of life. I make 
the argument for the specific approach taken in the present research with respect to the WTHD 
literature later in this chapter. 
  
Previous analysis of the attitudinal research showed that support and opposition for AD for the 
terminally ill has been stable over the last 20 years, on average 68% and 15% respectively 
(Young et al., 2019). Of the studies that differentiated between euthanasia and the person self-
administering the lethal medication, 67% want both to be legal; 19% think that only self-
 
25 This section has been adapted from the publication Young, J., Egan, R., Walker, S., Graham-DeMello, A., & 
Jackson, C. (2019). The euthanasia debate: synthesising the evidence on New Zealander's attitudes. Kōtuitui: New 
Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online, 14(1), 1-21. doi:10.1080/1177083X.2018.1532915 
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administration should be legal, while 13% believe that only euthanasia should be legal (Rae et 
al., 2015). This finding is relevant because under the End of Life Choice Act, the person chooses 
if the doctor or the person themselves administers the medication.  
 
The circumstances under which health professionals and lay people find AD acceptable varies. A 
survey, commissioned by the End-of-Life Choice Society, which asked about a person who had 
irreversible unbearable suffering which may not cause death in the immediate future (giving the 
example of motor neurone disease) found that support (66%) for AD was much higher than 
opposition (14%) (Horizon Research, 2017). Support was much lower for paralysis and 
permanent dependence (44–49%) and 18% were unsure and 39% were opposed, suggesting that 
New Zealanders are more comfortable with AD for life-limiting conditions (Young et al., 2019). 
However, all poll questions contained limited information about the circumstances of the case 
under consideration (Young et al., 2019). 
  
Vignettes in the Rae et al. (2015) survey were more detailed. That study investigated how 
participants weighted age, prognosis, and nature of suffering in different situations regarding the 
appropriateness of AD. Age and life expectancy did not significantly influence responses 
however, the type of suffering—pain or loss of dignity—had an impact. The participants 
responded that AD was most appropriate for situations where this is a loss of dignity which 
remained even when pain was controlled (Rae et al., 2015). Two other studies found that 
treatability of pain is a factor in determining whether or not participants support AD, suggesting 
that it is considered as a last resort by some respondents (Young et al., 2019). 
  
When looking at ANZ studies of support and opposition by demographic factors, there was no 
difference of attitudes between genders, and results according to age group showed no clear 
relationship (Young et al., 2019). People with religious beliefs were less likely to support AD. Of 
the socio-economic status indicators (i.e. income, deprivation, education, occupation) only 
educational attainment was statistically significant, with lower educational attainment being 
associated with higher support for AD (Young et al., 2019). Those living rurally (i.e. non-urban) 
were found to be more supportive of AD (Young et al., 2019). In terms of ethnicity, support was 
highest among Pākehā (71%), then Māori (64%), Other (64%), Pasifika (57%), Asian (55%) 
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(Young et al., 2019). Indians were the only ethnicity not to show a majority (49%), however 
these data came from only two studies and must be interpreted with caution. AD is popular 
across the political spectrum with more than a majority of support among voters of all political 
orientations (Young et al., 2019). This might explain why MPs from a range of political party 
memberships with differing ideologies have submitted AD bills as well why no party has a 
policy explicitly opposing the issue. Attitudinal research does not add much to our understanding 
of why people hold their particular views and how these might change with more information, 
or, more pertinent to this research, why people might consider hastening their death. 
  
There have been in-depth studies about why New Zealanders support or oppose AD which add 
nuance to the above findings. Concerns about the potential abuse and coercion of AD among the 
vulnerable (Ryan, 2014), fears of a ‘right to die’ evolving into a ‘duty to die’ to stop being a 
burden on others, and religious beliefs were reasons for healthy older New Zealanders opposing 
AD (Malpas et al., 2014). The primary reasons healthy older adults supported AD were 
anticipating inevitable decline in capacity and not wanting to become a burden, wanting to 
preserve independence and dignity, a belief in the right to choose and respecting autonomy 
(Malpas et al., 2012). Fear of pain did not feature greatly in participants’ reasons for supporting 
AD (Malpas et al., 2012). The participants in Malpas et al.’s study were recruited from the End-
of-Life Choice Society and therefore may represent a biased group (Malpas et al., 2012). 
However, the aforementioned reasons (both for and against) reflect the national (Health 
Committee, 2017) and international arguments (Walker et al., 2020), enhancing the 
transferability of the results to other groups. Similar to the participants in the present study, prior 
experiences of death influenced participants’ views on AD (Malpas et al., 2012; Malpas et al., 
2014). 
  
As with the present research, Ryan (2014) did not engage with the morality of AD but examined 
how people ‘made sense of euthanasia’. Her genealogical investigation and discourse analysis of 
interviews with healthy adults (Māori and non-Māori) concluded that AD was made meaningful 
through discourses of identity, reciprocation, burden and duty. These discourses were connected 
to how people perceived themselves and wished to be perceived by others. AD is positioned in 
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these discourses as a solution to the problem of dying and as embodying neoliberal values (Ryan 
et al., 2011).  
  
Since the present research takes place in ANZ, attention to the views of Māori on AD are 
important. Using a kaupapa Māori approach, 20 kaumatua (Māori elders) were interviewed in 
focus groups Malpas et al. (2017). This was the first study about AD with only Māori 
participants; it was also the first AD study to use a focus group method and kaupapa Māori 
paradigm. Participants in the Malpas et al. study had concerns about AD interrupting the process 
of dying and wairua (spirituality) of the whānau (nuclear and extended family) as well as the 
dying person. All aspects of death and dying are strongly guided by tikanga (Māori 
custom/proper practice) and kawa (protocol, ceremony) and a few participants thought there may 
be a possibility for AD to be guided by tikanga. Some saw the potential of AD to strip the mana 
(status, prestige, spiritual power) from whānau while others talked about how seeing a whānau 
member die in pain made AD seem more acceptable. A few noted historical instances of 
hastening death. Fear, distrust and institutional racism of health systems remain issues for Māori 
in general, but perhaps especially around AD. The key conclusion Malpas et al. (2017) drew was 
that whānau need to be included in AD decisions, as they are the decision-makers for the whānau 
member approaching the end of life. The authors noted that the views of kaumatua may not 
represent all Māori. Hence, there is a need to interview Māori approaching the end of life. As an 
aside, more recently and as part of the third reading of the Bill (New Zealand Parliament, 2019) 
and commentary following it (Johnsen, 2019), there has been discussion on the diversity of 
tikanga and the place AD in te Ao Māori (the Māori world). A recently released poll of Māori 
found 58% of the 543 respondents did not believe assisted dying was incompatible with tikanga 
Māori (The Hui, 2020). 
  
A narrative analysis of the qualitative research found that feeling like a burden was a theme 
across all studies except for the kaumatua Māori study (Young et al., 2019). The explanation 
proffered was that independence, autonomy and reciprocity are culturally bound so they may not 
be conceived in the same way among Māori. Ryan (2014) identified a special reciprocity 
between kaumatua and whānau, community and society. Another study found that being a 
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burden to one's family was the top priority among both Māori and non-Māori participants in a 
ANZ study of end-of-life care preferences among people of advanced age (Gott et al., 2017). 
  
Analysis of how AD is discussed in media and social media and what those data indicate about 
the public’s priorities and concerns have been conducted over some years now (Jaye et al., 2019; 
Lewis, 2005; Revell-Dennett, 2018; Winnington, 2016). Using discourse analysis, these studies 
identified the contested standpoints, authorities and competing discourses. The present study also 
uses discourse analysis. Lewis (2005) framed her work around the sanctity of life discourse vs 
the right-to-die discourse. Over a decade later, studies suggested the balance between these 
discourses was tipping towards patient choice which is promoted by medical discourse (Ryan, 
2014; Winnington, 2016). However, Winnington (2016) also concluded that medical discourse 
positions the choice of AD as deviant and that patient choice is an illusion. These findings will 
be discussed in Chapter Five on control. More recently Revell-Dennett (2018) emphasised the 
limited range of discourses on assisted dying. The above discourses relate to the religious, 
medical and legal authorities which were both challenged and reinforced by citizens posting on 
various platforms when the End of Life Choice Bill was drawn (Jaye et al., 2019). People posting 
online were commenting on the relationship between government and its citizens (Jaye et al., 
2019), which is also relevant to the findings in the control chapter (Chapter Five). The debate 
online also occurs at a meta-level over issues such as how should AD be debated? What should 
the law be, and how should we decide? What will be the consequences of allowing AD? (Jaye et 
al., 2019). These discourses are in a state of flux (Winnington, 2016), especially in light of the 
recent passage of the End of Life Choice Act. The social media analyses are important because 
they represent the views of the public who may not participate in the formal political processes 
(Jaye et al., 2019). They represent the vox populi. 
  
One critique of the polls, surveys, interviews and social media data is that respondents may not 
have a deep knowledge of the issues around AD, the medical treatments already available as well 
as the potential consequences of legalisation (Walker et al., 2020) or, for that matter, continued 
illegality. Also, those data are only cross-sectional. One poll commissioned by Euthanasia-Free 
NZ (published after the data collection period for the Young et al. (2019) review) suggested 
conceptual confusion may be present in New Zealanders’ understanding of AD (Euthanasia-Free 
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NZ, 2017). However, I argue this poll deliberately obfuscates by asking leading questions, in a 
particular order, about what constitutes AD (asked as follows: turning off life support, stopping 
medical treatment, DNR requests, stopping food/fluids, receiving pain medication, deadly drugs 
for later, deadly drugs injected). There will be some respondents who are unclear but social 
desirability to answer ‘correctly’ is likely to have been a factor. 
  
To address these concerns, a citizens’ jury was conducted on AD to understand how 15 random 
citizens’ views changed after education and facilitated deliberation and why they held those 
views (Walker et al., 2020). The finer details of the jury process are outlined in Walker et al. 
(2020). Briefly, there was a polarisation of views with a few participants changing their position 
from support to opposition after the jury. A two-thirds majority still supported law change after 
the jury process. Participants could not come to a consensus on whether the law should change in 
ANZ because they disagreed over whether the risks could be sufficiently managed or not. 
  
However, as noted above, all of these studies have been conducted with healthy adults. Those 
with shortened life expectancy are an important group to examine because they are faced with 
their own mortality and it is this salience (immediacy of dying) that informs their views. Life-
limiting illness challenges one’s subjectivity (defined for the moment as identity and explained 
further in Chapter Three), interrupts one’s narrative and throws into question one’s ontological 
place in the world (Broom & Kirby, 2013; Bury, 1982; Charmaz, 1983). Patients are the experts 
in their own experiences of illness and suffering (Cassell, 2004), what they consider a 
meaningful life, and their values (Gawande, 2014). People approaching the end of life represent 
a distinct life stage because, like oldest old, they are likely to be in process of making peace with 
impending dying in ways that younger or healthier people are not. Thus, they are in the best 
position to know how they feel about AD. Participants’ experiences of dying are crucial to 
understanding what does it mean, and in what ways it is possible, to die in ANZ today? 
 
The Wish to Hasten Death 
Within the broader AD field of research, the specific body of literature that this research is 
situated with is the WTHD. It forms a major part of my conceptual framework. In this subsection 
I define the WTHD, describe the nature of this research, and then discuss the common themes 
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and gaps in the WTHD literature. Terms such as ‘wish to die’, ‘desire for hastened death’, 
‘request to die’ or ‘desire to die’, ‘desire for early death’ as well as ‘wish to hasten death’ and 
other related expressions or synonyms for requests for AD are used variously and 
interchangeably in the literature (Balaguer et al., 2016; Monforte-Royo, Villavicencio-Chávez, 
Tomás-Sábado, Mahtani-Chugani, & Balaguer, 2012). I adopt the ‘wish to hasten death’ 
(WTHD) based on the research being synthesised in two major meta-reviews which used this 
terminology (Monforte-Royo et al., 2012; Rodríguez-Prat, Balaguer, Booth, & Monforte-Royo, 
2017). Having said that, this research concludes that for ANZ participants, while there is no legal 
access to AD, it is more accurate to describe the WTHD as a wish to have the option of hastening 
death. 
  
International research has explored the attitudes, intentions and motivations around assisted 
death for those near the end of life (e.g. Broom & Kirby, 2013; Chapple, Ziebland, McPherson, 
& Herxheimer, 2006; Eliott & Olver, 2008; E. J. Emanuel, Daniels, Fairclough, & Clarridge, 
1996; E. J. Emanuel, Fairclough, & Emanuel, 2000; Johansen et al., 2005; Karlsson, Milberg, & 
Strang, 2012b; Kelly et al., 2002, 2003; Seale & Addington-Hall, 1994; Wilson et al., 2000). 
There is a subset of this research that examines those approaching the end of life with a stated 
WTHD. This is also the focus of my thesis. To reflect the specific emphasis of the present 
research, I have chosen to concentrate on the studies that focus on people approaching the end of 
life who would consider choosing AD. I also refer to studies that interviewed people approaching 
the end of life’s views on AD more generally if it supplements the more immediately relevant 
finding of the WTHD research (e.g. Broom, 2012; Eliott & Olver, 2008; Karlsson et al., 2012a; 
N. Richards, 2017a). 
  
In terms of defining the WTHD, a consensus process with international multi-disciplinary 
experts put forward the following definition of the ‘Wish to Hasten Death and Its Related 
Factors’: 
the WTHD is a reaction to suffering, in the context of a life-threatening 
condition, from which the patient can see no way out other than to accelerate 
his or her death. This wish may be expressed spontaneously or after being 
asked about it, but it must be distinguished from the acceptance of impending 
death or from a wish to die naturally, although preferably soon. The WTHD 
may arise in response to one or more factors, including physical symptoms 
 45 
(either present or foreseen), psychological distress (e.g. depression, 
hopelessness, fears, etc.), existential suffering (e.g. loss of meaning in life), 
or social aspects (e.g. feeling that one is a burden) (Balaguer et al., 2016, p. 
8). 
These factors will be discussed in greater depth throughout the thesis. This definition 
corresponds with the WTHD research that identifies suffering as a primary reason for 
considering AD (Dees et al., 2011; Hendry et al., 2013; Monforte-Royo et al., 2012; Rodríguez-
Prat et al., 2017). The WTHD definition and models (described below) will be engaged with and 
challenged throughout the present research where participants’ accounts did not align. Ohnsorge, 
Gudat, and Rehmann-Sutter (2014a, p. 1025) propose a more active definition: 
the wish to die should be understood as a responsive and agential space, 
within which internal and external negotiations interact, conflicting values 
and aims are continuously valued and weighed against each other, and the 
patient, relatives and multiple caregivers are involved. 
This latter definition involves interactions with others whereas the former focuses solely on the 
person expressing the WTHD. Ohnsorge, Gudat, and Rehmann-Sutter (2014b) attribute agency 
to the patient in their expression of wishing to die while Balaguer consider the WTHD primarily 
as a reaction to circumstances. There is a need to distinguish between a general wish to die, a 
WTHD, manifestations of this, and actual requests (Monforte-Royo, Villavicencio-Chavez, 
Tomas-Sabado, & Balaguer, 2011; Schroepfer, 2006). 
  
The WTHD in those approaching the end of life has been explored in many studies that have 
been synthesised in several systematic reviews and meta-ethnographies (Hendry et al., 2013; 
Hudson et al., 2006; Monforte-Royo et al., 2012; Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2017) and one consensus 
study (Balaguer et al., 2016). The majority of the literature was from Western countries. Studies 
have been conducted in countries where AD was legal e.g. Netherlands (Dees et al., 2011; Rurup 
et al., 2011) and Switzerland (Ohnsorge et al., 2014a, 2014b), and countries where AD was 
illegal at the time e.g. United Kingdom (N. Richards, 2017a), Sweden (Karlsson et al., 2012b) 
Germany (Pestinger et al., 2015), USA (Coyle & Sculco, 2004; Pearlman et al., 2005; 
Schroepfer, 2006), Hong Kong (Mak & Elwyn, 2005), Canada (Lavery, Boyle, Dickens, 
Maclean, & Singer, 2001; Nissim, Gagliese, & Rodin, 2009; Wilson et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 
2000) and Thailand (Nilmanat et al., 2015). Pestinger et al. (2015) found that the motivations of 
patients were not fundamentally different in Switzerland where AD is permitted compared to 
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Germany where it is illegal. As noted above, no research with this cohort has been conducted in 
ANZ to date. Eliott and Olver (2008) conducted a study in Australia which is perhaps culturally 
the most similar to ANZ. They conclude it is necessary to go beyond examining autonomy and 
“interrogate highly valorized [sic] notions of self, control, death, and medical jurisdiction” (Eliott 
& Olver, 2008, p. 655). The present research responds to their call and builds on these notions. 
  
Characterising the studies highlights the limitations of this body of research. Many of the studies 
have been conducted with people with advanced cancer (e.g. Coyle & Sculco, 2004; Kelly et al., 
2002; Nilmanat et al., 2015; Nissim et al., 2009; Ohnsorge et al., 2014a). Other studies’ samples 
were comprised of a people with a variety of life-limiting conditions (e.g. Dees et al., 2011; 
Pearlman et al., 2005; Pestinger et al., 2015; N. Richards, 2017a; Schroepfer, 2006) with the 
exceptions of Lavery (2001) whose study who interviewed people with AIDS. Ohnsorge, 
Rehmann-Sutter, Streeck, and Gudat (2019) compared the WTHD with different disease 
trajectories.  
 
Methodologically, if stated, most of the studies explicitly drew on phenomenology and some 
hermeneutics. The main approaches used to gain an understanding of the reasons for a desire for 
hastened death were surveys, standardised instruments, or in-depth interviews (Hudson et al., 
2006). Most studies were conducted within a clinical setting, often hospice or palliative care. 
None of the studies reviewed have taken place in an aged care environment and very few at 
home. A few interviewed patients over more than one occasion (Coyle & Sculco, 2004; Nissim 
et al., 2009; Pearlman et al., 2005). One exception to the aforementioned limitations is Richards’ 
ethnographic study of a Right-To-Die organisation (N. Richards, 2012, 2017a, 2017b; N. 
Richards & Rotter, 2013). Richards, an anthropologist, interviewed community-dwelling people 
actively seeking to go to Switzerland to die. Her analyses were informed by 
anthropological/sociological theory and are discussed throughout the present research. 
  
In clinical terms the WTHD has a ‘multi-factorial aetiology’ (Monforte-Royo et al., 2011), 
meaning there are many factors causing it. The WTHD has been characterised as a result of 
unmet care needs (e.g. Back & Pearlman, 2001; Mak & Elwyn, 2005; Rodin et al., 2007). The 
losses and fears with a WTHD, or existential despair, are examples of a proposed mental 
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disorder called demoralisation syndrome (Kissane, Clarke, & Street, 2001). Demoralisation, 
medicalisation and pathologisation of the WTHD will be discussed in Chapter Four and then 
revisited in the discussion chapter. Ohnsorge et al. (2014b, p. 12) put forward that the WTHD 
“might be part of a normal coping process that patients balance their motivations for or against 
life and death, and develop and express a wish to die”. Some research suggests that the desire for 
hastened death is not uncommon among all hospice patients (e.g. Arnold, Artin, Person, & 
Griffith, 2004; Hizo-Abes, Siegel, & Schreier, 2018; Starks et al., 2005). 
  
Components of the first WTHD model (Monforte-Royo et al., 2012) resulting from a systematic 
review and meta-ethnography (see Figure 1) were suffering; loss of: self, function, control, hope, 
dignity and meaning; fear of death and dying. These factors combine to suggest that the WTHD 
is a means for control, ending suffering and an exit strategy in response to emotional distress. It 
can be an expression of the will to continue living and a way to ask for help. I discuss these with 
regards to other literature beyond the WTHD in turn and then discuss the updated model 




Figure 1. Explanatory Model of the Wish to Hasten Death.26 
 
 
As the consensus definition captures, and the WTHD literature concludes, the WTHD is a 
response to unbearable suffering (Balaguer et al., 2016; Monforte-Royo et al., 2012; Rodríguez-
Prat et al., 2017). Unbearable suffering is a key concept that has many contributing factors (Dees 
et al., 2011; Hendry et al., 2013; Monforte-Royo et al., 2012). Psychological, emotional, 
spiritual, existential and social reasons are important as well as physical symptoms. One study 
demonstrated that concerns about suffering at the end of life vary by disease (Ohnsorge et al., 
2019). Unbearable suffering is an important construct in the Netherlands, Belgium and other 
jurisdictions laws (Oliver, 2016), including ANZ’s End of Life Choice Act (2019).27 Suffering is 
discussed primarily in Chapter Four and touched upon throughout the rest of the thesis. 
  
 
26 Reprinted from Monforte-Royo et al. (2012, p. 13) [open access]. 
27 For the purposes of the End of Life Choice Act (2019), unbearable suffering is suffering that cannot be relieved in 
a manner that is acceptable to the person requesting AD. It is subjectively defined in the Act. 
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The WTHD literature suggests dying people may experience a loss of self (cf threat to the 
integrity of self Cassell, 2004; Lavery et al., 2001; Monforte-Royo et al., 2018; Monforte-Royo 
et al., 2012; Rodríguez-Prat, Monforte-Royo, Porta-Sales, Escribano, & Balaguer, 2016). It may 
be experienced as a disintegration of self, a loss of community, loss of function, loss of meaning, 
loss of hope, loss of perceived dignity and loss of control (Lavery et al., 2001; Monforte-Royo et 
al., 2018; Monforte-Royo et al., 2012; Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2016). The losses are related to 
dying people’s diminishing ability to fulfil social roles, in particular to reciprocate in 
relationships. As people become no longer able to do things without help from others, especially 
those activities which made their life meaningful, their perception of self can change. How others 
perceive and relate to them also changes. Partly this is problematic because people would prefer 
to be remembered as they were prior to illness and decline. AD was a means of limiting this loss 
(Lavery et al., 2001). Part of the loss of the self is related to the disintegration of the physical self 
that for some, resulted in social isolation from social networks and sequestration in hospices 
(Lawton, 2000). Lack of social support can also be a factor in the WTHD (Schroepfer, 2008).  
  
Fear of death and the dying process are implicated in the WTHD (Monforte-Royo et al., 2012). 
For some, the prospect of a life of suffering was expressed as a fate worse than death (Mak & 
Elwyn, 2005). A hastened death represents a way of ending the suffering and avoiding protracted 
dying. Alternatively, AD can also be conceptualised as a letting go of life (Nissim et al., 2009; 
Winnington et al., 2018) and the ‘fight’ to survive. The desire for hastened death was a 
manifestation of letting go of life when “death can no longer be resisted” (Nissim et al., 2009, p. 
14). The acceptance stage of adjustment to dying in Kübler-Ross’ (1969) work is relevant here as 
is existential maturity. Existential maturity is a state of well-being reached by facing one’s or 
others’ mortality (L. Emanuel, Reddy, Hauser, & Sonnenfeld, 2017). 
  
The updated WTHD model included twice as many studies as the first review (Rodríguez-Prat et 
al., 2017). In essence they adopted the Ohnsorge et al. (2014b) typology of reasons, meanings 
and functions, and retained the overarching role of suffering in the WTHD (see Figure 2). The 
updated model also incorporated the timeline towards dying and death into the model. Pestinger 
et al. (2015) and Nissim et al. (2009) emphasised the perception of time as important, as do the 
findings of this research. The present research also explores reasons, meanings and functions but 
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with a broader socio-cultural focus than the Rodríguez-Prat et al. (2017) review and comprising 
research. I briefly discuss the updated WTHD model with reference to my own research and 
draw upon the original studies to elucidate the model. In the discussion chapter I reinterpret the 
WTHD models using assemblage theory. 
  
 
Figure 2. A Wish to Die: Its Motivation, Intention and the Constitutive Social Interaction.28 
  
Across the studied groups, patients’ reasons for the WTHD were primarily spiritual-existential 
and social rather than physical (Ohnsorge et al., 2014b). Ohnsorge et al. (2014b) put this down to 
good physical symptom control. If the reasons for the WTHD are primarily psycho-spiritual-
social then it contests the notion that if patients’ symptom control by palliative care is good 
enough, then their WTHD will be eliminated, discussed in this thesis. The WTHD is transitory 
for some but can be enduring for others (Wilson et al., 2007). “Physicians often limit themselves 
to searching for reasons that can then be treated” but the authors point out that meanings are 




28 Reprinted from Ohnsorge et al. (2014b, p. 3) [open access]. 
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In terms of meanings, which is one of the research questions guiding this study, the expression of 
WTHD cannot necessarily be taken at face value. The WTHD is multifaceted, polysemic and can 
change over time (Coyle & Sculco, 2004; Dees et al., 2011; Lavery et al., 2001; Mak & Elwyn, 
2005; Monforte-Royo et al., 2012; Nissim et al., 2009; Pearlman et al., 2005; Pestinger et al., 
2015; Rurup et al., 2011). The will to live also fluctuates (Chochinov, Tataryn, Clinch, & 
Dudgeon, 1999). The ambivalence of a WTHD is also noted (E. J. Emanuel et al., 2000; 
Monforte-Royo et al., 2012). A WTHD is not always an actual request for an assisted death 
(Pestinger et al., 2015). Paradoxically, the WTHD can also be expressed as desire to live but not 
this way (Coyle & Sculco, 2004; Dees et al., 2011; Mak & Elwyn, 2003; Nissim et al., 2009; 
Ohnsorge et al., 2014a, 2014b; Pearlman et al., 2005; Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2017; Schroepfer, 
2006). It is not simply a matter of considering a hastened death or not. There is a range of ‘mind 
frames’ or intentions related to readiness for and acceptance of dying including one mind frame 
that considers hastening death without a plan and one that involves active plans for hastening 
death (Nissim et al., 2009; Ohnsorge et al., 2014a; Schroepfer, 2006). Some patients expressed 
both a WTHD and a will to live because life still had some meaning (Monforte-Royo et al., 
2012). Acceptance of dying does not mean there is a will to die (Ohnsorge et al., 2014b). Patients 
still desired good care, wished for support and acknowledgement regardless of their WTHD 
(Back et al., 2002). 
  
There are multiple functions of the WTHD. Functions included re-establishing agency, a vehicle 
to speak about dying, a way to avoid a difficult dying process, a communication tool, a 
manipulation of one’s environment or people around you expressing need for non-abandonment 
(Coyle & Sculco, 2004; Ohnsorge et al., 2014b). The WTHD can be an expression of despair 
about one’s current circumstances or cry for help (Coyle & Sculco, 2004; Nissim et al., 2009). It 
can also be an expression of unmet need (Mak & Elwyn, 2005; Rodin et al., 2007) or a coping 
strategy for anticipated agony (Pestinger et al., 2015). Coyle and Sculco (2004, p. 704) argued 
the desire for hastened death was a mechanism for reasserting oneself and drawing attention to 
“me as a unique individual”. 
  
These reasons, meanings and functions represent a fairly narrow individually-focused, 
psychological understanding of the WTHD. Ohnsorge et al. (2014b) acknowledge the socio-
 52 
cultural context that socialised the patient but do not elaborate any further. They suggest that 
social interactions constitute a wish to die, meaning “the interaction brings the [wish to die] 
about” (Ohnsorge et al., 2014b, p. 4). The patient’s context in which they exist is crucial, that is 
to say in relation with others who may influence their decisions and societal attitudes towards the 
end of life (Rosenberg, Horsfall, Leonard, & Noonan, 2015). Much of the literature conducted in 
the WTHD field has focussed on the individual patient approaching the end of life; a few studies 
also included family (Arnold et al., 2004; Back et al., 2002; Pearlman et al., 2005). For some 
terminally ill elders the WTHD is rooted in preventing their loved ones witnessing their 
suffering; Coyle and Sculco (2004) suggest this is a form of altruism (see also Feigin et al., 
2017). Other terminally ill elders repressed WTHD to prevent hurting their family (Schroepfer, 
2008). 
  
The present research included family members according to the participants’ wishes because it is 
not only the self that is considered in the WTHD; decisions are often co-produced by patients 
and their care network. However, even more broad influences than the people directly involved 
in one’s life shape the WTHD hasten death. In this research, I highlight the need to contextualise 
WTHD within societal meanings of death and dying and in relation to others. For example, the 
individualism and neoliberalism that privileges autonomy over collectivist values reflects the 
cultural norms which inform bioethics and the culture of medicine (Austin, 2008; R. Fox, 1989; 
Menkes, Hill, Horsfall, & Jaye, 2008). What influence do broader concepts such as agency, 
power and social structures have? Why do some ideas, such as control, have prominence over 
others in the WTHD? What influence do health professionals and medicine have on the WTHD? 
These are some of the questions explored in the present research.  
  
A critique of the studies discussed here is that they are generally not informed by sociological or 
other theories. The major exceptions are Richards’ work discussed above (N. Richards, 2017a, 
2017b) and Karlsson et al. (2012a) who examined how AD might change power relations 
between patients and doctors, concluding that AD both increases and decreases patient 
autonomy. The WTHD literature largely only attends to the inner world of the patient and not to 
the contextual, discursive or relational influences. I bring the two literatures—the WTHD and the 
sociology of death and dying—together. This is the unique approach that the present research 
 53 
adds to the WTHD literature. Moreover, the uniqueness of ANZ as a bicultural country with its 
own culture and legislation warrants its own study of the WTHD. 
  
The gaps in the WTHD literature are around theorising control (Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2016), the 
role of medicalisation in the WTHD and the normative discourses that are implicit in the WTHD 
and AD. Although there are other areas worthy of exploration, these three mapped closely to the 
data and first level of analysis. These are the three major theoretics that are discussed in the 
analysis chapters. In what follows, I draw on heavily on Foucault and other key theorists such as 
Conrad (2007), Rose (2007a), Lupton (1992), Seale (1998) and Norwood (2009) to explain and 
exemplify medicalisation, control and discourse as they relate to the WTHD. 
  
Medicalisation of the Wish to Hasten Death 
In this subsection I tease out what medicalisation is and how it occurs, to expand on the claims 
above that death was transformed from an existential event to a medicalised event (Broom 2015). 
I then relate these ideas to the WTHD. Different theoretical orientations exist in the literature on 
medicalisation. For example, Singer (2004) and Lock (2004) take a critical Marxist or 
hegemonic approach while a social constructionist/Foucauldian approach has been used by 
Petersen and Bunton (1997) and Rose (2007a). More recently an assemblage theory/new 
materialist approach, explained in the Methodology chapter, has been taken (N. Fox, 2011; 
Kennedy, Zapasnik, McCann, & Bruce, 2013). I find the latter two orientations useful for this 
research because of my interest in power relations inherent within, and the dynamic nature of, 
medicalisation with respect to the WTHD. 
  
Even though medicine is often referred to as if it is a unified object, including within this 
research, there is no singular epistemological model of medicine that can be referred to (Rose, 
2007a). Rather medicine is an assemblage comprised of individual practitioners, bodies of 
knowledge and practices that manifest in varying forms across locations and times (N. Fox, 
2011). These practices are always contextual in that medicine is globalised, localised and 
hybridised. What medicine does have in common is the ways in which it provides medical 
meanings to life and to experiences, by shaping and reshaping relations with our bodies, popular 
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culture and societal structures (Rose, 2007a). However, medicalisation is not just about medical 
intervention but the broader territorialisation of people as patients/medical beings, and the 
political nature of medicine as a moral discourse (N. Fox, 2011; Hannig, 2019). 
  
The concept of medicalisation is attributed to Zola (1972) who argued that medicine is an 
institution of social control by encouraging an overreliance on health professionals, and to Illich 
(1977) who argued that medicalisation disempowers and harms29 people by stripping them of 
their own capacity to deal with their health and accept ill health/suffering. Medicalisation 
dehumanised dying by viewing it as a failure of medicine and thus subjects dying people to a 
range of technological indignities in attempts to keep them alive (Illich, 1977). The biomedical 
model, from which medicalisation stems, is noted to pathologise all sorts of things as a risk to 
one’s health: 
from sex to food, from aspirins to clothes, from driving your car to riding the 
surf, it seems that under certain conditions, or in combination with certain 
other substances or activities or if done too much or too little, virtually 
anything can lead to certain medical problems (Zola, 1972, p. 498). 
More recently is the work of Conrad (e.g. 2005; 2007). He proposed medicalisation as the 
process of turning everyday life into a medical problem. When a problem is defined, created or 
taken control of by the institution of medicine, the solutions necessarily become medical. 
Conrad’s concept identifies that medicine possesses a moral power to bring social problems into 
medical jurisdiction which then justifies treatment, even against a patient’s will if life is at risk 
e.g. doctors can force feed someone if their weight is too low. Medicalisation can also be seen in 
the expansion of medical professional’s power over increasing areas of life, in particular around 
delineating deviant behaviours from normal ones. Some have argued that medicine has 
supplanted religious and legal modes of social control (Foucault, 2012; Zola, 1972). Medical 
assessments, opinions and treatments are incorporated in various legislation including AD 
legislations, which is to say, they are part of the assemblage. 
  
Medicalisation occurs through medical experts having the power to define what is normal and 
what is pathological through normalising technologies (Foucault, 2012). The authority and 
 
29 Illich (1977) coined the iatrogenic harm—harm that is caused by medical care. 
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legitimacy of doctors is derived from the ‘clinical gaze’ by which doctors (aided by technology) 
access the inner most recesses of the body, often invisible to the naked eye and ‘see’ and 
translate the pathologies therein into a diagnosable disease (Foucault, 2012; Jutel, 2011). 
Another form of medicalisation is giving medical meaning to things (Rose, 2007a). Medicine is 
one of the discourses that constitutes the experience of being alive, of illness and of dying. As 
Rose (2007a, p. 700) put it, “it has made us who we are”. It is this physicality of embodiment 
that underpins patienthood because the body is given meaning predominantly through medical 
understandings. Medicalisation occurs through the very experience of being a patient, interacting 
with health professionals and the healthcare system, and receiving treatments. 
  
However, medicalisation is not only something that is done to patients. One of the recent drivers 
of medicalisation is consumers or patients themselves (and in fact, medicalisation could not 
happen without them) (Conrad, 2005). Humans generally desire to be healthy and live for a long 
time and therefore consume medicine. Doctors still act as gatekeepers to treatments but they are 
no longer the only factor. Rather, patients also engage in a form of medicalisation. Through 
necessity they become experts in their own illnesses, develop a knowledge base about treatment 
options, and act as a good patient who is compliant with medication regimes while undertaking 
self-management activities to control their illness.  
  
But why are doctors the professionals we turn to when we are ill or at the end of life? According 
to Good (1994) it is because of the moral drama of human suffering at end of life. Following 
Weber, Good (1994, p. 70) stated that “civilizations are organized [sic] around a soteriological 
vision—an understanding of the nature of suffering, and means of transforming or transcending 
suffering and achieving salvation. In Western contemporary civilization, medicine is at the core 
of our soteriological vision”. Medicine mediates physiology and soteriology in the moral drama 
of care (Good, 1994), offering a secular soteriology of a long life (Jaye et al., 2018). Medicine is 
relied on because it offers some certainty over life and death. Such existential concerns are 
always present within medicine but unable to be contained by practice (Good, 1994). Modern 
medicine revolutionised health and longevity through prevention and curative measures. The 
certainty is derived from scientific medicine, for example antibiotics, vaccines, life-saving and 
life-prolonging treatments. In this way, medicine has jurisdiction over death and has 
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manufactured some certainty in an ontologically frail world; even if the certainty is illusory. 
However, such advances have also created uncertainty and previously unavailable choices to 
extend life or not. Medicine creates some of the ambiguity thereby reinforcing the needs for their 
services (Timmermans, 2005). Uncertainty is an overarching theme in the present research. 
  
At the same time as medicalisation, movements to de-medicalise life occur. Childbirth, which 
has parallels with death, is a prime example of the de-medicalisation movement (S. Kitzinger, 
2005). The internet has accelerated the education of ‘patients’ outside of clinical interactions and 
made peer support and self-education more accessible. Salmon and Hall (2004, p. 55) observed 
that “sociological analysis has long been concerned with the advance of the boundary of medical 
responsibility, but it has been less concerned with its retraction”. Medicalisation and de-
medicalisation can occur simultaneously and on different levels (Halfmann, 2012). Rose (2007a) 
suggests going beyond medicalisation, that to state medicalisation occurred is not a critique nor a 
conclusion. In Chapter Four I argue there is a re-medicalisation of dying occurring. By re-
medicalisation I mean the reestablishment of dying under the jurisdiction of medicine when 
attempts to de-medicalise it are made by hospice and palliative care (e.g. empowering patients 
and whānau to care for their loved ones, the compassionate communities movement (Abel, 
2018)). Re-medicalisation has occurred with psychiatry (Pasnau, 1987), homosexuality (Conrad 
& Angell, 2004), medical marijuana (Pedersen & Sandberg, 2013) and male circumcision 
(Carpenter, 2010).  
  
As established above, the WTHD is conceived in medical (including psychological) terms. The 
vast majority of the research is conducted by clinicians and carried out in clinical settings. This 
makes sense given the medicalisation of the WTHD. The treatments suggested to remedy the 
WTHD are more care, often in the form of pain relief or talk therapy such as psychiatric or 
counselling. AD is an intriguing anomaly where medicine, at least as it is represented by its 
professional organisations, does not want AD within its jurisdiction. Despite opposition from 




Medicine is implicated in AD in three ways. Firstly, the proposed regimes around the world all 
involved doctors in some capacity, casting AD under their jurisdiction and control. Secondly, 
crucial technological developments in medicine are related to the rise in popularity, or at least 
acceptability, of AD. The “contemporary movement for euthanasia can be viewed as a response 
to the medicalisation of dying and the propensity of medical science to perform life-saving 
‘miracles’ that result in ‘bad death’ by keeping people alive only with superior technology” 
(Kellehear, 1999, p. 151). Thirdly, modern medicine has facilitated knowing when death can be 
expected, albeit quite crudely (Christakis & Lamont, 2000). By making it possible to anticipate 
death, it consequently becomes possible to modify when death occurs.  
 
In summary, medicalisation is a social and cultural process that is identified post-facto. Many of 
the changes in dying can be attributed to medicalisation originally driven, although 
unintentionally, by doctors. I conceptualise the medicalisation as a negotiation and collaboration 
between patient and doctor during their interactions but also between society and medicine. What 
is negotiated is the degree of medicalisation and the degree of resistance to or engagement with 
medicine. This thesis will show that participants seeking AD through the cooperation of doctors 
is a new iteration of medicalisation. 
  
Control and the Wish to Hasten Death 
The purpose of this subsection is to review how control has been discussed in relation to the 
WTHD with a view to understanding the agency and control surrounding a person’s WTHD. The 
lack of control over death and dying is a crucial factor in the development of the WTHD 
according to much of the literature (Monforte-Royo et al., 2012; Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2017). 
And yet, as noted above, control and the WTHD was identified as under-theorised by Rodríguez-
Prat et al. (2016) who conducted a systematic review and meta-ethnography. Control is discussed 
in several ways within the WTHD literature, most often as located within the individual (before 
losing it). “Death is essentially an experience of loss of control” according to Rehmann-Sutter 
(2015, p. 163). Monforte-Royo et al. (2012) suggest that loss of control is experienced by 
patients with advanced illness in three domains: functional impairment, psychological control 
and the inability to take control over suffering at the end of life. Loss of control was often related 
to the loss of self, one’s life and future (Monforte-Royo et al., 2012; Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2017). 
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Although the context, personal factors and condition varied for each participant in the reviewed 
studies, in general terms, the loss of control was found to be a major category in the meta-
syntheses of the WTHD (Monforte-Royo et al., 2012; Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2017). The original 
WTHD model suggests the WTHD is a kind of control, ‘to have an ace up one’s sleeve just in 
case’ and posits that the WTHD is “an extreme (or perhaps the sole) manifestation of the desire 
for control” (Monforte-Royo et al., 2012, p. 12). 
  
Discussing and planning an assisted death (without necessarily acting on it) is a way of 
redeeming some control over one’s life and current situation. Having the option or a plan for 
hastened death can relieve some of the suffering that is caused by the loss of control over life 
(Coyle & Sculco, 2004; Monforte-Royo et al., 2012; Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2017; Schroepfer, 
Noh, & Kavanaugh, 2009). A hypothetical exit plan helped to tolerate the present or anticipated 
future (Nissim et al., 2009). Several studies suggested the WTHD was a final act of control. In 
the wish to die framework by Rurup et al. (2011, p. 206), control could be reclaimed by 
“developing thoughts about death as a positive thing or release of problems” due to feelings of 
being out of control to realise the desired situation. Onwuteaka-Philipsen (2015, p. 116) 
described the WTHD as, “when everything else is out of their control, the wish to stop living is 
someone’s final autonomous protection against the threat of continued life”. Expressing the 
desire for hastened death is a manifestation of the last control the dying can exert because losing 
control can be a form of suffering (Coyle & Sculco, 2004; Rodriguez-Prat & van Leeuwen, 
2018). This corresponds with one of the nine meanings of the wish to die that Ohnsorge et al. 
(2014b, p. 8) identified, “to preserve self-determination in the last moments of life (control)”. 
  
Monforte-Royo et al. (2018) defined control as self-efficacy in their structural equation 
modelling of the role of dignity and control in the WTHD. The definition of control as self-
efficacy creates conceptual ambiguity as they are not totally synonymous. While one has to 
believe that something can be done in order to seek to control it, I suggest this concept alone is 
too narrowly focussed. A broader consideration of the discursive context as well as the 
individual’s perception of control is necessary to gain a deeper understanding of the issue of 
control and why it is highly valued in late modern society. Seale (1998) explained the 
sociological meaning of taking control over one’s death as one way of preserving a meaningful 
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social existence until death and securing self-identity because it enables maintaining intact 
personal narrative of self-identity and social bonds. 
  
Control, dignity, autonomy and identity are interrelated concepts for people at the end of life 
(Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2016). Control and autonomy were not defined but taken as self-evident in 
the review (Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2016). The authors identified two different conceptualisations 
of dignity; autonomy as the basis of dignity or dignity as intrinsic. They adopted the definition of 
dignity as intrinsic which most participants in the studies they analysed did not identify with; 
instead those participants preferred a definition of dignity that is dynamic (a personal quality 
related to self-perception and their context). This has implications for the trustworthiness of 
Rodriguez-Prat et al.’s interpretation and subsequent applicability, particularly since the 
conception of dignity varies between people and cultures and the majority of the literature was 
from Western countries. 
  
Another way of understanding control is by examining the things individuals do in order to 
exercise control. Schroepfer et al. (2009) explored the aspects of dying which elders seek to 
control and the means for so doing, drawing on Heckhausen and Schulz’s (1995) life-span theory 
of control. The aspects of the dying process that were important to have control over were 
decision-making, personal independence, psychological attitude, activities of daily living and 
relationships. Over half of Schroepfer et al.’s participants wanted more control; however, they 
felt their illness prevented them exercising more control. The three control strategies were: 1) 
‘selective primary control’, when the person uses their own resources (time, ability, effort) to 
attain a goal; 2) ‘compensatory primary control’, the person seeks the help of others if necessary; 
3) ‘compensatory secondary control’, the person adapts to their situation or uses cognitive 
strategies to reassess their own circumstances. Schroepfer et al.’s participants who employed 
multiple strategies of control felt more in control. This third strategy offers a more nuanced 
perspective on control that the aforementioned literature lacks. It acknowledges that as well as 
changing external factors, people also adapt internally and reframe the situation as it unfolds. 
However, this understanding is individually focussed and does not consider what control is and 
is not possible in this socio-historical moment. 
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In response to uncertainty at the end of life, people seek control as they desire greater certainty 
(N. Richards & Rotter, 2013). Prognostic, temporal, existential and narrative uncertainties exist 
for people with advanced cancer, creating a ‘lived incoherence’ (Kenny, Broom, Kirby, Wyld, & 
Lwin, 2017). In particular for hospice patients, uncertainties included who was in control of their 
dying and uncertainties about important relationships (Stephenson, Sheehan, Hansen, & Mayo, 
2017). Stephenson et al. (2017) argue the nature of uncertainty is spiritual and is related to 
uncertainties about dying, whereas Beck proposes that uncertainty stems from the loss of trust in 
expert knowledge (Beck, 1992). Risk and uncertainty are interlinked for Beck. They are related 
to the transformations in society and selfhood (Lupton, 2013). Risk and uncertainty, as part of 
the reasons people seek control, are important concepts for the present research. I concur with 
Richards and Rotter’s (2013) conclusion that people seeking assistance to die in Switzerland 
were seeking certainty against suffering. Uncertainty at the end of life is under-researched 
(Stephenson et al., 2017). 
  
Overall, my reading of the literature suggests control is central to the WTHD, however it is 
generally dealt with on an individual, and therefore superficial, level because it does cannot not 
take the wider context into account. It overlooks the importance of social structures, such as the 
legal, social and cultural norms, and political systems, which together shape what one can do and 
how one can be/become. Chapter Five explores the nuances and external factors that shape 
individual control over one’s dying. There, I define control in terms of the context and other 
values it relates to. 
  
Discourse, Death and Dying 
In this subsection I describe a Foucauldian understanding of discourse and exemplify how 
discourse relates to dying and AD. There are several different treatments of discourse. 
Sociological approaches to discourse go beyond linguistics and how language is used to examine 
how texts, in the broadest sense of the word, have discursive functions (Foucault, 1980). The 
main sociological theorists describe discourses in terms of hegemony (T. Bates, 1975) or relating 
it to ideas and power (Foucault, 1983). I am using discourse to make visible the ways in which 
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power/knowledge formations (defined in the following chapter) privilege some ways of 
knowing, doing and being and exclude others (Petersen & Bunton, 1997). 
  
Discourse produces knowledges that inform what is thought of as normative, self-evident and 
common sense (Norwood, 2007). Discourse is evidenced by both a collection of statements and 
the rules by which a collection of statements is formed (Foucault, 1972). These rules have a 
discursive function and limit what is possible to say and who can say it (Mills, 2004). Discourse 
is more than speech acts, discourse incorporates practices, knowledges, values, objects, subjects, 
institutions, rules, statements and norms. As well as formal rules that govern discourse, there are 
also unwritten and informal rules. For example, family involvement in euthanasia in the 
Netherlands is not part of the law but comprises part of the informal practice (Norwood, 2007). 
The classic Foucauldian definition of discourse is “practices that systematically form the objects 
of which they speak... Discourses are not about objects; they constitute them and in the practice 
of doing so conceal their own intervention” (Foucault, 1972, p. 49). I adopt this definition 
because it alludes to the discursive and constitutive formation of meaning and of subjects.  
  
Discourses are produced and governed by disciplinary blocks or social institutions (Foucault, 
1990). “Discourses, for Foucault, are the vehicles by which the knowledges, normalising 
technologies and underpinning values of these institutions, are generated and dispersed” (Jaye, 
Young, Lomax-Sawyers, & Egan, 2020, p. 3). For example, the institutions of religion and 
medicine leverage their authority to frame AD as violating the value and sanctity of life. Social 
movements such as humanism or proponents of ‘requested death’ (McInerney, 2000) produce 
their own discourses. In all our interactions we encounter discourses—they are often pervasive. 
Discourses can be seen as operating at a macro-, meso- and micro-levels through shaping social 
practices and the discursive constitution of individuals’ subjectivities according to Lupton 
(1992). Discourses detail what can be said and done in particular epochs and locations by 
particular actors. In this way, discourses provide the positions made available for subjects to take 
up. Individuals take on different identities based on the range of subject positions made available 
in a particular socio-historical context which, in turn, is shaped by the current discourses. 
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Discourses establish categories of normal and deviant. A dominant discourse may be buttressed 
by legal structures. For example, doctors are authorised by law to compel patients to treatments 
under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act (1992). Deviance is 
defined by experts in medicine (psychiatrists) who are expert in what is normal and therefore 
abnormal human behaviour (McGann & Conrad, 2007). Extreme deviance (i.e. risk to self and 
others) is supported by law with the result that individual’s rights and autonomy can be severely 
curtailed by health professionals within the dominant discourse. This is ostensibly reasonable 
given the risk that deviant individuals pose to themselves and others. The appeal of this discourse 
is the safety of citizens and preserving the life of the patient. Under this discourse, corrective 
therapies on the deviant individual can be imposed. 
  
However, discourses are always relative and they can be contested. They represent truth but at 
the same time truth is relatively fluid. What is at stake is truth; that is, which knowledges are 
privileged and/or have become normative. Dominant discourses are those which “privilege 
versions of social life that legitimate existing power relations and social structures” (Willig, 
2013, p. 130). Dominant discourses come to be understood as ‘truth’ so much so that they are 
regarded within cultures as ‘common sense’. A discourse is dominant when it has the support of 
a regime of truth and the power to define knowledge, norms and behaviour (Foucault, 1991). The 
normative power of discourses means they are relatively impervious to challenge. Truth is 
dependent upon persuasive arguments supported by appeals to various forms of evidence 
(science, tradition, experience, common sense, religion) (Neale & Boarder Giles, 2018) and the 
effectiveness of rhetoric devices. The effectiveness of dominant discourses as normalising 
technologies is their pervasiveness at all levels of citizens’ lives as common sense because this 
obscures the genealogy and the highly political nature of discourse. 
  
Now, I turn to some of the dominant and competing discourses around dying and AD. Official 
discourses can be treated as a cultural script that provide people with rhetorical resources for 
explaining and justifying their actions (Seale, 1998). In the context of managing dying, these 
scripts tend to come from medicine, the psy-sciences and religion (Seale, 1998). Normative 
constructs around dying include: dignity, grace, peaceful, hopeful yet realistic/accepting, 
altruism, duty, virtue, gift, resilience, stoicism, being brave, not feeling regrets, sanctity, 
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survivorship, compassion, growth through suffering, and vulnerability (e.g. Broom, 2012; 
Broom, Kirby, Kenny, MacArtney, & Good, 2016; Seale, 1998). More contested discourses, 
often associated with AD include: the right to die, death with dignity, giving up, control and 
choice, free will, risk, paternalism of medicine, sin and suicide (e.g. Gandsman, 2016; Hannig, 
2019; Jaye et al., 2019; Seale, 1998). N. Richards and Krawczyk (2019, p. 5) suggested that 
“assisted dying only succeeds in becoming lawful in the first place when proponents are 
successful in attaching cultural scripts about the virtues of assisted dying to pre-existing, already 
socially accepted cultural scripts about the postmodern ‘good death’”. Thus, attention to the 
intersection of the dominant and competing discourses about death and AD are important and are 
explored in Chapter Six. 
  
Such constructs intersect and support each other to create normative discourses around dying 
whereby one should accept death but not hasten death, and one should want to live for as long as 
possible because life is precious and of value (historically speaking, in certain cultures). These 
discourses have greater relevance for dying people and healthcare professionals. The normative 
constructs are felt strongly by dying people and carers, and perpetuated by healthcare 
professionals (Proulx & Jacelon, 2004). Family and friends of dying people are seeking guidance 
on how to navigate this terrain making the normative praxis of health professionals even more 
consequential. The dying person also seeks guidance, but arguably their experiences of suffering 
and questioning of continued existence prompt them to challenge the dominant discourses, as the 
resultant analysis of this research shows. People approaching the end of life are likely to be 
aware of the competing discourses as they become salient for them. 
  
Other studies have used discourse as a means to analyse the end of life and AD (e.g. Armstrong, 
1987; Jaye et al., 2019; Karsoho et al., 2016; Lamers & Williams, 2015; Norwood, 2007, 2009, 
2018; Street & Kissane, 2001; Winnington, 2016; Zimmermann, 2004; Zimmermann, 2012). 
Discourses around death, dying and illness in the AD debate are dominated by the institution of 
medicine, eclipsing other framings (Kellehear, 2007; Lamers & Williams, 2015). Various data 
have been used including court documents, ethnographic observations, interviews, social media 
and media. Overall these studies conclude that discourses are both productive and disciplinary 
meaning they produce silences and incitements. They found that certain discourses (often 
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medical) prevail by excluding other framings through the power/knowledge nexus that bolsters 
their claim to authority. To elaborate, Zimmermann (2012, p. 217) used Foucauldian discourse 
analysis to show the discourse on acceptance of dying promoted by palliative care “represents a 
productive power, which disciplines patients through apparent psychological and spiritual 
gratification, and encourages participation in a certain way to die”. Discourse analysis will be 
described in Chapter Three where I discuss the methodology for this research. The ways in 
which dominant discourses are contested, used for particular ends and rarefied, is the subject of 
Chapter Six. 
  
In summary, in this section I described the conceptual framework that marries structure and 
agency, the sociological literature and the WTHD literature to analyse the phenomenon of New 
Zealanders’ WTHD. The gaps this research seeks to address are the paucity of ANZ research 
about people approaching the end of life considering AD and a broader contextual consideration 
of the WTHD. I identified three key theoretics to elevate the AD debate to a higher level. 
Through my analysis of the reasons people consider AD, I contribute to the theorising of 
medicalisation, the role of control and normative discourses surrounding the WTHD. 
  
Conclusion 
Dying and death practices have changed through the ages, shaped by structural, demographic, 
social, economic, cultural, and ideological factors. Acceptable dying (the good death) is 
culturally and individually specific (T. Walter, 2017). It appears the acceptability of AD is 
increasing as jurisdictions around the world pass legislation; as evidenced locally where attitudes 
have been stable over the last 20 years (Young et al., 2019) and the passage of End of Life 
Choice Act (subject to a public referendum). However, no WTHD death studies have been 
conducted in ANZ and one of the effects is that the views of people approaching the end of life 
with a WTHD are missing from the debate on AD. Research that explores New Zealander’s 
explanations and motivations for considering an assisted death, is necessary to shed light on our 
unique local context and inform societal and political debate. 
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I have purposefully not engaged deeply with the debate on whether AD is ethically permissible 
or not, to focus on the nuanced reasons people consider AD and the broader sociology of death 
and dying. The rationale for doing so is to delve into the conceptual and contextual elements that 
underpin the WTHD which are relatively unexamined. Instead, I have knitted together literature 
that has the topic of death, and specifically AD, in common but addresses it from different 
standpoints and varying aims. My review of this literature, that the WTHD literature is largely 
atheoretical and decontextualised, has led to my approach being guided by sociological theory 
while attending to the socio-cultural values that shape and inform the WTHD. The next and 
subsequent chapters draw on a variety of sociological theories to examine the meanings, values 




Chapter Three: Methodology 
 
Introduction 
Designing a research protocol to explore AD from the perspectives of people who would 
consider it required careful consideration because of the ambiguous and unlawful nature of the 
topic, the fluctuation of WTHD for any individual over the course of their dying and because it 
can co-exist with the wish to live (Hudson et al., 2006; Johansen et al., 2005; Ohnsorge et al., 
2012). There are various instruments to measure the WTHD (Bellido-Pérez, Monforte-Royo, 
Tomás-Sábado, Porta-Sales, & Balaguer, 2017; Hudson et al., 2006). I have chosen not to use 
these because they do not fit with the overarching aim of the study—to explore the nuances of 
why people would consider hastening death. According to my own worldview and others’ 
(Kleinman, 1988), quantifiable measures render suffering as standardised numbers that fail to 
impart the phenomenological and experiential components that underlie a person’s choices. Nor 
do such measures capture individuals’ holistic or discursive contexts. Qualitative methods are 
more appropriate for exploring the qualities of dying and offer a more in-depth study of the 
experience as a whole. A qualitative approach to the WTHD acknowledges the complex realities 
of people’s reasons for considering hastening their death. In this research, I seek to illuminate the 
many facets of meaning and inherent contradictions rather than make claims about the absolute 
truth of AD wishes. 
  
The term qualitative research covers a vast range of traditions, fields, subject matters and 
methods (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Guba and Lincoln (1994) outlined four main competing 
research paradigms—positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and constructivism30—each 
with its own ontological and epistemological assumptions and methodologies. Paradigms are 
philosophical standpoints or belief systems that underpin all human inquiry and govern modes of 
 
30 Some disciplines differentiate between constructivism—the beliefs that individuals create their own internal 
meanings of the world—and social constructionism recognising these individual internal meanings are constructed 
from the social context in which the person exists (Harper, 2012). In later works Guba and Lincoln (2005) refer to 
this inquiry paradigm as constructivism/constructionism (without an explanation that I read). I will use 
constructionism as it incorporates both aspects. 
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human inquiry, shaping what are legitimate questions and how to go about answering these 
questions (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Crotty (1998) called paradigms theoretical perspectives and 
identified more than four. Despite some variation, there are several commonly agreed paradigms 
within qualitative research: constructionism, critical theory (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) and 
participatory (Guba & Lincoln, 2005) and more recently, new materialism (N. Fox & Alldred, 
2015).  
 
Some terms are used variously in the field. For example Crotty (1998) used constructionism as 
an epistemology and Guba & Lincoln (1994) as a research paradigm. I use constructionism as a 
paradigm to inform my ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. While 
definitions of ontology, epistemology and methodology are interrelated, and sometimes 
conflated, I discuss them separately as far as possible for the purposes of a clear and developing 
explanation. Ontology (the nature of being and reality) informs epistemology (how we can know 
the world), which together influence methodology (how to collect and analyse data). Harper 
(2012, p. 87) succinctly summarises that “epistemology concerns what it is possible to know 
whereas ontology concerns what there is to know in the world ‘out there’”. 
  
Briefly, this project is grounded by a relativist ontology and a subjectivist epistemology that is 
informed by a constructionist paradigm (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). These terms are defined below. 
The analytical framework underpinning the present research is comprised of two methodological 
approaches—Foucauldian discourse analysis (Foucault, 1991; Lupton, 1992; Powers, 1996) and 
assemblage theory (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Feely, 2019; N. Fox & Alldred, 2015; N. Fox & 
Ward, 2008)—as well as a range of other theoretics to augment the analysis. I begin this chapter 
with an overview of the ontology and epistemology (meta-theories) that underpin this qualitative 
study. It is important to articulate my own ontological and epistemological premises for this 
piece of research because they influence which research questions are asked and the strategies 
that are appropriate for answering them. I then move to methodology and describe the two 





Ontology concerns the nature of reality and social entities (Bryman, 2016; Guba & Lincoln, 
1994). Broadly it can be divided into two camps, realism and relativism (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Ontological positions can be seen as a continuum corresponding to the research paradigms from 
positivism to constructionism, respectively (Crotty, 1998; Harper, 2012). A realist position 
assumes that a single reality exists outside of the mind (Crotty, 1998; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Truth resides in objects outside of consciousness (Crotty, 1998). Realism is an ontological 
assertion that the meanings ascribed to phenomena exist independently of social actors (Bryman, 
2016). 
  
On the other hand, relativism assumes that while objects exist and comprise reality, they only 
have meaning once interpreted. Reality has local and specific meanings, constructed by 
individuals and groups in social interactions (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Relativism accepts that 
multiple realities exist because each person has their own experience of reality comprised of their 
own attributions of meaning. It acknowledges that social phenomena and their ascribed meanings 
are continually achieved by social actors through interactions, therefore they are subject to 
change (Bryman, 2016). Relativism takes the position that data do not mirror reality because 
there is no single reality to mirror and there are multiple valid interpretations of the same 
phenomena (Harper, 2012). 
  
Another component of ontology is that of social ontology; what is the nature of the social world? 
Ontology forms part of the classical sociological debate between structure and agency, as defined 
in the previous chapter, and the influence attributed to each in shaping our social reality. 
Ontology is revisited in the methodology where I draw connections between the two 
methodological approaches used in this research. 
  
Epistemology 
Epistemology considers the question, “what is the nature of the relationship between the knower 
or would-be knower and what can be known?” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). It has 
implications for what knowledge is accepted as valid (Bryman, 2016). Epistemological positions 
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range from objectivism to subjectivism, depending on the ontological and paradigmatic 
assumptions. In contrast to positivism, which proposes a phenomenon can be objectively known, 
the constructionist paradigm acknowledges subjectivism. That is to say, the knower plays an 
active role in acquiring and creating knowledge. 
  
According to objectivism, since there is a single reality, data collected mirrors reality (Harper, 
2012). The researcher is assumed to be objective and unbiased; they do not influence what 
knowledge is discovered. Researchers usually apprehend reality through objective experiments 
and observation. Subjectivism rests upon the notion that researchers do not discover knowledge 
so much as construct it (Harper, 2012). The researcher always brings their experiences to the 
research; therefore, knowledge is always subjective because it is constructed and interpreted 
through one’s worldview. Subjectivism recognises the entanglement between researcher and 
research subject and through interactions, the research data is co-produced (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015).  
  
The inextricable linkage of researcher and research participant collapses the traditional 
categories of ontology and epistemology so that the research becomes a product of this particular 
investigator interacting with this particular group of people, at this particular moment in time 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994). With a subjectivist epistemology, researcher reflexivity becomes 
important. Reflexivity seeks to understand the ways in which the research, particularly data 
collection and analysis, is shaped by the researcher, who they have been and who think they are 
(Pillow, 2003). And similarly, how the research shapes the researcher. I discuss my position on 
AD in more depth below and I reflect on the role I played in the research in the discussion. 
  
Positioning the Present Research 
This research is grounded within a constructionist paradigm. Constructionist research 
acknowledges the socially constructed nature of reality and inherent within this, that knowledge 
is also socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Constructionism rests on an assumption 
about the nature of being and the world: while there is substantial sharing, there is no one truth or 
reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Gergen & Gergen, 2003). Having said that, different truths 
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have different social power, as the present research will demonstrate. Harper (2012) aptly points 
out that recognising how concepts are constructed and change over time does not deny that 
people experience the concept in a very real way. 
  
There is a further distinction within constructionism between more radical and moderate 
conceptualisations. Radical social constructionists posit that we cannot know another person’s 
reality because we cannot directly access it (Harper, 2012). They argue that research should 
focus on the textual data that is available rather than infer abstract entities such as thoughts and 
emotions.  Texts are not treated as a window into something else but as something to be studied 
in and of itself (Harper, 2012). Moderate social constructionism, also known as critical realist 
social constructionism, assumes that there are certain a priori, material shared practices that 
shape discourse and that while we can investigate reality, it will not be a direct or whole account 
(Harper, 2012). This perspective adds social, cultural and historical analytical lenses to the 
analysis (Harper, 2012). A Foucauldian discourse analysis adheres to this view (Harper, 2012). 
The acknowledgement of ‘the material’ aligns with the use of assemblage as a theoretical tool for 
analysis (as opposed to a new materialism paradigm), described below, that I have adopted in 
this research. 
  
My worldview aligns me with a moderate social constructionist position. As I understand it, a 
constructionist researcher seeks to understand and represent individuals’ interpretations of their 
experiences by interacting with participants and eliciting their views. Through talk and other 
cultural forms, participants’ accounts are signifiers of socially constructed discourses and 
practices. As a by-product of research, I reconstruct participants’ representations as well as my 
own. I see a need to incorporate the materiality of life and dying in my analysis of how 
participants approach the end of life. My interest in the social and cultural systems (structure) 
that people draw on and rework to make sense of wanting the option of AD (agency) lends itself 
to this perspective.  The body, other objects (both animate and non-human) are by nature, 
implicated in this dynamic interplay between individuals and social structures. 
  
A constructionist research paradigm is consistent with a relativist ontology and a subjectivist 
epistemology. A person’s experience of dying is relative; they have their own unique meaning of 
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what it means to live a good life and how to die well.  While these concepts have some shared 
social meanings, they are also relative to the way that individual has lived their life. This 
research seeks to explore individuals’ realities of dying, their personal meanings and the social 
constructs they draw on to make sense of their experiences. In seeking to understand and 
interpret their experiences, as is the aim of constructionist inquiry (Guba & Lincoln, 1994), my 
access to their experience and thus my account will only ever be partial. 
  
My analysis will always be interpreted through my own worldview, or a double hermeneutic. 
This is defined as “the researcher is trying to make sense of the participant trying to make sense 
of their personal and social world” (J. Smith, 2004, p. 40). It does not undermine the account 
produced; rather subjectivism recognises it is one of a number of interpretations possible. In 
exploring these meanings with participants, I am explicitly involved in producing their accounts; 
that is to say, knowledge is socially co-constructed. As well as asking participants to tell me 
about themselves and their experiences, I asked questions which took the interviews in particular 
directions. I am the instrument with which the participants were probed. My unique 
characteristics, strengths, weaknesses and worldview coloured the interviews; these are reflected 
upon primarily in the discussion chapter, occasionally throughout the thesis and in the section 
below. Disentangling subjectivity and objectivity is complicated due to one’s embeddedness in 
the context being studied (Bourdieu, 1992). In order to begin interrogating my own views, I must 




In this section I describe the strategies of inquiry drawn on to put the social constructionist 
paradigm into action and to explore the data. The two methodologies adopted for this research 
are Foucauldian discourse analysis and assemblage theory. I then highlight the points of 
articulation and difference. As I searched for the most appropriate methodology for the analysis I 
wanted to conduct, in order to meet the aims and answer the research questions of my study, I 
found each had its own merits and shortcomings. I decided a methodologically pure approach 
was neither possible nor necessary. Rather I engaged different methodologies to highlight the 
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complexity and varied nature of the end of life and specifically the WTHD. To use a metaphor, a 
toolbox has many tools and a task will often require more than one tool. This approach can be 
termed the ‘research-assemblage’, comprising of the subject being studied, contextual elements, 
instruments, theoretical approaches and people (N. Fox & Alldred, 2015). The research-
assemblage is an emergent and pragmatic construction, using theories, methods and strategies as 
the research requires. Theories are tools that answer the question: what’s going on here? Within a 
paradigm, mixing methodologies is acceptable when they are commensurable in terms of their 
axiomatic elements (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). An assemblage and Foucauldian discourse analysis 
approach is consistent with the relativist ontology, subjectivist epistemological positions adopted 
in this research. There are increasingly blurred boundaries between strategies, disciplines and 
philosophies (N. Fox & Alldred, 2015; Kincheloe, 2001). Next, I describe each methodology. 
  
Discourse Analysis 
The concept of discourse was explained and exemplified in the previous chapter. Here I expand 
on related concepts that are central to understanding discourse and discuss one approach to 
discourse analysis. Many discourse analysts draw upon the philosophy of Michel Foucault 
(Foucault, 1972, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1997) to examine how texts, in all senses 
of the word, encompassing discourses and their comprising practices and institutions, serve to 
produce particular subjects, subjectivities, social relations and meaning. I find Foucault’s 
concepts of discourse, subjectivity and power particularly useful. The relatedness of these 
guiding concepts leads me to discuss them as intertwining threads. I then briefly discuss ways of 
doing discourse analysis. In keeping with the theoretical orientation of this thesis, I adopt a 
constructionist rather than post-structuralist approach to discourse analysis. 
  
Foucault rejected the Enlightenment concept of identity as it assumes a coherent, rational, 
autonomous self and instead preferred the term subjectivity. Subjectivity integrates the ideas of 
being subjugated to someone else’s control and tied to one’s own identity through conscience or 
self-knowledge (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). In contrast, identity connotes something fixed and 
essential, whereas subjectivity highlights the multiple, contradictory and fragmented experience 
of the late modern world. Subjectivity allows us to identify how we are constituted and 
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positioned by discourses in one context or another. This theoretical orientation makes it possible 
to see the multiple discourses and webs of power relations that we are caught up in. Where 
researchers (e.g. N. Fox & Ward, 2008; Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2016) and participants used 
identity, I adopt their language; or I use identity to refer to it as fixed. 
  
The way Foucault conceptualised power is central to understanding this process of constituting 
subjectivity. In particular, his arguments that power is productive rather than repressive and that 
it constitutes the individual as a subject are pertinent here (Foucault, 1980). This is the 
connection with structuration theory. Power and structure both enable and constraint agency and 
are reproduced by individuals’ actions. Foucault explained power as a relationship between 
individuals, groups and institutions and as something that is exerted rather than something that is 
possessed and static (Elliott, 2001). As Foucault (1980, p. 39) put it: 
in thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary 
form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of 
individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their action and 
attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives. 
Rather than conceptualising knowledge as power to do things, Foucault thought of knowledge as 
a means to control others. He signified this as power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980). Systems of 
examination, surveillance and normalisation use power/knowledge to exercise disciplinary power 
through which subjects can be managed, regulated and disciplined (Foucault, 1979). Biopower, a 
form of disciplinary power introduced by Foucault, will be expanded upon in Chapter Five on 
control. Since power is productive as opposed to repressive it also opens up possibilities for 
resistance. Power relations simultaneously construct the subject as an object and produce him/her 
as a subject with the capacity to resist. 
  
Discourse analysis is the process of investigating the conceptual and social preconditions that 
permit certain discourses to exist and the origins of those discourses are foregrounded. The 
changes that occurred over time within discourses are considered and the effects of discourses on 
social structures are examined (Powers, 1996). Some modes of discourse analysis such as critical 
discourse analysis employ specific methods to examine the text, discursive and social practices 
(Fairclough, 1992). However, a Foucauldian discourse analysis draws on genealogical 
understandings, power analytics and critical hermeneutics (Powers, 1996) and has no 
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prescriptive method to follow (Burrows, 1997). Instead discourse analysis inspects more than 
what is explicitly said, but also the silences, contradictions and internal rules (Lupton, 1992; 
Powers, 1996). I apply the methodological techniques of examining textual and contextual 
dimensions of discourse (Lupton, 1992) in the following chapters. Discourse analysis  
is concerned not simply with the manifest or obvious content of text and talk, 
but also seeks to display the reproduction of ideology, and the more subtle 
forms of control, persuasion and manipulation in the meanings inherent in 
discourse, both popular and arcane (Lupton, 1992, p. 149).  
It also examines the social and political contexts in which discourses are produced and 
reproduced (Lupton, 1992). 
 
As already discussed in the Introduction, Foucauldian discourse analysis and theory has been 
found to be a valuable methodology for investigating AD (e.g. Jaye et al., 2019; Jaye et al., 2020; 
Kubiak, 2015; Lamers & Williams, 2015; Norwood, 2009; Prado, 2003; Ryan, 2014; Ryan et al., 
2011). An analysis of the discourses that people who want AD draw upon and re-work to make 
sense of their experiences is useful because an individual’s subjectivity is made possible through 
the circulating discourses and power relations. Discourse analysis helps to highlight the ways 
people are able to be in the world and how other possibilities are limited or able to be contested. 
The genealogy of how euthanasia has come to hold a common sense understanding at the end of 
life (Ryan et al., 2011) and the subject positions available within ‘euthanasia talk’ have been 
fruitfully discussed (Norwood, 2009). 
  
My research methodology is broadly social constructionism with a discursive orientation, 
although as I conducted the research it became clear that the issues participants faced related to 
their embodied reality of decline and suffering, shaped by the material world around them. Thus, 
another methodology was necessary to complement it. I chose assemblage theory as a means of 
making sense of the multitude of discourses, viewpoints, and actors within the shifting AD/End 
of Life Choice Bill landscape. 
Assemblage Theory 
As I delved deeper into the data, an assemblage analysis appeared to add value to what a focus 
on discourse could. It helped me to notice the dynamic relationships between people, things and 
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ideas. I was intrigued by the potential of assemblage theory to provide a theoretical scaffold that 
could further the aims of this research because it “brackets evaluative moral questions and 
instead encourages new and divergent thoughts, to yield new lines of inquiry” (Kennedy et al., 
2013, p. 63). The capacity of any assemblage to form new relations and affect the social context 
(N. Fox & Ward, 2008) also appeals to my sensibility of social change. As well, it was an 
apposite approach given the suffering and objects participants described because assemblage 
privileges the embodied experience and materiality which can remain unseen in a purely 
discursive analysis (Feely, 2019). As the next chapter and discussion will show, the discursive 
effects of medicalisation are undeniable, but they also have affect and can be affected. 
  
New materialism, of which assemblage theory is one aspect, is positioned as an alternative to 
realism and social constructionism (N. Fox & Alldred, 2015). It balances human agency and 
discourses with the bodies, material world, objects and affect (Feely, 2019). Agency goes beyond 
human action, inanimate objects also have the capacity to have affect (N. Fox & Alldred, 2015). 
Affect is more than emotions, it refers to changing states and becoming (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987). Relevant here is a Deleuze-Guattarian ontology that emphasises interaction, processes, 
and becoming (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; N. Fox & Alldred, 2015). 
  
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) explained assemblages as the relations between components that 
together, have the capacity of doing things, not just what they are comprised of. Assemblages 
operate as machines with relational properties that are emergent, contingent and in flux (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1987). Assemblages are living arrangements (Buchanan, 2015). De Landa (2019) 
also emphasises the emergent properties of assemblages. Assemblage theory captures the ways 
that assemblages continuously arrange, produce and conceals it elements and relations, with real 
affects and effects (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Kennedy et al., 2013). Assemblage dissolves the 
boundaries between the dualisms of structure/agency, culture/nature, human/object, to focus on 
social reproduction, the material workings of power and how desires, feelings and meanings 




Assemblages have multiple affective capacities (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). The term 
‘rhizomatic’ captures assemblages’ multiple affective capacities, meaning the “branching, 
reversing, coalescing and rupturing flow” (N. Fox & Alldred, 2015, p. 401). Rhizomatic refers to 
the way assemblages have internal relations between the elements as well as connections to other 
assemblages (Kennedy et al., 2013). Another key concept is that assemblages are ‘territories’, 
undergoing process of territorialising and de-territorialising (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). In other 
words, territorialising is the stabilising and maintenance of relations within an assemblage and 
de-territorialising is the destabilising (Feely, 2019; N. Fox & Alldred, 2015). De-territorialisation 
can be a subversive process that allows change among the assemblage (Feely, 2019; N. Fox & 
Alldred, 2015). In one sense, “the body is lived through the assemblages”, always in process and 
doing (N. Fox, 2011, p. 362); with its assemblages of relations, the body is a ‘territory’ 
continuously contested over by rival forces, inanimate objects, which shape identity and desire in 
unpredictable ways (N. Fox & Ward, 2008). 
  
As a quick exemplar of these ideas, medicine is a complex assemblage of norms, values, 
practices, objects, and knowledges. It involves technologically advanced objects as well as 
tangible and symbolic actors, most obviously patients and health professionals but also managers 
and policy makers, who comprise a diverse and dynamic network. The affective capacity is to 
care for patients, although depending on the type of illness, treating professionals and 
characteristics of the patient, this can vary greatly. In ANZ medical care is mostly publicly 
funded, with subsided primary care appointments. Law reform such as the End of Life Choice 
Act de-territorialises the relations between these components, something that is explored in 
Chapters Four and Seven through an examination of medicalised dying and AD as assemblages.  
  
A possible critique of this research is that I have used assemblage as a methodology rather than 
as an ontology. However, I see it as part of the toolkit with which I can use as an implement as 
necessary to achieve the task at hand. How I went about the Foucauldian discourse analysis and 
assemblage method of analysis (Feely, 2019; N. Fox & Alldred, 2015) are described below. 
First, I turn to the connections between discourse analysis and assemblage and then describe the 
method of data collection. 
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Ontological and Epistemological Connections 
Having described the inquiry strategies adopted in this thesis, the purpose of this subsection is to 
outline my particular understanding of the connections that can be drawn between the 
methodologies of discourse analysis and assemblage theory as well as the disconnections. 
  
Foucault influenced the work of Deleuze and Guattari, especially around control (Deleuze, 
1992). Foucault’s as well as Deleuze and Guattari’s work is inherently about issues of power 
(Buchanan, 2015). Discourse analysis examines what individuals’ accounts of a phenomenon tell 
us about ideas of subjectivity, power, and society (Lupton, 1992). Assemblages are also 
concerned with the materiality of power; “power can act to direct flows in ways that serve the 
interests of certain groups and allow them to dominate other groups” (Haggerty & Ericson 2000 
cited in Feely, 2019, p. 9). Buchanan (2015) suggested that any examination of power, resistance 
and control should be contextualised (socially and within space and time) within the continual 
flow of affect.  A discursive approach also seeks to highlight the socio-cultural contexts, and 
structural conditions that allow the individual accounts that are provided; an assemblage looks at 
the comprising elements in relation to the context. Assemblage has been used alongside 
discourse (e.g. Feely, 2019). The two approaches illuminate different facets of the WTHD, as 
discursively experienced or comprising of different components, both at a particular time and 
place. Discourses are not fixed and neither are assemblages or material entities. As assemblages 
have relations with other assemblages, discourses also relate to other discourses. Much like 
assemblages are comprised of parts, so too are discourses made up of statements and rules. 
  
In terms of ontological assumptions, Buchanan’s (2015, pp. 386-387) interpretation of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s work is that “there is only one reality, but that reality is multiple in and of itself 
and we need conceptual tools like Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the assemblage to 
disentangle it and render visible its constitutive threads”. Whereas constructionist researchers 
focus on how each individual has their own lived reality whereby the phenomena are (re)created 
and the goal of understanding is the individual’s complex experience of the social world (Gergen 
& Gergen, 2003). All interpretations and constructions arise within the researcher’s experience 
of the world, speaking to the intersubjective nature of the world. With an assemblage lens, 
intersubjectivity can also include objects, materiality and external forces. De Landa (2019) 
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suggests language plays an important but not constitutive role; the version of discourse I adopt is 
more than language, it involves practices, knowledges and truths too. 
  
Where the two methodologies differ is the emphasis of the analysis. Assemblage analysis looks 
at the capacity and elements of an assemblage. A constructionist discourse analysis examines the 
words uttered by individuals to make sense of their experience and in so doing, how they are 
constructing their subjectivities and the world around them. On the other hand, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s approach has also been used to understand ‘health identities’ and the relationship 
between self, body and society (N. Fox & Ward, 2008). Individuals’ identities are constructed 
from encounters with bodies as elements of particular assemblages (De Landa, 2019; N. Fox & 
Ward, 2008). 
  
Assemblage theory and discourse analysis differ in their understanding of agency. According to 
assemblage theory, inanimate objects have agency (see for example Caronia & Mortari, 2015), 
especially as part of an assemblage (N. Fox & Alldred, 2015), whereas individuals have agency 
over objects according to accounts of structure and agency. The dualism of structure and agency 
is dissolved by both approaches (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; N. Fox & Alldred, 2015; Giddens, 
1979). Without rejecting discourse, a Deleuze-Guattarian ontology treats the discursive and 
material worlds equally (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). This helps to overcome the issue of 
discourse both describing what it constitutes and constituting it.  
  
I argue the two analytic approaches can be shifted between. It could be said that there is a move 
from a particular individual’s experience of the context to the general constituents of the context. 
The foci are conceived as different but connected orders of existence or a flat ontology where no 
one entity is more important than another (De Landa, 2019; Feely, 2019). Pragmatism and the 
goals of the research encouraged me to select the two approaches as the discursive analytic 
complements the material-affective analysis. Assemblage theory is useful for examining the 
forces that influence personal experiences of those who want AD and has an embodied, material 
aspect that some discourse analyses can overlook (Feely, 2019).31 Embodiment is important 
 
31 Discourse analysis does not necessarily imply a Foucauldian concept of discourse. Foucault's concepts of 
discourse, biopower and technologies take the body as the subject/object of the productive of power. 
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when researching dying yet is often neglected (Lawton, 2000). Dying is always, already 
embodied. 
  
In summary, the approaches are sufficiently consistent to be used as part of the research-
assemblage and to augment each other. Though there are definite connections as well as 
differences between the theoretical resources I am drawing upon to inform my analysis, the 
research-assemblage affords a multifaceted approach that embraces contradiction, complexity 
and partiality (N. Fox & Alldred, 2015). This gives me the opportunity to select aspects of 
theories that I find constructive and reject those that are not. The usefulness of these approaches 
should be assessed in terms of “verisimilitude, emotionality, personal responsibility, an ethic of 




The following subsections outline how I conducted the study, from design through to recruitment 
and interviewing. I describe who participated and why. Then I discuss the ethical considerations 
and how I took them into account. 
  
Designing the Study 
Most studies that involve participants with terminal illness recruit through physician referral, 
particularly in oncology and palliative settings (e.g. Broom, 2012; Dees et al., 2011; E. J. 
Emanuel et al., 2000; Nissim et al., 2009; Ohnsorge et al., 2014b; Pestinger et al., 2015). Other 
studies have used: advocacy organisations that counsel people interested in hastened death; grief 
counsellors; articles in newspapers; general practitioners; support groups (Chapple et al., 2006; 
Dees et al., 2011; Pearlman et al., 2005; N. Richards, 2012). My supervisors and I consulted with 
my local community hospice where I had been volunteering over the past year, including their 
Kāitakawaenga (Māori liaison/advisor), about the possibility of involving them in recruitment. 
The explicit focus on people who want or would consider AD was not a subject that this hospice 
could or wanted to be associated with given Hospice NZ’s longstanding stance against AD 
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(Hospice New Zealand, 2012, 2017). I also sought input from Māori advisors, a Pacific 
researcher, palliative care nurse specialists, a law professor, a patient with a terminal illness, a 
Consumer Advisor who was part of the Ministry of Health Palliative Care Expert Advisory 
Group and a number of medically qualified clinicians regarding the design of the study. Each 
consultation revealed paradigmatic assumptions. 
  
After consulting with the above stakeholders and prior to seeking ethical approval in the 
development phase of the study, I sought formal consultation from the University of Otago’s 
Ngāi Tahu Research Consultation Committee, established under a Memorandum of 
Understanding between Te Runanga O Ngāi Tahu and the University of Otago. All research is of 
interest to Māori (Pūtaiora Writing Group et al., 2010), especially matters related to death and 
dying which have high cultural significance for Māori (Moeke-Maxwell et al., 2019). The 
Committee commended the work that went into developing collaborations with Māori and 
suggested further a contact.  
 
Ethical Approval 
Ethical approval was sought from the Health and Disability Ethics Committee (HDEC) 
(17/NTA/90).  The application was reviewed by the Northern A Health and Disability Ethics 
Committee and provisionally approved pending receipt of further information regarding: how the 
audio-recordings would be kept confidential; reports from the internal peer review; 
confidentiality of participants during recruitment from organisations; whether the sample size of 
15 was necessary; to confirm that free counselling would be available to all participants 
including carers and health professionals which the study was originally designed to interview as 
well. To keep the research to a manageable size, I decided to only interview people approaching 
the end of life (and additional family members if the participants wanted to include them in the 
interview). I responded to these issues and an HDEC-expedited review pathway the (Chair and 
two Board members) approved the study as it was deemed a lower-risk observational study. 
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Recruitment 
I drafted a media release that was circulated through the University of Otago’s communications 
office. The media release was neutral regarding AD to avoid offending some members of the 
public or being seen to promote AD. For details please see the media release, advertisement and 
resulting media coverage in the Appendix A. These stories were shared widely online, for 
example on patient support groups. The study was also advertised in the Dunedin free 
community newspaper to ensure broad access. Relevant community and patient support 
organisations were also approached to include the study advertisement in their newsletters and 
online, such as Age Concern, Carers NZ, Eldernet NZ, Agewell, the Cancer Society, Multiple 
Sclerosis Society, the End-of-Life Choice Society and online groups/pages (e.g. the Lecretia’s 
Choice page). My approaches were met with varying successes. Gatekeeping by health 
professionals or organisations, due to an assumed vulnerability of patients or unacceptability of 
AD, was an issue recruiting participants through referral for many but not all of the 
aforementioned organisations as described by Kars et al. (2015); McLoughlin (2010); Pessin et 
al. (2008). One family member did not act as a gatekeeper as suggested by Wilkie (2001) but as a 
facilitator who contacted me on behalf of their parent. Local aged care facilities were approached 
however their residents were either too well or unable to give informed consent. 
  
Participant Criteria 
Criteria for inclusion/exclusion were based on the draft End of Life Choice Bill (2017). Before 
the legislative process refined the Bill, a person eligible for AD was within the last six months of 
life due to a terminal illness or a grievous and irremediable medical condition. I opted for a 12 
months life expectancy criterion to enable the potential for longitudinal data collection. While 
life-limiting illness and serious illness seem to be the preferred terms within palliative care 
literature, terminal illness was used to advertise the study because it is a widely understood term 
by the public who were the potential participants in this study. 
  
Inclusion criteria 
• those with a terminal, incurable, degenerative or progressive illness defined as 12 
or less months life expectancy 
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• who want or would consider choosing an assisted death 
• 18 years of age or older 
• capable of making and communicating health care decisions for themselves. 
Exclusion criteria 
• cognitively impaired 
• severe psychiatric conditions. 
  
This study did not discriminate in the selection and recruitment of participants by including or 
excluding them on the grounds of ethnicity, age, sex, disability or religious/spiritual beliefs. 
Rather I sought diversity among the participants. I accepted the potential participant’s indication 
they meet the prognosis criteria rather than seeking medical confirmation for reasons related to 
confidentiality and autonomy. Exclusion criteria ensured that only those who can provide 
informed written consent participated in the study and that I not expose them to unnecessary risk 
by discussing issues of suicide. This approach is consistent with other similar studies (Broom & 
Kirby, 2013; Johansen et al., 2005; Pestinger et al., 2015). 
  
Screening questions 
I used the following guide to screen people who contacted me to express their interest in 
participating.  
“Thank you for your interest in the study. The study would involve talking with me at a time and 
place of your choice about your thoughts and feelings about euthanasia and assisted dying. Do 
you have any questions about the study? May I please ask you a few questions to help work out 
whether you could be a candidate for the study? Please feel free to ask questions at any point. 
• The study involves an interview about your thoughts and feelings on assisted 
dying. Is this something you are comfortable talking about? 
• Can I please confirm that you have a diagnosed terminal, incurable, progressive or 
degenerative illness? 
• Do you or your doctor think you might have less than 12 months left to live? Are 
you still interested in being in the study? 
• Are you over the age of 18? 
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• We want to ensure no one is put at risk by participating in the study. Are you 
receiving care for a severe mental illness? Do you have a diagnosed cognitive 
impairment such as Alzheimer’s disease? 
• What are your thoughts on assisted dying and euthanasia? 
• This is a difficult question. Have you actually considered that for yourself? If 
assisted dying or euthanasia was legalised, might you consider asking for an 
assisted death, by that I mean ask for a lethal prescription to be able to end your 
life should to choose to? 
• As you can tell from my questions, the interviews may be distressing, do you have 
a person who you can turn to for support? 
• Can I please ask you some basic information questions? 
o   What gender do you identify with? 
o   How old are you? 
o   Which ethnicities do identify with?  
-  If Māori, which iwi do you belong to? 
o   Do you associate with any religion? Which one/s? 
o   Where do you currently live in New Zealand? 
  
Based on the 27 responses, I deemed three people ineligible due to opposition to AD and one 
ineligible because she would not choose AD although felt others should have the choice. Of the 
remaining 23 people eligible who met all criteria I selected 15 based on a maximum variation 
(ethnicity, age, gender, illness) and whose life expectancy was closest to 12 months. One of the 
eligible participants died before the interview could take place. 
  
I then contacted all potential participants by phone or email, depending on how they had 
contacted me, and asked to send them more information (see Appendix B for the information 
sheet and consent form) about participation for them to consider; then either they could contact 
me with any questions or I would follow up after two weeks. Everyone who I invited to 
participate agreed to. For those who were not eligible, I said “Thank you for your interest in our 
study. I'm sorry to inform you that you weren't selected for the study. I really appreciate your 
willingness to participate and our conversation was enlightening”. If the person seemed 
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distressed or upset, I had a list of support agencies to suggest they discuss their concerns. This 
turned out to be unnecessary. 
  
Participants 
At the time of interview, participants had been diagnosed with a life-limiting illness that was 
likely to end their life within 12 months. Participants also had to be well enough to participate. In 
terms of illnesses, seven participants had advanced cancer(s); three participants had motor 
neurone disease; two had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD); and one participant 
had both a life-limiting auto-immune disease and cancer. Six were enrolled in and one had a 
referral to hospice or palliative care, and eight had advance care plans in place (ACPs). 
Participants lived across ANZ. There were eight female and six male participants, aged 34-82 
(average 61 years old). Of the 14, 12 identified as Pākehā/NZ European and two as Māori. 
Participants came from a wide variety of educational backgrounds, some having never completed 
secondary school while others had post-graduate qualifications. Occupations were equally varied 
and included professional, entrepreneurial and carer roles or being too sick to work and 
supplementing their income with illegal activities. Four of the participants said they had some 
spiritual or religious beliefs.  
  
It should be noted that the narrowing of the End of Life Choice Act from the original Bill to the 
terminally ill only meant that the three people I interviewed who had been diagnosed with motor 
neurone disease, a grievous and irremediable medical condition, may no longer be eligible for 
AD. 
  
I have kept the description of participants at a group level for confidentiality and other 
identifying characteristics have been omitted or changed, except for occasionally citing their age, 
ethnicity and illness. Due to the size of ANZ, it is easier to narrow down the identities of any 
particular person (Tolich & Davidson, 1999). For this reason I have given participants 
pseudonyms rather than provide information about each individual as some studies do (e.g. 
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female, 56, NZ European). Even though renaming participants is standard practice, it felt like an 
erasure to rename participants, magnified because almost all of them have since died.32 
  
Six participants chose to have a family member be part of the interview or present. A notable 
difference between solo and partner/offspring interviews was they were able to confirm and 
prompt each other’s accounts. I was hugely fortunate to recruit perspicacious participants. 
  
Ethical Considerations and Informed Consent 
There are complex ethical issues of involving people nearing the end of life and their family in 
research, especially when there is no direct benefit to them from the research and where there is 
potential emotional distress (Wilkie, 2001). While the participants were a vulnerable group 
according to the guidelines (National Ethics Advisory Committee, 2019), they still possessed 
agency regarding their participation. The relative lack of benefit was addressed by informing 
patients of this issue thus ensuring informed consent. Participants were informed of the voluntary 
nature of participation, and that they were free to decline to participate or to withdraw from the 
research at any time, without any disadvantage as per Health and Disability Ethics Committee’s 
standard procedure. 
  
Several studies show it is not upsetting for most patients to ask about the end-of-life or the 
WTHD (Broom & Kirby, 2013; Pessin et al., 2008; Porta-Sales et al., 2019). In fact, there may 
have been altruistic benefit to participants from knowing their participation in the research may 
benefit future dying people. Discussing research with palliative patients, Wilkie (2001, p. 70) 
describes that “patients may very much wish to participate in a project even though their 
participation may cause them inconvenience, even discomfort, and may also be time-consuming. 
Patients may wish to help and to ‘give’”.  
 
32 Scarth (2015) discusses naming participants in research with those bereaved by suicide. In hindsight de-
identifying participants is something I may have done this differently because naming participants would have 
centred them and emphasised their agency. It may not have been acceptable to all participants but I am confident 
several would have liked their names to be used because two participants had been in the media about their desire to 
have the option of hastening death. 
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There was some risk involved in this study, as the interviews covered sensitive issues and asked 
the participants to reflect on their situation. van den Hoonaard (2020) pointed to vulnerability as 
a relational concept. He notes that vulnerability is an ill-defined concept that touches on 
informed consent, research design, researcher interaction with participants, voluntariness, harm 
prevention, harm reduction, obligations to research participants, human dignity, and justice. 
Discussing what can be considered by some to be a taboo subject given its legality and fraught 
social framing as controversial, even if not for them, may have been additionally challenging for 
them. The risk and reward of this research for both the participants and myself comes from raw 
and vulnerable in the interviews, discussing our feelings about life and death. Despite this, 
interview participants are asymmetrical in terms of power and vulnerability because researcher 
defines the conversation to some extent by introducing topics for discussion and asking follow 
up questions; there is less reciprocity than usual conversation. The burden of the interview 
process and content were countered by the possibility that these issues were likely to be everyday 
considerations in the life of the participants with life-limiting illness. 
  
The information sheet and consent form were sent before confirming participation. Some 
example questions were included on the participant information sheet so they knew the range of 
topics we would discuss when agreeing to participate. The questions promoted reflection in 
advance of the interview. The day prior to the interview, I phoned participants to check whether 
they were feeling well enough for the interview. Written informed consent was gained at the time 
of interview before proceeding. Participants chose where and what time of day they wanted to be 
interviewed. Participants were unaware that they were going to be given a $20 supermarket 
voucher as a small token of appreciation when agreeing to participate. I also took a small food 
item that could be shared during the interview or left with the participant. 
  
Data Collection 
Following McKechnie (2009) and Egan (2010), participants chose a solo interview, or a pair 
interview comprising themselves and family/whānau member. Participants were informed they 
were welcome to have a support person present. The information sheets asked participants to 
consider whether they could speak freely in front of their family. All interviews were conducted 
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within one session at participants’ homes. The interview length depended on the participant’s 
answers and energy. Cues such as long pauses, closed eyes or crying prompted me to check in 
with participants about how they were. I encouraged them to interrupt the interview, take a break 
or postpone the interviews if they felt tired or distressed. Making more tea and going to the toilet 
were the only reason participants paused the interviews. 
  
When I followed up with participants after the interview, I mentioned that any further 
communication with me about their views on AD was welcome but up to them to initiate so as to 
not unduly burden them. A few participants chose to stay in touch electronically and a couple of 
family members let me know when their loved one had died. 
  
Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim professionally and checked by me. I 
collected 26 hours of interview data, the average length of interview was 100 minutes. 
Transcripts were sent to participants who wanted a copy to check if they would like to review or 
amend any information. A couple of participants edited for clarity, a couple corrected minor 
details and some did not respond. 
  
Approximately a month after their interview I sent participants a draft of the submission I made 
to the  to ask for their feedback (see Appendix B). Eight participants confirmed they were 
pleased with what I had written and others did not respond. This also served as a form of 
reporting back to participants. 
  
Interviews 
This research used a semi-structured interview method with open-ended questions. The interview 
explored the meanings, experiences and views around quality of life, suffering, autonomy, 
dignity, beliefs around AD, past experiences with the death and dying process of others, planning 
for end of life, concerns or fears about dying. Please see the interview guide in Appendix C. The 
questions were used responsively, based on the participant’s answers. An emphasis was placed 
on dialogue, ensuring the participants discussed the topics they saw as pertinent (Frank, 2005). 
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The interview questions were sensitively designed with the assistance of palliative care 
specialists and were piloted in advance. I looked at available interview schedules of other studies 
in this field (Johansen et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2000) and the study with kaumatua Māori 
(Malpas et al., 2017) to inform my own. Several participants said the interviews were a welcome 
opportunity to discuss death and dying openly that was not always available (Pessin et al., 2008; 
Pestinger et al., 2015). In some ways participating in the interviews may have helped to make 
meaning from their own death. Participation in research can be seen as a meaningful social 
activity in the course of dying. 
  
Stories are intrinsic to in-depth interviews. Interviews and stories are relational acts (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2015; J. Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). Stories are conduits for communicating 
social facts about social and moral order, institutionalised practice and ideology that otherwise 
may not be recognisable (Garro & Mattingly, 2000; Riessman, 2005). The stories of illness and 
dying that were shared with me are socially, historically and culturally situated (Chase, 2005; 
Hydén, 1997). Researchers, participants and the narratives co-produced are situated at a 
particular point in time. Although I chose not to use a narrative inquiry approach, I found the 
concepts of narrative humility (DasGupta, 2008) and empathic witnessing (Kleinman, 1988) 
useful as a listener: to recognise the story is the person’s, to hear what is said, what is not said or 
unable to be said, and be moved by the story teller. However, to assume there is a coherent 
retelling to be reliably communicated is problematic and based on rational accounts of identity, 
decision-making and communication. I likely encouraged or asked questions that promoted a 
coherency where there may not have been unity (Hydén, 1997). In doing so, the person is 
reconstituted through narrative reconstruction (Atkinson, 2009). 
  
Interview-based research is always a co-construction of knowledge between participants and the 
researcher. Interviews are political, there is no such thing as neutral interview (Fontana & Frey, 
2005). Fontana and Frey (2005, p. 696) go so far as to say, “the interviewer becomes an advocate 
and partner in the study, hoping to be able to use the results to advocate social policies and 
ameliorate the conditions of the interviewee”. Research should not obfuscate the role of the 
researcher in initiating the relationship (however short or contrived) and reconstituting the 
interviewee’s account. Although I sought participants views, by nature of asking particular 
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questions over other questions, I initiated their accounts of why they would consider AD if it 
were available to them. At the same time, I created space for reflection and reassured participants 
any emotion or belief was acceptable. I was surprised by how much laughter there was in 
interviews. What I realised was, you can only understand laughter and jokes in context of whole 
story of who that person is. By seeking to get to know a person you can situate their lived 
experience within the context in which it makes sense for them to want to hasten their death. 
  
Safety Protocol 
The length of the interviews and effect of questions on participants were taken into consideration 
when conducting the interview. The participants were monitored continuously in order to 
determine whether to continue and whether all questions were appropriate. As noted, 
interruptions were encouraged. Care was taken to ensure that collecting data was always 
secondary to participant well-being, dignity, and comfort. A support person known to each 
participant was identified on the consent form prior to commencing the interview. After the 
interview, I suggested the participant could contact their support person or that I could contact 
them if needed. Participants were assured that counselling would be covered by the study if they  
became distressed as a consequence of participation. Contact details for the independent health 
and disability advocate service were provided on the information sheet and for Māori 
participants, as per the ethical guidelines, I also included an appropriate local Māori health 
advocate they could contact. 
  
I phoned participants to check in with them about how they were three days after the interview. 
This length of time was based on the advice from the psychotherapist I talked to on three 
occasions.  She said that if the person was going to struggle it would become apparent on the 
third day after the rush of adrenaline from talking about trauma would settle. In hindsight, three 
days was too long to capture any additional after thoughts and for the one person, who had a hard 
time after the interview due to several issues arising at the same time, this occurred two days 
after the interview. He had already contacted his health professionals when I spoke to him the 
next day. Participants already had strong support networks in place both professional and 
informal. Almost half of the participants were enrolled in hospice care—one of the aims of 
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which is to help patients to come to terms with their own mortality—meaning they had 
psychotherapy and spiritual care services. I had access to the psychotherapist as an employee of 
the university through the Employee Assistance Programme, among other University services if I 
needed them, as well as many opportunities to debrief with my supervisory team who have 
experience in palliative research or provision and grappled with these experiences themselves.33 
  
Confidentiality 
Confidentiality was a potential issue as the issue of AD was illegal in ANZ at the time of 
interview. Participants could have been stigmatised for considering or wanting an assisted death. 
I have sought to remove any identifying markers such as names, occupations and places.34 All 
data collected was confidential to the study investigators and the transcribing company signed a 
confidentiality agreement. Transcripts were coded with a participant identification number so 
that the identity of participants was kept confidential. The information sheet informed 
participants that all research data was subject to police investigation if there was an inquiry.35 I 
was aware of the risk of conducting the study; namely that I may become a witness in a police 
inquiry and be required to testify or the data may become evidence if there is an inquiry into a 
participant’s suicide or someone encouraging/aiding suicide. This did not eventuate. 
  
Analysis 
I used ATLAS.ti to manage the data. As a first step, I listened through all interviews for parts of 
the interviews where the transcriber was unable to discern what was said and I checked for 
accuracy. I added in other non-verbal cues such as laughing and crying. This allowed me to re-
familiarise myself with the interviews; it felt like reliving the interviews. 
 
33 For a recent discussion on this issue see Tolich, Tumilty, Choe, Hohmann-Marriott, and Fahey (2020). 
34 See footnote 32, p. 85. 
35 The data is not totally confidential if the police or a judge can insist I cooperate with an investigation. Ogden v 
Simon Fraser University is a fascinating case where a Masters student studying assisted dying in Canada on his 
ethics application offered “absolute confidentiality” and was then asked him to reveal confidential research 
information at a police inquest. He refused and was not supported by his university. See Lowman and Palys (2000) 
for further discussion. Having completed the research and reflected on the process, I now see there are other risks 
such as risk to the family members. 
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Being wedded too closely to one method of analysis can close off other avenues. My approach 
was a thematic analysis that also followed the principles of immersion/crystallisation of intuition 
and reflection (Borkan, 1999; Braun & Clarke, 2006). Specifically, I familiarised or immersed 
myself with the data by reading and listening to the interviews multiple times. I also created a 
mind map of themes for each participant. Next, in a first pass of coding the transcripts, I 
identified segment of texts and created codes to capture the meaning. I kept memos about what 
each code pertained to, an evolving definition and comprising ideas. I continued to identify codes 
throughout the analysis iterations. My supervisors also read a subset of transcripts and after I had 
coded four transcripts we met to discuss what I was seeing in the data. The second passes of the 
data were to group the codes into categories again using the memo function for a second round 
of memos about the categories. This helped me to identify themes and their comprising 
categories of medicalisation, control and contesting discourses that tied (most of) the data 
together. My third pass of analysis consisted of reading through each transcript with an attention 
to the theme. I made notes going through each transcript as thoughts occurred to me, identified 
new codes, grouped similar ones, and continued regrouping until I identified an emergent 
thematic structure for each theme. 
  
The thematic-immersion/crystallisation analysis was augmented by methodologies of 
Foucauldian discourse analysis and assemblage theory. I wanted additional theoretical 
frameworks to take the analysis in new directions beyond established ideas in the literature, as 
discussed in Chapter Two. Through the lens of discourse I analysed the textual dimensions to 
examine the normative structures of discourses and the contextual dimensions to look at the 
structural descriptions of the social, political or cultural context as a way of investigating the 
reproduction of meanings and ideologies (Lupton, 1992). Feely (2019) recommends beginning 
assemblage analysis with identifying the components or relations, then mapping flows of affect, 
meaning, material and social, and lastly exploring processes of (re)territorialisation and de-
territorialisation (defined above). I was interested in the fractures and dissonances as well as the 
coherences and commonalities within and across participants. I examined how the components—
material, cultural, macro through to micro—assembled together and what this assemblage 
produced “the capacities these affective flows produce” (N. Fox & Alldred, 2015, p. 408). As I 
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wrote about the data for each of the three analysis chapters, key theoretics (discussed in situ) 
were considered against the data for their ability to explain what participants were saying, what 
was implicit or unsaid and what could be inferred. 
  
Conclusion 
In summary, any data collection is bound by the socio-historical context in which it occurs. This 
behoves me to examine the context as well as the individual accounts I elicited through 
interviews. A contextual emphasis helped to fill the gaps in the WTHD literature discussed 
previously. As methodologies, assemblage theory and discourse analysis both look at the 
relationship between individuals and the context around them, whether that is by way of 
examining discourse or relations with others, including non-human objects. I have adopted a 
relativist ontology and subjectivist epistemology, informed by a constructionist paradigm with a 
pragmatic approach to the different analyses (thematic-immersion/crystallisation analysis) I 
performed. In the following chapters I offer three analyses, each with a different theoretical 
framework, that are underpinned by the power of medicine, law/government, society, religion 
and the individual. These themes are only analytically separable from one another as the powers 
intersect.  
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Chapter Four: An Assemblage of Medicalised Dying   
  
Introduction 
In this chapter I explore the role of medicine in participants’ accounts, using a theoretical toolkit 
that includes assemblage theory and discourse analysis, described in Chapter Three. I illustrate 
how participants’ wish for the choice of hastening death can be interpreted as exploiting 
medicalisation as a means to achieve one’s end (literally). By this I mean the work that 
participants do to explain their views on AD, the appropriation of discourses to pursue and 
justify their objectives and their pointing to the multiple moral and ethical standpoints within 
medicine. Throughout the chapter I draw on concepts of power, resistance, empowerment, 
morality, uncertainty and salvation to illustrate entanglements of the parts in the assemblage of 
medicalised dying, how they flow together to have effects and affects. 
  
I became aware of participants’ ambivalence about the role of medicine in why they might wish 
to hasten their death. As a result of medical intervention and the nature of their illnesses, 
participants expected dying to be protracted. There was a juxtaposition of wanting medicine to 
help them have a good death while also anticipating the likelihood that it would not be able 
relieve their suffering to provide a good death. Medicine is suffused with soteriological concerns 
which, as defined earlier, attends to suffering and salvation through technical efficacy against the 
finitude of death (Good, 1994). The institution of medicine and its constituents play a major role 
in managing dying and the alleviation and management of suffering (in its broadest sense) in the 
modern world, occasionally with AD. Because participants’ accounts of AD and suffering are 
understood within a medical framework, and because the wish to die is itself medicalised (van 
Wijngaarden et al., 2016), they offer insight into the relationships between the institution of 
medicine and patients. 
  
As noted in the introduction, there is no unifying epistemological model of medicine (Rose, 
2007a). Rather, medicine is a cultural system (Lupton, 2012), or an assemblage (Kennedy et al., 
2013). Nevertheless, while I refer to medicine, I mean its multiplicity. For example, there are 
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competing cultures within medicine as exemplified by the ‘prolong life at any cost’ ethos and 
another is ‘it is all about quality of life’. 
  
The first section of this chapter identifies the elements of this assemblage of dying. Specifically, 
these are the medical practices of diagnosis, prognosis and associated interventions to relieve 
suffering and delay death. They illustrate how participants constructed dying as a medical 
process. The second section examines the affective capacities of this assemblage of medicalised 
dying. Participants were not simply passive recipients of medicalisation, rather they strategically 
rejected and embraced forms of medicalisation, actively constructing it at the same time as 
resisting it. The final part of this section explores the main benefit of medicalisation, such that 
participants could stake their moral claim as being deserving of an assisted death. Participants 
justified their claim that medicine should help them to die because it cannot relieve their 
suffering.  I argue in the discussion that participants re-medicalised dying by framing their dying, 
death and suffering as activities that require medical intervention to achieve the good death that 
medicine promised (E. J. Emanuel & Emanuel, 1998). I conclude that as a consequence of the re-
medicalisation of dying, participants are ‘strategic negotiators’ who construct AD as a rational 
medical intervention to the problem of dying badly. By using ‘dying badly’ I reference the 
opposite of a good death, as opposed to a moral judgement.  
  
The Assemblage of Medicalised Dying 
In this section I explore the relations and elements of this assemblage of medicalised dying. This 
assemblage was comprised of past experiences of others’ dying, dynamic relations between 
patients, health professionals, families, care settings, the WTHD and the End of Life Choice Bill 
was a hypothetical future. I was also part of the assemblage. This assemblage included key 
medical practices of diagnosis and prognosis, from actors such as various doctors and nurses, as 
well as symptoms, tests, surgeries and scans. These existed a priori and outside the individual. 
Suffering was a major component. The medicalisation of death and the WTHD also featured in 
this assemblage.  
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I begin with a brief discussion of the external relations, past experiences and where these took 
place. Then, I explore the elements of diagnosis and prognosis that flowed together to contribute 
to participants viewing dying as a medical process. Next, I describe the treatments and 
technologies that comprised part of the assemblage. The suffering participants experienced and 
the means for relieving suffering are discussed and connected with participants’ authority to 
speak about dying and lay a claim to access AD. Lastly, I illustrate the participants’ and health 
professionals’ medicalisation of death and the WTHD. These elements of the assemblage are 
discussed because they seemed most salient to participants’ accounts. Some of the headings in 
this section reflect the medical terms participants used as well as their lay meanings to reflect the 
participants’ negotiation of medicine within their lives. 
  
External Relations, Past Experiences and Places 
Many participants spoke of experiences of their family members’ deaths influencing their ideas 
about dying. Participants often cited such experiences of what they considered bad deaths as the 
origins of their current perspectives around AD. Some said that their loved one’s ‘horrible’ death 
was often the lasting memory of that person. They considered this continuing effect of their 
deaths on their own families when considering AD. The deaths participants referred to almost 
always occurred in a medical setting—hospital, residential care or hospice, indicating medical 
intervention and care, as well as dying being experienced as orchestrated according medical 
rhythms (Buchbinder, 2018b; Glaser & Strauss, 1968; Kaufman, 2005). 
 
For example, Claudia described her father’s death a few years earlier in aged residential care and 
feeling powerless to help her father. 
I’d say, that because of my personal experience with my father’s death, I’m 
very, very, very supportive of end of life choice…36 [My siblings and I] felt 
completely powerless, and just couldn’t understand in this day and age how 
he could be left for at least three and a half weeks in acute pain. And definitely 
given morphine by nurses in a care home, but never enough, and they were 
legally allowed to administer every four hours… He was saying, you know, 
kill me, kill me, you know, help me. It’s just so hard to hear when you can’t 
do anything about it. (Claudia) 
 
36 …indicates where a section of the interview has been abbreviated.  
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Claudia interpreted both her own and the carers’ inability to provide adequate pain relief to 
relieve her father’s suffering as abandonment. Here we can see the law and medicine interacting 
to regulate what is compassionate through medication administration regulations. Claudia went 
on to cast the ANZ system for dealing with dying against the Netherlands’, where euthanasia is 
legal, in terms of progress. She said that she thought a peaceful death would have been possible 
for him and her family if AD was an option. She saw more medical intervention, either morphine 
or euthanasia, as the solution. The international and relational nature of the assemblage is 
evident.  
 
Diagnosis/Receiving Bad News 
Participants made sense of their own dying through their past and present lived experiences of 
health and illness as well as through their interactions with health care professionals. In this way, 
participants’ diagnosis and later, dying are choreographed through the medical system, with 
patients as partners (Buchbinder, 2018b). 
  
For some, the diagnosis came as a shock as they previously had been extremely healthy or they 
had been told all of the cancer had been removed. 
I’ve never been in hospital, like I’ve never been admitted to hospital. The 
worst thing I’ve ever done is had a broken wrist in the way of any sort of 
medical attention, and a haemorrhoid on my bum.  And that’s it, seriously. 
(Dennis) 
 
Louis: Now the joke about this whole cancer thing, I said I had cancer two 
and a half years ago and they removed half a lung, and theoretically they got 
it all…  I had another scan, I was given a 100 percent perfect. 
Jessica: What was that like? 
Louis: Shock.  Hold on, how can that change all in three months?... I funnily 
enough bumped into that doctor who I’d had to see every six months since 
that operation. And he said I’ve been back over your x-rays, I’ve looked and 
looked, and he actually pulled them up on screen for me, and said there’s 
nothing there. (Louis) 
The second quote intimates that doctors offered Louis certainty about his cancer diagnosis but 
this certainty is later exposed as illusory. The reality of medicine is much more uncertain because 
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the body is less predictable than portrayed.  The doctor going back over x-rays to see if he 
missed any signs is searching for meaning and answers to the question, how could this happen?  
It is unclear whether the doctor was seeking an explanation for the patient or himself, seeking to 
maintain the epistemic integrity of diagnostic medicine. It speaks to the failure of medical 
technologies and the fallacy of medicine’s capability to predict death. 
  
For Kate, her cancer diagnosis came as a relief because the medical explanation legitimised her 
symptoms. 
When I was diagnosed with my kidney disease, because it’s a rare untreatable, 
unpredictable, incurable kidney disease, I was dying back then, you know?  
My world had ended and, you know, it was just like, oh my god.  There’s 
nothing that they can do for me and I’ve, so I think I did my grieving and 
went all through that back then.  When I got the cancer diagnosis, it was 
almost like it was a relief because it was like, well it’s not in my head.  It is 
real, what is going on and once again, you know, I’m right and it’s like, oh 
well, I’ve beaten this kidney thing for the last, you know?... It’s like, okay, 
yeah, we’ll face that challenge… it’s given me the confidence to be more 
vocal.  (Kate) 
‘Putting a name to it’ (Jutel, 2011) helpfully explained Kate’s symptoms by giving meaning to 
them in the form of a diagnosis. The diagnosis gave her a tangible illness to concentrate her 
efforts around. Kate’s diagnosis was ‘empowering’ for her and gave her confidence to take up 
new opportunities such as publicly advocating for medicinal cannabis. Processes of 
medicalisation, in particular through diagnosis, can be empowering for patients who’ve been 
suffering from the felt illegitimacy of their illness. This was not necessarily the case for all 
participants, as discussed below. 
  
Sometimes a diagnosis was sought out by participants and their families outside of the medical 
sphere. Interestingly, in the exchange between Dennis and his wife Rebecca below, the self-
diagnosis occurred by chance through popular media and the internet, expanding the assemblage. 
Rebecca: Yeah, we pretty much diagnosed ourselves before we had the final, 
yeah.  We were like hopefully we’ve just got this, or hope we haven’t got that. 
Dennis: …they announced [South African rugby player] died of motor 
neurone.  I was like what is motor neurone? I hadn’t paid any attention to it.  
Dr Google, holy shit, that’s everything that I’ve got. (Dennis) 
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In this instance, walking slowly with an odd gait became a symptom to seek a legitimate medical 
explanation for. Self-diagnosis was one of the chief routes into medicalisation that participants 
sought of their own volition. Some diagnoses were hoped for over others, indicating 
sophisticated medical knowledge. The diagnosis territorialised them as patients. Usually 
accompanying a diagnosis of a life-limiting illness was prognosis. 
  
Prognosis/How Long I Have Got Left 
Participants’ accounts of dying was punctuated by receiving a prognosis; it was a transformative 
moment (Jutel, 2019). Prognosis seemed intimately connected to hope for some participants. 
However Louis seemed to have lost hope due to limited prognosis. 
there’s no hope down the track. Am I going to improve and get better from 
where I am?… So when you’ve got something that is terminal, why prolong 
it?  Why, yeah why?  (Louis) 
He drew a connection between hope for recovery and pointlessness. Some participants, notably 
the younger ones, were not accepting of their limited time left and expressed they wished to 
lived. 
At this time, I'm not really accepting or ready. I don't want to die. (Ben) 
  
So that was faster than we ever expected. That was two years in and we’d 
kind of been hoping for five to ten years, you know?... so that there’d be a 
cure but yeah, that doesn’t look like it's going to happen. (Paula) 
Even though Ben is categorical in his view at that moment, he left the possibility open that he 
may come to accept his prognosis. Prognosis was connected to future hope and possible medical 
innovations for Paula. 
  
Whereas some participants spoke of accepting a limited life expectancy while still not wanting to 
die (as compared to a loss of hope as a result of the prognosis). 
So when the brain tumours kicked in and got diagnosed, I was actually 
relieved, cos at least I knew.  And I didn’t have to live with the uncertainty.  
So, at that point, I thought… we’re just gonna have to roll with it…  So, I 
already had a fairly good idea that, that, because of the aggressiveness of the 
cancer, that it wouldn’t be a long time. But I wanted it to be a good time… 
And one of the things [a patient with terminal cancer she met in hospital] said 
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to me when we were talking about the different things that really changed her 
perspective, was acceptance.  The word acceptance.  (Dee) 
Dee illustrates, what according to Clark (2002, p. 907), is “the medicalisation of palliative care, a 
specialty that opens up a space somewhere between the hope of cure and the acceptance of 
death”.  Wallace was also accepting: 
I think you’ve got to, you know.  If you don’t it’ll be like a cancerous growth 
on you.  So because I’m, yeah I know it’s terminal there’s no point in getting 
angry or pissed off about it, you know.  If you accept it it’s just going to make 
the whole deal so much easier down the road… So it is what it is, yes, yeah. 
(Wallace) 
The disease metaphor that Wallace employed speaks to the biomedical explanation of end of life 
and the conception of cancer as lethal, from a participant with COPD. For some participants, 
prognosis had a positive affect because accepting they were going to die sooner rather than later 
meant they could get on with living. This may be indicative of prognosis as empowering people 
to live fully as either an obligation to honour God, as a technology of self (Foucault, 1988), as a 
late modern capitalist dictum of self-realisation (Giddens, 1991) or as pragmatism.  
  
Many participants sought the certainty of a firm prognosis but not everyone received one, or if 
they did it was too imprecise (i.e. in the range of years). Dee also did not wish to receive a 
prognosis because it created both certainty and then uncertainty. 
I said to the doctors right from the beginning, don’t give me a timeframe.  I 
don’t want it.  Because you work to whatever, you know?  If they say three 
months, then I’ll be, right okay, three months.  You know, and I like a good 
schedule.  And I work to three months, and then I’m, oh well, that’s great, 
I’m still alive.  What am I supposed to do now? (Dee) 
Here we can see the reification of prognosis which is to say, the abstract concept takes on a life 
of its own and gains form and power in the assemblage of medicalised dying. Claudia stipulated 
to her first specialist she did not want a prognosis but was told anyway.  
And naturally the worse thing was having an oncologist tell me that, you 
know, a prognosis, when I told her I didn’t want to have a prognosis… she 
said, I would say you’ve got two months to live based on, she didn’t say what 
it was based on. She was just, no, they're so free to give those, you know, 
definitive prognosis. I was, oh, it’s weird, I didn’t like her or trust her… If a 
patient asks, you know, what’s the prognosis, it’s a little bit different. 
(Claudia) 
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In this way, she resisted the medicalisation of her remaining life and the patienthood associated 
with it. However, the power of the doctor to divulge this information despite her wishes 
undermined her attempt. This in effect disempowered Claudia to have the dominion over her life 
as she desired. Claudia could understand why some people might seek a prognosis but for her, 
the idea that prognosis was wishing death upon someone had salience.  
  
Some participants had outlived their prognosis. This affected an uncertain experience of being in 
the world, which Judy described as living with a ‘temporariness’. 
I had a massive arrhythmic attack and nearly died. And my kids were told on 
Christmas morning that you might have your mum for a week… I came out 
of hospital and was told about a year… since then lived with a temporariness, 
I’m not using the right words, but yeah, being kind of temporary, and the 
strong possibility that I won’t be here this time next year. Sort of like this is 
probably my last Christmas, this is my probably my last birthday or things 
like that, and I’ve had three birthdays since I was told a week… I’m definitely 
deteriorating quite a lot, and so whenever I ask him, the haematologist, he 
says, oh, about a year, give or take, and he’s been saying that for two years. 
(Judy) 
The temporariness Judy described has parallels with the anthropological concept of liminality 
(Turner, 1974). It describes the betwixt and between, the neither and both (MacArtney, Broom, 
Kirby, Good, & Wootton, 2015; Turner, 1974). Liminality is a social space that patients with 
life-limiting illnesses inhabit that is “characterised by ritualised degrees of separation from 
society” (McKechnie, Jaye, & Macleod, 2010, p. 10). The feeling of temporariness or of being in 
a liminal space, mediated by Judy’s haematologist and living beyond the expected timeframe, 
shaped her expectations for the future. MacArtney et al. (2015) described the multiplicity of end-
of-life care of both living and dying as a parallax experience. The shifting nature speaks to the 
becoming, dynamic affect of any assemblage. 
  
In some ways, the liminality of having a limited prognosis affected new ways of being in the 
world and new possibilities. Emily reconsidered healthcare decisions. 
Because I think well I’m dying anyhow, so you know, whatever, I’ll take the 
risk.  I’ve always been too scared to do that. I’ve got atrial fibrillation which 
they told me to go back to the cardiologist.  I make decisions about what I 
will be seen for, what I will go to the doctor for, and what I won’t.  Now I 
won’t go to the cardiologist, because if I die of a damned heart attack that 
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would be brilliant. And I mean that’s my own kind of euthanasia.  So yes, I 
do make decisions…  But if there was anything that was going to kill me 
suddenly I’d let it pass, I wouldn’t go and see the doctor… And I always 
smile, coz I think what does it matter? (Emily) 
The knowledge of a relatively imminent death gave new meaning to the avoidance of risk and 
symptoms such as atrial fibrillation for Emily. She interacted with her doctors differently as a 
result of her life-limiting illness. 
  
Prognosis had varied affects on participants—loss of hope and new meanings in life about time, 
certainty and risk. As noted previously in Chapter Two, one of the key aspects of medicalisation 
is the process of turning everyday life into a medical problem (Conrad, 2005). In terms of 
prognosis, the amount of life left is turned into a medical problem. The clinical gaze, with the 
help of medical technology, is used to peer inside the body to determine how much time a patient 
has left. The doctor (at their discretion) pronounces the ‘truth’ about prognosis by providing a 
time frame, overlooking uncertainty and error (Surbone, Zwitter, Rajer, & Stiefel, 2013). 
Prognostication and its reification as certain by doctors enables them to re-establish “a 
tremendous power” (having lost their God-like status) through the pronouncement of “life and 
death sentences” (Surbone, 2006, p. 57). The feeling of being cast adrift after the prognostic 
timeframe may work to undermine the epistemic certainty of medicine and the power of the 
doctor as giver of time/life. Medicine as an epistemic system can cope with the de-
territorialisation because it still frames prognosis within certain timeframes of days to weeks, 
weeks to months, months to years. 
  
Thus far, I have shown how diagnosis and prognosis work together to territorialise medical 
meanings of participants’ end of life. Diagnosis and prognosis had affects for patients on the 
receiving end of them in terms of legitimacy of their illness, hope, risk, empowerment and 
liminality. They produced particular power/knowledge relations between patients and families 
with health professionals where the doctor possesses the body of knowledge, crucial for 
exercising professional power, and where patients predominantly rely on them for information. 
In the excerpts above we saw how diagnosis can also be supplemented and appropriated by 
patients for their own benefits and aims. Only as a result of diagnosis and prognosis could a 
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treatment plan be made. I now turn to treatments and technologies which were sought in the 
name of extending life or at least maintaining quality of life. 
  
Treatments/Bridge Between Life and Death 
The availability of treatments affected participants’ orientation to life and medicine. One 
poignant example was the youngest participant in the study who hoped the current treatments 
would buy her more time for new treatments to be developed so she could have more time with 
her young children. 
So that’s, when […] cancer returns it is then stage four and terminal.  So it's 
a matter of how long you get, there’s nothing that can cure it at that point, 
medically, treatment-wise. And the average that most, the average that people 
live is three years from that point… my oncologist said it's not working… 
we’ve really only got one option, one treatment chance left. (Paula) 
Paula employed medical terminology and statistics to describe her time left. Paula and many 
others had become highly literate in their diseases and treatment options. This is a form of 
medicalised empowerment as they are able to communicate with doctors about treatments in 
more nuanced way. On the other hand, it may mean they experience this knowledge as a burden 
as they reconciled their hopes for the future with their predicted limited life expectancy. 
  
Similarly, some participants had sought in-depth medical knowledge and learned to keep abreast 
of developments in treatments.  
I don’t read just ordinary stuff on Google, I go through to the medical 
reports… I’d go on once a week to see if there’s any medical advances.   
(Emily) 
Several participants also used the internet to find other specialists to seek opinions from. Many 
discovered online support groups that they found useful, but were also sometimes unhelpful 
because they witnessed others with the same condition dying. Some had sought out their own 
knowledge in alternative and complementary treatments because the options were non-toxic or 
the side effects of pharmaceutical options were unacceptable. 
I’m probably more laisse-faire, [Husband] got on the internet and looked at 
the research on cancer… [People at a cancer support group] were all like, oh 
you haven’t been on the internet, and you haven’t found this, and it’s like, no, 
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I don’t want to be Googling all day, and having it in my mind all the time. 
(Claudia) 
  
I might be using medicinal cannabis and [my doctor] might have an idea that 
cannabis gets you high and gets you off your head.  I don’t get high and I 
don’t get off my head.  So, I don’t wanna take your pharmaceuticals if it 
makes me like that. (Kate) 
Kate contested the doctor’s moral aspersions of medical cannabis to ‘get you high’. This is an 
ironic judgement given the negative effect of codeine had on Kate (and many other drugs that 
have side effects). In comparison to cannabis as a ‘folk medicine’, industrialised and regulated 
medicines come in established strengths and are able to be titrated. 
  
Some participants sought as many treatments as they could while others did not want medical 
intervention that would not extend life expectancy sufficiently. 
And a lot of these drugs, they’re telling you about drugs that can help you but 
they only give you four months (Emily). 
For Claudia, not having to undergo cancer treatments because they would not provide any 
benefit was a relief to her. The lack of options meant she could focus on living rather than being 
a patient undergoing arduous treatments for the rest of her life. 
So in a way that was a huge relief, I just thought I don’t have to have chemo, 
I don’t have to have radiotherapy, you know. It’s amazing to be kind of told 
there aren’t any options for treatment, you know, I’ve had the two surgeries 
that can do anything to benefit me. And ah, it’s a huge weight off your 
shoulders, you can just kind of go home and get on with living, and yeah, it’s 
weird isn’t it, you’re told you’ve got a terminal illness and you’re going to 
die. (Claudia) 
Claudia’s account evokes a sense of letting go; not of life altogether but of seeking longevity at 
all costs. Letting go is one of many meanings the WTHD has for patients (Ohnsorge et al., 
2014b). However, choosing to die or giving up are major cultural taboos.37 Perhaps the proximity 
of death is a reprieve from ‘survivorship’; the cultural expectations of patients to persevere and 
undergo any and all treatments in the fight against illness that have discursive, somatic affects 
(Dragojlovic & Broom, 2018). These ideas are returned to in Chapter Six. Approaching death 
 
37 Existential approaches to suicide have described exhilaration, peace, acceptance as consequences of the decision 
to die (e.g. Yalom, 1980). 
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offered freedom from burdensome treatments. Although Claudia expected to have palliative care 
at the end-of-life, she was also relieved not to have her remaining life medicalised. This 
opposition to medicalisation may explain the cultural dissonance between participants’ attitudes 
toward hastening death and medicine which generally aims to sustain life. 
  
The medical treatments to remedy a limited prognosis and relieve suffering were considered in 
terms of the balance of their benefits, harms and burdens. For example, one of the side effects of 
Emily’s chemotherapy resulted in another type of cancer, an iatrogenic harm (Illich, 1977). 
Treatments were not considered only in isolation. Participants were aware of the effect on their 
families. More generally, Emily was concerned about what was equitable in terms of older 
people’s access to medical treatments. 
There are clinical trials which I could do overseas.  I will not take that because 
I believe they should be left for younger people.  That’s my personal opinion 
that, you know, I don’t think that I should be taking a place.  And I am quite 
shocked when I know people of my age who do it… So I’ve got this whole 
attitude that there is a time when you should step aside, whether it’s a new 
job or whatever, for younger people.  So that’s one thing I’m quite altruistic 
about. (Emily) 
Her moral and ethical reasoning regarding treatments related to distributive justice, rights and 
altruism. A few others expressed similar sentiments and reasoning. 
  
Treatments afforded participants opportunities to bridge life and death. Some treatments were 
welcome and others were not, and some illnesses did not have treatments available. Treatments 
included objects beyond the usual medical intervention, bringing support groups, illegal drugs, 
medical knowledge into the assemblage. Treatments medicalised life or were a moment for 
resistance. They blurred the boundaries of being alive and dying, with compromised quality of 
life for some participants. 
  
Technologies/Restoring Life to ‘Normal’ 
Technologies also blurred the boundaries between human and object. Technologies are linked to 
medicalisation through the idea that medical technology promotes a ‘normal’ life. A few 
participants made distinctions between treatments and technologies designed to extend life and 
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those designed to reduce suffering, improve quality of life. For those with COPD and motor 
neurone disease who did not have life-extending treatments available to them, technologies were 
another form of medicalisation in everyday life. 
  
Technologies were a necessity for well-being and formed a part of the medical assemblage of 
dying. For example, the two participants with COPD had oxygen tanks to assist with their 
breathing for many hours a day. Heather had to buy the oxygen tank because the hospital would 
not give her one as she did not want to give up smoking fully. 
Coz my oxygen isn’t portable, I can’t take it with me because being a smoker 
they won’t give you oxygen.  Even though I wasn’t for six months after 
coming out of hospital, and then I did start.  And that was the happiest I 
actually was when I bought that packet of smokes, because it was finally a 
part of the old me.  (Heather) 
Heather’s decisions about what technologies/objects to accept and when they became 
unacceptable is connected with subjectivity and power. Heather began smoking again because 
she saw it as a remnant of her identity/subjectivity before becoming ill. Heather’s health 
professionals had the power to decide what criteria aid will be given on. It illustrates the 
moralisation behind medical treatment, eligibility for technological aids and concepts of 
deservingness. The decision not to give smokers oxygen may have been based on safety but 
Heather did not indicate this was aware of this reason. 
  
Participants with motor neurone disease were encouraged by their healthcare professionals to 
bring assistive technologies in to their lives earlier than necessary so they were available when 
required. 
You know, we were told take [the wheelchair] now, even if you don’t need 
it. So we did that, and everything has just run so smoothly.  These people 
know what they’re talking about, so we’re just going to sit back and go with 
it. (Dennis) 
Health professionals’ advice was accepted because of their expertise and experience. On the 
other hand, non-technological options were also useful, such as honey for a coughing fit which a 




The necessary intrusion of medical technology into daily life was particularly evident for the 
three participants with motor neurone disease. One participant was using a computer-assisted 
communication device HeadMouse which followed his head movements and the interview was 
conducted via this technology. Others were training a system with their voice or learning how to 
use it. The communication device, along with ramps and wheelchairs, were another integration 
of technology as part of their lived experience. 
I use that phone all right, well, not all right, but my computer I can only use 
my thumb. And same with that thing there, I can voice text, but I can’t use 
my fingers, my fingernail hits it, I’ve got no control over. And I’ve got a thing 
that you can use to press, but I can’t hold it properly, you know, same with a 
pen.  (Jacob) 
The fundamental act of communicating, Jacob’s sociality and the ability to interact, became 
mediated by technology. While the device is intended to empower/enable the user, Jacob’s slow 
loss of control was accentuated. 
 
Treatments and technologies were entangled in participants’ end-of-life experiences, made 
possible by a medicalised dying assemblage. They affected their conceptions of death, loss and 
subjectivity. Treatments and technologies as means to relieve suffering also led to the 
medicalisation of life and suffering. 
  
Relieving Suffering/Suffering Made Medical 
Suffering was a present reality for some participants and anticipated by all as something that was 
likely to be experienced in their future. The most commonly mentioned form of suffering was 
from pain; other forms of suffering are discussed below. Pain was a major concern for many 
participants, particularly the people with cancer. Pain was described as uncontrolled, anticipated, 
unpredictable, and as psychological, emotional and relational. 
The mental, obviously what’s, yeah, going through their mind.  When you’re 
suffering with pain, it just affects everything, your sight, your hearing, your 
smell, your taste, your coordination, you know?  Your sleep patterns, your 
thinking, you’re just all over the place.  And that’s just from the pain alone.  
(Kate) 
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One phenomenological account of pain that coheres with Kate’s description described it as, “In 
the face of pain, one’s whole being is re-oriented” (Leder, 1990, p. 73). 
  
Pain in particular was seen by participants as something that medicine should be able to relieve 
them from. And yet, several were currently or had previously experienced overwhelming pain, as 
a result of their illness or after treatments such as chemotherapy or surgery. As Dee put it: 
The idea that somehow accepting assisted dying is like accepting that 
[hospice] can’t stop all pain.  Well, they can’t.  They’re bloody good, but 
they’re not, they don’t have a magic wand… Unbearable suffering is intense 
pain that takes over.  When your whole being, the only focus of your whole 
being is on the pain… unbearable suffering is just that point where you go, 
you know, this is not where I wanna be.  What can we do to change it?  Okay, 
well let’s give those things, and if that doesn’t work, then this [assisted dying] 
is my option.  It’s really cut and dried for me. (Dee) 
  
I took one of the Codeine, the next day I was just absolutely whacked off my 
head.  And I couldn’t drive, I couldn’t function, I had to get my daughter to 
help me out. And it was just, and that was like, yeah, no thanks… I want 
medication so I can function, so I can have a good quality life. (Kate) 
Dee was clear that when other medical solutions were no longer effective, AD was the option of 
last resort to prevent, or be saved from, suffering. Kate’s response to (widely used) medication 
was unacceptable to her as means for relieving her suffering. Medical treatments were keeping 
some participants alive or relieving suffering but at personal cost to them. This unrelieved 
suffering formed a major part of participants’ moral reasoning that they had a legitimate claim to 
be assisted to die. 
  
However, some participants suffered less than they anticipated. For example, Sylvia’s pain was 
managed with Panadol at first and steroids later. 
I’ve had no pain, so I’ve been really lucky, and whether that’s going to 
continue, I don’t know either. But I imagined I would have… before I was on 
the steroids, it was really uncomfortable, but the steroids seem to have helped. 
(Sylvia) 
Sylvia put this down to luck as well as medical management. Sylvia’s daughter emailed me five 
months after our interview to tell me that her condition worsened before she died. Both Dee, 
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quoted above, and Sylvia’s belief in medicine to save them from suffering was limited as they 
anticipated medicine eventually ceasing to be effective.  
  
Suffering took many forms beyond physical suffering. When asked about what unbearable 
suffering meant to them, participants responded with their past experiences of confusion, 
struggling to breath and the related anxiety, loss of dignity through being dependent and not 
contributing to family or society, not feeling like their illness was believed, loss of hope, among 
many other things that formed part of the assemblage of dying. These were more difficult to 
relieve than pain. Participants talked about mental and social suffering and, while not identified 
as such, existential and spiritual suffering. As Ben put it: 
To me it's extremely subjective. I feel that I am enduring considerable 
suffering now, but there is enough positive going on to make it bearable. 
Without meaning in my life, I think it would be unbearable... When there is 
nothing left but suffering, I want the choice.  (Ben) 
Ben’s answer to unbearable suffering was the option of AD. Suffering of a non-physical nature is 
related to the threat of disintegration of the person (Cassell, 2004). 
  
For all participants the length of their dying and of suffering was a major factor in their WTHD. 
While no one wished to die, they were concerned about the time it would take them to die and 
what it might entail. The following quotes illustrate the different criteria of suffering and 
motivations participants had for when they would consider hastening their death. For Judy, her 
slow deterioration was problematic: 
I’d much rather go from sort of how I am now to not there, rather than the 
deteriorating stages. So I would kind of, given the choice, which I don’t have 
at the moment, rather have a heart attack and be done with it, or something, I 
don’t choose a stroke, coz then you’re disabled or, yeah. So you know, 
preferably something quickly, tidy and no blood. (Judy) 
Judy compared the prospect of her long dying with other deaths that were quicker and tidier. 
The uncertainty of when they were going to die was experienced as a form for suffering by some 
participants. 
  
While some acknowledged that a slow death (as compared to a sudden death) allowed them to 
prepare for death, suffering meant dying slowly for many participants. Louis described it as 
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‘limbo land’. Louis’ subjectivity is implicated in his loss of connectedness and loss of the 
activities (work, socialising, horse breeding) which he defined himself by. His existential 
suffering is detectable. 
so you’re neither, anything.  You’re not sick enough, you’re not well enough, 
you’re in limbo. And I mean in the well enough category you could say, well 
you’re not dead.  You could be part of that, so I’m not dead but I’m not well 
enough to participate…. What I noticed in the first month, six weeks, 
particularly when people thought I was going to go out the back door by the 
end of September, is a whole flood of compassion, and oh we must catch up. 
And most of them made the effort to catch up.  Now that I’ve gone two and a 
half months, who cares, who gives a shit? (Louis) 
He was in a liminal space because he was undergoing cancer treatments and not well enough to 
work sufficiently to earn a living or to participate in social life, but also not sick enough to 
receive assistance at home, even though he was struggling with ‘activities of daily living’. His 
life was medicalised but not enough to relieve in his suffering. Suffering is often concealed in 
medicalisation, particularly in formal care contexts where suffering manifests as an inter-
subjective assemblage between the sufferer and those caring for them (Dragojlovic & Broom, 
2018). Louis was experiencing a social death, being treated as if he was already dead 
(Borgstrom, 2017; Králová, 2015; Sudnow, 1967), exacerbated by friends’ visits dwindling as 
time passed. It took a further three months for Louis to die. According to Dragojlovic and Broom 
(2018), suffering is a relational ontology without discrete relations between the sufferer and 
those who care for them, or lack thereof in Louis’ instance, causing additional suffering.  
  
Participants acknowledged the relational aspects of suffering, or relations with others within the 
assemblage of medicalised dying, and the effect of their protracted suffering on others. 
And it’s a human right for the family, not to have to put up with all the agony 
that goes with the, with letting a person go through all of this. (Daniel) 
The slow death was a source of suffering for the dying person and was perceived by several 
participants as inflicting suffering on their family too.  
But it’s also about having a bit of dignity and not making the people around 
me go through too much suffering.  Cos my dad lasted for a whole year and 
he was only supposed to be three months.  And it wasn’t pretty.  And I don’t 
wanna put other people through that.  So whenever I lose the battle with the 
pain or, you know, or I have to have so many drugs that I’m just completely 
out of it or I can’t speak or whatever, as far as I’m concerned, I would quite 
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happily be dead.  I just don’t see the point of existing in that sort of realm. 
(Dee) 
Specifically for Dee, her suffering entailed pointless pain, being unable to communicate and 
causing suffering to others. The certainty of knowing they could choose the timing and manner 
of their death when living was perceived to relieve suffering. AD was perceived to bring back 
power and choice in the face of suffering and uncertainty surrounding dying. 
  
The concept of suffering and its relief are tethered to medicine (Parker, 2004). However, 
participants’ suffering, physical or otherwise, was not always relieved by medicine. Callahan 
(2000) suggested that medicine has no competence in dealing with the psychological fear, 
uncertainty and anguish and, at a more existential level, the lack of meaning or pointlessness of 
suffering. Therefore, according to Callahan, medicine should not attempt to deal with such 
problems through AD. Participants would disagree with his interpretation that AD is not the 
solution to such problems. 
 
Arguably, some of the experiences participants described, such as Louis’ feelings of dying a 
social death, Ben’s existential questions about meaning in life, and Dee’s pointless suffering may 
not be within the remit of medicine. Although palliative care’s focus on the quality of life, 
holistic care and total pain (Clark, 2002; Ministry of Health, 2001; World Health Organisation, 
2019) would mean attending many, if not all, of these issues. Total pain, described in Chapter 
Two, facilitates the capturing of a complex phenomenon by connecting multi-faceted expressions 
of suffering.  Following Foucault (2012) and Armstrong (1987), Clark (1999) argued that total 
pain incites new modes of disciplinary work by comprehending physical pain as unlocking the 
psyche and extending the clinical gaze to the other elements of total pain. What may be a social, 
spiritual or existential problem is reconceived as a medical problem (van Wijngaarden et al., 
2016) and therefore medical solutions should be utilised. Total pain unintentionally produced 
new categories of human suffering by objectifying it and providing strategies for relief (Clark, 
1999), in other words medicalisation. 
 
The primary response of palliative care to help patients transcend their suffering is to provide 
opportunities for meaning-making and personal growth (Rattner, 2018). Rattner argued that 
palliative care constructs a particular discourse or truth that all suffering can be relieved. The 
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discursive effects on patients, families and providers is disciplining, making some stories of 
suffering ‘tellable’, the right way, and others ‘untellable’ or illegitimate (Rattner, 2018). For 
example, the ‘living every moment’ hospice philosophy (Hospice New Zealand, 2018; Lawton, 
2000) does not align with participants’ desire to hasten dying. It could be that living every 
moment may be acceptable with the option of AD if ‘living-dying’ (T. Walter, 2017) became too 
hard.  
  
Medicalisation of Death and its Expansion Into the Wish to Hasten Death 
As well as suffering being medicalised, death and the WTHD were also understood within a 
medical framework. The medicalisation of death and the WTHD were discussed in the 
introduction. The idea of a natural death was mentioned by several participants and was usually 
contrasted with medical technology (J. Seymour, 1999). The natural death discourse will be 
discussed in more depth in Chapter Six on the normative discourses of death and dying. I briefly 
discuss it here to establish that many participants were well aware that the ethos of medicine was 
to save lives and that this did not fit with their priorities for a natural, or at least not protracted, 
death. Daniel’s comments were most poignant on such issues. He felt strongly that life was 
prolonged unnaturally. 
And I’m not advocating that we start killing people off, but I think we’ve got 
to be very careful that we’re not keeping people alive who are in the process 
of dying. Dyseuthanasia, I call it.  D-y-s.  Where we’re actually medicating 
people to stay alive, when the natural course of the events is to die.  It’s to do 
with prolonging life that’s naturally ending. (Daniel) 
There were some statements about the implications of overmedicalisation of the end of life and 
the extension of life. For example, Daniel also related the cost of medicating people when they 
are dying to the burgeoning costs of aged care and the pension. 
there has always been a concern to me about the extra money that older 
members of society are costing the community?... And I think the same thing 
applies to the age at which people are living. … There seems to be no limit to 
what we can do for people in aged care, and we keep on doing it. (Daniel) 
He related these issues to the financial sustainability of keeping dying people alive and the 




I now explore the claim that the WTHD can be mitigated with enough or the right type of care 
for the person’s needs, that is to say, medicalisation. This view can be traced back to Saunders’ 
philosophy of hospice care, as discussed in Chapter Two and some of the early literature on the 
desire for death (e.g. Breitbart et al., 2000; Mak & Elwyn, 2005). I have found this to be a 
strongly held view among the palliative care and other medical professionals I have talked to 
throughout this study.  
  
Participants disagreed that the WTHD was due to unmet care needs. I usually asked participants 
whether they had any unmet care needs and explained (sometimes before and sometimes after 
they answered) that I was asking because the opinion among health professionals is that the 
desire to hasten death can be alleviated with the right type of care for the person’s needs.  
The support I have is pretty amazing. I can't think of anything that I might 
want or need that isn't provided. (Ben) 
  
there isn’t any more support that would make a difference to my thoughts on 
that, and yeah, there again it comes back to the manner of dying and there’s, 
I mean, like I accept that there’s pain killers and stuff that can be given too. 
But I don’t want to lie about being a vegetable, not in pain, in order to say 
that nobody has to give me the final dose of something. I don’t see the point, 
yeah. I get pretty much all the care or medical support that I need. (Judy) 
Judy was more concerned about being overmedicated than under-cared for. Her priorities were 
quality of life and autonomy, discussed in the next chapter. 
  
In a few instances participants’ comments on whether they had unmet care needs, there was 
ambivalence. As Paula described: 
I don’t agree with that because I have a view that hospice will do everything 
they can. And that’s when they can’t do anymore that then, and it’s not 
working, that I’d then need to use it.  So no, I don’t feel like there’s a gap 
there for unmet care needs, no.  Well yeah, as in care that could be provided 
that isn’t, I’m not aware of that, yeah… Pain would be, pain would be number 
one, yeah.  Yep, ‘cos you can’t enjoy life when you’re in intense pain like 
that. I couldn’t even look after the kids. (Paula) 
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Although some participants said their desire for the option to hasten death was not related to 
unmet needs, they still referred to wanting AD if they had unrelieved pain or when nothing was 
‘working’. This could be considered an unmet care need or the limits of medicine. 
  
What was apparent in Dee’s narrative was the purpose of living without joy. 
for me, it would be simply if we couldn’t get on top of the pain.  Or I was in 
such a poor condition that there’s just really no point to me continuing... So I 
don’t think it’s about an unmet need, but if you’re getting no joy out of your 
life, then why wouldn’t you, if you know what I mean?  That’s, that’s kind of 
my thing.  Is that life is for living and enjoying.  And as soon as you stop 
doing that, then why would you want to, why would you want to keep going. 
(Dee) 
Dee went on to describe her interaction with a patient support organisation’s counsellor: 
she said just be careful in the hospice if you talk about assisted dying or 
something like that.  They start to watch what pills they give you because 
they’ve obviously gotta keep themselves away from suspicion, if you know 
what I mean…  She said, just be wary that they will start looking at you, that 
you might be hatching a plan, if you know what I mean. (Dee) 
The participants did not describe themselves as experiencing meaningless, feeling particularly 
hopeless or in despair and thus considering suicide and in need of medical attention. What they 
questioned was the purpose of suffering needlessly and why the notion of suffering till the end of 
life prevailed. Also pertinent was why suffering until end of life was more acceptable than 
hastening death. AD was the solution to a life defined by participants as not worth living on the 
basis of pain, lack of enjoyment or for some, futility. 
  
However, according to demoralisation syndrome (Kissane et al., 2001) meaninglessness and 
despair in the face of death and the attendant desire to die are ‘always abnormal’ (Parker, 2004, 
p. 768). This attitude is potentially harmful because psychiatry (not the patient themselves) 
defines what may be considered neither abnormal, irrational or maladaptive as pathological, 
constituting a ‘psychiatric colonisation’ and pervasive medicalisation (Parker, 2004). Parker 
(2004, pp. 770-771) questioned the ideological basis of demoralisation syndrome. To quote at 
length, he described demoralisation syndrome as helping: 
to further entrench the long-standing social–moral position taken by the 
medical profession against assisted dying. Whether this is an intentional result 
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or a convenient one, it illustrates how human interests and purposes may well 
partly determine what we take to be the facts of our classificatory systems…. 
given that the proponents of DS  [demoralisation syndrome] appear to 
pathologise all requests for assistance to die as maladaptive and harmful, the 
proposed category would then effectively and ‘scientifically’ define out of 
contention what many people now see as a matter of social choice, and the 
subject of social debate, not just of medical research. This would seem to 
valorize science as a new dispenser of truth, or perhaps more accurately, to 
represent as science traditional Christian values such as the sanctity of life, 
which medical practice has long supported, by ruling out any alternative ways 
in which this particular experience could be understood and responded to. 
Parker challenges the epistemic basis of medical classification and social construction of 
knowledge, and its effects on societal debate and patients. Another way of looking at 
demoralisation syndrome is as a territorialisation of WTHD under the remit of medicine. 
  
The Australian & New Zealand Society of Palliative Medicine (2017); New Zealand Medical 
Association (2018); Palliative Care Nurses New Zealand (2012) organisations suggest patients 
with a WTHD have unmet care needs and that until there is universal palliative care (itself a 
medicalisation), no person should have access to AD in case their WTHD could be solved with 
the right care. While care will resolve some WTHDs for some patients, the high proportion of 
people accessing AD alongside palliative care has shown this to be untrue for all people 
(Chambeaere et al., 2011; Downar et al., 2020; E. J. Emanuel et al., 2016; Oregon Public Health 
Division, 2019). At the same time, the rejection of AD as a legitimate option by the main ANZ 
health professional organisations and affiliates is one of the ways in which medicalisation, in this 
instance a de-medicalisation, acts as a force on patients. This idea will be picked up again in 
Chapter Six on normative discourses and in the discussion. 
 
Experiential Authority 
On the basis of the suffering that participants had already experienced, or were already 
experiencing and expected to worsen, participants deployed their experiential authority on dying 
and suffering. This was contrasted with the experiential knowledge that healthy people lacked  
about suffering at the end of life. 
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Where I felt my quality of life had reached a stage which was no longer 
enjoyable to go through.  I should be able to make that decision, not a 
committee or a doctor. (Louis) 
  
And I find it now, more than ever, people who aren’t terminally ill making 
these statements [opposing assisted dying], not knowing how people who are 
terminally ill actually feel. So people like Maggie Barry [MP] should come 
sit here and have this conversation with the likes of me and say how do you 
feel about knowing that you’re on a timeframe?... And for Members of 
Parliament just to be able to go ‘we don’t think it's right because we’re fit and 
healthy’, well hang on, you’re not facing it… Shane Reti [MP], who want to 
vote against it but they are not personally actually facing it. (Dennis) 
Shane Reti is both a doctor and a MP, meaning his power/authority was in effect multiplied. 
Several participants suggested that no one else, especially those in positions of power such as 
doctors and MPs, had the right to tell them what to do with their lives because they had no 
comprehension of what the day-to-day experience of dying. 
  
Ben implied he should be the authority on his quality of life, AD and his death. 
I think it's important that people in my situation have an input in the debate… 
I think that when a person gets to the point where all quality of life is lost, and 
they don't wish to carry on, they should be allowed to choose. I hate the idea 
of someone who doesn't know me or have any understanding of what I'm 
going through telling me that my life is too precious for me to end on my 
terms. (Ben) 
Ben commented on whose views were prominent in the AD debate and other participants made 
similar points. Personal experience was deployed to counter hegemonic ways of thinking about 
dying. On the other hand, in her exegesis on mental health, Voronka (2016) cautions using 
‘people with lived experience’ as a unified identity category because it risks essentialising lived 
experience by erasing the material, ontological and epistemological differences. Ben and Dennis 
alluded to the health privilege of doctors and MPs I introduced in the first chapter. Participants 
appreciated that I was valuing dying people’s views and contributing their experiences to the 
current AD debate in ANZ. This highlights the issue of who is a knowledge producer and what 
knowledges count, discussed later in the thesis.  
 
Many health professionals claim that hastening death is not compatible with the tenets of 
palliative care and medical ethics in ANZ and that the WTHD can be relieved with the right type 
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of care (Australian & New Zealand Society of Palliative Medicine, 2017; Hospice New Zealand, 
2012, n.d.-a; New Zealand Medical Association, 2018). Submitters and commentators on the 
End of Life Choice Bill argued that palliative care and other health professionals must be 
acknowledged and listened to because they have the most experience in caring for the dying (see 
for example Hospice New Zealand, n.d.-b; Mannix, 2019; New Zealand Medical Association, 
2018). It could be construed as paternalistic medicine where doctors know best and patients do 
not know what is appropriate for them. Medicine and palliative care’s claim positions them as 
having the authority over dying on the basis of quantity of experience whereas dying people only 
have their own experiences to draw on. However, Daniel had more experiences of dying to speak 
about from his profession.  
  
So far, I have shown that for participants suffering took many forms and medicine was often 
both the cause and the solution. Health professionals also caused suffering for some participants, 
illustrating the flow of affect among assemblage elements. Participants conceptualised the means 
for relieving suffering within medicine, such as pain relief and certainty provided by the choice 
of AD, and outside of medicine, through meaningful social interactions. The political nature of 
suffering as a moral discourse is coupled with medicine through its technical efficacy against 
some forms of death. Participants politicised or territorialised their suffering and claimed 
experiential authority based on this suffering, as they made their case for being assisted to die. If 
medicine could not relieve their suffering then participants claimed they should be helped to die. 
 
This section began with an illustration of how past experiences, medical spaces, diagnosis and 
prognosis were the elements for participants understanding dying as a medical assemblage. 
Prognosis became reified as social fact in participants’ lives and had the capacity to permit 
particular courses of actions (or inaction). The treatments, healthcare appointments and 
technologies that were necessary for living well with dying turned everyday life into a life that 
was oriented around medical events, though resistance to all of these were apparent. Participants 
expected their suffering to be relieved by medicine but anticipated, sometimes based on their 
past experiences, that it would not be able to relieve all of their suffering. Participants used their 
experiential authority to claim that they were deserving of being helped to die because only they 
knew what it was like to experience suffering and what it was like to approach the end of life. 
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This section has shown how participants medicalised dying and suffering in order to justify the 
medical intervention to hasten death as legitimate. The following section examines the ways that 
participants engaged with medicine and the medicalised dying assemblage. 
  
Negotiating the Medicalised Dying Assemblage and its Affects 
An assemblage analysis examines the capacities that the particular set of relations within an 
assemblage afford (Feely, 2019). The previous section identified some of components and 
relations of the assemblage. In this second section of the chapter, I outline the affordances, 
specifically, the ways in which participants were rejecting and contesting ideas of medicalised 
dying. I discuss how they were potentially harmed and limited by the medicalised dying 
assemblage. Next I examine how they were critiquing and adopting the medicalisation of dying. 
Participants offered a sophisticated critique of medicine generally, as well as the medicalisation 
of dying, in terms of: resisting medical ways of understanding care, illness and treatments; 
particular modes of patienthood; the business of medicine; the cost of life-extending or around 
the clock care. At the same time, they selectively picked and chose what aspects of medicine 
they accepted. Then, the benefits of medicalisation are examined. These related to participants’ 
claim to be deserving of assistance to die by distinguishing their terminal condition and non-
terminal and the type of suffering they were experiencing. 
  
Rejecting 
The ways participants rejected medicine and medicalisation were most apparent in a few 
participants’ resistance to the idea of palliative or hospice care. One interpretation is that 
transition to palliative care represents uncertainty, fear and the end of hope (Broom, Kirby, 
Good, Wootton, & Adams, 2014). Alternatively, this can be interpreted as resisting the 
medicalisation of dying. Of note is that other participants embraced hospice care and were 
grateful for it, although they also did not agree with hospice’s interpretation of a good death, as 
discussed in the following subsection ‘contesting’. For Jacob, his rejection of such care was 
related to pride, quality of life and being able to meaningfully interact with others. When these 
things were diminished, he considered it the time to end his life. 
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So anyway, palliative care, if I need that, that’s about when I want my 
[cyanide] pills, don’t want that. I don’t want palliative care when I'm 
absolutely fucked… When I’m like that, that’s when I want to say goodbye, 
really. Yeah. I don’t want that. I know it’s pride… I’ve been in there, seen the 
people, seen what they’re like... they just get rolled over in beds, get their arse 
wiped, sponge and, I don’t want that, that’s when I want, that’s when I want 
a way out, you know. (Jacob) 
Jacob was emphatic he did not wish to live under certain circumstances. The routine daily cares 
Jacob found unacceptable would be considered ‘best’ care from the perspective of health 
professionals. Paradoxically, the pills as a means for ending his life and the lethal injection 
others spoke of, are a medical technology. It would seem that participants rebuffed parts but not 
all modes of medicalisation. 
  
Louis’ suspicion about palliative care was related to his unfamiliarity with what it was. He was 
still waiting to find out what palliative care was when I interviewed him. 
I spoke to my new nurse and said hey, I don’t understand palliative care.  And 
she agreed to get someone, which is obviously Nurse Maude, to contact me 
and then I can have a discussion with them.  But obviously you’re sedated 
and they just push food into your body.  I’m presuming it’s basically pretty 
much the end of the road... Yeah, basically that means they stuff you with 
morphine. (Louis) 
Based on his assumptions of what palliative care was and the social death Louis was 
experiencing, his position might be interpreted as not wishing to be further socially isolated by 
moving into the hospice and being sedated. Deep sedation has the potential to impose a ‘social 
death’ before biological death by removing the last vestiges of personhood and the ability to act 
on the world, especially if sequestered within the hospice (Lawton, 2000). 
  
Dennis’s rejection of counselling was based on the premise that talking and thinking about his 
condition too much might make his mental health worse. 
And whether I would benefit from a counsellor sit here every Tuesday 
afternoon with me, you know, how do you feel Dennis?  In some ways I’m 
scared, coz I think it would actually make it worse, because you start thinking 
about things you don’t need to think about.  It brings it all to the surface. 
Sometimes burying it is not so bad I suppose, but I don’t know if I’ve got it 
buried because I just don’t know. (Dennis) 
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The issue and ethics of care actually creating issues for people is not well examined. Dennis does 
not comply with the revivalist discourse of returning death as a normal part of life in his 
unwillingness to talk about ‘things’ (T. Walter, 1994). This has its roots in Kübler-Ross’s (1969) 
final stage of acceptance. Acceptance of dying is considered as a wholesale good thing and 
necessary as part of a ‘good death’ by the hospice movement (Zimmermann, 2012; cf ‘happy 
death movement’ in Lofland, 1978). Dennis’s way of dealing with his diagnosis, prognosis and 
associated long dying of motor neurone disease could interpreted as being stuck in the denial 
stage38 as a defence mechanism, or as evidence of the death denial thesis (Zimmermann, 2004). 
Or perhaps he is rejecting the medicalisation of dying and the fixed identity of a dying person. 
Together, the above rejections of parts of medicine and modes of care constitute a micro-level 
resistance to medicalisation (Halfmann, 2012). 
  
Contesting 
Participants strongly contested the view that AD should not be part of medical practice and 
hospice care in particular. For example, Kate said “I see that’s [AD] at the end of the line, and I 
still see that it works in combination with, with hospice”. The following exchange between 
Dennis and his wife Rebecca explains why they disagreed with hospice’s position. 
Rebecca: Hospice could be somewhere where this is implemented initially… 
But at the end they could be there, I mean hospice come and administer 
morphine so why couldn’t it be a similar thing?... Again, do they say [they 
won’t be involved in AD] because of their religious beliefs, or they don’t want 
that stigma of oh people go there to die. 
Dennis: Well everybody knows that already. 
Rebecca: Yeah, they do but if you say they do the assisted dying thing there, 
well I hate them, I don’t want to go there anymore.  Is that what’s making 
them think that? 
Dennis: Probably, yeah. 
Rebecca: Or are they genuinely saying yes, we want to help comfort people 
and if that’s their choice we’ll, you know, help them through it. That’s what 
hospice should be there for, to help people through their last days, last weeks.  
Not to go oh well, this is our opinion, we’re not going to go with it.  I don’t 
think it would harm hospice in any way. 
 
38 Although the sequential stages have been refuted (Corr, 2019).  
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Both Dennis and Rebecca were critical of hospices’ prioritising concerns about the perception of 
hospice over meeting the needs of the people that they provide care for. They also acknowledged 
the influence of religion, ideology, personal opinion and financial priorities on patient care. 
  
Dee also picked up on the theme of perceptions of hospice changing. 
it’ll just blossom and open up and make sure that places like the hospices and 
stuff are still seen as fantastic places.  Where people come to get relief and to 
live out what time they have, in the most wonderful fashion so that it doesn’t 
undermine the work that these guys do.  So it doesn’t say, ‘oh we need 
euthanasia because you’re actually not as good as you think you are’, or 
whatever else. So it’s not seen as a slap in the face, it’s just another tool added 
on to the tool box.   (Dee) 
Although she hugely appreciated the care she was receiving at the time of the interview, Dee 
alluded to the culture of medicine and to hospice as not respecting her autonomy to make choices 
that she felt was best for her elsewhere in her interview. Her comments about “accepting they 
can’t stop all pain” (quoted above in relieving suffering subsection) and “a slap in the face” 
indicate AD as undermining the power hospice has over the end of life. Participants were 
implying that there should scope within the culture of medicine for multiple modes of dying, as 
opposed to the either hospice or AD dichotomy. 
  
Hospice and palliative care have constructed certain modes of dying as acceptable and limited 
other possibilities or excluding them altogether as legitimate options (Rattner, 2018; 
Zimmermann, 2012). This was particularly felt by participants who wanted AD but noted that it 
was vehemently opposed in the media by Hospice NZ and medical professional bodies. 
Participants contested hospice’s portrayal of AD as one of only a number of ways of thinking 
about it. The Foucauldian principle of rarefaction is relevant here too (who can speak 
authoritatively on a subject and is qualified to speak (Foucault, 1972)), and explored in more 




The harmful effects of the lack of AD as an integrated part of care were palpable in the 
interviews. Participants used words such as concern, fear, sadness, anger, hurt and frustration to 
describe the affect on their experiences of dying. 
Jessica: So what’s it like for you knowing you can’t legally choose assisted 
dying? 
Jacob: It’s very annoying, because I, it leaves me with a fear that I’m going 
to be in palliative care, with no dignity. And that’s what really, really, really 
hurts… So I am pissed off that you can’t do it, and when you start talking 
about it, thinking about it, you know, just because of religion, some righteous 
bastard doesn’t agree with it, who the hell are they to tell us what. They don’t 
have to have it, it’s still a choice, but those people, what right have they got 
to take that choice away from people in a situation that they don’t understand, 
or haven’t been in. (Jacob) 
Jacob draws on the concept of dignity and his experience of approaching the end of life to 
legitimise his position. For this subsection, it is important to note the intersection of the power of 
medicine with the power of religion. They flow together as a productive force, shaping what 
choices are and are not available to participants. 
  
The legal alternatives to AD were considered more harmful, in particular VSED and suicide. 
Yeah, well now I can refuse medications, refuse foods, stop eating and 
drinking.  Makes it a slow, hard death. (Heather) 
The length and difficulty of a VSED death was problematic. Whereas the harm of less time 
arising from the lack of AD as an option was brought up by several participants. Lecretia Seales’ 
legal claims were outlined in the introduction. Seales and her case was brought up by several 
other participants who admired her courage and advocacy. Sylvia’s daughter Josie summed 
Seales’ argument up and Sylvia agreed: 
Josie: You [Sylvia] haven’t talked at all about sort of suicide aspect, and 
whether, you know, I mean, basically this is the Lecretia Seales’ argument, 
was, you know, according to the Human Rights Act you had to give her this 
right to actually choose to have assisted dying. Otherwise the option for her 
was to actually take her own life, thereby robbing her of a period when she 
could have actually still had some quality, but wasn’t prepared to take the 
risk, coz she might fall into the I’m not going to have any quality of life… 
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Sylvia: No, well you’re more likely to commit suicide if you haven’t got 
euthanasia. (Sylvia) 
 
By not having the option of AD available to them, most participants said they had given thought 
to the various methods of suicide available to them. Only one participant did not clearly 
differentiate hastened death from suicide. Some were more serious in their contemplations and 
others joked about it. Many discussed stock-piling medications but were unsure about how much 
they would need to take. 
I used to have what I called my suicide pack, coz I used to, you know, with 
my hunting, I used to poison possums, so I had cyanide. So I thought, one day 
I’ll be able to just chew one of them… But won’t be able to use them, yeah, 
I’m a bit scared about it too, because I don’t know how nice a death it would 
be. Don’t know. But yeah, I have thought about it, don’t worry about that. 
But that’s why I think the medical people should be able to help you out, so 
it is painless. Painless and not traumatic, you know. (Jacob) 
  
I keep saying that if it gets too bad then I’ll just overdose.  In my mind I have 
this fear that if I did I might be sick and that would stop it, or I mightn’t do it 
properly which would be worse for my family.  Because you’ve got to think 
of the people that are left behind, so that’s a really scary thing to think. And 
then I thought well there’s a horse drug, tranquilliser that you can get, but 
where do I get it?  Then you have to go to the, what is it, the dark web. (Emily) 
Participants considered suicide in light of the harm to themselves and to others and positioned 
AD as less harming. Some opponents of AD argue there is a right to die but only by way of 
suicide and not with medical assistance (1 News, 2019b). However, suicide is still not morally 
acceptable, rather it is seen as shameful, selfish and sinful as a legacy of religious discourses 
(Hannig, 2019). Compassion and relieving suffering are so central to medicine, so for some 
health professionals who I spoke to, and for politicians in the media (1 News, 2019b), I contend 
that it is harmful to suggest that suicide is a feasible alternative for those who WTHD. The irony 
is that they lament the high suicide rates of ANZ and put suicide contagion forward as a reason 




Another capacity of the assemblage was limiting. Participants did not wish their lives to be 
defined by their illness as it was a limited understanding of who they were or what life was 
about. Nor did they want theirs’ and others’ lives to revolve around their dying. Several 
participants said they did not want to be consumed by their illness and the work that can 
accompany patienthood such as attending numerous appointments (Strauss, Fagerhaugh, Suczek, 
& Wiener, 1985). Or in other words, have their life medicalised. For example, Emily compared 
her own experiences with that of her friend who had the same cancer. 
every day he goes to something like a naturopath or something like that… 
And he can’t get away from it, I can’t see how he can be healthy in mind if 
everything is aimed around, you know, he must be thinking every minute of 
the day what can I do... But when you talked about what brings purpose, well 
going to medical care every day is not purpose to me. (Emily) 
Emily was critical of too much healthcare because it constructed her subjectivity around being a 
sick person. She separated personhood from patienthood because it limited her subjectivity. To 
reject patienthood is deviant under the medicalisation of dying, which according to Clark (2002, 
p. 905) is a form of social control. Biomedicine has been described as a territorialising force (N. 
Fox, 2011) and palliative care as a disciplinary force (Rattner, 2018). Medicine constructs people 
as patients, making possible particular kinds of subjectivities and experiences and excluding 
others (Rattner, 2018; Street & Kissane, 2001; Zimmermann, 2012).  
  
Critiquing 
An assemblage affords multiplicity, meaning there are tensions and inconsistencies within 
(Kennedy et al., 2013). The inconsistencies and the contradictions of medicine were pointed out 
by participants. 
I’m pretty confident in saying a lot of those people [soldiers at war] were 
assisted to pass away, rather than kept alive because the doctors just went 
man, this is just going to be too hard… Probably some of it was not a decision 
the recipient chose even, but they just knew that, those in the circumstances 
knew that that was the best choice for them. (Dennis) 
Dennis highlighted the benevolence as well as paternalism of doctors who hastened their dying 
patients’ deaths. He compared patients who want AD available with those whose deaths are 
 124 
expected. A couple of participants suggested that euthanasia had been historically acceptable if it 
was the doctor’s choice; they commented on the hypocrisy that AD was not available now, when 
patients wanted to make the choice. As discussed above and according to Dennis and other 
commentators such as Buchman (2019), the president elect of the Canadian Medical Association 
and palliative care physician, in contemporary society the ideology of hospice not to hasten death 
(e.g. Hospice New Zealand, 2017; Palliative Care Subcommittee & NZ Cancer Treatment 
Working Party, 2007; World Health Organisation, 2019) is privileged over the patient’s 
preferences. 
  
Participants remarked on medico-legal policy on AD being out of step with the public on the 
parallel issues of medical marijuana, abortion and homosexuality. Animal euthanasia and cruelty 
to animals were also raised. 
We can put animals down humanely, and at the other end of the scale we’re 
quite happy to give an abortion.  Oh, you don’t have enough money to raise 
it?  Yeah, okay, we’ll give you an abortion.  Isn’t this double standards? 
(Louis)39 
  
I can remember when it was actually illegal to be gay, or to not be gay, but to 
indulge in gay acts.  That’s absurd… So, to me, this is in the same gambit, 
that we will look back on this and go, why was this such a big deal, you 
know?...  It’s the same thing, there won’t be, you know, people just killing 
themselves all over the place because they fancy it.  (Dee) 
Medicine and the law, as with other social issues, have often been slow to catch up with public 
opinion on AD.40 The forces of medicine and the law to define participants’ lives and what they 
 
39 Although abortion and AD are seen as equivalent by Louis, scholars argue that they are different (Shaw, 2002; 
Yuill, 2013). Abortion is dealing with potential person; it is rare to argue that an embryo has the same moral status 
as a full human life. AD applies to a person with moral status, social identity and biography. Abortion is decided for 
a foetus while AD is actively sought by the individual. Therefore, the issues of agency and competency differ. In 
order to make abortion and euthanasia comparable, there is a levelling process whereby the life of a foetus is given 
same agency and legal standing as an individual with biography in the world. As well, there are potentially opposing 
interests (mother vs. foetus) and that of an authority compelling a woman to do something (carry pregnancy to term) 
that are not equivalent issues in with AD (although some doctors encourage dying people to carry on). 
40 Homosexuality has been de-medicalised with its removal from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in 1973 
(Drescher, 2015) and removed from the New Zealand Crimes Act (1961) in 1986. At the time of data collection 
medical marijuana was illegal but at the time of writing, medical marijuana was then permitted for those 
approaching the end of life. It has been re-medicalised to legitimise its use (Pedersen & Sandberg, 2013). Abortion 
law in ANZ comes under the Crimes Act and at the time of writing, is undergoing reform. Currently, two doctors 
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were allowed to with their bodies were felt. “Death clearly highlights the convergence of forms 
of institutional control or regulation over bodies: namely, medicine, religion and the law” 
(Nettleton, 2006, p. 116). The right to bodily autonomy over some aspects but not others was 
inconsistent according to participants. According to LiPuma and DeMarco (2016, p. 39) it is 
inconsistent that palliative care policies “claim to uphold the value of respect for patient 
autonomy and dignity, but reject PAS”. 
  
Another inconsistency within medicine that participants critiqued was regarding money. Kate 
found her health professionals less interested in her end of life wishes and quality of life than her 
as a revenue producing asset. 
health professionals are about keeping you here cos while you’re here, you, 
and it also doesn’t, you know, it doesn’t seem to matter too much about your 
quality of life.  Or, you know, as long as you keep walking through their door, 
turning up for the appointments.  (Kate) 
I infer Kate was referring to her GP, which in ANZ is fee for service.41 Other participants 
pointed to the tensions between the financial side of medicine and ethics of practice. For 
example, Emily thought that doctors might be self-interested in their concern about the financial 
implications of AD and by implication, that they should be patient-centred. Emily described her 
consultation with a specialist when she was seeking a diagnosis: 
So in those terms they could be worried about, from a business point of view.  
Not that I know, well no, I do know because the specialist that I went to was 
only interested in money…So yes, there are doctors that would think about 
what it meant for them financially. (Emily) 
 
Emily’s experience as a board member of a health care organisation gave her unique insights into 
the aspects of medicine and AD that are often not discussed. She considered the cost of 
treatments and the potential implications of attempting suicide. Again, Emily is referring to 
distributive justice, this time in reference to autonomy. 
 
must approve the abortion satisfies the legal grounds although doctors can conscientiously object to participate but 
are supposed to refer to another health professional or provider (Ballantyne, Gavaghan, & Snelling, 2019) 
41 There are also hidden costs at the end of life from such time off work to care for family members to parking at the 
hospital, as well as personal and interpersonal costs (Gott, Allen, Moeke-Maxwell, Gardiner, & Robinson, 2015). 
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And do you know, the thing about it is if I attempt it with tablets and I don’t 
succeed, then that’s hospitalisation… And so therefore, by them doing it [AD] 
they’re saving hospital costs, that’s my argument.  Coz I know it’s always the 
cost, that’s all that they think about in the end is the hospitals know that’s a 
cost, that’s a cost. And I know what they do [from her experience on a health 
care organisation board]… [Cancer is] going to happen more and more and 
more, and I think euthanasia, if people want it, is the answer, because we’re 
not going to have the resources.  Which is a terrible thing to say…. I will not 
go chasing a cure that’s going to cost an arm and a leg.… I’m always thinking 
that if I’m taking this money up, you know, if I demand it, that’s only thinking 
about me. (Emily) 
The economic benefits of implementing AD were put forward explicitly by Emily and more 
implicitly by other participants. They were taking into account not just their own needs and 
desires but take a more altruistic and equitable approach to the costs and distribution of care. 
Death is deferrable but at what cost both financially as well as physically and emotionally? The 
above excerpt also illustrates the tension between moral decision-making at individual/family 
level and decision-making made on ethical principlism in medical practice.  
  
Adopting 
Participants adopted the medicalisation of AD as indicated by their expectation of doctors’ 
involvement in the process and reference to medical conditions as grounds for eligibility and 
exclusion, which I discuss in more detail in the following subsection. Participants saw the value 
of doctors and considered them part of their toolkits against a bad death. They relied on them for 
access to restricted medications, treatments and referrals. Participants felt hospice/palliative care 
doctors and general practitioners were in the best positions to be involved in decision-making on 
AD because of their relationships with patients and experience in providing end-of-life care. 
Doctors were perceived as the agent of implementing eligibility criteria and safeguards. 
Moreover, they trusted them to regulate the AD system. Some thought an AD specialist would be 
useful for dealing with requests. Some participants thought a panel of doctors would be 
acceptable if the approval process was swift, considering their limited life expectancy. All 
participants agreed AD should be their personal choice and felt that formal approval from two 
doctors would help ensure that it was. 
I think it should be in place but under medical guidance… I have enough faith 
in the doctors to, yeah, arbitrate safely. (Dennis) 
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I guess I want to trust the people in the system.  And I think that there’s every 
reason to believe that the medical people particularly will be conservative. 
(Paula) 
However there was also some concern that doctors might not agree with patients about when the 
time is right for AD. Other participants thought AD should not ultimately be a doctor’s decision 
(for example, Louis as quoted above in the experiential authority subsection) but saw the need 
for doctors’ expertise in applying strict eligibility criteria to ensure public safety. Participants 
thought that doctors should be comfortable with making decisions around AD when there were 
clear oral or written instructions about what the person wanted, pointing to the tension between 
patient autonomy and the power doctors retain in a medicalised AD model. The convoluted 
process of accessing AD is medicalising and in some ways diminishes the power participants 
were seeking to reclaim. This tension around power is the focus of the next chapter. 
  
Some participants preferred euthanasia than a self-administered death, adopting a more 
medicalised version of AD. This was because it was a perceived as a “safer” death and because 
they had witnessed peaceful euthanasia for their pets. Others preferred a self-administered death 
because they wanted to have control and because it would not involve health professionals as 
active agents, out of a consideration of the burden euthanasia could place upon health 
professionals. 
I’d kind of like to have the control over it myself. And I think that’s probably 
better for the medical profession. I really favour the idea of having the means 
there, but still having to choose to use it.  I think that’s a really good model. 
(Daniel) 
Heather preferred euthanasia because a self-administered death could technically be classified as 
suicide with implications for her insurance policy pay-out. A few participants did not express a 
strong preference either way. 
  
By adopting medicalisation, participants accepted that the option of AD was only going to be 
available through a medical system even if this controlled their ability to access it. By framing 
AD as a medical intervention with doctors as safeguards, participants contributed to the 
medicalisation of AD and their own deaths. Thus far, I have shown how the participants in this 
study couched death and dying as an assemblage of activities that require medical intervention 
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whilst also rejecting, contesting and critiquing the medicalisation of dying. Participants asserted 
their claim that medicine should help them to die because it cannot relieve their suffering and 
only left them with the harmful option of suicide. They used medical concepts and 
medicalisation to legitimate their interests, one of which was establishing their deservingness as 
candidates for AD which the following subsection explores. 
  
Benefitting: Hierarchy of Deservingness 
One of the most significant benefits of the medicalisation of dying was participants could stake 
their moral claim as being deserving of an assisted death using medical concepts. Building on the 
experiential authority section above, in this subsection I illustrate how participants distinguished 
their own circumstances of suffering due to a life-limiting illness from non-terminal cases. Then 
I show how the type of illness participants had, and their anticipated, irremediable suffering, 
legitimated their deservingness of AD. I chose to explore ideas of deservingness because it is 
defined as “worthy of being treated in a particular way” (Lexico, 2019, para. 1) and I am 
interested in the moral reasoning of participants. Deservingness was closely connected to 
eligibility, legitimacy and rights. Rights will be discussed in the following chapter. 
  
Participants used medical explanations to justify their deservingness and eligibility as candidates 
for AD. The most apparent distinction was between AD for people with and without a medically 
diagnosed life-limiting condition. Most wanted AD to be available only to people with a limited 
life expectancy. Although some also acknowledged that this is complicated by prognosis being 
difficult for doctors to predict. 
Everybody should be allowed to ask to be assisted to die if they’re, if they 
meet the criteria.  Not just cos they think it’d be a good time to go, you know, 
I’m ready to go now.  But if they meet the criteria of unrelieved pain, of a, a, 
a terminal situation within six months, I think the Bill says…  But you’ve got 
to include the six months’ terminal, that’s got to be included.  It’s not an 
alternative.  And, and you’ve got to include the thing relating to pain, too, I 
think.  (Daniel) 
  
I always held quite strong views that I’m pro-euthanasia, absolutely, you 
know, not uncontrolled… But even if we did it a bit, if you know what I mean, 
but it’s this whole thing, is like saying, well, can you have assisted dying if 
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you’re going to live for three months, six months, 12.  Well, actually doctors 
don’t have that, they don’t have that ability to be that accurate.  (Dee) 
  
A key part of the distinction between participants’ claim to AD and others’ entitlement was the 
difference between irrational suicide associated with mental illness and rational suicide for those 
with a life-limiting illness. With regards to eligibility, other participants emphasised that they 
were of “sound mind”, a term associated with capacity for decision-making in medical settings. 
So yeah, it’s got to be regulated obviously, but I still think you should have 
the choice to do it with a big of dignity, you know. And I don’t think it’s a 
coward’s way out, it takes a lot of guts to make that, it takes a lot of courage 
to make that choice, because most of the people that commit suicide in a state 
of depression don’t really know what they’re doing. I’ve seen people that are 
depressed, and you can’t talk reason to them. They make the decision, but 
they’re not in right mind. (Jacob) 
Heather had some personal insight into the experience of suicidal ideation: 
But I think when they’re suicidal, okay they say they want death as a way out, 
but they don’t see what death is.  It’s just a way out, and they don’t sort of 
think beyond that, the permanence.  It takes probably going through all those 
steps to realise how permanent it is.  I think having had issues in the past 
myself with suicide you don’t see any bigger picture, it’s just something 
instant you want to happen that moment, to get out of that headspace.  And 
you don’t think beyond that, you don’t have the capabilities at the time. 
(Heather) 
Heather thought that a suicidal person does not have capacity for insightful thought or 
comprehension of the implications of the decision in that moment, perhaps implying reduced 
agency.  
 
Participants’ rationality in addition to their shortened life expectancy were the basis for their 
autonomy and therefore deservingness and assumed eligibility to be helped to die.  Claudia 
connected her capacity to what she saw as a right to make a decision about whether to hasten her 
death. 
As a rational, competent, caring human being, I should be allowed to make 
that decision. (Claudia) 
 
Okay if the person is presenting as irrational, you know, that’s a little bit, you 
know, okay, so what is going on?  They obviously need more help to do it 
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[make the decision].  But I don’t think I’m irrational, I don’t think I’m going 
off half-cocked, I don’t think I’m in the wrong mind-set now, or in the future.  
Yeah.  If I change my mind, well, firstly I’m not in the right time to clock out. 
(Kate) 
Kate asserted her own rationality. It included the ability to change her mind. Although all 
participants, except for one, rejected that their wish to die was a form of suicide, the term rational 
suicide has some analytical utility for explaining how participants conceptualised their WTHD 
(Werth, 1999). Participants had thoroughly considered their prospective future, it was not an 
impulse as suicide is often assumed or portrayed. Perhaps more importantly, they did not wish to 
die as a suicidal person might, but wished to control how and when they died as they were 
already approaching the end-of-life. 
  
People with conditions such as depression or dementia were seen as less able to make rational 
decisions or competent to make decisions about AD. 
I think it’s mind wise and that I’m all good with it, and I’ve had no mental 
health problems at all. (Wallace) 
  
You can’t just, because you’ve, you know, got some mental health problems 
and you feel like committing suicide, that you can go to your doctor and say 
‘I want to die today’. You know, that’s not going to happen. You have to be 
of sound mind and mental illness counts that one out. You know, your dying 
grandmother has dementia, that kind of thing, well it counts that out.  
(Rebecca, Dennis’s wife) 
Although participants felt they possessed capacity, this capacity as also understood as something 
that could become compromised. 
And the being sound of mind bit I find a bit tricky, ‘cos what if you lose your 
mind because you’ve got brain cancer and you’re in huge pain and then can 
they determine you’re sound of mind to make that decision still? (Paula) 
  
Heather further distinguished between people who were able to express their wishes at the time 
of any assistance to die. Heather shared that she had watched videos online about people being 
euthanised against their will, despite an advance directive to this effect. 
I used to be all for it, and think yes it’s a human right.  I still believe that.  I 
think Netherlands has taken it far too far, that I am totally against.  But yeah, 
it should be an option for the terminally ill, but only if they can say so.  And 
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I would’ve said even if they had it in writing, but I think, and say it happened 
years later, I think they need to be able to say so at the time… I did see one 
video on a man who said he always wanted it, and then when he had 
Alzheimer’s he was saying no.  So he was sort of aware.  But yeah, who 
governs that and says where the cut off line is? (Heather) 
Heather was referring to the advance directive for people with cognitive and communication 
difficulties patients such as those with Alzheimer’s, like her mother. She queried how such 
circumstances should be managed safely for people who lacked capacity and later suggested a 
committee could. 
  
Paula reflected on another difficult scenario, the possibility of AD for people who were not in the 
last stages of life but suffering from pain and paralysis. 
Me Before You put it front of mind, that movie and the book…And in that 
case he wasn’t, he was, he had pain, he’d been in a motorbike accident and 
was living with big pain and paralysis and he chose to die. He definitely 
wasn’t within the last few stages of his life and I could see why he chose it 
but I didn’t agree. I didn’t agree with that as an option so I don’t think we 
should have that here. (Paula) 
I asked about her thoughts on the laws that are based around unbearable suffering, rather than a 
terminal diagnosis. 
And how do you determine unbearable suffering. And I suppose this is what 
this guy [in Me Before You] was saying he had.  But yet from the outside, 
others, me looking in, I wouldn’t say that was unbearable suffering… I think 
that unbearable suffering is very grey and wouldn’t be wise to enter into at 
this stage in New Zealand, yeah. (Paula) 
By acknowledging the ‘grey’ area of non-terminal cases and the potentially limited capacity for 
decision-making, participants legitimised their own claims to a sanctioned assisted death as 
unequivocal and therefore more acceptable. The greyness might undermine their own right to 
die.  
  
The criteria participants expected were relatively restrictive, that is to say life-limited illnesses 
only, meaning an exclusion of other forms of suffering. This effectively privileges some types of 
suffering over others. While the parameters on who should be eligible could be construed as 
participants ‘pulling up the ladder behind them’, participants also had concerns about 
‘vulnerable’ people making the wrong decision. 
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Even among terminal illnesses there was some hierarchy of deservingness. Some participants 
distinguished between the types of life-limiting illnesses and the WTHD. The type of suffering 
associated with different illnesses also made a difference to the perception of the appropriateness 
of AD. The availability or lack of potentially life-extending treatments shaped the way some 
participants saw AD for different conditions. This was because there was a chance cancer could 
go into remission. 
Rebecca: Yeah, there could be a small chance that, I know in Dennis’s case 
[with motor neurone disease] he won’t get better, but for other people, they 
could actually be – 
Dennis: Remissions and things like that. 
The progressive nature of illness like motor neurone disease with no treatments available assured 
Dennis and Rebecca that there was no chance of him recovering and therefore there was less 
uncertainty around AD. 
  
For the three men who had motor neurone disease, their slow loss of movement and function, as 
well as difficulty breathing and swallowing at the end of life, was the basis for their perceived 
deservingness. 
Yep I think, with motor neurone of course, I’m not in pain, so it’s a bit 
different from people who have got physical pains and so forth.  But I know 
there’s going to be a point when, yeah, I’m just a complete zombie just about 
and how long do I want to live like that for?...  If you go to Huntington’s, well 
you’ve lost your mind and everything so who cares, you know?  Someone 
else can make the decision for you sort of thing, but with motor neurone, 
[your mind’s okay] right through the bitter end… (Dennis) 
For participants with cancer, pain was the most significant factor in their perceived 
deservingness. 
I would sometimes have this really intense pain that would cause almost panic 
attacks because it was so bad… I was writhing around on the floor and you 
just don’t know what to do with yourself.  And if that’s what it’s like all the 
time… especially when you’re facing that, yeah, facing, it is a potentially 
painful, horrible experience… I just don’t think that it’s fair for you to have 
a terrible end to your life when you shouldn’t need to.  (Paula) 
The two participants with COPD were already experiencing severe breathlessness which led to the 
loss of function which was the cause for their belief that they should be able to be helped to die. 
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It’s at that stage where it’s just horrible, you know… shortness of breath, it’s 
like this all the time… I’m all for it because at this stage sometimes I feel I’m 
suffocating and it’s really hard to catch my breath at times, and I think I don’t 
want to be doing this for years, and years, and years. (Wallace) 
People with different illnesses have been found to have varied reasons and motivations for the 
wish to die (Ohnsorge et al., 2019).  
  
In making these distinctions between rational and irrational, between types of illnesses, suffering 
and deaths, and also between the healthy and the dying, the participants created a hierarchy of 
deservingness that posited them as most worthy of an assisted death. Participants were claiming 
the value of my personhood and my suffering as deserving of help. Their experiences of certain 
types of suffering as they approached the end of life was used to strengthen the legitimacy of 
their claim. They used medical categories to differentiate between themselves and ‘others’. 
These categories legitimised their own circumstances as candidates for AD and illustrate the co-
opting of medicalisation for their own means. 
  
The two key ideas that emerge from this second section are that the assemblage of medicalised 
dying afforded multiple affective capacities and that participants were not passive recipients of 
medicalisation. The rhizomatic nature of assemblages and specifically for this thesis, the 
medicalised dying assemblage, allows for rejecting, contesting, critiquing, adopting and 
benefitting (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Feely, 2019; N. Fox, 2011; N. Fox & Alldred, 2015). The 
benefit of accepting medicalisation was to be able to assert their claim of deservingness couched 
in medical terminology. Participants separated healthy or non-terminal people from people with 
a limited life expectancy. An unintended effect of this was undermining the claims of others who 
were not terminal to AD. 
  
Discussion: Agency, Strategic Negotiators and Re-Medicalisation  
This chapter has illustrated that this assemblage of medicalised dying is complex and dynamic. It 
is comprised of relations between patients, health professionals, families, care settings, diagnosis, 
prognosis, treatments, technologies, pain, non-physical suffering and the End of Life Choice Bill. 
Discourses of suffering, acceptance, empowerment and meaningfulness also shaped these 
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relations. Medicalisation, when viewed as an assemblage theoretic, is a construct that 
continuously arranges, produces and conceals its elements and relations (Kennedy et al., 2013). 
Conceptualising the relationships between people, concepts and objects as part of an assemblage 
which interact and affect other, helped to clarify some of the ambiguities apparent in the data. 
Participants were able to accept, adopt, reject and critique the forces of medicalised living and 
dying that were afforded by the assemblage. The effects and affects varied from person to person 
but can be identified in the participants’ engagement with the elements of the assemblage. 
 
Within any assemblage there is agency and capacity to form new relations and affect the social 
context (De Landa, 2019). Viewing medicalisation as a generative and transformative 
assemblage highlighted patients’ engagement in discursive practices about their own death to 
establish deservingness and access to end-of-life choice. One of these transformations was 
participants contesting medical meanings of the end of life (e.g. the WTHD as pathological or 
ameliorable) in order to construct AD as a logical medical intervention for dying badly.  
 
I propose the term ‘strategic negotiators’ to capture how participants in this study engaged with 
the discourses of medicine and subverted them for their own advantage. They strategically 
engaged with medicalisation to their advantage, emphasising the lack of certainty about when 
and how they will die, challenging doctors’ ability to treat their suffering, and rebuffing other 
parts of medicine such as particular medications or accepting daily cares. Not everyone would 
have the capacity, literacy and resources to engage in this way. Participants sought to redress the 
power they perceived medicine had over their lives and define their own version of a good death 
by empowering themselves to critique medicine including the medically-defined concepts of 
patienthood and sociality of survivorship (Dragojlovic & Broom, 2018). 
 
Participants demonstrated their agency by exploiting medical language and concepts in order to 
gain access to the assistance to die that they wanted. There were examples of participants 
subverting the compassion of medicine and doctors to make the case that they had a moral and 
ethical responsibility to relieve their suffering. Their claim was based on the social contract 
between doctors and patients to relieve suffering (S. R. Cruess, 2006). Relieving suffering is the 
ethical cornerstone of medical practice (Parker, 2004). Participants possessed moral capital on 
 135 
the basis of their suffering and their vulnerability (Jaye, Young, Egan, & Williamson, 2017). If 
doctors fail to relieve suffering then they have breached the contract and therefore, according to 
participants, should relieve their suffering with AD. This could be interpreted as patients 
constructing a lay moral framework by making claims to what medicine should do as part of 
medical ethics. Their desire for AD challenges the position of medicine as the saviour of modern 
humanity. 
 
However, by participating in medicalisation, they contributed to the medicalisation of death that 
they were critical of. Since AD is conceived within a medical framework, they framed death as a 
medical problem to be managed by health professionals with medical technologies and 
treatments. At the same as resisting medicalised dying, the medicalisation of the WTHD and the 
ethos of medicine, participants’ idea of dying well often involved medical intervention in some 
form whether it was drugs, an injection, or a palliative care team. Too much medicine was often 
the source of the problem but medical intervention to bring about death was also the solution. 
There was also the need to cooperate with medical discourses and systems to gain access to AD.  
  
The excerpts drawn on in this chapter offer insight into the relationship between the institution of 
medicine and patients. Using the participants’ accounts of approaching death and dying, I 
demonstrated that there are multiple ways that reveal participants’ agency. In particular, the 
medicalisation initiated and co-opted by patients themselves is a re-medicalisation of dying. Re-
medicalisation captures what is occurring when participants framed dying as a medical problem 
and their agency in doing so. Re-medicalisation was defined in the introduction as the re-
establishment of dying under the jurisdiction of medicine in spite of attempts to de-medicalise it 
through empowering patients, families and communities to make their own decisions at the end 
of life and care for the dying. Medicine is strong enough to maintain its power (medicalisation) 
while giving up parts of it (de-medicalisation) (Halfmann, 2012). Although power over AD still 
rests with medicine, bolstered by the institution of law, I argue for the need to incorporate more 
emphasis on participants’ agency through their re-medicalisation of dying. However, 




I set out to reveal the ways in which participants engaged with medicine. As shown in the first 
section of this chapter, participants were highly accustomed to medical intervention in their lives 
through medical appointments and treatments as well as more implicit medical meanings of 
health, life and death, as per the expansionist model of medicalisation described in Chapter Two. 
The assemblage theoretic enabled me to identify an assemblage of medicalised dying as it is 
presently arranged and that participants were not passive recipients of medicalisation. 
Assemblages will be returned to in the discussion chapter. As a consequence of the familiarity of 
medicalisation of life and death, AD was perceived as another medical intervention to solve a 
problem, in this case of dying badly. Participants used the values of medicine and processes of 
medicalisation in order to construct AD as a rational and compassionate medical intervention to 
the problem of bad dying. In section two, I demonstrated how participants were ‘strategic 
negotiators’ engaging with medicalisation and co-opting medical discourses to suit their own 
aims, alongside rejecting and contesting them. Participants resisted futile intervention at the end 
of life and medicalisation of death and dying. Paradoxically, death is medicalised but not 
medicalised enough to help them have a peaceful death. They leveraged their case for AD within 
a medical framework, but in doing so, they also re-medicalised the end-of-life practices that they 
were critical of and unintentionally diminished the suffering of non-terminal people. The 
uncertainty around dying, suffering and death that medicine was perceived to be unable to 
manage sufficiently left participants seeking their own strategies for control. It is the issue of 




Chapter Five: Assisted Dying, a Paradox of Control 
  
Introduction 
The notion of ‘control’ was fundamental to participants’ experiences of living with its attendant 
embodied experiences of illness and dying. Contemporary social and medical discourses tend to 
represent selves/bodies, as ‘things’ that are controllable and should be controlled (Giddens, 
1991; Lupton, 2013; Shilling, 2012). Further, a good death is conceived as one that is controlled 
(inter alia) (Hendry et al., 2013; Howarth, 2007; McNamara, 2004; R. Smith, 2000). In fact, one 
descriptive definition mentioned control in five of the 12 principles of a good death (R. Smith, 
2000). As noted in the introduction, the loss of control featured in many of the studies on the 
WTHD but remains under-theorised according to one recent meta-review (Rodríguez-Prat et al., 
2016). The authors of this review concluded “there are, to our knowledge, no studies exploring 
the experience and meaning attributed to this desire [for control at the end of life] by patients 
themselves” (Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2016, p. 15). This gap forms part of the rationale for 
exploring control in the present research. I asked participants some form of the question, ‘this 
sounds like an obvious question but is having control over your death important to you and 
why?’ 
  
Building on the previous chapter about medicalisation, one of the assumptions inherent to this 
argument is that health professionals, specifically doctors, exercise control over dying through 
clinical interventions. Interventions postpone and interfere with the timing of many deaths, 
particularly in the modern era with the discovery of antibiotics and the introduction of other 
pharmaceutical and surgical interventions. Winnington suggests that more than physically, 
medicine attempts to control dying and the dying individual trying to enact their own death by 
blocking AD (Winnington et al., 2018). Despite claims that power is more likely than ever before 
to be shared between health professionals and patients in the clinic, the expert knowledge, ability 
to offer treatments and recommend particular choices still resides with the doctor, suggesting that 
doctors are still very much in control of and have power over dying.  
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For participants, feeling in control of their death primarily involved having a choice about when, 
how and the circumstances under which they die. The choice of AD appears to afford an 
opportunity to the individual to control their own dying. Yet there were ambiguities expressed in 
participants’ accounts which indicated that AD would not necessarily afford individual control as 
they expected it might. It is participants’ understandings and experiences of control, and related 
concepts of autonomy and dignity, that drive this chapter. Throughout, I interrogate the range of 
ways participants positioned themselves, and were positioned, in relation to notions of control, 
paying particular attention to the contexts within which particular ideas about control and choice 
circulate and are rendered meaningful to participants.  
  
I begin with a précis of control and related concepts. Then, I outline the theories of control that 
help to explain the data. Specifically, I draw on biopower, technologies of the self (Foucault, 
1988, 1991) and ethopolitics (Rose, 2001), and lastly, control and freedom (Deleuze, 1992). 
Structuration theory (Giddens, 1979), described in Chapter Two, is revisited in this chapter. The 
second section explores what participants sought to control, namely the risk of dying badly, and 
the range of practices they engaged in or desired to do so. These included formalised means such 
as advance care plans (ACPs) and funeral planning, and ‘informal’ methods such as suicide. In 
the third section I discuss the broader discursive context of control. That is to say, the 
participants’ commentary on rights, government, religion and social control. Participants 
referenced control as well as the interrelated values of autonomy, dignity, self-determination and 
freedom as the reasons for wanting the choice of an assisted death. They also considered the 
limits of these values. I draw the chapter to close with a discussion of whether the participants’ 
experiences are mired in paradox and return to the theories introduced at the beginning of the 
chapter. I argue that participants employed discourses and practices of control in attempting to 
avoid the risk of dying badly but in doing so they also reinforced the medical professionals as 
being in control of death. Within this paradox though, there is still some scope for choice, 




Control is a noun, a verb and an adjective. Control is multivalent, making it difficult to discuss 
with accuracy. Control can be defined in psychological terms of internal and external locus of 
perceived control over one’s life (Reich & Infurna, 2016); in sociological terms of personal 
agency or social control over the creation of the self (Elliott, 2001). Other disciplines have their 
own understandings beyond the scope of this thesis. As Giddens noted, control is highly prized 
in late modern society (Giddens, 1991). Humans have sought control over other humans 
especially deviants, their bodies, nature, and the future (Giddens, 1991). In exercising power in 
order to control or manipulate others, individuals mobilise forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1986). 
Mastery and control are part of the modernist identity strategies (Elliott, 2001). Summarising 
Bauman’s work on identity in contemporary culture, Elliott (2001, p. 145) said “the desire for 
mastery takes the self into the controlled and controlling world of rationality and rational 
decision-making”. However, the rational is not so easily disconnected from the emotional (N. 
Richards, 2017b). 
  
For the purposes of this research, because participants spoke of control in terms of their ability to 
make choices they wanted, it is tempting to understand control as the ability to change an 
outcome towards what it is you desire and to enact this by making self-determining choices; 
however, control is also limited by what resources are available to individuals to influence 
change and the context. This definition aligns to Giddens’ structuration theory (1979) and brings 
together emotional, rational and contextual elements. The constructs of choice and control 
intersect; to some extent they are illusory and are only ever a semblance of choice or control. 
Choices are a means by which one both constitutes and governs oneself in everyday life. 
  
Control on a personal level is related to agency, autonomy, rights and freedom. These concepts 
are debated within bioethics, moral anthropology and philosophical fields (Fassin, 2014; 
Laidlaw, 2014). This chapter considers the relationship between control and agency (defined in 
Chapter Two). Control and autonomy are related in the definition that Beauchamp and Childress 
(2001) outlined in their theory of autonomy. Non-control is one of three conditions for autonomy 
along with understanding and intentionality. Non-control refers to freedom from undue 
influences or coercion on a person’s decisions so that they can be self-directed. Considerations of 
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autonomy often lack attention to the sociological question of agency; how much agency does a 
person have if choices are limited by structure and conditioned by context. Rights are somewhat 
more aligned to structure and agency. They relate to what is permissible, moral and just within 
modern society and shape laws and governments. “Rights are entitlements (not) to perform 
certain actions, or (not) to be in certain states; or entitlements that others (not) perform certain 
actions or (not) be in certain states” (Wenar, 2015, para. 1). Rights entitle certain freedoms. 
Freedom is a preceding condition for the exercise of power (O'Farrell, 2005).42  Control, choice 
and autonomy are inter-related concepts that interact with and are constrained by structure, 
including complex health care systems (Kaufman, 2005; T. Walter, 2017) which is why they are 
a necessary focus for this research. 
  
Biopower 
Foucault offered a powerful account of the tensions between control and autonomy, structure and 
agency, with his concepts of biopower and technologies of the self. Biopower focuses both on 
biopolitics, the regulatory controls of the population, and anatomo-politics, the disciplining of 
the individual body as a machine to maximise its usefulness and docility to integrate it into 
efficient and economic systems (Foucault, 1991). Danaher, Schirato, and Webb (2000, p. ix) 
explained that: 
bio-politics and bio-power refer to the technologies, knowledges, discourses, 
politics and practices used to bring about the production and management of 
a state’s resources. Bio-power analyses, regulates, controls, explains and 
defines the human subject, its body and behaviour. 
Biopolitics and anatomo-politics are unified by intermediary power relations and technologies of 
power (Foucault, 1991). The ‘two poles’ of biopower—control of the population and control of 
the individual body—were brought together with investigations, regulation and interventions into 
the causes of death (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983; Foucault, 1990; Sandstrom, 2005). The 
institution of medicine is an example par excellence of biopower (Rabinow & Rose, 2006). Both 
 
42 Freedom is used interchangeably with liberty (Carter, 2018). Berlin distinguished between positive and negative 
liberty and construed them as rival and incompatible interpretations of the same ideal (Carter, 2018). “Negative 
liberty refers to the absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints. One has negative liberty to the extent that actions 
are available to one in this negative sense. Positive liberty is the possibility of acting—or the fact of acting—in such 
a way as to take control of one’s life and realize [sic] one’s fundamental purposes” (Carter, 2018, para. 1). 
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the individual body and the population are controlled in part through medicine and the use of 
medical knowledge to define and measure health, illness and deviance (Foucault, 1991). 
  
Rather than power being possessed by a sovereign who could take subjects’ resources and life at 
will, power is now located and wielded at the level of life by the state and its institutions of 
power (Foucault, 1991). As nations became increasingly industrialised, the state became 
interested in birth, morbidity, mortality and longevity as they were necessary for expansion. New 
power relations meant citizens had rights to life, satisfaction of needs, health and to one’s body 
(Foucault, 1991). Biopower is a useful heuristic for this thesis because “the economy of 
contemporary biopolitics operate according to logics of vitality, not mortality: while it has its 
circuits of exclusion, letting die is not making die” (Rabinow & Rose, 2006, p. 211). In other 
words, the state has the power of giving and administering life (not taking it) (Foucault, 1980). 
  
Although there was a change in perspectives in Foucault’s work over time, Foucault’s 
conception of the individual as ‘docile’ does not fully account for the influence of desire, 
emotion and creativity on subjectivity (Elliott, 2001; Sandstrom, 2005). The creative capacities 
are especially important for dying people who, as people in the margins, can play with power, 
meanings and resistance in the “liminal spaces of discourse” (Sandstrom, 2005, p. 71). I have 
chosen to take the approach used in his later work that assigns the subject some degree of agency 
through technologies of the self (Foucault, 1988). 
  
Technologies of the Self and Ethopolitics 
Technologies of the self are a set of techniques and practices by which individuals produce and 
shape their own bodies and thoughts. This constitutes ethical work which impacts the 
individual’s capacity for self-regulation and attainment of perfection, wisdom, happiness and 
mortality (Foucault, 1988). Foucault defined ethics as the relationship each individual has to 
themselves involving intentional self-formation with reference to moral conduct (Foucault, 
1997). Ultimately this self-critique is seen as being beneficial to the community as the 
achievement of a full and complete life contributes to the improvement of society (Danaher et 
al., 2000). Despite Foucault attributing some degree of agency to the subject through the creation 
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of ethical subjectivity (Foucault, 1997), this self-regulation is also a form of control through 
which power operates because technologies of the self are situated within larger technologies of 
power. They are a mechanism of governance and align individuals with state discourses of good 
citizenship (Foucault, 1988). Biomedicine is profoundly intertwined with contemporary 
technologies of the self and disciplinary power (Rose, 2001). However, as noted earlier, with 
Foucault’s concept of power as productive, resistance is always possible because it is produced 
when power is exerted (Danaher et al., 2000). 
  
As I understand them, technologies of the self are equivalent to ethopolitics. According to Rose 
(2001), contemporary biopolitics is ethopolitics. By ethopolitics, he refers to the “the ethos of 
human existence” or the ways in which: 
the sentiments, moral nature or guiding beliefs of persons, groups, or 
institutions – have come to provide the ‘medium’ within which the self-
government of the autonomous individual can be connected up with the 
imperatives of good government… ethopolitics concerns itself with the self-
techniques by which human beings should judge themselves and act upon 
themselves to make themselves better than they are (Rose, 2001, p. 18). 
Ethopolitical concerns and judgements are about contestations of the value to be assigned to life 
itself (Rose, 2001). AD exemplifies these concerns and judgements. 
  
Societies of Control and Freedom 
Deleuze (1992) briefly elaborated on Foucault’s work, suggesting there has been a shift from 
discipline to control. Deleuze argued that disciplinary societies and the institutions which formed 
their basis are finished or are in crisis (for example, law, hospital, factory). The central point I 
take from Deleuze (1992) is that societies of control are a nascent form of domination that 
simultaneously permit new freedoms and new mechanisms of control. Societies of control are a 
modulation that changes continuously. They are dispersive, never finished and the administration 
is always in reform. This evolution of society aligns with how neoliberal governments operate 
(Challies & Murray, 2008). Challies and Murray (2008) argue that governments tinker with 
neoliberal policies to retain their own continued legitimacy and the theoretical credibility of 
neoliberalism. Such tinkering further entrenches neoliberalism’s political acceptability and 
makes it more impervious to challenge (Harvey, 2005; Kelsey, 1995). 
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In sum, the theories of structuration (described in Chapter Two), biopower, technologies of the 
self and ethopolitics, as well as societies of control, all consider in their own way the degree of 
control an individual has over their own life. The interplay of structure and agency, or 
structuration, involve the communication of meaning, the exercise of power and the judgement 
of conduct (Jessop, 1989). These three processes articulate with Foucault’s discourses and 
normalising judgement that are central to disciplinary power and biopower. These theories offer 
an interpretation that fits with the data in the present study where participants are asserting their 
rights as humans and as citizens43 to control their death and dying within the structure of society. 
I will return to them in the discussion of this chapter. Next, I consider what were participants 
trying to control and how? 
  
Practices to Control the Risk of Dying Badly 
In the next subsections, I discuss who and what influences control, the practices participants 
engaged in to seek control at the end of life and how they perceived AD as offering more control 
than existing, sanctioned options for control. The choice of an assisted death was seen as a 
solution to the problem or risk of dying badly, as compared to a normal dying or a good death.  
 
Dying badly signified being out of control. Dying itself was a loss of control that some were 
more comfortable with than others. Participants sought control over the circumstances, manner 
and timing of death due to concerns about dying badly. Briefly, dying badly from the 
participants’ points of view included: too slowly; suffering pointlessly; pain and other physical 
symptoms; mental suffering; social suffering; existential suffering; losing independence and 
going into care (because no control over daily life); the effect of their suffering on others 
(relational suffering); uncertainty and unpredictability of their situation. Dying badly involved a 
 
43 There is a subtle distinction between human rights and citizens’ rights. Human rights are universal and inalienable 
rights and freedoms that are established under the Human Rights Declaration (United Nations, 1948). There is a 
shared sense of morality among the ‘human family’.  While citizens’ rights are human rights tempered through the 
political regime of a country and dependent on the regime. Citizens are accorded certain rights on the basis of 
paying taxes, fairness and the responsibility of the state to look after its citizens. Some rights create a duty on others 
(Spicker, 2013). 
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loss of: dignity; autonomy and self-determination; quality of life; their subjectivity and legacy; 
capacity; bodily functions; communication; decision-making. These will be exemplified 
throughout the chapter to reduce repetition as much of it has already been covered. The reasons 
given by participants in my own study largely correspond with the literature (for example 
Hendry et al., 2013; Kelly et al., 2002; Mak & Elwyn, 2005; Monforte-Royo et al., 2018). What 
the present research adds is the discursive context of control. 
  
A recurrent theme in the interviews was that control was desired or even required if they were 
dying badly. In other words aspirations of control were bound up with mitigating and 
management of risk as well as controlling the future (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991). The 
connection between control and risk is important for participants in this context because 
identifying and managing risks underpins the reflexivity that characterises late modernity (Beck, 
1992; Giddens, 1991).  
 
Of note is that participants distinguished between dying and death. Some participants were not 
afraid of death or being dead but were concerned about dying badly. Although participants 
understood that they could not control death itself, they did seek to control dying. To be precise, 
dying is the time before death occurs whereas active dying processes begin in the last hours or 
days of life (Hui et al., 2014). AD does not control death itself, it controls the manner, means, 
circumstances and timing of it. According to Kaufman, controlling the time of death is a recent 
phenomenon (Kaufman, 2010). 
  
Spheres of Control 
It is useful to consider what elements participants considered to be within their control and what 
were not, due to other influences or limited by structure. This subsection discusses some of the 
aspects of control that participants talked about, in particular the influences of health 
professionals, family and the environment on individual control. I also identified more diffuse 
but powerful influences on participants’ control from society, government and religion, 
discussed in the next section.  
  
 145 
Health professionals were perceived as a major source of influence on control over at the end of 
life. Ironically in medical settings, patients are encouraged by their health professionals to take 
control of their own health care. “Communication, choice, control and an accompanied, natural 
death are promoted in policy and in healthcare practice, not least palliative care” (T. Walter, 
2017, p. 34). Participants could accept or reject treatments and types of care such as palliative 
care, but only from the selection of choices presented to them (Kaufman, 2005), unless they had 
identified other options from their own previous experiences or research. 
As in give me the information, I don’t want you Mr Doctor making the 
decision for me, I want to make that decision. (Louis) 
Louis acknowledges that the doctor has the power of knowledge but that when this knowledge is 
shared, then he himself can make an informed decision. In this way of thinking, the doctor is 
expected to provide medical expertise but not influence the autonomous individual’s decision-
making (J. Walter & Ross, 2014). Although, the individual is still only able to exercise autonomy 
within the parameters offered them (to state the obvious, this did not include AD). Patients are 
encouraged to be engaged with their healthcare decision-making but some areas are off limits, 
speaking to the issue of structure and agency, as well as rarefaction (discussed in Chapter Six). 
AD represents a form of resistance by individuals who want to exercise control outside of the 
normative bounds of medicine and the law. 
  
Family, for some participants, were another influence on control; either as a reason to seek 
control or to share control. In one example, Wallace sought control over end-of-life affairs in 
order to make it easier on his family and block some members of his family from decision-
making. 
I want it to be done my way, my wishes… I don’t really want to leave it for 
anybody else to sort out.  I’d rather have it all sorted so that in the end it’s just 
going to be, I don’t know, easy.  Yeah, there’s going to be no pressure on 
anybody else…  And I’ve got my briefcase with all my important stuff in 
there, and Ruth’s put a combination into it, so only her and I know the 
combination which means that none of the other family can access any of that 
paperwork, it’s all there. (Wallace) 
Wallace was concerned with leaving his affairs in order with a will, enduring power of attorney, 
ACP and funeral arrangements. He did not want to leave decision-making to his family. Together 
these suggest Wallace did not want to relinquish control if he was unable to make decisions 
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approaching the end of life (autonomy, legal status), of how he was represented during his 
funeral (identity), and over his affairs were dealt with after his death (legacy).  
 
In another example, control over decision-making was shared among family and friends. 
And for me, I would need the agreement of my tight five, because I would  
never want to do it and drag somebody else through something that they were 
comfortable with. (Dee). 
Taking control over the end of life was not just about the dying person alone. Some participants 
were considering the impact on others and exhibiting relational autonomy. Relational autonomy, 
defined in Chapter Two, adds another layer of complexity to the agency/structure issue. 
Relational autonomy is discussed further below. 
  
As well as other people, influences on control were on a wider scale. Heather noted that the 
environment and weather around her, which greatly affected her breathing, was out of her 
control. 
Heather: And then the risk is if I get out and about the chance of picking up a 
cold, which is going to take me out, is so high, you’re just about scared to go 
out as well.  So what do you do? 
Jessica: I was just going to say how do you cope with that, what do you do? 
Heather: Read, read, read (laugh)… Yeah, different atmosphere and the 
weather makes it harder to breathe… Yeah, even just smells and perfumes, or 
people burning rubbish or stuff (Heather). 
Heather identified the risks that faced her outside of the home and the fears this evoked. Heather 
exercised control by avoiding some risks or accepting other risks, such as having visitors. As an 
aside, there is somewhat of a contradiction in avoiding a cold when catching one might obviate 
the need for AD; although Heather acknowledged her will to survive was strong. The solution to 
things outside of participants’ control was to seek control over factors within their control: their 
own responses to the situation, their personal environment, the people around them, and planning 
for their dying and death (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Schroepfer et al., 2009).  
  
This subsection has illustrated that some participants acknowledged that health professionals and 
family influenced their decisions, even if they wanted decision-making control. The above 
excerpts exemplify the complexity and the inconsistencies about control and decision-making at 
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the end of life. While AD and other end-of-life decisions are framed as an individual choice, the 
sphere of individuals’ control is shaped by the context and other people. The discursive context 
of control will be explored shortly. First, I discuss what I am calling ‘mechanisms of control’. 
  
Mechanisms of Control 
As the choice of an assisted death was not available to them through any legal routes, this 
subsection explores the other ways in which participants tried to control death and dying. 
Participants knew that death could not be fully controlled but dying could be managed and coped 
with using different strategies. Participants sought to control their dying and limit the extension 
of life with ACPs (Ministry of Health, 2011), advance directives,44 do not resuscitate45 orders 
(DNR), enduring power of attorney (EPA) (Ministry of Justice, 2019a) and funeral plans. 
Contemplating suicide was another potential mechanism of control, albeit less regulated and 
legitimate than other mechanisms, and with attendant risks identified. Each mechanism is 
discussed below. Decisions about what care to accept, delay or reject, learning about their 
condition and treatment options, consulting different health professionals were other expressions 
of control over their situation.  
  
Judy, who had most of the above list in place, described these things as her “last vestiges of 
control”. By creating these formal documents, participants tried to ensure their wishes were 
carried out and to continue to be in control of their own life. They could be taken as proof of 
having made peace with dying or death acceptance. The healthcare decision-making devices—
ACP, advance directives, EPA and DNR—were written to try and ensure quality of life was not 
compromised by heroic medicine. The DNR Judy signed had to be notarised by relevant 
authorities. 
Jessica: What helped you feel like you were regaining control once it was 
taken away from you with the diagnosis? 
Judy: It was looking at what can I, what is there in this scenario that I can 
have some say about and some control over, yeah, and that was the, well, the 
 
44 Daniel in particular wanted advance directive added into the End of Life Choice Bill as a previous bill had. 
45 Allow natural death is another term for this. I have continued to use the language participants used and 
acknowledge that allow natural death is the preferred term of hospice and palliative care. 
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powers of attorney, and advance care plan, and yeah. Just step out of the 
advance care plan came the idea of the funeral pre-plan… Well, the DNR, 
and so I’ve had all that, done all that through my GP and the hospital and the 
haematologist, and the management here – 
Jessica: I was going to say, are they on board with that, because you hear 
about, you know – 
Judy: You have to have it authorised, or witnessed, or something – 
Jessica: Yeah, notarised or something like that. 
Judy: Yeah. You can’t just say do not resuscitate, because they do, there’s a 
defib here, and they’re very keen on. (Judy) 
Some participants were encouraged to make ACPs, sign DNRs etc, by their health professionals, 
signalling that they could and should take control of their end of life. Most commonly I found 
ACPs and DNRs were advocated for by palliative and hospice practitioners. ACP is framed as 
evidence-based best practice palliative care (Ahluwalia et al., 2014). To quote the official ANZ 
ACP guide for health professionals, the value of an ACP is it “helps a person achieve a sense of 
control as their illness progresses and death approaches” (Ministry of Health, 2011, p. 7). The 
guide acknowledges that ACPs are shared planning with the health professional and the patient 
who may wish to have family/whānau involved. ACPs are “a reflection of society’s desire to 
respect personal autonomy while also holding to the traditional medical principles of beneficence 
(the moral obligation to act for the benefit of others) and non-maleficence (the obligation not to 
inflict harm on others)” (Ministry of Health, 2011, p. 2). The ACP guide for health professionals 
states that the process should empower individuals to make informed decisions about their future 
care (Ministry of Health, 2011). The ACP process ostensibly privileges choice and autonomy in 
planning and receiving health care, but not the choice of AD. 
  
The ACP, DNR and funeral plan documents are intended to relieve others of burdensome duties, 
especially during bereavement. The wills and funeral plans were to ‘finish business’, indicating 
being prepared for death is a good death (Kellehear, 2007). They were created to attempt to 
ensure that participants’ control continued throughout dying and beyond death. For example, that 
not too much money should be wasted on the funeral but that the wake should be of a high 
standard. 
Judy: So yeah, just the practicalities, so I don’t want the kids stuffing up with 
some half-arsed idea of how it should be… Properly by my standards…Yeah, 
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I know how it should be done. Mum’s way or the highway the kids used to 
say. 
Jessica: What was that like, making an advance care plan and doing some of 
the funeral planning? 
Judy: It was good, yeah, I felt like I’d kind of tidied things up… And I realised 
just how much is involved [when a person dies without a will], and what a 
huge ask it is of people to deal with all that… I just wanted to make sure that 
kids knew what was going to happen [with the estate]… funerals are very 
expensive, and I did want them wasting money on stuff, I’d rather they spent 
it on the wake, or, you know, had some decent bubbles… It’s like, sounds a 
bit like a control freak, but I mean, they’ll do whatever they do, and I won’t 
know, but at least I’ve had a go, you know. (Judy) 
Judy acknowledges she would not be able to control aspects of dying, death and her legacy as 
much as she would like, as a ‘control freak’, but at least she will have tried. Even when 
authorisations are in place (i.e. control is shared with authority) they are not necessarily enacted 
or may not be available. For example, where the sanctioning authority is not present, the agent at 
hand may not enact the instruction e.g. not administer additional pain relief because they are 
afraid that it may hasten death. What this indicates is that ACP and other mechanisms only offer 
the illusion of control. 
 
An EPA nominates a proxy decision-maker. It needs to be witnessed by a lawyer in the first 
instance and becomes operative when a registered medical practitioner activates it, following a 
judgment that the patient no longer has capacity to make decisions (Ministry of Justice, 2019a). 
Heather described her experience of having an EPA created urgently. 
The only thing I was annoyed about, like I don’t know how they did it but 
they got, my niece was always going to look after things when I die 
regardless, but they got all papers set up and the solicitor in the hospital for 
me to sign for my niece as power of attorney.  Which I think was a bit stink, 
they should’ve given me the time, not coming round with solicitors. But that’s 
my sister, she’s very business minded, that’s how she is but it’s not how I 
personally probably would’ve done things. But you don’t know, it just 
happens so fast… [Much later in the interview] Now seeing how vulnerable 
people are, and how quick my family could get papers and have power of 
attorney, when I was really not in my right state of mind.  Okay, I don’t hold 
anything against my family for that, but seeing how they even got a solicitor 
at the fucking hospital for me to sign papers. Okay, I am angry about it 
actually.  When I have basically no memory of it, to me is very dangerous if 
euthanasia can be done the same as that, so easy and quickly.  (Heather) 
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While ACP, EPA, and DNRs are supposed to be empowering patients or their proxies to make 
choices according to their wishes and have control, Heather’s experience of an EPA highlighted 
the evocation of complex emotions. Heather identified the vulnerability and lack of control 
patients have in emergencies and extrapolated these to the need for strict controls needed to 
manage any similar risks of family involvement around AD. 
 
Another way mechanism for retaining some control over your death was decorating your coffin 
(Claudia, Kate) and writing your own obituary (Dee). These brought a measure of control and 
indicated the acceptance of death. 
I don’t wanna be a hero… that’s why I don’t like the death notice, you know, 
valiant warrior lost the battle.  That crap.  Mine’s, you know, Dee got knocked 
off her perch by, you know, far too, far too soon, by metastatic breast cancer.  
That’s it.  That’s what happened.  No, you know, valiant warrior.  And we did 
that with my dad, you know?  Warrior, and oh, and I look back and, it was to 
make us feel better. (Dee) 
The metaphor or cultural script of battling cancer was rejected by Dee, instead preferring the 
randomness of being knocked off her perch by cancer as the narrative surrounding her death. 
Rituals around death, such as death notices, repair and reaffirm social bonds for the living in the 
face of death by drawing on imagined communities, revivalist discourses and resurrective 
practices, described in Chapter Two (Seale, 1998; T. Walter, 1994). By writing her own death 
notice, Dee was able to control her presentation of self after death (Goffman, 1959)—continuing 
her biography.46 
  
Suicide was another mechanism of control that most participants had considered but did not wish 
to pursue. In the absence of any AD law, suicide was mentioned by most participants as one of 
few options available to take control of dying. The risk of premature death had to be balanced 
against risk of leaving it too long and losing control as well as quality of life. The risk in suicide 
is that one may not be able to successfully complete it whereas a medically-assisted death is 
secure and dignified. 
 
46 No participants mentioned using the biography service Hospices offer. 
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But I couldn’t think of anything worse, trying to do it yourself and making a 
balls up, you know. And I think it would be horrific for your family to find 
you, not that I could, but hanging or back of your head blown off, or. (Jacob) 
  
I’ve got morphine and things here that I know if I take the lot I’ll go 
unconscious and probably go.  That’s my lifeline really if I feel I’m starting 
to get sick, or can’t get help or whatever, because I know I probably won’t 
remember much after the first bottle.  So that’ll be it, I still have that control 
‘til the end, in my sort of funny, fizzy way, without any interference… But 
yeah, I also don’t want to come around vomiting because I’ve overdosed or 
something like that, coz then I could asphyxiate and really have even more 
severe lung problems, and struggling, gurgling.  But you just hope that 
doesn’t happen. (Heather) 
Perhaps participants wanted control over dying badly but not to the extent of taking their own 
life. The fear of suicide and in particular of being ineffective was discussed. AD was more 
guaranteed and euthanasia put the onus on the doctor. Participants wanted certainty and control 
over death.  Suicide was not certain enough to provide the death that participants wanted, pain-
free (e.g. Daniel, Emily), mess-free (e.g. Jacob, Judy), surrounded by family (e.g. Paula) and 
friends (e.g. Heather). They also considered the impact of suicide on others and the implications 
of suicide for their relationships, social bonds and life insurance (Durkheim, 1915 cited in Seale, 
1998). Many of these rationales are pragmatic in nature. It is unclear how much of the 
unacceptability was the deviance of suicide or that suicide was outside permissible limits of 
control and autonomy. Almost all of the participants distinguished between suicide and AD so it 
is possible that suicide was an unacceptable aesthetic of dying in the way that Richards describes 
(2017a). 
  
To summarise so far, there were existing mechanisms of control, such as ACP, EPA, and DNR, 
available to participants. These were more acceptable than other mechanisms of control such as 
suicide (and VSED discussed in the previous chapter). Such documents fit into existing 
bureaucratic structures of control. They are sanctioned, legitimated and notarised by a medico-
legal system. The above mechanisms of control are examples of participants exercising 
permissible autonomy within approved parameters. They are consistent with neoliberal ideology 
of self-responsibility and the rhetoric of individual choice (Borgstrom, 2015). Neoliberalism 
conditions citizens to valorise independence, autonomy and self-responsibility (Harvey, 2005). 
Since participants still wanted AD in addition to ACPs, DNRs, EPA, it is possible that they did 
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not think that the available mechanisms of control would mitigate the risk of dying badly or that 
they recognised the illusory nature of the control such mechanisms offered. As Borgstrom 
concluded about end-of-life policies in the United Kingdom, “even if people can assert 
preferences about their end-of-life care when death is ultimately certain, ‘choice’ cannot control 
the uncertain ways in which dying processes unfold” (Borgstrom, 2015, p. 710). Participants saw 
the choice of an assisted death as control in the face of death of an unknown quality at an 
unknown time (Glaser & Strauss, 1968). The following subsection explores this idea in more 
depth. 
  
The Choice of Assisted Dying as Control 
Over and above the mechanisms of control that were available to participants through legislated 
means, they wanted the option of an assisted death. The control offered by a hastened death was 
perceived as remediating or mitigating an untenable situation (Coyle & Sculco, 2004). All 
participants wanted the choice of AD at the point when they considered their quality of life was 
not worth living for. For example, Dennis saw the choice of AD as a way to control when he 
could not tolerate life any longer. 
I mean anyone’s got a choice in this world, or should have the choice. I mean 
you’ve got a choice whether you choose to vote, you’ve got a choice whether 
you use to get your car licence, you’ve got to choose all sorts of choices… 
And so you should have the choice [of assisted dying]. You should have the 
choice of when enough is enough, on that basis. (Dennis) 
The rhetoric of choice that Dennis expounded may be illusory. Choice is deeply embedded in 
market capitalism and celebrated within health care (Mol, 2008). Mol noted that “making people 
long for choices and invest a lot in making them, is a disciplining technique” (2008, p. 4). What 
is not acknowledged in this excerpt is that choices are not equally available to people, such as 
those from marginalised groups (Buchbinder, 2018a). 
  
Most participants indicated that they would not need to choose an assisted death if their dying 
was satisfactorily being managed. 
I know that the palliative care teams and hospice will try and make it as easy 
as possible.  I would, yeah, I would like to have the ability, if it gets too bad, 
yeah, to end it but I guess I just have to hope that it won’t be.  (Paula) 
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There is a level of risk and trust in others implicit in Paula’s thoughts around AD. She positions 
AD as an option of last resort. When I shared with a few participants that one third of people 
who go through the application process in Oregon do not end up taking the lethal medication 
(Oregon Public Health Division, 2019), they said they could understand that perspective. For 
example, Kate described that having the prescription would be a “backstop”. The uncertainties of 
dying and loss of control may be easier to cope with knowing there is an exit strategy in case of 
emergency (Nissim et al., 2009). Somewhat paradoxically, knowing AD is an option might 
provide enough control to help patients to live longer because they can tolerate some uncertainty 
with the reassurance of an exit strategy (Nissim et al., 2009). 
  
For Dee, the possibility of a choice in and of itself was empowering.  
Yeah, it is a degree of control, because you do, when you get a disease like 
this, you lose all control of your life…  So, if I could just have that little bit 
of, or the option and even if they, even if you’ve got the option of assisted 
dying, if you don’t actually do it, you still have the option.  You still feel like 
you have some control over what’s the right thing, and if the right time came 
up, then you could?  It’s a possibility that you could choose that, or you could 
choose not to.  It does mean, having a choice is a very empowering thing. 
(Dee) 
This quote illustrates that control can be a means to the end, in this case to have a good death. 
Alternatively, the end might be exercising of control in itself. That one third of Oregonians do 
not go through with AD may also illustrate that control can be an end in and of itself. If the 
situation gets so bad but no relief is available from others, direct access to the means of ending 
life is palliative. The availability of the means to end life reduces uncertainty. Bowling (2015) 
posited that a sense of control was more influential than choice on quality of life ratings in older 
people. 
  
So far, I have shown how the option of an assisted death was felt to bring participants choice; 
choice signified a measure of control over dying badly. ACPs and other mechanisms of control 
were examples of participants exercising permissible autonomy. The legal means to control 
dying were insufficient guarantee for a good death. The choice of AD was thought to help with 
equanimity in times of suffering. Although AD was seen as an individual choice, this choice is 
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shaped by the context and other people. The next section explores the explanations participants 
had regarding the structure of society about why this choice of AD was not a possibility. 
  
The Discursive Context of Control 
This section of the chapter discusses the broader context in which participants’ views on control 
are situated. Participants believed that dying should be within their control, as they felt the rest of 
their lives had been. There were layers of reasons given for wanting control over the end of their 
life which the following three subsections explore: individualism with its associated self-
responsibilism (Spicker, 2013) as opposed to religious or governmental control; the right to 
choose based on ideas of dignity and compassion within established systems of law and human 
rights; and lastly control over life using philosophical arguments of autonomy and freedom. 
Individualism and the related discourses of empowerment, personal responsibility and choice 
underpin the explanations participants offered about why control was important to them. Closely 
related to these values were the rights of autonomy, justice/fairness and dignity. Although what 
follows discusses autonomy, fairness and dignity as distinct issues, the reader should note that 
for participants they were enmeshed together in their lived reality. 
  
Participants justified their reasons for wanting control by co-opting and reframing personal 
rights, based on their values. The terms discourse, values, ethics and rights are used variously by 
different disciplines. As concepts they overlap and are somewhat fluid in meaning. Values 
pertain to what people hold as important. Ethics are about what is right according to normative 
discourses (as well as the practice of freedom through the creation of self-fashioning of ethical 
subjectivities (Foucault, 1997)). They are described as normative because they reflect the values 
of those constructing the discourse, as discussed in the following chapter). Rights are 
entitlements to particular freedoms by virtue of being human and a citizen (see footnote 43, p. 
143).  In addition, some rights are values and values can be discourses as well. For example, 
autonomy is variously defined as a right and a value; individualism is discussed in terms of 
(creating individual) rights, a moral value and individualist discourses (Colburn, 2013; Hurka, 
2011; Spicker, 2013). 
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Individualism/What’s Right for Me 
Kate, and many others in the study, did not want other people making decisions for her. Making 
her own decisions was related to maintaining control. Kate exemplifies the self-reliance, 
independence and self-determination that is central to individualism (defined in Chapter One). 
Kate: And it’s just knowing that you’ve got some control over it.  You’re not 
putting it all in somebody else’s hands.  
Jessica: Okay.  Here’s the obvious question.  Why is it important to you to 
have that control? 
Kate: I think I must be a bit of a control freak.  It’s, because it’s me making 
choices for me, rather than somebody else making those choices for me.  
Yeah. (Kate) 
Kate’s response to my question illustrates that she believed no one else can tell her what is right 
for her. How can she be certain that someone else will do what is right for her? Other 
participants expressed similar sentiments. It was also rooted in their belief that only they knew 
what is best for themselves. A potentially protracted death characterised by suffering was at 
stake if participants could not choose the timing and manner of their death for themselves. 
  
Participants contrasted their right to individual control over their death with the controlling and 
authoritarian influences of religion, society and government. This subsection will deal with 
religion primarily, and address society and government in the following subsections. As Jacob 
put it: 
I think it’s, in a way, part of it is having control, and part of it is feeling 
annoyed that people deny me that control… a lot of it is the people that are 
trying to resist are doing it for their religious beliefs, who, like vastly differing 
religions, I mean, they shouldn’t have the right to determine people’s thoughts 
on this. Because it doesn’t agree with their religion. (Jacob) 
Jacob’s quote highlights that control flows in two directions or is recursive. He made a strong 
statement about structure restricting agency. Even Jacob, who described his religious beliefs as 
“brought up a Roman Catholic, and I don’t go to church anymore, so I’ve got a few beliefs, but 
they’re not strong religious beliefs”, felt that religion (and religious leaders) did not have the 
right to determine people’s views on AD and other social issues. There is a distinction between 
constraints imposed by the state in the form of laws and licences and belief systems that carry 
moral imperatives that are not enforceable.  
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Interestingly, a different take on the issues of religion was offered by Daniel. He considered that 
liberal religion and AD were compatible if there was a will among the Church leaders and 
members. 
My church, 30 years ago, had strong views on liberal legislation like adult 
males consenting a homosexual act.  On abortion, you know, where there was 
a huge end of life, I mean, right to life movement on both sides again.  But 
my church was very strong on those things, it’s not now.  I can’t find a lot of 
people in the Church who support the kind of, kind of position that I’ve, that 
I’ve come to.  Not terribly many. And that’s a shame, because the impression 
is created that it is the, the non-religious liberal fringe which is promoting this 
thing.  And I want to say that you can be a Christian and you can have a 
profound theology of life and still adopt the position that nobody needs to die 
in pain. (Daniel) 
What this illustrates is the changing of attitudes over time, pointing to their constructed and 
contested nature. Allegedly irreconcilable issues were compatible for Daniel, despite some 
religious authorities claiming they are diametrically opposed (e.g. Nathaniel Centre - the New 
Zealand Catholic Bioethics Centre, n.d.; Presbyterian Church of Aotearoa New Zealand, 2018). 
  
T. Walter (1994) outlined how the authority overseeing death and defining a good death has 
shifted from religion, to medicine and in late modernity, to the individual. This was evident in 
many participants’ views on God. 
But I don’t, yeah, in terms of purpose, being put here on this planet, I believe 
in our biological imperative, you know, we are just, in terms of Darwinian 
perspective, yeah. I don’t need a higher power, I don’t need anything 
controlling me, yeah, just being part of the world. (Claudia) 
  
No, I don’t believe in God, I believe in higher self. But to me a church is just 
another form of controlling people again, and brain washing.  It’s not an area 
I like.  (Heather) 
The reference to a higher self is a form of individualism. This ascendancy of the individual, as 
opposed to religion, was present within participants’ arguments as to why they should have 
control over the end of their life. 
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Religion was also considered by some to still have a major influence on society and politics and 
was considered a primary impediment to the passage of AD legislation in ANZ. They saw an 
explicit intersection of religion and government: 
And I personally believe it’s political, and it’s religion that are the drivers 
behind it. And every time I see an article, anti-euthanasia, I want to write back 
and say are you religious, are you a Catholic?  But it’s not just Catholic, but 
Catholics are very strong about it. And it’s political because Bill English is a 
staunch Catholic, and his politicians are not going to vote against it because 
their jobs depend on it… When I saw that Bill English had appointed [Simon 
O’Connor] in charge of that [Health Select] committee I said to [husband], 
and I think that happened even before I had cancer, I thought what a joke.  
You know, to have an ex priest, we know what’s going to happen before it 
even gets anywhere. [The ] won’t get in… No way.  We’re a country that’s 
still ruled by the Catholics… religion was brought in when there weren’t any 
councils or governments or anything like that, and it was a form of control. 
(Emily) 
  
Dennis: I don’t believe MPs should be able to put in place a law that says you 
can or can’t do that medically… I struggle, that’s one thing I really struggle 
with, you know, the likes of Bill English [Catholic MP]… 
Rebecca: Are they voting against it because of their religious beliefs and they 
can’t have a voice for themselves?  You know, how do they really feel about 
it?  Are they just voting against because it makes them look better, you know, 
because that’s what they think people want to hear?   It shouldn’t be that way.  
(Dennis) 
These participants’ perspectives reflect the secularisation of the ANZ population (1 News, 
2019a), even though religion is still believed to have some control over society and those 
individuals who choose to subscribe to a religion. Religion is an artefact that still underpins the 
state (Jaye et al., 2017) and remains influential in contemporary secular ANZ society (Lineham, 
2017). The participants felt there should be less religious influence on government and that it 
certainly should not be influential over an individual’s choices. Schroepfer et al. (2009) found 
terminally ill elderly participants referred to four categories of who was in control (defined as 
those responsible for how their illness and dying played out): (1) personal control, (2) God’s 
control, (3) the participant and God were in control together, and (4) government control. The 
study was conducted in the US where religiosity is greater than ANZ which may be why none of 
the present study’s participants felt God was in control. Notably, health professionals were not 
mentioned as in control in Schroepfer’s study. 
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The theme of ‘I know what is best for me’ is evident in the reasons participants gave about why 
the apparatus of religion, as well as government and medicine, should not impede people 
accessing AD if someone is “dead set” (Kate) on the decision. There is a tension between 
structure imposing legal, moral, theological or social limits and the self-determination and self-
realisation that is privileged by individualism. 
  
Rights/Right to Control 
Many participants articulated their right to control the end of life within a human rights 
framework. The other right that participants mentioned most often was their dignity in relation to 
end-of-life decision-making. They felt that their rights were being restricted by law makers and 
the choice to die should be available on principle. As Ben put it, 
It's my life and no policy maker has greater claim over it than I do… I feel 
that control over the end of my life is a basic human right. Currently that 
human right is being oppressed. (Ben) 
Underpinning Ben’s pithy statement is the question who owns my life? Participants were staking 
a moral claim to control their life and death. This claim was grounded in a belief that they had 
inalienable rights as individual citizens.  
  
Several participants acknowledged that part of the reason they did not have the individual right 
to die was the political nature of AD legalisation. The theme of government and individual rights 
to make decisions for oneself about AD and life more generally was most clearly articulated by 
Louis. 
Jessica: Why is it important to you to have that decision be yours over your 
body, have that control? 
Louis: Why is it important?  That’s a strange question.  Isn’t that the tenor of 
life, that we make our own decisions?  Or do we say Jessica, the man you’re 
living with we don’t think is right for you, now here’s someone, take him.  Is 
that the way you want your life led?  So isn’t the whole theory of democracy 
is allowing us to make as many decisions for our own betterment, or not. You 
want to be a mechanic.  No, I believe you need to go to university, or vice 
versa. 
Jessica: Yeah, yeah so the decision should be yours? 
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Louis: Well, obviously.  Hey, unless we want to live in Russia or maybe 
China. (Louis) 
Louis’ persuasive statements about making our own decisions as the ‘tenor of life’ highlights 
how decision-making is seen as fundamental to society at this moment in history. Moreover, 
Louis implies there is a right to make decisions for your own betterment, albeit within the 
confines of the law. In contrasting ANZ with countries associated with communism, Louis 
pointed out the rights participants should have as citizens of a democratic country, making the 
case that AD should be a right too. 
  
Dignity was also bound up with rights. Dignity was often defined in terms of having physical 
control over one’s body, in particular over pain and bodily functions. Dignity goes beyond 
physical control of the body to thoughts, self-image and others’ perception of self. Other 
embodied aspects of dignity were looking well and being able to communicate. In the latter two 
excerpts below, dignity is about maintaining one’s identity and independence. 
I’m not a particularly dignified person probably. But oh, just having control 
over your own body I suppose. I mean, I’d hate to get to the stage, well, I 
don’t suppose I have now, with a catheter really, either. But oh I don’t know, 
I suppose that’s the main thing, is your sort of control physically, yeah, really. 
I mean, I’d hate to get to the stage where, you know, your bowels sort of pack 
up, and you were just, it’d be horrible, I can’t bear the thought of it. But yeah, 
I think that’s probably the main thing, just physical. (Sylvia) 
  
Dignity means not having to be changed in napkins, or be in full control of 
my urinary and bowel functions.  And not screaming out with pain in front of 
people.  Yes, dignity is just being able to live life like a lady. (Emily) 
  
Jessica: People often talk about dying with dignity, and dignity means 
different things to different people.  The same as suffering does.  Is this 
something that has meaning for you, this idea of death with dignity? 
Kate: Yeah.  So yeah, there’s still, so you still can have that pride and, yeah.  
It’s quite hard to find the words.  But not feeling, yeah, like crap… Going out 
on my terms, probably more like it.  (Kate) 
The intersection between dignity and other values such as independence and compassion was 
apparent. Dignity was connected with subjectivity, maintaining control and self-respect for many 
participants. Dignity is linked to the loss of control and to the value one ascribes to their life 
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(Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2016). Some other participants described dignity in dying in terms of 
temporality; dying at the right time, on their terms. In other words, having control over the 
timing and manner of their death. The theme of ‘the right time’ forms part of the next chapter. 
  
Dignity is a term used widely in official rhetoric and the AD debate. However there is a 
mismatch between theory and the lived experience participants described. The Universal Human 
Rights Declaration enshrines dignity, equality and freedom (United Nations, 1948). The NZ Bill 
of Rights Act (1990) only refers to dignity with reference to being arrested. However, the Code 
of Health and Disability Consumers’ Rights promotes patient rights including dignity and choice 
in the name of optimising the quality of life. Right 3 states “every consumer has the right to have 
services provided in a manner that respects the dignity and independence of the individual” 
(Health and Disability Commission, 2019, para. 4). The missives do not deploy dignity as a right 
in the same way participants did. For the participants, dignity was a much more dynamic and 
interpersonal quality rather than an inherent quality as differentiated in the study by Rodríguez-
Prat et al. (2016). Dignity to an extent was defined by participants’ ability to be self-determining.  
Dignity is undermined when a person feels they have lost autonomy/self-determination and 
identity (Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2016). The value of life was also defined for some by their ability 
to be self-determining (as well as other things such as having meaningful relationships). This 
way of thinking about the self has links to Giddens’ entrepreneurial producer of the self and fits 
with the ideology of individualism (Giddens, 1991). Although there were limits to participants’ 
self-determination and autonomy. These are discussed in the next subsection. 
  
In response to what participants considered oppression of human rights such as dignity and self-
determination, some participants engaged in activism about the right to die and other issues. 
Dying people have a short window of time for expressing their activism. This lends urgency to 
this issue of AD from their perspective. Becoming involved in activism around end-of-life choice 
was another means for seeking control, albeit in an indirect way. Some had joined political 
parties, the End-of-Life Choice Society or donated to campaigns around legislation change. 
Some were going to submit to the Select Committee. A couple of participants had publicly 
campaigned for end-of-life choice and another for medical cannabis. A participant regularly 
blogged and made short videos about end-of-life choice. Another had been raising public 
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awareness and funds for her type of cancer. They used their agency to advocate on behalf of 
others. 
I’m just a strong advocate for it [AD] in the respect that people should have 
the right.  It’s just another right that is in society that we should have.  It’s not 
a wrong, or a bad, or you know, whatever else sort of situation.  It’s a right 
that people have, and those who choose to use it will use it, you know. 
(Dennis) 
Participants used terms such as being on a ‘crusade’ (Dee) and a ‘mission’ (Kate) to describe 
themselves. There were social roots of actions, not just individual agency alone. Partaking in my 
research may have also been part of their activism. Activism around death and dying was an 
opportunity to make meaning of their death. 
  
Their activism sought to change ANZ society to incorporate the rights they expected as citizens. 
They commented on the kind of country ANZ should be and what values were important. 
Compassion and fairness were discussed. 
Why do we allow that to happen?  That’s my question. You know, like we 
talked about with young kids, and once one of those young kids have had a 
family member, and probably would need to be a family member, to witness 
the pain, the agony, then they wouldn’t wish that on anybody.  But so few 
will have that experience, which is why it just takes time, life experience to 
draw the conclusion it’s not fair. (Louis) 
  
I mean when you talk about assisted dying, and that’s doing it in an ethical 
and a compassionate way. (Dennis) 
Many participants also commented that animal euthanasia was performed out of compassion and 
that humans should be treated with the same compassion. Fairness is a value that is held dearly in 
ANZ (Fischer, 2012) as is compassionate care by hospice patients (Fernando, Rea, & Malpas, 
2018). Compassion was also raised by Sylvia when her daughter emailed me five months after 
our interview to tell me “she would want you to know that as her condition worsened and her end 
became nearer she remained of the view that a compassionate state would allow her the right to 
end her life”.  It illustrates how dignity as a right is supported by compassion as a value.  
  
Dignity and compassion were deployed in ways that supported their claim to a right of control. 
Participants offered a critical commentary on social control, rights and civil liberties that were 
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available to them in ANZ by the state and some engaged in activism. One such liberty was that 
of autonomy. 
  
Autonomy/Control Over Life 
Several participants commented that they had exercised control and choice throughout the rest of 
their life. Control was mentioned with reference to bodily autonomy, specifically choices 
regarding medical treatments/healthcare, reproduction, sex, drugs, diet and exercise. Eating 
healthily and exercising are things that individuals can control (Jaye et al., 2018). However, as 
mentioned above, some illnesses and death are ultimately not within one’s control. It seemed 
incongruent to Judy and Claudia below to not have control over their bodies/lives in death. 
Because I’ve always been very strong in having control over my life. I’ve, 
before the days of women’s liberation, which I also marched for in the 70s, 
I’ve never been dependent on a man for anything, I’ve always been, well I 
was an only child, and I’ve always been very independent, and determined to 
be in control of my own life, or destiny. Doesn’t mean I haven’t made 
mistakes, I have made some poor choices at times. But always like taken 
responsibility for it, or it’s been my decision, and okay, it was a dumb 
decision, but, you know, that was what I did, and now we have to deal with 
the consequences or whatever. So I guess it’s just how I am, and that was 
probably one of the big hurdles to get over when I was diagnosed, that there 
was nothing I could do to change the situation. So I’d lost control of that. Like 
normally eat healthy, exercise, you know, blah, blah, do what you can to have 
a healthy, and being in control of your own life. But all of a sudden, that kind 
of disappeared, so that was quite hard to deal with, as a strongly independent, 
in control person. (Judy) 
Participants commented that they had always had responsibility for their decisions, and the 
decisions about end of life should be no different. They found this paradox to be inconsistent 
with prevailing regimes of individualism and neoliberalism. To paraphrase, participants felt that 
they were being told ‘you are responsible for your body, health and life but you are not allowed 
or trusted to choose AD’. 
  
Autonomy is undermined when people feel they have lost control over their life, circumstances 
and health (Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2016). Autonomy was linked to responsibility and 
independence. Individualistic societies promote personal autonomy for individuals to choose 
how they die, whether that is by way of palliative care or AD (T. Walter, 2003). 
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Jessica: Why is having control over your death important to you? 
Claudia: It’s just so much part of individual autonomy, and I’ve had control 
over, you know, bringing life into the world, my reproductive system, why 
would it be any different from any other part of my life? Why would, yeah, I 
could have not had those operations, I could have made the call then, I could, 
you know, have refused medical intervention of any sort. You know, really 
it’s just part of the whole spectrum of, you know, personal autonomy, 
decision making, yeah. Yeah, it, to me it’s ludicrous to suggest that anybody 
else would have that control. 
Yeah, I mean, if I had a parent that was completely, you know, not 
autonomous, you know, couldn’t make a decision for themselves anymore, 
that’s completely, that’s just a situation of trust, isn’t it? That, yeah, which is 
a tricky area, I suppose, if there’s conflict in the family and things. But most 
situations, there’s this strong trust between parent and child, that you, I mean, 
I would completely, absolutely and utterly trust my children to make the best 
decision for me, yeah. Yeah, but there’s, yeah, but as a rational, competent, 
caring human, being, I should be allowed to make that decision. (Claudia) 
Taking control was seen as a positive attribute. As Seale (1998) noted, taking control of dying 
reflects their character and preserves their identity in death and dying. Because a key principle of 
individualism is that individuals are moral actors who make decisions, the responsibility for 
those decisions also rests with them (Spicker, 2013). Neoliberal ideologies similarly promote 
responsibilism. For this reason, most participants were annoyed, frustrated or even angry that 
they, as responsible individuals, could not die at the time of their choosing. Individual autonomy 
is central to neoliberal governance and disciplinary control through responsible self-management 
(McNay, 2009). The interpersonal aspects of autonomy will be returned to below. 
  
AD was also considered in terms of freedom (or negative liberty, see footnote 42, p. 140) by 
some participants. As Daniel put it: 
If the Bill is not put into law and I don’t have the freedom to advance death 
for some very good reasons then that is, that’s going to be a disappointment 
and a frustration.  (Daniel) 
Ben sent a follow-up email after our interview and wanted to add that freedom was specifically a 
freedom of choice: 
When considering opposing the Bill, I would ask that people consider this; if 
you believe that voluntary euthanasia is wrong, and you want no part in it, or 
if you would simply never consider that option, then this Bill will have no 
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impact whatsoever on your freedom or rights. The only people directly 
affected will be those who want the freedom of choice. (Ben) 
Implicit in much of the discussion of choice is the important liberal principle that people should 
be allowed to make their own choices, as long as they do not harm others (Mol, 2008). Ben 
thought that the choice to die would not impact on others’ freedom. One of the principle 
arguments against AD legislation is that there is a risk that it will impinge on others’ right to life, 
particularly those with disabilities (New Zealand Human Rights Commission, 2019). “Someone 
choosing to end their life through AD, while personal to that individual, could have far-reaching 
consequences for the people around them. For example, those with similar medical 
conditions/prognoses may feel pressured to do the same” (New Zealand Human Rights 
Commission, 2019, p. 5).  If one accepts this as true then when advocating for or opposing AD, 
the unintended implication is that my freedom to choose overrides others’ and the effect my 
choice has on them is regrettable but that cannot be helped without sacrificing my entitlement. 
However, Kamm (2013) argued that negative attitudes towards people with ‘certain medical 
conditions/prognoses’ should be changed because they are incorrect and can cause indirect harm; 
as opposed to said attitudes causing direct harm which would be grounds for limiting others’ 
freedom. 
  
Drawing on philosophical arguments, participants laid their claim to die on the basis of their 
freedom and autonomy. Autonomy was related to independence, competence, choice, 
responsibility and self-determination. These qualities were highly regarded by all participants, 
speaking to their contemporary cultural salience. Patient autonomy is an important ethical 
principle in medical practice,47 but the contradiction Kaufman (2005) points out is that autonomy 
only applies to a narrow sphere of decision-making regarding specific treatments which have 
been offered by doctors, which are in turn constrained by institutional imperatives, norms and 
regulations. As Rabinow and Rose articulate, “the rhetoric of choice clearly resonates with the 
ethic of autonomy at the heart of advanced liberal modes of subjectification” (2006, p. 208). 
Embedded within autonomy and choice is responsibility. Responsbilisation is embedded within 
 
47 Some have argued autonomy is the most valued of the ethical principles while other argue it is too highly valued 
(Drought & Koenig, 2002; Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; J. Walter & Ross, 2014). 
 165 
biopower (Rabinow & Rose, 2006) and neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005) which will be discussed 
shortly. 
  
However, while freedom and autonomy were highly valued, they were not considered absolute. 
For example, in the above excerpt Claudia recognised that there were circumstances where 
people were not fully autonomous and potentially vulnerable to family conflict. Relational 
autonomy is an alternative model to an individualist conception (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000). It 
incorporates the social context from which the individual and their family/whānau are embedded 
within. Relational autonomy acknowledges the intersubjectivity, the role of emotions and 
embodied aspects in decision-making. 
I watched my uncle, who was my godfather, he passed away two years ago 
while I was having treatment for the first time.  And at the end of his life, he 
lost a lot of dignity in terms of wasn’t able to shower himself and was 
incontinent at times.  But he had good nurses who’d come in every day who’d 
shower him and he had his family around him, looking after him and they 
definitely, his family still definitely got pleasure from being with him at that 
time. And they got a lot out of those last few weeks, so I wouldn’t necessarily 
want to take away that from my family; being able to care for me and being 
able to say goodbye… And that those around me will look after me and get 
me through it, yeah. And make it okay like they did for my uncle. (Paula) 
While some participants were concerned about the burden of their protracted dying on their 
family/whānau (discussed further in Chapter Five), for Paula, consideration of her family 
provided a reason to not hasten her death. In te Ao Māori and other cultures autonomy is not the 
only consideration in dying because the dying person is not considered an isolated individual but 
inextricably connected to one’s ancestors and future generations (Gott et al., 2015; Ho et al., 
2013; Malpas et al., 2017). The distinction between self and other(s) softens: the self takes up the 
kindness and care and, in turn, others take pleasure in this (see Chattoo & Ahmad, 2008 for a 
discussion of the boundaries between carers and cared for). 
  
Although autonomy and freedom to decide was crucial to participants, it is important to note that 
participants did not want an unregulated, uncontrolled system of assisted death either. While 
some felt adamant it should be purely their decision, all recognised the need for safeguards. 
I think there is a strong percentage in our community who, seeing that they 
could get a return from the demise of their family or friend, may… If we could 
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all say people are sensible, they won’t abuse it, in the same way they would 
never abuse abortion, ho ho ho, then open slather. But I don’t think you can… 
What are going to be the safeguards?  Who’s going to vouch for the kids to 
say that Dad is off his trolley, he can’t make a decision, or Mum, you know?  
(Louis) 
  
And it’s not so much being a drain on society, I pay my taxes, so I don’t mind 
getting help, but I’ve, I think you should be able to choose if you want to do 
it. I think it’s got to be regulated so greedy relatives can’t just drop you off 
for the inheritance. So yeah, it’s got to be regulated obviously, but I still think 
you should have the choice to do it with a bit of dignity, you know. (Jacob) 
Rights, both as a human and as a citizen, are balanced with risks in the above quotes. Jacob’s 
claim was based on his rights or moral capital as a tax-paying citizen; others made similar points. 
  
The reason safeguards and limits on autonomy were deemed necessary was because individuals, 
the state and society are not totally trustworthy. Heather had strong views on this matter of 
societal trust. 
Yeah, there’s something, it’s got to be tight because we’re getting more and 
more a disposable society and people just don’t matter. And it’d be too easy 
to just flick ones off that they don’t want.  It’s just the way society is 
happening, sort of it seems to me what’s happening in Holland… It’s not like 
when we, this is before your time, when we were younger growing up.  
Society has changed so much, it’s just not nice like it used to be.  It’s really 
people out for themselves. (Heather) 
Heather thought that society is unsafe, social norms were decaying, and the regulation of society 
was at risk of breaking down. Or in other words, autonomy will become out of control and 
should to be limited by structure through formal regulation. Others expressed their concerns 
about vulnerable people needing protection from the risks that family posed, more so than the 
breakdown of structure. In thinking about the risks involved in any AD system, participants were 
not only considering what would be best for them as autonomous individuals but considering 
others as well. Having said that, almost all felt these risks could and would be managed 
sufficiently enough for AD to be allowed (Walker et al., 2020). 
  
To recap, in this section I illustrated how participants argued for their right to AD on the basis of 
their individualism as opposed to government, religion or medicine because only they knew their 
experiences and what is best for them; that they had a right to control their death as doing so 
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would be consistent with the rest of their life; and lastly because autonomy is a right and they 
were autonomous decision-makers. However they also acknowledged the need for safeguards 
around AD and took others into account when thinking about AD. It was common sense for 
participants to take control of death as they had control over other spheres of their life. 
Controlling dying (with medical intervention) was constructed by participants as the natural 
order of things if dying was going badly. 
  
Discussion: Biopower, Freedom and the Paradox of Control 
Thus far in this chapter I have outlined the mechanisms of control and ways of expressing their 
wishes already available to participants. Arguably ACPs, advance directives, DNRs, and EPAs 
were not a sufficient guarantee to secure a good death and prevent dying badly for participants. 
They saw the option of AD as offering control and mitigating risk. Participants were trying to 
control the uncertainties around or risks of dying badly which took many forms. They drew on 
notions of individualism, rights, dignity and autonomy to argue for the right to determine the 
timing and manner of their death. With the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss the nuances 
of control and AD drawing on the theories of biopower, technologies of self, ethopolitics and 
freedom that were introduced at the beginning of the chapter. I consider the extent to which AD 
represents a paradox because although individuals were seeking control, any medically-oriented 
AD system entrenches existing power relations where doctors are in control of dying. The 
question under discussion is: does AD increase or reduce choice for individuals? 
  
Biopower 
A Foucauldian perspective is a particularly useful way into understanding AD. Rather than the 
dichotomy between the police state and an individual’s right to die, the focus is better placed on 
the administration of life (Tierney, 2010). There is a diffuse exertion of biopower over life and 
death, such that it does not come from any one institution in particular but produces normative 
ways of being and doing. There are three elements that Rabinow and Rose (2006, pp. 203-204) 
include in their elaboration of Foucault’s biopower: 
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a form of truth discourse about living beings and an array of authorities 
considered competent to speak that truth; strategies for intervention upon 
collective existence in the name of life and health; and modes of 
subjectification, in which individuals can be brought to work on themselves, 
under certain forms of authority, in relation to truth discourses, by means of 
practices of the self, in the name of individual or collective life or health. 
To exemplify, the authorities and experts who are able to speak the truth in the case of AD are 
policy makers, doctors, religious leaders and ethicists. The individual requesting AD has some 
say but is not considered an expert. Doctors, courts, coroners and parliaments are involved in 
decisions over life and death, eclipsing individuals’ decisions (Kubiak, 2015). They establish 
consensus for a law change, are involved in implementing the law, most notably with reference 
to the eligibility criteria, and are responsible for monitoring AD practices and statistics. The 
strategies for intervention in the name of life and health are the intricacies of an AD system. 
Training for health professionals, protocols and paperwork are to ensure that collective life 
continues, and that death only occurs in restricted circumstances. New modes of subjectification 
become possible under an AD system. The subject is self-regulating: they calculate risks of 
dying badly (exemplifying Beck’s (1992) ‘reflexive modernisation’), understand themselves in 
new ways in relation to the AD criteria, and come to see/have their view reinforced that society 
is inherently risky and must be regulated in the name of collective life. There is a reconfiguring 
of the relations of power, knowledge and subjectivity (Rabinow & Rose, 2006). New modes of 
individualisation arise with rules and regulation around AD, the subject becomes knowable by 
the medical experts in relation to their proximity to death. There is a constitution of a new 
category of ‘the dying’ through the governing policies that has temporal, physical and cognitive 
elements (Hempton, 2019). This in turn reshaped the ways in which participants related to 
themselves, how they thought about and acted upon themselves in relation to dying. 
  
AD itself can be seen as a continuation of biopower, in the sense that death becomes increasingly 
managed and legislated by the medico-legal system (Kubiak, 2015). Kubiak (2015, p. 31) also 
argued that AD is a “protest against the monopoly of biopower”. Kubiak concluded that 
biopolitics is facing a crisis because of the increasing number of grey zones where individuals 
(supported by advocacy organisations) are pushing back against the subjugation of life by 
asserting their individual claim to have death on the basis of their morals, subjectivity and values 
of dignity and autonomy. To choose to die by suicide escapes power relations (Foucault, 1991) 
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and is part of the injunction against suicide. “It is over life, throughout its unfolding, that power 
establishes its dominion; death is power’s limit, the moment that escapes it; death becomes the 
most secret aspect of existence, the most private” (Foucault, 1991, p. 261). The desire to hasten 
death, activism, advocacy, and participation in the present study represents participants’ 
contesting the state’s biopower over their life. The right to die challenges the biopolitical 
insistence on living (Gandsman, 2018b) and is part of a new social movement (McInerney, 
2000). 
  
However challenging AD is to biopolitics, is AD a technology of the self that is really 
disciplinary power in disguise? Biopolitics operates through such techniques of ethopolitics: self-
regulation, knowing oneself, self-surveillance and confession, whereby individuals align 
themselves to the current moral codes (Rose, 2001). Foucault identified the three main 
technologies of the self as exploring how our thoughts tie in with the rules of society; 
understanding how the relations between our inner thoughts tie in with the rules of society; and 
examining the extent to which our thoughts correspond with reality (Danaher et al., 2000). The 
‘right way to be’ at present is according to neoliberalism, individualism and responsibilism. 
Participants appear to embody these ideologies in their desire for AD. I will explore the idea of 
power, agency in making the self and ideologies in greater depth in the Discussion chapter. For 
now, I suggest AD is a technology of self or part of emerging ethopolitical moral codes that 
allowed the participants in this study the possibility to shape their own (dying) bodies and 




Another lens for examining AD is freedom. The struggle for freedom is a consistent theme in the 
entire history of Western modern societies (Foucault, 1991). Foucault spoke of freedom in terms 
of exercising freedom rather than achieving it (Foucault, 1991; Laidlaw, 2014). This places an 
emphasis on the ways and extent to which “people can exercise choice or are subject to 
coercion” (Laidlaw, 2014, p. 104). AD does ostensibly offer new freedom. First and foremost 
AD offers the choice and freedom to die. With that choice comes some measure of control over 
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the timing and nature of death, an uncertainty which was uncomfortable for many. The End of 
Life Choice Act also offers some freedom over the means of death, whether euthanasia or self-
administered medication, and the method of administration—oral, injection, via a gastric tube. 
  
Although there is the possibility of new choices, these choices become highly regulated and 
monitored. AD exemplifies what Deleuze (1992) termed ‘societies of control’. Societies of 
control maintain the illusion of freedom but freedom is monitored and regulated (Deleuze, 1992). 
Choice/control is ceded to the existing power structures, albeit within a modulated 
administration. The choice is only a choice within the circumscribed parameters of the law. And 
only then does the ‘freedom’ of an assisted death become available. This framing of freedom 
aligns with the limits of autonomy and agency pointed to throughout the chapter. Baudrillard 
(1993) outlined a similar argument about how AD is evidence of increasing social control over 
life and death, in all its forms. Death by AD requires a socio-medico-legal permit (at least in a 
regulated system) (Baudrillard, 1993). Controlling death is inscribed in the logic of the system 
with its rules and resources (apropos Giddens’ definition of structure). A body is not the person’s 
asset, free to decide to do with as they please; a permit is required. Baudrillard (1993) also stated 
that the biological/‘natural’ chance of death is still a type of freedom. 
  
On the other hand, Foucault argued agency is always possible under power relations and 
constraint (Foucault, 1997). It is an individual’s intentional choices about their moral conduct 
that constitute freedom in the ethical making of the self (Foucault, 1988, 1997). Participants 
sought practices (ACP, DNR, AD etc) to enact their own freedom. Freedom is historically 
specific; what is considered freedom is defined by the culture, place, social group, and the 
individual too.  Drawing on Foucault, Laidlaw (2014) distinguishes between freedom and 
agency. Agency is not a substitute for freedom because agency is popularly discussed as the 
ability to change the structures through action, meaning that agency is conflated with power. 
Agency also denotes whether people’s choices are genuinely their own (Laidlaw, 2014) (similar 
to the definition of autonomy by Beauchamp and Childress (2001)). Whereas freedom, according 
to Foucault, refers to how individuals construct their actions and choices. An ethical life is more 
than following sanctioned rules. Laidlaw (2014) highlights that we only consider people’s 
choices as instances of agency when we agree with the choice. The take home point is that AD 
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can be regarded as an ethical practice of freedom rather than agency according to Laidlaw 
(2014). Participants demonstrated their agency in other ways, as the next chapter will explore. 
  
The altruistic reasons for participants wanting regulated AD (minimising impact of their 
suffering and dying on others, ensuring public safety, as well as other considerations such as the 
cost of care, pensions, ageing population and relational suffering outlined the previous chapter) 
leads me to conclude that Deleuze’s (1992) and Baudrillard’s (1993) theorising of societies of 
control does not acknowledge that there may be shared interests between the state and the 
individual. Which is to say that participants accepted some level of biopower and biopolitics 
wherein the population is controlled for the good of the state (Foucault, 1990). Both the state and 
the individual are concerned about the good of society, its resources and that AD does not occur 
non-voluntarily. As illustrated above, participants felt there were some unscrupulous people 
within society, making the control of AD through regulations necessary. Safeguards are 
mechanisms of government control and in this case, are enforced by doctors as the arbiters of the 
State. Participants accepted reasonable limitations of their freedom. 
  
Paradox of Control 
AD appears to afford individuals an opportunity to exercise control in dying by manipulating the 
manner and timing of their death. Yet in examining the system of AD, it does not necessarily 
afford the expected control because it reinforces power relations that participants sought to 
challenge. A paradox is a something that combines contradictory features (Lexico, 2019). 
Paradoxes highlight the contradictions and ambiguities in contemporary society. 
  
AD was desired by participants as an expression of freedom and autonomy exercised over the 
quality of dying.  Death was inevitable with or without that expression of freedom and 
autonomy. Paradoxically AD ultimately removes any autonomy and freedom by bringing about 
death. It also makes them dependent on another person (either directly with euthanasia or 
indirectly via a prescription) to bring about their death (Hannig, 2019). Participants in this study 
wanted control over dying (badly). By this they meant the ability to exercise choice in 
accordance with principles of autonomy and rights, both as a free human being and as a 
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responsible citizen. They wanted to exercise agency beyond the limits afforded them within the 
medico-legal system. However, under an AD system, death becomes even more tightly 
controlled. A highly specified set of criteria must be met. Two doctors must assess that you meet 
these criteria, only one of whom you know and choose, if they agree to participate. You must 
submit to an assessment of your psychiatric well-being if either of the two assessing doctors have 
doubts over your capacity for decision-making, i.e. competence. If any coercion is perceived, the 
medical practitioner must stop the process.  
  
In this way, AD creates a paradox of control. The control resides with the doctor who may reject 
or permit the request for AD. Doctors are in turn regulated by the state and accountable to the 
law. While patients exercise control by mandating the behaviour of doctors, doctors are still the 
experts who interpret the strict criteria of the law, making the choice available to some patients 
and not others. Paradoxically, the choice may give dying people a sense of control, even though 
the power lies with the doctor, it may make them feel like they have more control. The control 
AD offers is partially illusory. The choice to have AD would not ultimately be for participants to 
make. If AD was legally available, I think participants assumed their doctors would see their 




It is paradoxical that individuals seeking control over dying badly with AD extends the control of 
medicine and the state. In effect, AD systems of regulation and control reconfigure and reinforce 
the power relations that doctors, medicine and the state can exercise over life and death. Freedom 
is offered through AD but it also becomes more highly regulated and monitored (Deleuze, 1992). 
Despite control over assistance in dying ultimately remaining with the state and mediated by the 
medical profession, there is still some freedom for the dying person to choose how to morally 
conduct themselves (Foucault, 1997), shaped by ethopolitical means (Rose, 2001). At this 
moment in time, to choose to hasten one’s death out of consideration for the self and others may 
be how participants ethically make the self and in doing so, constituted their freedom. Through 
their activism participants were enacting ethical subjectivities (Foucault, 1997). AD challenges 
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biopolitics but also appears to be a technology of the self that embodies it as well. They resisted 
discourses around who controls death by promulgating counter discourses of individual control 
and choice. The following chapter explores dominant and counter discourses in more detail. 
  
Participants in this study based their arguments for the right to control the timing and manner of 
their death on freedom, choice, individualism, autonomy and self-determination. However, they 
also recognised these values were not absolute. Gandsman (2018b, p. 2) also concluded that 
“right-to-die activists construct an ethical worldview in their activism that transcends rhetoric of 
freedom, choice, individualism, autonomy, and self-determination”. Instead, activists were 
seeking AD partially because of their responsibilities to others and the effect of their prolonged 
suffering on them. I concur with his conclusion. Participants in this study also considered the 
effect of their suicide on others. They sought to control the minutiae of their dying and death 
with ACPs, funeral plans and so on because it would relieve the burden of decision-making on 
their grieving families as well as bring themselves a measure of control (or at least expressing 
their wishes). The participants acknowledged that, although the safeguards impinged on their 
autonomy and self-determination, there was a shared interest with the state in protecting 
vulnerable people from coercion through regulation. 
  
Some research has concluded that control and choice at the end of life are fictional rhetoric 
(Gandsman, 2018b; Winnington, 2016). I disagree. This comes back to the differentiation 
between the results of control and the exercise of control as an end in itself. Death is not 
controllable but AD does bring dying under the person’s control to some extent by choosing the 
manner, means and timing of death. People are already free to refuse food, request withdrawal of 
medical intervention and to die by suicide. These are sanctioned choices that offer control, albeit 
suicide far less so. The distinction AD creates is control over whether death occurs now or at 
some later date. The choice over dying was empowering and the basis for being a self-
determining human. People are still making a choice when choosing from certain options 
(Colburn, 2019), even though the options are limited by what is acceptable in the biopolitical 
regime of the time, including legal and moral facets (Foucault, 1988, 1991, 1997). Of note is that 
the choice of AD is still a hypothetical one contingent on the public End of Life Choice Act 
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referendum at the 2020 general election. To reiterate, rather than a dichotomy, there is a 
‘dialectic of control’ between social systems and agents (Giddens, 1984). 
  
The choice to determine when the time was right to die was important to all participants. Having 
control over dying badly related to the future, quality of life/dying and anticipated suffering. 
Choosing when to die challenges the normative ways of dying, which the next chapter explores. 
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 Chapter Six: Participant Resistance to Normative 
Discourses about Dying 
  
Introduction 
Discourses shape the way we think, feel and act in the world (Norwood, 2009) and therefore 
form an important part of the landscape in which the WTHD exists. I take discourse to mean the 
knowledge, practices and talk that produce particular truths and exclude others (Foucault, 1972).  
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how participants take up, resist and negotiate normative 
discourses around dying and AD. In this chapter I am using normative to refer to social norms or 
standards, rather than in a prescriptive ethical sense to determine the rightness and wrongness of 
behaviour (Driver, 2009). Although the discourses I identified also have a prescriptive function, I 
am seeking to unpack how normative discourses are social constructions that reflect dominant 
ideas of moral standards. By implication I am claiming (following Foucault) that morality is 
comprised of socially constructed values and rules generated by institutions such as religion or 
medicine (O'Farrell, 2005). According to sociologist De Vries (2019, p. 40), bioethics “render[s] 
judgements about the moral correctness of some aspect of the world… with no appreciation of 
the way such judgments are shaped by the context in which they are made or the way those 
judgments will influence that context”. 
  
To begin, I identify some normative discourses around dying that participants identified. I draw 
on popular media, academic literature, and palliative care missives as illustrations of the 
discourses. Then, I discuss how these prevailing norms are evident within participants’ reasoning 
about why they would consider choosing AD if it were available to them. I demonstrate how 
normative discourses of dying are contested, reworked and adopted by participants. Lastly, I 
offer an interpretation of why AD is problematic for some groups, which is to say, because it 
crosses the boundaries of normative dying. In the discussion I draw on Foucault’s principles of 
exclusion, rarefaction and games of truth to examine how discourses function. Examining the 
dominant and counter discourses available to participants to explain their desire for hastened 
death sheds light on the different ways and different justifications in which it is possible to die in 
contemporary ANZ. 
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Discourses Identified by Participants 
In this section I delve into the nuances, underpinning authority and rhetoric of five normative 
discourses of dying: killing is wrong but letting die is permissible; a long life is a successful life; 
death is natural; dying and death are a special time; a good death for all. I have chosen to discuss 
these five discourses over others because they featured prominently across all participants’ 
accounts in their rationale for wanting the choice of AD. These discourses build on the previous 
two chapters as they also engage with ideas of control, medicine and who should be able to 
decide when the right time to die is. I show how participants were cognisant of these discourses 
as they adapted and co-opted them. Where dominant discourses did not reflect how participants 
saw the world, they put forward alternative explanations. Throughout this section, I have 
identified what could be considered counter discourses. Occasionally participants were out 
rightly repudiating the dominant discourses but predominantly they were expanding the 
boundaries of dying in an attempt to normalise their desire for hastened death. As discussed 
earlier, discourses although pervasive and exclusionary, are also able to be challenged. The 
individuals in this study claimed moral and experiential authority, described in Chapters Four 
and Five, to challenge the normative discourses, on the basis of their status of approaching the 
end of life. 
  
Killing is Wrong but Letting Die is Permissible/No Moral Distinction Between 
End-of-Life Decisions 
This subsection48 describes the ‘killing is wrong but letting die is permissible’ discourse and how 
participants engaged with it. Medical ethicists distinguish between foregoing or withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment which allows a patient to then die from their underlying disease, and 
AD which is an active bringing about of death (Gillett, 2017). This rests on the killing is wrong 
but letting die is permissible discourse. As noted in the introduction, some scholars have 
classified the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment as passive euthanasia (Garrard & 
Wilkinson, 2005; Rachels, 1975).  
 
 
48 This section has been published in the Annals of Palliative Medicine for the Focused Issue on Hastened Death 
(Young, Winters, Jaye, & Egan, 2020). 
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By way of introduction to this discourse, Dennis and Rebecca pointed out that as with AD, the 
withdrawal of life support is also a choice made by doctors.  
Dennis: Mum passed away… and morphine was the passage out really. She 
had a stroke and became fairly incapacitated and yeah, they just morphined 
her up and two days later, oh look at that, it's all over.  
Rebecca: But she really only died of old age though. 
Dennis: Yeah, the last week or so. And you know, I’ve got family who are 
medical people and they said it's the best option. But it’s legal to do that, but 
it's not actually called assisted dying. It’s just helping her not suffer. 
Jessica: Yeah, the intention is not to kill her, it's to relieve her suffering. So 
there’s a fine line of distinction there. 
Dennis: It’s how many milligrams, that’s the distinction (laughter). 
Participants highlighted that both decisions (active euthanasia and withdrawal of life sustaining 
treatments) bring about the same consequence, death. Most participants spontaneously 
mentioned that AD was already occurring informally by administering pain relief, sedation, 
withdrawing life support and intentional euthanasia. Many participants believed that legalising 
AD was a way of formalising informal practices of covert AD. There is some research, although 
contested, to suggest covert euthanasia is occurring in ANZ (Malpas et al., 2015; Mitchell & 
Owens, 2004) as it is in other countries (Kuhse et al., 1997; Neil et al., 2007; Seale, 2006). Such 
practices were equated to covert euthanasia but not considered murder when no explicit consent 
was sought. 
 
The killing is wrong but letting die is permissible discourse is codified in ANZ law and medical 
ethics (Gavaghan & King, 2016). It is acceptable according to the law to withdraw life sustaining 
treatments and allow ‘natural’ death. This discourse has its roots in Judeo-Christian theology as 
some participants acknowledged. 
Very much a Christian based society.  Thou shalt not kill.  But it’s 
contradiction, and that’s why I’ve kept harking back to abortion.  It’s almost 
like a, well it is, it’s just a contradiction, it makes no god damn sense at all. 
(Louis) 
Louis commented on his perception of inconsistencies of allowing abortion in practice and a 
prohibition on AD (see footnote 39, p. 124). Participants’ opposition to religious influences on 
government was discussed in Chapter Five.  Louis highlighted an internal contradiction in a 
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value system concerning the sanctity of life under which some deaths are permissible through 
exemptions. 
  
In this next exchange, Dennis and Rebecca challenge the distinction between legal end-of-life 
decisions and AD. 
Dennis:  When you look at it now, with this life support and the doctors go 
hey if we take them off life support the chances are, in a way isn’t that just 
bringing the end closer anyway?  It is isn’t it?  They say to the family ‘look, 
we don’t think Johnny or Grandma’s going to make it past this point, it’s only 
the machine that’s keeping them alive, what do you want us to do?’  ‘Oh, turn 
the machine off.’ 
Rebecca:  Yeah, you’ve given the choice to the family, so what’s the 
difference? (Dennis) 
Again, Dennis and Rebecca pointed out that as with AD, the withdrawal of life support is also a 
choice with same outcome, death.49 The role of an electro-mechanical component in care, i.e. 
life-sustaining treatment, is pivotal in clinical differentiations of hastening and allowing death. 
Participants challenged the assumption that extension/cessation of life through technology is 
acceptable and unproblematic but that AD is illegal and unacceptable to several New Zealand 
medical bodies (among others).  
 
Sedation at the end of life also draws on this discourse of killing is wrong but letting die is 
permissible. Sedation in end-of-life care is a last resort option and involves the monitored use of 
medications to reduce consciousness (and therefore the ‘self’) in order to relieve otherwise 
intractable suffering (Cherny & Radbruch, 2009). Daniel fervently disagreed that sedation at the 
end of life was any ethically different from AD and Claudia also thought they overlapped. 
You know, bang people on the head and put them in a coma.  No, no.  I’m 
not convinced that’s palliative.  I mean, that is clearly, I mean, as is giving an 
overdose of Oxycodone or anything else.  I mean, that is clearly 
acknowledging that this is going to end life.  We’re not doing palliative care 
when we give those last doses of these drugs. We’re speeding up the end of 
life… I think, I think it’s a, it’s a, it’s a weasel argument.  If you know what 
is going to happen, saying we’re intending to do something else, that is 
bullshit (laughing).  I just don’t want to be in that sort of position at the end.  
(Daniel) 
 
49 A rare exception to this is when life support is withdrawn, and the consequence is not death. 
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The palliative care team will simply come to your house, yeah, and they make 
the call, ‘yeah, it’s really got to unmanageable levels’. And yeah, it’s, coz in 
a way, that’s assisted dying, isn’t it?... but it’s not going to be my choice 
[when to die]. (Claudia) 
While doctors and ethicists distinguish between intentionally bringing about death and providing 
pain relief or levels of sedation (by drawing on the DDE), many of the participants, who will be 
on the receiving of such treatments, did not. Palliative sedation or providing high levels of pain 
relief was perceived to make the timing of death the doctor’s decision, whereas Claudia would 
prefer to make it herself. The DDE that Daniel is referring to is central to the practice of 
palliative care and was described in the Introduction (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). Daniel 
identified that although sedation relies on the distinction between intention and foresight of 
death, he questioned whether this separation was plausible to maintain.  
  
The issue is: 
whether there is an important moral difference between, on the one hand, 
giving sedative or analgesic drugs to relieve symptoms, foreseeing that death 
may be hastened; and on the other hand, using the same drugs with the 
intention of hastening death (C. Douglas, Kerridge, & Ankeny, 2013, p. 1). 
Research shows that doctors do not always have a clear distinction between intention and 
foresight (C. Douglas, 2009; C. Douglas et al., 2008, 2013). Trankle’s (2014) study on how 
doctors drew on the DDE found every physician reported its inadequacy as a medico-legal 
guideline. In his words, “the narrow focus on the physician’s intent illuminated how easily it 
may be manipulated, thus impairing transparency and a physician’s capacity for honesty” 
(Trankle, 2014, p. 1).  By referring to the doctrine of double effect as a weasel argument, Daniel 
pointed to its intellectual and moral sophistry. If the moral distinction that the killing is wrong 
but letting die is permissible discourse relies on is dubious, then the rules are illogical.  The 
participants’ quotes suggest that medicine has double standards that enable it to be opposed to 
AD, while secretly (or not so secretly) practicing it by drawing on the DDE. 
  
Research shows that palliative sedation therapy and opioids do not hasten death when used 
appropriately (Maltoni et al., 2012). If opioids and sedatives do not hasten death then why does 
the DDE need to be invoked (Riisfeldt, 2019)? However, what participants were asserting maps 
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to consequentialist argument where the outcome is the same so each means (active and passive 
routes to death) is therefore morally equivalent. According to consequentialism, the outcomes of 
an action are the ultimate basis for any judgment of that conduct (Driver, 2009). Health 
professionals, in the circumstances that participants were describing, would likely draw on 
deontological ethical frameworks. Kantian deontology privileges the intention of one’s action as 
the most relevant consideration for judging the ethical rightness or wrongness of conduct; the 
consequences matter far less (Alexander & Moore, 2016; Driver, 2009).  
  
The counter discourse was there is no moral distinction between end-of-life decisions. In 
emphasising the relatedness between AD decisions and other end-of-life decisions, participants 
resisted the dominant medical and legal interpretation of killing. Participants viewed AD as 
preferable to sedation which, from their perspective, effectively amounts to a ‘slow euthanasia’ 
overdose of morphine. Although it would achieve a similar outcome of reducing suffering, they 
did not want to spend their last days drugged and unable to think; they did not want to wait until 
they “starved to death” (Claudia) to die.  In challenging well-established law and practice, 
Daniel, Claudia and Dennis sought to normalise AD as a justifiable practice at the end of life. 
While the killing is bad but letting die is permissible discourse is buttressed by the power of the 
medico-legal institution, it can still be challenged by individuals who assert that there is no moral 
difference between the relief of symptoms, withdrawal of life support and AD because these 
practices achieve the same end. 
 
A Long Life is a Successful Life/There are Some Ways of Living That are Worse 
Than Death 
Another discourse that was challenged was that a long life is a good or a successful life. Instead 
participants put forward that a meaningful life is a good life. This subsection explores longevity 
and where participants considered the tipping point between too young and old enough to die. 
Then it investigates related points, if a long life is a successful life, can it be too long, and if so, 
when is it too long? What participants thought was an acceptable age to die depended on several 
things. Views on longevity interacted with current age and stage of life, attitude towards life, life 
experiences, current health status and proximity to death. The following examples illustrate and 
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analyse these factors. Participants made meaning of their death in relation to their particular 
circumstances. Lastly, I explore the activities that participants undertook in the name of 
longevity. This rationality deeply affected the conduct of individual lives (Kaufman, 2010). 
  
Evolutionary biology, genetics, biomedicine and culture all emphasise the will to survive and the 
‘naturalness’ of longevity (Kaufman, 2010; Rose, 2007b). A Google search (January 2020) of 
“what is the secret to a long life” shows there are 1,930,000,000 results, pointing to the cultural 
valorisation of longevity that is perpetuated by popular media. The normative discourse 
establishes that ‘old people’ die (see also N. Richards, 2017b; van Wijngaarden, Leget, & 
Goossensen, 2015) and it is more of a tragedy when a person dies too young. This is why the 
first question often asked is, ‘how old were they’? when we hear that someone has died. We are 
judging the degree to which it is a tragedy or not as per the rules of the normative discourse. This 
reflects a widely promulgated and normative belief that a long life is a proxy for a successful life, 
and ‘early’ death is often a moral failure to look after your health. The latter is discussed below. 
On the other hand, the right-to-die movement highlights that there are some ways of living that 
are worse than death and old age, challenging the normative discourse of longevity (Gandsman, 
2018a; Hendry et al., 2013; Warraich, 2017). 
  
What was considered a ‘long life’ differed for each participant. They drew on the normative 
expectation of longevity. In contemporary society, life expectancy is somewhere around ‘old 
age’. For example, in the example below Emily estimated her life expectancy was 70 while 
others suggested between 80 and 85. Officially, life expectancy at birth in ANZ is 80.2 years for 
males and 83.6 years for females in the 2016-2018 period (Stats NZ, 2019). Kaufman (2010, p. 
226) proposed the term reflexive longevity to refer to “an emergent form of life, a mode of 
knowledge, reasoning and embodiment that older persons and their families come to inhabit at 
the site where ethics, ageing, clinical technologies and life itself meet”. Reflexive longevity 
shapes the way we live and medical decision-making, calculating the time left with respect to 
age, risk, death and success of medical interventions (Kaufman, 2010). Participants calculated 
‘time left’ and when to hasten death in terms of age, quality of life and suffering due to the 
effects of their illness and the nature of their anticipated dying. 
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Emily deemed old age to be determined by one’s attitude to life, which was reinforced by others’ 
view of her. 
But I am 76, I’m six years past my use by date.  I mean I know people are 
older, and I have aged because the chemotherapy has aged me, but prior to 
that, you know, people have always thought with what I’ve done that I’m 20 
years younger, with my attitude to life.  And so I’m coming from it from an 
angle where I’m dying anyhow, you know, within the next 10 years I’ll be 
dead anyhow, so it’s just a little bit sooner. (Emily) 
Emily’s sense of longevity was tempered by her illness and treatment. She illustrated the 
philosophy to ‘count the life in years, not years in life’. She felt that at 76 she was not being 
cheated of much life because she was already living on borrowed time. The idea of borrowed 
time is underpinned by a normative expectation that people will live for a long time. 
  
Some participants recognised that longevity was a recent phenomenon in the human lifespan. 
This helped them to accept that their lifespan was not going to be as long as the average life 
expectancy. Wallace, who was 65, had become accustomed to his friends around him dying. This 
may have made his own imminent death seem normal relative to others’ early deaths. The 
discourse appealed to below is a natural one, that everything dies. 
No, well at the end of the day we’ve got to, because it’s the cycle of the Earth, 
you know.  Look, 100 years ago I would’ve been well gone because 40 was 
old age sort of thing, you know, so would’ve been well gone years ago… I’ve 
been a professional mourner the last couple of years… and there was another 
memorial today, yay, that’s one I don’t have to go to.  Yeah, so it is, you 
know, people peeling off.  (Wallace) 
  
Yeah, I don’t know how anybody couldn’t feel that way [gratitude], I mean, 
it’s nothing particularly to be bitter and twisted about. Yeah, look at my life, 
I wasn’t born in a slum in India, I’ve had, you know, hugely privileged life, 
and yeah, it’s definitely hard with my grandchild having arrived… my 
children aren’t young, they’ve grown up, they’re adults, have children 
themselves… You know, and our life expectancy, not long ago, as humans 
was 36, 39 years old, I’m 57, you know. (Claudia) 
Claudia also commented on life expectancy; 57 was enough in the context of historic human 
lifespan. At age 57 and with adult children she did not feel bitter about dying within the coming 
year(s), although she had expected to watch her grandchildren grow up. This view was 
augmented by her ‘privileged’ life and gratitude for a good (short) life, implicitly compared to a 
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long bad one. Seeking alternative explanations for early death, such as that longevity is a recent 
phenomenon, might be a way of reconciling oneself to dying in the 21st century western context. 
  
Having achieved most of the things she wanted to do with her life helped Dee to accept she was 
going to die around age 54. 
So I said to my girlfriend in [when she first found a lump in her breast] if this 
goes tits up, cos that seemed like the right expression, I’m 54, I wasn’t then.  
I was 53.  And I’ve done a lot in my life.  I’ve done huge amounts of things. 
I’ve already sort of been out there, I am literally the one in the car in the 
handbrake slide.  And, you know, if this doesn’t go well for me, then I’m not 
one of those people who can turn around and say, oh there were so many 
things that I wanted to do.  Cos I’ve pretty much done most things… I 
followed a couple of blogs of, you know, hideously young women dying of 
this.  And they started to sort of pop their clogs along the way.  And you go, 
you know, I’m 53, this is, this is not in their position, if you know what I 
mean?  (Dee) 
Dee compared her own situation with that of younger women dying of breast cancer. Dee was 
referring to the quote by Hunter S. Thompson: 
Life should not be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely 
in a pretty and well preserved body, but rather to skid in broadside in a cloud 
of smoke, thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and loudly proclaiming 
‘Wow! What a Ride!’ 
I recall being surprised during the interviews when participants in their 50s felt they had lived 
enough life to accept their deaths. I came to realise the degree to which I had also accepted the 
long life is a successful life discourse. What most participants conveyed was that they had lived a 
good life regardless of length; a meaningful life was about the years in life not life in years. Dee 
felt she had done enough to die satisfied with what Giddens called ‘the project of life’ (Giddens, 
1991). 
  
When thinking about the length of life, it is interesting to look at the perspectives of the two 
oldest people in the study, Sylvia and Daniel (82). They were concerned about the length of life 
continuing beyond when they considered life worth living. All participants identified or could 
imagine states of living that they considered to be worse than death. As Sylvia and her daughter 
Josie discussed: 
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Sylvia: I just can’t believe that it’s six, nearly six months since I had the 
operation, it’s just, yeah. 
Jessica: You didn’t expect to live this long? 
Sylvia: No, no, I thought I’d be lucky to last a month, but, so here I am, six 
months later. And had Josie’s daughter’s wedding, got another one coming 
up in March, these are grandchildren... 
Josie: Except [Sylvia] keeps saying she won’t be around for them. ‘I won’t 
be here for that’ 
Sylvia: No, well I don’t expect to be… I don’t want to last that long 
(laughter)… I’ve really enjoyed the family, and they’ve been really good, but 
I don’t want it to get, I mean, six months is a long time, and I don’t want it to 
become a, you know, something that they don’t want to do, or you know. So 
I guess if they don’t want to do it, I’d probably have to go into care, and I 
don’t really fancy that much, after living here, it’d be awful, but still, if I have 
to, I have to. 
Jessica: What about moving into care is so awful for you? 
Sylvia: Oh just sort of losing more independence… 
Josie: Mum’s still got a pretty good quality of life… there’s a real risk that 
she might consider that she’s more of a burden than she is. So you know, 
we’ve gotta kind of keep emphasising that message. But I also know that 
Mum would absolutely hate not having any independence, you know, so if 
she was bedridden, that would just be awful for Mum, coz she’s always been, 
you know, get up, go for a walk, do, do, do, you know. And I think we’d hate 
to see you like that, but it would always be her decision, you know, if she still 
felt she had quality, then, you know, we’d continue to support her. (Sylvia) 
Sylvia’s children were taking turns at living with her to care for her which Josie said during the 
interview that they were happy to do and for which Sylvia was grateful for. Of all of the 
participants, Sylvia spoke most of not wanting to be a burden on her family in terms of their time 
and expenses in looking after her. Sylvia was conscious of her prognosis and took this into 
account when weighing the prospects of a long life. The idea of considering hastening her death 
was more acceptable than losing independence by going into care and becoming a burden on her 
family (see Rodriguez-Prat, Balaguer, Crespo, & Monforte-Royo, 2019 for a review on this 
topic). Loss autonomy is the top given reason for wanting AD in Oregon (Oregon Public Health 
Division, 2019).This could be interpreted as not valuing her own life enough to deserve care or 
alternatively, reflecting her independence. This feeling of being a burden was not the ‘trigger’ of 
the WTHD as Rodriguez-Prat et al. (2019) posit based on their review and consensus definition 
(Balaguer et al., 2016) and does not match the emphasis on concerns about burden in much of 
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the ANZ literature on AD (Young et al., 2019). Instead, Sylvia’s consideration of her WTHD 
and of being a burden was part of the broader equation of a life worth living, involving a 
potentially extended period of dependence, “feeling dreadful” and not being able to do things she 
enjoyed. Perhaps the whole concept of feeling like a burden reflects a bounded, Western, self-
determining notion of the individual that does not take into account relational ontology. 
  
Daniel was concerned with how long his life would continue to have ‘quality’. 
So, you know, quality of life relative to our age, we’re doing amazingly well 
and long may it last… But quality of life, no, it means, partly for me, it means 
doing things that are useful.  So, just surviving, like a lot of people do out 
here, sitting in a chair and watching the news is not quality of life for me. 
(Daniel) 
Later in the interview he also recognised that life prolongation was also part of the problem, as 
troubled in Chapter Four. The normalisation of medical intervention in late life that Daniel 
identified echoes Kaufman’s commentary, “as medicine extends lives routinely, death in the 
seventies, eighties or even early nineties appears no longer acceptable, usual, indeed ‘natural’, to 
a large segment of society” (Kaufman, 2010, p. 232). Both Sylvia and Daniel were asserting a 
counter discourse that living a meaningful life was more important than living a long life, at least 
after a diagnosis of a life-limiting condition. A meaningful life was agentic, independent, and 
involved fulfilling relationships and partaking in activities that made a difference. Participants of 
all ages made similar arguments. 
  
Participants linked their quantity of life to their quality of life and current health status. For 
Louis, Emily and Wallace, their desires for longevity and the WTHD rested on their current, past 
and anticipated quality of life. 
I mean it is what it is, why fool yourself and say I must live to see this.  It 
depends on the quality of your life… The quality of life has become the big 
issue… If you don’t have a quality of life, what’s the point? (Louis) 
  
Sooner or later I’m going to die, and I’ve got no desire to live to 100 unless 
that life is really, really good. (Emily) 
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Of course, quality and quantity are not mutually exclusive. However, the value of the time left 
appeared to be considered in calculations of the benefits of AD with respect to longevity. Several 
participants felt the time trade-off was not of concern for them (Perez, McGee, Campbell, 
Christensen, & Williams, 1997). This willingness to forego some amount of life contravenes the 
“powerful progress narratives of science and biomedicine, including shifting ideas of standard 
treatment and emerging notions of ‘normal’ ways of growing old” (Kaufman, 2010, p. 227). A 
cross-cultural study of the attitudes of older adults towards longevity found that a longer life was 
only desirable if health was maintained (Ekerdt et al., 2017). 
  
Attitude towards when is an acceptable time to die appeared to depend on age and stage of life. 
For example, the two youngest participants with young families seemed the least accepting of a 
shorter than expected lifespan. They were aged 40 or under at the time of interview. 
I just feel sadness for, I don’t want to miss out on this life, but also sad for the 
kids, that I’m not around, yeah… I couldn’t even look after the kids at that 
point [extreme pain], but for me at that point, I was still getting a lot of 
enjoyment from the kids. Even though I was tired and having to sleep a lot, 
there was still a lot of pleasure in my life. Yeah, so I haven’t yet been at a 
point where there’s an alternative that I’d prefer to that. (Paula) 
  
Right now I still have a lot to live for. I'm still able to have a meaningful 
relationship with my wife and daughter. (Ben) 
They felt a strong obligation and connection to their families. Family—children, spouses and 
parents—were the reason to try and live a long life, even through difficult times. Relationships 
with loved ones were life-sustaining in the face of significant pain and limited function. 
  
Some participants also felt an obligation to care for their aging parents which their limited life 
expectancy had foreclosed the opportunity to fulfil. 
I’m disappointed I can’t help Dad with Mum, now that she has Alzheimer’s 
and that. That’s always, always wanted to be there for them, and now actually 
Dad’s, even though he’s dealing with Mum he’s there for me. (Heather) 
There are normal and natural life stages and cycles in modern Western culture. For example, the 
joy of watching children and grandchildren grow-up is the norm, and it is therefore seen as a 
deviation from the norm for parents to bury their child because it violates the ‘natural’ order of 
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things. The natural and moral order of things are out of sync or transgressed when the expected 
reciprocal care roles of parents and children cannot be fulfilled. Some participants felt they had 
been short-changed of a long life, according to the normative discourse of longevity and ideas of 
fairness.   
 
Proximity to death affected attitudes to longevity. Some participants were accepting that they 
were dying and converted this acceptance to a willingness to consider hastening death. Much like 
Louis’ attitude “it is what it is”, many participants were accepting of the limited life expectancy. 
As Sylvia put it, “never mind, that’s life, isn’t it?”. At the same time, for some there was also 
strong will to live for as long as possible, even if their existence was “shit”: 
Like I can’t get a job again or return to work, I can’t even mow the bloody 
lawns.  Or some days you don’t even get up, or it’s hard to shower.  It’s no 
freakin’ life, coz I was always on the go, energetic and did my own thing… 
Had I known I’d rather have gone then, had I known what this last year was 
going to be like yeah… Because once you get sick your will to live is so 
bloody strong, it changes your, even now I’ve got a shit existence but at least 
I’m still glad to be here (laugh).  Which, I don’t know, you can actually 
tolerate so much which I hadn’t realised before.  (Heather) 
Heather’s tipping point shifted as she became sicker and she reconsidered what a meaningful 
existence consists of, illustrating the disability paradox. The disability paradox is the discrepancy 
between the public’s perception of a limited or undesirable quality of life and how that is 
experienced as a good or excellent quality of life by people living with disability (Albrecht & 
Devlieger, 1999). The tipping point moved between when life is ok despite suffering and when 
the suffering takes away the will to live. Her experience, which Heather acknowledged, offers 
some support to an anti-AD positions because of her changing outlook on a life worth living. 
Heather expressed existential ambiguity about her desire to live in her current state and the 
strength of her will to live. 
  
Another contradiction regarding longevity was Heather’s smoking with COPD. She valued 
smoking over longevity. Heather appreciated hospice’s approach on this matter at the end of life: 
And hospice said they didn’t care if you’re going to lose a few months 
because of it [smoking], but it’s what makes you happy, that’s what’s 
important. (Heather) 
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In some respects, hospice’s ethos (or Heather’s interpretation of it), of quality of life over 
quantity of life goes against Heather’s avowed will to live. However, the WTHD is compatible 
with a wish to live. While Heather acknowledged her strong will to live, she did not wish for 
longevity at any price. It is also a pragmatic acknowledgement of fatalism, going against the 
dominant healthism discourse where adherence to the healthy lifestyle is the paramount concern 
(Jaye et al., 2018). 
  
In contrast to Heather’s smoking, participants engaged in practices of longevity-making 
(Kaufman, 2010). This included attending medical appointments and medication/treatment 
regimens were adopted by some in the hope that this would bring more time (perhaps to push out 
the tipping point). 
It’s [medication] the only thing they give you for the motor neurone disease. 
And it’s supposed to keep you alive longer, keep your breathing a bit better, 
but it’s the old how long is a piece of string. I mean… who knows, might 
keep me alive a bit longer. So I’ll keep taking them. (Jacob) 
  
But we’re very much aware that it is depending on this, this wonder drug and 
very grateful to be able to be on it.  And to risk the 40 side effects that come 
with it, but we haven’t seen any really serious ones so far.  (Daniel) 
  
The adherence to a healthy lifestyle was mentioned by some participants. 
I think that’s partly maybe while I’m still surviving now, is because I was so 
healthy. (Sylvia) 
  
I was lucky that I was fit because, you know, if I hadn’t have been as fit as 
what I was I don’t think that they would’ve gone ahead [with the surgery]. 
(Emily) 
  
At the moment I’ve just changed my lifestyle, diet completely, I don’t eat 
meat, don’t eat dairy… just do meditation, diet, lifestyle, try and remove 
stress for your life. And you know, a lot of cancer patients that I’ve met… 
they were all drinking wine, eating cheese, and I thought, oh, I didn’t 
understand why none of them had changed their lifestyle. (Claudia) 
Sylvia attributed her longevity to her healthy life. Claudia had modified her lifestyle to increase 
her chances of longevity. Given their terminal prognoses, participants had possibly passed the 
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point where risk reduction and prevention strategies could be of benefit to them. Claudia’s 
surprise that other patients had not also changed their lifestyle reflects the moral nature of 
longevity. This speaks to a normative assumption that lifestyle is the chief cause of early death 
and people are not morally blameless for dying early. Longevity is reward for living a ‘good 
life’; good ascribes a moral value, implying that a short life is a moral failure. Longevity is 
associated with the healthy lifestyle, which is underpinned by discourses of healthism that are 
characterised by self-responsibility, risk and consequence (Jaye et al., 2018). These discourses of 
healthism are normalising moral technologies that “promote a secular soteriology of extending 
life” (Jaye et al., 2018, p. 374). 
  
The counter discourse both implicit and explicit in participants’ accounts can be summed up as 
‘there are some ways of living that are worse than death’. The kinds of existence and suffering 
that were worse than death were described in the preceding chapters. Paradoxically, most 
participants expressed a desire to live, but not with a significantly impaired quality of life 
(Monforte-Royo et al., 2012; Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2017). However, relationships with family 
could make a limited quality of life bearable for some participants. In the US, the cultural milieu 
of extending the quantity of life at any cost and by any means shapes individuals’ subjectivities, 
hope, concepts of life and time as negotiable (Kaufman, 2010; Norwood, 2018). In this ANZ 
study, participants were simultaneously hoping for more time whilst if AD was a choice, 
potentially choosing to have less time. Participants may have been eschewing the moral 
imperative to live for as long as possible (Foucault, 1988) in favour of a better quality of 
remaining life and better dying. Choosing to die early goes against medical, social, cultural, 
religious and political imperatives to live. For these participants, the duty to live may be more 
problematic than a duty to die.  
  
This subsection has explored how quantity and quality of life, life expectancy and longevity 
figure in the participants’ accounts of their consideration of hastening death. Participants 
contested the ‘long life equals a successful life’/‘life at any cost’ discourse. Their goal was a long 
life but a good, meaningful life, as they personally defined it (e.g. relationships, enjoyable 
activities), was more important. As all of the participants in this study had been told by their 
health professionals they had a life expectancy of around one year, there were limited options for 
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extending life which is likely to have figured in their reflexive longevity (Kaufman, 2010). 
Discourses of healthism informed some participants’ practices of longevity-making (Jaye et al., 
2018). Quality of life figured largely in most participants’ calculations of the shifting tipping 
point between a life worth living and a life worse than death. 
  
Death is Natural/Dying People Know When the Right Time to Die is 
The natural death discourse is underpinned by the ‘a long life is a good life’ discourse. It is 
related to but differs from the ‘normalising death discourse’. The ‘natural death discourse’ is 
formulated by statements such as ‘nature will take its course’ and ‘you die when your time has 
come’.  But as the language indicates, death is an event preceded by a process (‘course’, ‘when 
it’s your time’) and it is the nature of the process that participants contested. Choosing the timing 
of death violates the normative discourse of dying a natural death. 
  
This subsection explores how participants challenged the discourse that death arrives at the 
natural time and emphasised that dying took a long time, or ‘long dying’. I define long dying as 
the period of decline with a known life-limiting illness where life as you knew it is no longer 
recognisable but death is not imminent. Instead, participants asserted that they would 
instinctively know when the right time to die was. When participants’ quality of life no longer 
outweighed the prospect of death, participants said this was the right time for them to choose to 
die. I begin by differentiating natural from normal, and how technology is positioned in 
constructions of normal, natural, or long deaths. Then I discuss how ACPs draw on ideas of 
natural death. To challenge these constructions, participants discussed long dying and reasoned 
there was a right time to die. 
  
Natural death is usually contrasted with medical-technological intervention, in an attempt to 
prolong life (J. Seymour, 1999). Whereas the ‘death is normal’ approach posits that death is a 
normal part of life, it defines life and they are mutually constitutive. Kate sums up the death is 
normal discourse: 
I’ve always been about demystifying death and stuff like that.  It’s not 
something that we should be scared of, it’s something that we should actually 
embrace.  It’s not horrible, it’s not bad, it’s not yukky.  (Kate) 
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The death is normal discourse aligns with and is informed by the palliative and hospice care 
approach (Mannix, 2018; Zimmermann, 2012). The edict, and more recently, the hashtag 
#weneedtotalkaboutdying promoted by Hospice NZ, and other hospices internationally, is 
evidence of the normalising death discourse (Hospice New Zealand, n.d.-b). 
  
For some of the participants, because death was normal, it could be somewhat welcomed. Kate 
was intrigued to see what death was going to be like: 
Jessica: Yeah, this is a pretty direct question, but how do you feel about 
dying? 
Kate: As I said, and that’s the bit that doesn’t bother me. 
Jessica: Yeah, it’s the lead up to the – 
Kate: It’s the lead, it’s the lead up to it.  I’ve actually, bizarre, quite excited 
to see what happens. Cos, I mean, you hear all these, but you don’t know until 
you’ve been there.  And it’s not something that we really wanna go in a hurry, 
but yeah. That sense of peace, and that sense of what is on the other side. 
(Kate) 
Kate acknowledged that while she did not want to die soon, she was accepting and even 
intrigued about what death would entail. Daniel was ready to ‘move on’ and at the same time, 
did not want to die. 
I think that, everything else being equal, I just want to get on with it, you 
know?  I, I can’t see any reason for wanting to put it off or delay the whole 
process, just for, just for any odd reason.  Though I don’t really want it to take 
place in the first place, you know?  So I’m quite ready to be a, you know, 
moving on to that, into a new stage. (Daniel) 
  
It’s more letting it [death] come to you… everybody reaches a point where, 
yeah, they’re totally at peace with the decision and there’s nothing more that 
needs to be. (Claudia) 
For a few participants the idea of death was a relief or a release. Death was both sad and 
something to be curious about, raising questions about the taken for granted meanings of death. 
These examples disrupt the dominant narrative of ‘the terror of death’, that death is always 
denied or feared by the public (Becker, 1973). Specifically within the terminally ill, denial is 
discussed by the palliative care literature as an individual psychological response as a defence 
mechanism, as healthy so not to become overwhelming and as temporary but something to 
overcome (Zimmermann, 2004). 
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The natural death discourse emphasises letting physiological processes occur without medical 
intervention to delay death. Hospice also adheres generally to this discourse of natural death with 
its ‘neither postpone nor hasten death’ ideology with exceptions for pain medications, breathing 
and other supports. It promotes the phrase allow natural death (Palliative Care Council of New 
Zealand, 2013). Daniel’s statement about end-of-life care alluding to the natural death discourse 
is worth quoting again: 
Where we’re actually medicating people to stay alive, when the natural course 
of the events is to die.  (Daniel). 
Hospices (and other health care institutions) are implicated in governing of timely, ‘natural’ 
deaths organisationally (Broom, 2012). However, the hospice patients interviewed by Broom 
(2012) found that the ‘natural’ death idea involving closure, dignity and acceptance, promoted by 
hospice did not necessarily resonate with the lived experiences of participants.  
 
Claudia embodied the natural death approach in part through not seeking experimental or 
curative treatments. 
Just that there’s kind of a sense of natural peaceful, there’s a word I’m trying 
to grasp, and I can’t quite get it. Yeah. It’s, it’s, to me, a natural process, we’re 
all going to get there in the end, and of course, it’s a huge issue of fear in 
human beings, but if you can remove the fear, and that knowing that you are 
going to have a peaceful end… I’m not constantly kind of grasping for cures 
or looking for ways to fight it off, to fight off the end. (Claudia) 
Claudia discussed acceptance. She acknowledged fear can be part of the decision-making around 
end of life and that her fear was of being in pain. Timmermans (1998, p. 148) noted, “the 
observation that it is impossible for advanced medical technology and humane, dignified dying 
to co-exist becomes thus both an assumption and a normative conclusion”. There is an 
assumption that less technology equates to a more humane death (Illich, 1977; Timmermans, 
1998). 
  
To try and enact more natural deaths, half of the participants had an ACP or advance directive to 
inform others of the healthcare they did (comfort care) and did not (life-sustaining treatment) 
want at the end of life. Legal documentation is required to forego getting on the heroic medicine 
conveyor belt (Zitter, 2017). Heather and Wallace talked me through their ACPs. Having had an 
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extensive hospital stay, Heather had written: “allow natural death, keep me comfortable” and “do 
not resuscitate if unresponsive” was underlined in the advance directive section of her ACP. The 
description to prompt people to consider their priorities in the advance directive section of the 
ACP is as follows: 
There are medical procedures that keep you alive or delay death. These may 
include resuscitation (CPR), life support, getting food and drink through a 
tube, and kidney dialysis. Sometimes treatments can be both helpful and 
harmful. They may keep you alive, but not conscious, or make you a bit better 
for a short time, but cause you pain. You need to decide if this is what you 
want. Your healthcare team will only offer treatments that you will benefit 
from, this includes the offer of CPR. Think about what is important to you. 
For example, quality of life (how good your life is) or quantity of life (how 
long your life is)? Are there circumstances in which you would want to stop 
being kept alive and be made comfortable so you can have a natural death? 
(Advance Care Planning Cooperative, 2016, p. 10). 
The description draws on quality/quantity and natural/medical dichotomies, although it also 
acknowledges some treatments can be helpful. ‘Natural’ includes suppression of naturally 
occurring pain. The natural death discourse emerged to critique the highly technological hospital 
death as unnatural (J. Seymour, 1999).  Hospice offers a low-technology-natural death hybrid 
(Norwood, 2018). Kaufman (2005) argued that death is not natural, rather it is ‘made’ and 
shaped by social, cultural, historic norms and expectations. Similarly, de Beauvoir observed: 
“there is no such thing as natural death: nothing that ever happens to a man [sic] is ever natural, 
since his presence calls the world into question” (de Beauvoir, 1969, p. 92 cited in J. Seymour, 
1999, p. 692). As well, dying trajectories, experiences and expectations are shaped by 
institutional processes (Kaufman, 2005) and official documentation such as the ACP (Borgstrom, 
2015). 
  
Participants discussed long dying as a reason for considering AD. Some participants attributed 
long dying to the nature of the disease, as with Dennis’s situation, or to the treatments for the 
disease as Louis describes. 
With motor neurone of course, I’m not in pain, so it's a bit different from 
people who have got physical pains and so forth.  But I know there’s going 
to be a point when, yeah, I’m just a complete zombie just about and how long 
do I want to live like that for?... it's just when you get to that point when it’s 
just too much to live really. I mean when you’re basically in bed 24/7, not 
even able to have a conversation or anything with people.  Just at that point, 
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I think it's, for me it would be, yeah, you know, ‘cos you know it’s coming. 
At that point why would you want to prolong the inevitable. (Dennis) 
  
Chemo might prolong your life, it won’t change the inevitable… they said the 
cancer will beat the chemo, it’s just all you’re doing is buying time.  And how 
much pain and agony do you want to go through is going to be your call, as 
to when you say enough is enough.  Yeah, but it comes down to quality of 
life. There have been days here where, when I say days here I mean there 
have been days in the last three to four months where I’ve thought no, this is 
not living. Well it’s living but it’s not living. (Louis) 
A natural death for Dennis was not an acceptable death due to the length and gradualness of 
decline. Dennis was going to be supported by technology to help him breath and talk, thereby 
creating a ‘zombie’ existence. He imagined a tipping point in the future where death will become 
preferable to long dying. For Louis, the boundaries between life and death were already blurred 
by the technological interventions at the end of life. The outcome of medical interventions that 
prolong life is long dying, or a ‘grey zone’ or ‘zone of indistinction’ between life and death 
(Kaufman, 2005). Technology is deeply embedded in the ‘cultural texture’ of dying 
(Timmermans, 1998). Kaufman, Seymour and Timmermans were writing about intensive care, 
resuscitation and the hospital, however their arguments translate to wider landscape of 
medicalised dying. As Norwood put it: 
I suggest this increase in the legalization [sic] of assisted dying in the United 
States is part of an emerging discourse that contrasts images of hybrid patients 
buried under technology and medical intervention with images of a ‘natural’ 
death at home, surrounded by family and supported with the minimum of 
invasive technologies (Norwood, 2018, p. 471). 
  
The idea that death was inevitable but only after a long, slow dying period made AD appealing to 
participants at the time when you had had ‘enough’ or it was ‘too much to live’. Long dying was 
expected by participants and can be interpreted as the new (but undesired) normal. Ordinary 
deaths are obscured by violent and atypical dying that heroic medicine TV programmes aim to 
ameliorate as suggested by Norwood (2018) in her analysis of representations of death and dying 
on US television and internet searches over time. This informs the cultural script of unrealistic 
dying and miracle cures; it has created a ‘new normal’ where people are unprepared for ordinary 
dying (Mannix, 2018; Norwood, 2018). Norwood argued this milieu feeds into people turning to 
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AD, another medical intervention. Alternatively, Jutel (2019) argues the purpose of media is 
entertainment in suspended reality, not to be informative. 
  
There was a sense among most participants that they would inherently know the right time to 
choose to die. They are also making a truth claim here based on their unique experience as a 
dying person that sets them apart from others. That moment was in the future and some 
participants acknowledged that the tipping point shifted.  
You know, when you’re ready, you’re ready I guess, it’s like anything.  The 
same as if you’re going on a diet, or you’re going to start exercising, or you’re 
going to learn to do something, when you’re ready you do it. (Daniel) 
  
Dee: I like the word peaceful, to peacefully slip away, that’s what I want to 
do.  And I want to do it at the right time, or before I lost my dignity. 
Jessica: Yeah.  You said before that you, would just intrinsically know when 
the right time is, yeah. 
Dee: I believe I will… I really, really do believe I’ll just know in my heart 
this is, this is a good time.  Or I trust the people around me enough that they 
would know as well.  And be able to say something to me, you know, yeah.  
But I don’t quite know where that comes from, but I just do absolutely believe 
that I would know when the time is right… if I could just have the choice to 
say, you know, tomorrow afternoon, okay people.  Things have gone downhill 
a bit, you know, and I think this is the right time… I just, I intrinsically feel 
that’s an emotional response, but I feel like I will know when the time is 
right…  Cos it’s, it’s a really big decision.  It’s not something you would do 
lightly. (Dee) 
  
Jessica: How would you know when the time’s right for you? 
Wallace: Well somehow, I think I will, you know.  Yeah, I’ll just, one of these 
days I’m going to say enough is enough with this can’t breathe shit, and I’ve 
done everything I can do in my life as such, you know.  I don’t want to be 
doing this all the time, it’s hard work. 
Jessica: Yeah, so living’s become hard? 
Wallace: Yes, yeah, and look, I just went across the room.  It’s not good.  It’s 
going to get to the stage where I’ve had enough of trying to breathe… There’s 
another wee bit of quality of life gone, yeah.  So I’m pretty sure I’ll know on 
the day, yeah. (Wallace) 
Knowing the right time was different for each participant; like an equation (being ready), an 
emotional appeal (in my heart), or pragmatic (too hard). For all participants though, the right 
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time to die was related to quality of life, dignity, having lost too much of their identity such as 
their sense of humour, or functional status, such as being able to breath or communicate. Being 
ready is a form of death acceptance where being dead becomes preferable to being alive in this 
way. This better off dead is another truth claim as most people do not know what it is like to be 
alive this way (i.e. so compromised). 
  
This subsection has identified three formulations of death as normal, natural or protracted. The 
grey zone between nature and medicine of long dying was highlighted in participants’ accounts 
of dying. The solution to the problem of long dying for the participants was AD. The right time 
to die was asserted by most participants as something they would inherently know. The all-
encompassing notion of quality of life was a determining factor in whether and when to choose 
to die. 
  
Dying is a Special Time/Long Dying Exacerbates Suffering for All 
‘Dying is a special time’ is another discourse that privileges living out one’s dying because of the 
opportunities for personal growth and/or for the personal growth of witnesses to the dying 
(Lofland, 1978; Rodriguez-Prat et al., 2019). Under this discourse, every moment should be 
savoured, no matter what it entails. Another formulation of this discourse is that there is moral 
value in suffering. A blog post on the popular ANZ Medical Humanities website Corpus 
pronounced that “actively ending suffering by causing death undercuts the meaning of 
suffering… If euthanasia is legalised the idea that meaning is found through suffering will no 
longer be available” (Paul, 2018, para. 5). The searching for meaning to cope with suffering 
aligns with some existential philosophical approaches (A. Bates, 2016; Frankl, 2006). In this 
subsection I explore participants’ different expectations of dying as a special time and conclude 
that for some, expectations to ‘live dying’ when the dying person is suffering may place 
untenable demands on both the dying person and family. 
  
Participants all valued the time they had left. For Paula, the last weeks of life would be a special 
time with her family. 
 197 
And in those couple of weeks I’ll just be wanting quality time with people 
when I’m awake, you know?... I had a good talk to [husband] about it the 
other day actually, coming up to this interview and he was the one who was 
saying, look, even if it's for an hour or two a day that you get to see the kids 
and they can come and visit you if you’re in hospice or something like that, 
that’s valuable. (Paula) 
  
Dennis: These are the people I need to go see.  I need to go see these people, 
I need to go stand on this hill, or whatever it is. 
Rebecca: Yeah, being truly happy with yourself and feeling the love from 
family and the joy from, that just means so much more too, but we didn’t 
really get that until now, you know.  All the things we did didn’t mean as 
much to us as they do now.  Now it’s like oh my god, that memory, I’ll just 
remember that forever.  Those special things, the things you buy can’t give 
you those…Yeah, but wouldn’t it be nice to go right, I’ve done all those 
things, I’ve truly loved every minute of it but now I’m ready to go.  I can’t 
physically do those anymore, I’m going to take my memories with me and 
now’s the time. 
Dennis: Yeah, I’m not ready yet. 
Rebecca: No, you’re not ready yet coz we’re still making memories, and 
we’re still having a great time. (Dennis) 
With each example, there is negotiation between living, dying and a hypothetical choosing of the 
right time to die. Both Paula and her husband wanted every possible moment together with their 
children. There was an assumption that she would and could keep living for her children. Dennis 
emphasises that now was not the right time for him as he and his wife were busy making special 
memories (rather than accumulating possessions). Daily life and experiences took on a new 
meaning with the prospect of death coming sooner rather than later. This speaks to the dialectical 
relationships between life and death, self and others. 
  
If she was able to hasten death, Sylvia was willing to forego special events. 
Jessica: I suppose, one of the concerns for doctors, and I suppose other people, 
is that had you had euthanasia at that time, when you are feeling a bit 
desperate, you wouldn’t have gone on to see the grandchildren and the 
weddings. 
Sylvia: No, but I wouldn’t have worried. 




Sylvia: No. I was quite happy to finish it, and I know everything would, you 
know, I wasn’t worried about anything. The family are all well set up, and, 
well I wouldn’t have thought about it anyway at that stage. I mean I certainly 
enjoyed, I mean the wedding was marvellous, and having new great 
grandchildren has been marvellous. But it wouldn’t have worried me if I 
hadn’t, you know, really. 
Sylvia accepted the risk of missing out on some life events which is at odds with the belief that 
one should have as long a life as possible (long life is a good life discourse). This indicates 
Sylvia felt the right time to die had already passed and she was outliving her desired life 
expectancy, even though she still enjoyed the family occasions. Several anti-euthanasia 
campaigners discussed how they would not be alive if they had chosen to die when they wanted 
to and how they are glad they did not go ahead with it (e.g. the story of Vicki Walsh who is 
terminally ill and was given 18 months prognosis eight years ago (#DefendNZ, n.d.)). It is 
possible to interpret that participants in this study were more willing to accept this risk that they 
may die prematurely or have gone on to change their minds. They may be comfortable with time 
lost (cf. time left Kaufman, 2010). 
  
The ways in which AD is discussed (what if the person were to change their mind) reflects a 
non-religious sense of death as final. 
I’m not worried about after life, I’m not religious as such but I believe I have 
spirituality in different ways and I believe I’ll be around… I definitely feel 
like there’s people waiting for me, yeah.  My uncle and my godfather in 
particular and he’s going to look after me.  And I feel him in the sky and in 
the sea and I know I’ll be there with him.  And in the stars.  (Paula) 
Paula’s spiritual beliefs were comforting. She believed, in line with te Ao Māori, that she would 
continue to exist in another realm. Her view challenges the Western secular view that there is no 
life after death.  In some cultures, death is not the end but a transition to another state, such as in 
Te Ao Māori, or to another life if reincarnated as in Buddhism and Hinduism or continues in 
heaven as in Christianity.50 This completely challenges the concepts of longevity, death as 
natural and dying as a special time because death is not final. 
  
 
50 I am grateful to Dr Keziah Wallis for pointing this out. 
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For many participants, approaching the end of life had some positive effects. Some participants 
felt that they had found new meaning as they approached the end of life, that a life-limiting 
diagnosis had put things into perspective. Joy, gratitude and what was important to them became 
heightened. 
yeah, there’s lots of blessings in this.  And that’s a word I’ve never used 
before is blessings and joy.  It’s religious language and I don’t know where 
it’s coming from and it’s not a religious thing for me… I get what joy is… it 
can be little things, and looking out that window.  I mean, that’s a beautiful 
thing, I get joy from that. (Dee) 
  
Don’t sweat the small stuff, you know, is a biggie. Don’t get, you know, I 
hear people getting so rattled about inconsequential stuff, it’s like, who 
cares… simplifying, or honing and tuning what’s important, and prioritising, 
well, I have to now, because I can’t do so many things… It’s like don’t angst 
yourself about that, you know, really, that’s their problem, but you hear 
people say the most ridiculous things. And just shut up, coz they’re in a 
different space… and making allowances, because often you have no idea 
what’s going on in somebody else’s life. (Judy) 
The new outlook of life that some participants found themselves experiencing did not preclude 
them from considering hastening their death. The two states—enjoying life and a WTHD—could 
be experienced concurrently. 
  
Dying was also a difficult relational experience for Judy and others because of the social 
expectation to be positive and focus on recovery. 
Judy: I mean, I don’t look sick, and so I get used to people telling me how 
well I look and all that stuff. 
Jessica: Yeah, a number of people have said that, and they find it so difficult. 
Judy: I actually get quite irritated, I have to shut up and swallow it, when I 
really want to say, well I’m bloody not, and I wish the inside matched the 
outside. And it’s almost like kind of denigrating my illness or something, 
which is completely unreasonable, because people don’t know often. A friend 
said the other day, oh, you’re looking well, are you, you’re getting better 
then? Well, no (Laughter)... but that’s what they want to believe, coz it’s 
easier for them. So they don’t really want you to be, it’s like when they say 
how are you, and you say, oh, bit half-mast today, and they scuttle on with 
some other conversation, coz they really don’t want to know that. What they 
want you to say is, oh good, coz then it’s easier for them. (Judy) 
 200 
There was a tension between ‘what is best for me’ and ‘making it easy on others’ and what social 
norms required of Judy, including others’ death taboo and denial she alluded to. The 
contemporary cultural discourse of cheerful ‘survivorship’ is pertinent to Judy’s description of 
dying. Survivorship is a ‘sociality’ permeated with emotion, uncertainty, dread and morality 
(Broom, Kenny, Kirby, & Lwin, 2018). It can contribute to normative pressures of individual 
victory over disease through positivity and hope (Broom et al., 2018). Broom et al. (2018) 
discuss the survivorship of cancer however their explication broadly fits with the accounts of all 
participants of living with life-limiting illness. Survivorship manifests in a circulation of emotion 
between ‘survivors’ in relation to people, groups and things (Broom et al., 2018). This discourse 
constitutes people through a set of affective relations that invokes normative and contradictory 
emotions such as: 
a desire for the here and now; a wilfulness to ensure a future; disgust with 
others’ expectation to persevere; a desire to prevail for the sake of an other(s); 
the will to survive; the desire to face death and confront mortality; and the 
expectation of remaining positive in the face of cancer (Broom et al., 2018, 
p. 4). 
The expectation to ‘live dying’, because dying is a special time, and of being a good dying 
person assumes a will to live, creates a duty to live and pathologises a WTHD. 
  
Some participants problematised the ‘dying is a special time’ discourse by repudiating the 
benefit of suffering as redemptive or giving meaning to life. Daniel felt very strongly, as did 
others, that suffering was unnecessary and not good for a person. 
And if this person suffers, well, it’s got to be good for somebody, you know?  
It may make the family stronger, or you may earn a place in heaven with God, 
or something like that…That’s the Catholic view… And I repudiate that.  I 
just cannot, I just cannot believe, I have difficulty believing in any kind of 
God these days.  But I find it very difficult to believe in a God who says, I’ll 
just let that one suffer a bit longer, it’ll be good for her. That’s got to be 
absolute bullshit. (Daniel) 
Daniel commented on religion as an institution which wields its power to shape the norms (i.e. 
make truth claims) around how people should die. Many participants shared with me their 
memories of deaths where they felt the person was suffering gratuitously. For example Kate 
described: 
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Yeah, my aunty just died recently.  And she’s had Alzheimer's dementia, so 
she’s gone downhill, and then, and the last year or two has been absolutely 
terrible for the whole family.  And then the last few months of her life were 
just so stressful for everybody.  And it was needless, you know?  She had 
gone mentally a long, long time ago.  And there’s nothing worse than waiting 
for people to get sicker and sicker and seeing the decline.  And when you’ve 
got, you know, half your family live overseas and they’re backwards and 
forwards from Australia to spend time with them… Isn’t it best to be able to 
clock out at a time planned by yourself and your family and those that are 
around you, to have a nice, have a nice passing and a nice experience?  Rather 
than a stressful, drawn-out, horrible experience.  (Kate) 
Kate could see logistical benefits of AD for the grieving family. Deciding on the time of death 
was preferred by all participants because it reduced the amount and duration of ‘needless’ stress 
on the dying person and the family and their shared suffering. Suffering is experienced 
interpersonally (Dragojlovic & Broom, 2018), as in Kate’s description of her family’s 
experience.  
 
Insisting on the value of suffering romanticises the end of life as a special time. It also overlooks 
the relational aspects, physical realities and temporal incoherencies in participants’ descriptions 
of their dying experiences and anticipated future (Broom et al., 2018; Kenny et al., 2017). While 
dying may be a special time, it may also be a painful and stressful (or traumatic) lived experience 
shared by those immersed in it. 
  
Dying as a special time for everyone is reinforced by the ‘happy death movement’ (Lofland, 
1978). As noted in the introduction and is worth restating, Lofland described the hospice and 
death acceptance movements as presenting a correct way to confront death (see also Broom, 
2012; Zimmermann, 2012). What about the toll on dying person to ‘live every moment’ 
(Lawton, 2000) or to accept death peacefully? Some participants’ experiences of dying were 
inextricably connected to their experiences of pain, breathlessness or diminishing function. A 
couple of participants seemed unlikely to accept they were dying, does this mean they are 
confronting death incorrectly? 
  
To sum up this subsection, some participants had found new meaning at the end of life and 
valued every moment of life. On the other hand, other participants disputed that dying and 
suffering was going to be meaningful, involve personal growth, or that every moment was 
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precious. Contradictory emotions of enjoying life and having a WTHD can be experienced 
simultaneously. Participants wished to reduce unnecessary suffering in dying, in contrast to the 
‘value in suffering’ discourse. The ‘dying as a special time’ discourse creates a duty to live and a 
taboo to choose to die earlier by excluding alternative interpretations such as long dying 
exacerbating suffering for both the family and the dying person.  
  
A Good Death for All/Assisted Dying can Guarantee a Good Death 
The concept of a ‘good death’ is a recent phenomenon with historic origins, but one that lacks 
consensus. The literature on definitions of a good death was discussed in Chapter Two. Much of 
the rhetoric around dying is captured under the cultural script of ‘a good death’. As a construct, 
the good death is “a socially approved form of dying and death with powerfully prescribed and 
normalized behaviors [sic] and choices”; it’s the modern equivalent of Ars Moriendi 
(Timmermans, 2010, p. 24). The good death is in stark contrast to the participants’ concerns 
about dying badly, their lived experiences of suffering discussed throughout this thesis and a 
recent collection New Zealand stories (Barber & Havill, 2018). Evidence that a good death is a 
normative discourse in Western societies comes by way of good death criteria, measures, 
systematic reviews and philosophy (e.g. Hales, Zimmermann, & Rodin, 2010; Meier et al., 2016; 
Sandman, 2004; R. Smith, 2000). Endorsed definitions of the good death do not include AD. 
  
The following quotes illustrate three of many different formulations of what a good death means 
to each individual. 
Just to go to sleep and not wake up (laughter), I think that would be the nicest 
way to go, but I think you’re probably pretty lucky if you go like that. Yeah. 
But, or maybe just your heart stopped beating. (Sylvia) 
  
Me, a good death?  If I had it my way, instead of funerals I’d have all my 
friends around before I went, and say well this is the time. We’d have our 
goodbyes, to the people really close to you and tell them what they mean to 
me.  You wouldn’t have all the nosey parkers, and hangers on. (Heather) 
  
To be in a situation where you’re totally at peace with what’s coming, what’s 
happening all around you, to, yeah, to have your wishes heard, to, yeah... to 
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me, it’s all really simple and straightforward, that I should be where I want to 
be, and yeah, to be able to trust those caring for me completely. That my 
family don’t put, get in any compromising, put in any difficult position, that 
it, yeah, just that there’s kind of a sense of natural, peaceful. (Claudia) 
Sylvia did not want to be aware that death was imminent while Heather and Claudia suggested 
they preferred a high level of awareness. Claudia’s excerpt evokes a strong sense of acceptance. 
The participants were commenting on the event whereas the literature mostly refers to the 
process that leads up to the final event despite referring to a good death not good dying. The 
timing of death seems to be crucial for these participants. Dying more quickly is preferable to the 
long death. Interestingly, in these three excerpts, AD is not explicitly mentioned as part of a good 
death. This is likely because AD was seen as an option of last resort. As Daniel put it, referring 
to AD: 
The control I want to have really is only in the event of, of, of a failure of a 
good death. (Daniel) 
The expectation that death will be bad was established by the doctor who gave him the diagnosis. 
Daniel’s wife Betty recalled the doctor taking her aside: 
He said it will not be a good death, you see.  So he’s, 15 years ago, telling me 
that it’s not going to be a good death and I’m having to relate to that. (Betty) 
The certainty of a bad death had a lasting impression. It made for a 'long dying' experience for 
Betty and presumably for Daniel too.   
  
Emily was much more explicit in her conception of a good death with AD. Again, for her AD 
was an option of last resort if she was in pain. 
Jessica: So what would dying well look like for you? 
Emily: Just an injection, like my dog, when I have my dogs put down.  Just 
an injection while I was holding them in my arms, and to go like that would 
be a joy.  But I have to say that I want that choice, but whether I did it not is 
an entirely different thing. (Emily) 
The cultural scripts that Emily has available to understand a good death are pet euthanasia and 
ideas of choice, as discussed in the previous chapter. Emily’s expectation of dying in pain was 
also derived from what her doctor had told her and from hearing other patients in the cancer 
ward screaming in pain. 
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Dee was also concerned she would be in pain and wanted certainty from her health professionals 
that she would not be in pain. 
There’s probably an 80% chance I may never need it [AD] because the pain 
control is good and everything else.  But they can’t guarantee it. They can 
talk about it, but they cannot guarantee that you’ll have no pain.  And if they 
do, they’re lying to you. (Dee) 
Others expressed similar sentiments, discussed earlier in the thesis about risk and control. Daniel 
also cited statistics of the likelihood of dying in pain. AD offered certainty against suffering, 
specifically against intractable pain. Participants were seeking a good death in their desire for 
hastened death. 
  
The awareness and acceptance of death, which are central to conceptions of a good death 
(Zimmermann, 2012), could be interpreted as fully realised in an assisted death. Dennis 
articulated this acceptance and awareness: 
You know, you’ve got to accept the fact it’s coming, so in some respects why 
prolong the inevitable when you’re at that point?  You know, as I said, I 
wouldn’t want to sit in bed or lie in bed absolutely buggered and not be able 
to even have a conversation or talk or communicate.  When you get to that 
level of total incapacity it’s just, yeah, hard to imagine… Dying well… it’s 
just in a timeframe that you’re ready for it and in a manner that is reasonably 
acceptable. (Dennis) 
Dennis’ imagination of what dying will be like informed his consideration of the choice of AD 
(Berthod, Stavrianakis, Pillonel, & Dransart, 2019). In order to choose to die, open awareness 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1965) is necessary and death must be accepted. AD might be a manifestation 
of a reworked normative ideal of accepting death, derived from palliative care. Much like the 
participants in this study, Goldsteen et al. (2006) found terminally ill patients responded 
variously to normative expectations around dying, such as acceptance. Responses included 
resisting, supporting or deflecting normative expectations. 
  
By claiming its goodness in its name, the good death is a difficult construct to argue against, 
after all, no one wants to die badly. Therefore, is it important to query, what constitutes good? 
Good for who? A good death is often defined retrospectively usually from the institutional 
perspective and/or the family perspective but not the dying person themselves (Howarth, 2007). 
Patients and families have different perceptions than palliative care professionals over what 
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constitutes a good death (Meier et al., 2016; Payne et al., 1996); this may explain the divergence 
between health professionals (Young et al., 2019) and participants over whether a good death 
includes AD. The normative good death discourse produces particular types of deaths and 
subjectivities for dying people. There is “tremendous societal pressure on a dying person to be a 
‘good patient’ while trying to experience the ‘good death’” (Proulx & Jacelon, 2004, p. 116; see 
also Broom et al., 2018). However, patients require social, cultural and financial capital to ask 
for a good death (McNamara, 2001). 
  
This subsection has shown how participants revised the good death discourse to meet their own 
priorities in dying, namely to minimise suffering. They still employed the idea of a good death 
but their version included the possibility of needing AD in the toolkit to achieve it because a 
good death was not guaranteed. As a theoretical ideal, the good death can detract from our 
understanding of a good death as subjective. The choice of AD was part of a good death for 
participants but it was only required if dying was causing unbearable suffering or was too 
protracted. Assisted death could be interpreted as the next iteration of death awareness and 
acceptance; simultaneously foreshortening the dying process may be an embodiment of a denial 
of dying (not death). 
  
Discussion: Dominant and Counter Discourses 
Participants readily commented on the normative discourses around dying. There were 
commonly held beliefs that constituted what normal dying is in contemporary society: killing is 
bad but letting die is permissible; a long life is a successful life; death is natural; dying is a 
special time; a good death for all. In recent decades, these discourses were promulgated by 
powerful institutions, codified in law and ethics, espoused by palliative care philosophy and 
reiterated in popular media. Taken together, these five discourses construct the correct way to die 
that does not include dying earlier by AD. However, this did not mean they were incontestable. 
  
Participants sought to expand normative dying to include other ways of dying, notably AD. They 
did so by putting forward counter discourses: hastening death is not morally distinct from other 
end-of-life practices; a meaningful life is more important than a long life and life can be 
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successful regardless of length; death no longer occurs at a natural time and dying people will 
know the right time to die to choose to die; dying is not always a special time because protracted 
dying can exacerbate suffering unnecessarily for the dying person and their family; a good death 
can be almost guaranteed by AD. Taken together these discourses construct alternative ways of 
dying as acceptable and challenge longevity. These discourses support Richards and Krawczyk’s 
conclusion that AD is a manifestation of the desire to shorten dying (N. Richards & Krawczyk, 
2019). The counter discourses that participants put forward intersected with the normative 
discourses by leveraging off the dominant discourses’ truth status and by adapting them rather 
than replacing them completely. This was in an attempt to normalise and legitimise their desire 
for hastened death. Overall the effect is to contest normative modes of dying. 
  
I previously noted that some discourse analyses lack attention to the phenomenological 
experience of dying and the many forms of suffering discussed throughout the thesis. My 
analysis suggests the normative discourses conceal complex, embodied experiences, feelings and 
relations. Perhaps the counter discourses produced by dying people incorporate the lived 
experiences more than endorsed, normative discourses of death and dying. Participants’ truth 
claims were grounded in their literal embodiment of dying. 
  
The discourses that participants propounded, when juxtaposed with the dominant discourses, 
reveal the relations of power, the latent ideological dimensions of dying and the wider social 
structures of discourse (Lupton, 1992; Willig, 2013) that shape death in contemporary ANZ. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I discuss these three aspects of discourse in turn. I then draw on 
Foucault’s principles of exclusion, rarefaction and games of truth to explain why participants’ 
accounts of dying may not hold as much power as other versions of ‘truth’. 
  
According to Foucault, power produces discourse as well as excluding it (Foucault, 1980; 
Lupton, 1992). Thus, the participants were able to challenge the bounds of normative dying and 
the associated power. Participants troubled the normative discourses, adopting them where it 
suited as well as co-opting them to serve their own needs, similar to the processes described in 
Chapter Four. The dominant discourses, buttressed by formal institutions and legitimated by law, 
could be challenged. There are official accounts of how people die (e.g. Hospice New Zealand, 
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n.d.-b; Mannix, 2018) and there are accounts by those experiencing dying that do not necessarily 
match up (Barber & Havill, 2018). Lay people on social media were able to produce other 
interpretations of dying and suggest what a good death looks like for them (Jaye et al., 2019). 
Participants were contesting constructions of normal dying on the basis of their claim of 
authority to speak on this issue because of their experiential and embodied knowledge of 
approaching the end of life. 
  
The difference lies in the marginal influence of these lay voices in comparison to the power 
organisations wield, such as NZMA, Hospice NZ, The Care Alliance, and Lawyers for 
Vulnerable Persons. The power differential was evident in the media attention such groups 
received in the course of the debate over the End of Life Choice Bill and who can speak on such 
issues (Morning Report, 2019a; Nine to Noon, 2015; RNZ, 2016, 2019). For example, the 
Lawyers for Vulnerable Persons called on a Queens Council member to speak on their behalf 
against AD. 
  
As a collective, the End-of-Life Choice Society has some influence on the public discourse. A 
couple of participants were members. Their power is helped by past-President of the Society 
Hon. Maryan Street being a past MP. She regularly commented on the issue of legalisation. 
There are articulations between the discourses the right-to-die movement promotes (suffering, 
dignity, autonomy, choice etc) and those of the participants. I discuss this overlap shortly. But 
rarely do dying people hold much more than an abstract presence in the debate on AD.  There is 
the practical thing that dying people do not put out press releases as organisations do. Moreover, 
they can be too ill to be activists and the fact that they are dying limits their opportunity for 
activism. They are positioned as either suffering or vulnerable, depending on one’s stance on 
AD. There are some exceptions to this lack of representation in public discourse such as when 
people approaching the end of life or people with disabilities are occasionally solicited for their 
views (Morning Report, 2019b; The Panel, 2019) or put their own views forward (Ford, 2019). 
Although he is not a dying person, Matt Vickers, widower of Lecretia Seales’, regularly 
appeared in the media and continues to advocate for AD. 
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The latent ideological dimensions of AD are highlighted by examining which discourses are 
Othered and which are normative. Discourse analysis interrogates whose interests are served by 
privileging particular interpretations over others. Does participants’ version of death yield to the 
implicit social and neoliberal pressure to die expediently and not become a burden on the family 
or the state? Or does it serve their own interests of reducing suffering, maintaining dignity and 
keeping their identity intact? Neoliberalism will be explored further in the discussion. Insofar as 
discourses are constitutive and contested, both are plausible explanations. A further possibility is 
that participants were wanting to create a better future for other dying people. They were 
asserting that no one should go through what I am/will go through. This relates to the activism 
identified throughout the thesis, particularly in Chapter Five exploring control. 
  
The divide over legalisation also exemplifies the ideological and power dimensions of AD. On 
one side, there appears to be the majority of doctors, hospice and religious institutions opposing 
legalisation and on the other the public are generally supportive (Young et al., 2019). 
Majoritarianism underpins the debate about AD (Jaye et al., 2019). MP David Seymour, the 
sponsor of the End of Life Choice Bill, referred to the overwhelming support for a law change in 
opinion polls as a persuasive argument in support of a law change as did various media 
culminating in the third reading (New Zealand Parliament, 2019). Paraphrasing Gutmann and 
Thompson (1996), Walker et al. (2020, p. 7) suggest that “to insist on unanimous agreement 
before changing policy could be to prejudice policy in favour of the status quo”. Policy would 
rarely change on this condition. Majoritarianism overlooks why people might support or oppose 
legalisation. Although I am speculating, older generations may be thinking about how they 
would like to die, having witnessed their parents’ deaths, and younger generations may 
emphasise autonomy and responsibilism, having been raised under neoliberal policies. 
Quantitative data do not show a clear relationship between age and attitude towards AD and 
there has been no qualitative research that looks at generational perspectives on the issue (Young 
et al., 2019). 
  
Most health professionals’ opposition to AD is based on a preservation, not shortening, of life 
and deep-rooted principles such as non-maleficence (defined by the doctor) (Gillett, 2017; New 
Zealand Medical Association, 2014). Non-maleficence is a core principle enshrined in the 
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Hippocratic Oath (Hajar, 2017).51 Its power continues even as doctors no longer take the 
Hippocratic Oath. The Oath can be seen as another ideology much like the right to die. There is 
an ideological obfuscation of the Oath as right and true. The former has a long-standing history 
and the right to die is a relatively recent phenomenon, predominantly driven by the public. 
Doctors maintaining autonomy over what doctors should and should not do is one of the key 
aspects at stake in the AD debate (although under the End of Life Choice Act they would still be 
able to conscientiously object). Others argue it is because of patient-centredness that AD should 
be provided by doctors (Buchman, 2019).  
  
The wider structures (i.e. the societal forces such as norms, tradition, law and rules) of the 
discursive, social, political and cultural contexts that shape dying were being contested by 
participants. The discourses people use to oppose or promote AD are revealing about the social 
and political processes by which individuals challenge norms. The contestation is taking place on 
traditional media such as those cited above, social media platforms (Jaye et al., 2019), in political 
realms through Members’ bills, political pressure (Care Alliance, 2019b) and sustained public 
efforts in the form of a petition (Health Committee, 2017). The public discourse on social media 
represents the views of lay people who may not have participated in formal political submission 
processes on the End of Life Choice Bill (Jaye et al., 2019) and future referendum. 
“Contributors’ posts reveal deeply held sociocultural values, as well as tensions and ambivalence 
about the relationship between citizens and the apparatus of government” (Jaye et al., 2019, p. 8). 
I will elaborate on the social structures and agency further in the discussion chapter that follows. 
  
While dying may be difficult for all involved, death, once it occurs, becomes a problem for the 
living (Elias, 2001). The norms and traditions around death and dying are resurrective, that is 
they reaffirm social bonds in the face of death (Seale, 1998; T. Walter, 1991). Specifically for 
AD, the choice can be perceived as a reflection on the carers’ ability to provide sufficient care or 
reasons to live, indicating a taboo to choose to hasten death. Resurrective rituals safeguard 
bereaved people’s being in the world, or ontological security, and helps to make sense of death in 
 
51 According to one account, “Sometimes a doctor was called in to assist in voluntary death, a role that was not 
forbidden by the Hippocratic Oath. An appeal to this oath by opponents of euthanasia in the modern sense of the 
word therefore is mistaken” (Van Hooff, 2004, p. 975). The belief that the Hippocratic Oath forbids hastening death 
is so widely held that it is accepted as true. 
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light of the ‘natural order of things’ (Seale, 1998; J. Seymour, 1999). This emphasis leaves little 
room for discussion of decline, dying and hastening death on account of it being impolite (as 
opposed to denial (Kellehear, 1984)) and not reaffirming of social bonds. Moreover, hastening 
death is not natural. Might resurrective discourses (Seale, 1998; T. Walter, 1994) help the living 
at the expense of disenfranchising the dying? Who has the death anxiety—the living or the 
dying? The loneliness of dying (Elias, 2001) is exacerbated by the emphasis on youth, the 
healthy, positivity and longevity that contemporary culture values and are promoted through the 
aforementioned dominant discourses (Broom et al., 2018; Segal, 2013). 
  
Having discussed the power relations, latent ideological aspects of assisted dying and wider 
structures that shape death, I now discuss how the five dominant discourses exemplify Foucault’s 
concepts of exclusion, rarefaction and games of truth (Foucault, 1971; Mills, 2004). The 
following subsections delve into each of these mechanisms for the circulation of discourses to 
look at the power/knowledge nexus. 
  
Exclusion 
Discourses prohibit or curtail counter discourses through procedures of exclusion (Foucault, 
1971; Mills, 2004). The first exclusion is through prohibition or taboo about what is able to be 
discussed; death is publicly acknowledged to be a taboo (Becker, 1973) (although strongly 
refuted in the academic literature (Kellehear, 1984; T. Walter, 1991; Zimmermann, 2007)). 
Choosing to die is even more taboo or threatening as it overlaps with suicide and is said to 
destabilise society (slippery slope, coercion of the vulnerable, duty to die). The second procedure 
delineates between the rational and irrational, or sanity and insanity. The emphasis on patients 
changing their mind about AD demonstrates the rational/irrational procedure (Hospice New 
Zealand, 2017; Johansen et al., 2005). The doctor is considered rational and objective to judge 
the wishes of the patient, while some types of patients may be deemed untrustworthy, emotional 
or unstable (Carel & Kidd, 2014). The third procedure is what Foucault called ‘the will to truth’ 
(Foucault, 1972). It relates to “what can count” as true or false knowledge and has a discursive 
effect (Mills, 2004, p. 59). There has been laxity in between the truth and falsehood (Mills, 
2004). ‘Fake news’ may be the latest iteration of this slippage. For example, a story that a Dutch 
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teenager was euthanised for mental health reasons went viral; shortly thereafter it was shown that 
the story picked up by international media was inaccurate (Henley, 2019). These three 
procedures attenuate the power of counter discourses. 
  
Rarefaction 
Foucault’s principle of rarefaction is also pertinent. Along with exclusion and limitation 
procedures, rarefaction is one of the discursive mechanisms which keep certain discourses in 
circulation and excludes others. Rarefaction can be summed up as discourse obscuring and/or 
precluding alternative ways of thinking and restricting meaning. One of the ‘circulatory 
mechanisms’ of rarefaction is through commentary. Discourses and texts are continued through 
commentary (Mills, 2004). Whose commentary on a discourse is considered valid and worthy? 
There is a connection to the second mechanism, the academic discipline of which medicine is a 
prime example. Disciplines permit what can be said to be true according to its assumptions and 
methodologies and constrain other knowledges. The relatively recent but burgeoning academic 
discipline of palliative care privileges certain accounts of the end of life while AD has no such 
formal field. Although as the present research demonstrates, participants can co-opt some of 
medicine’s discourses. The third mechanism is that of ‘rarefaction of the speaking subject’. As 
Mills (2004, p. 63) stated: 
although the utterances which could be produced by any one person are 
theoretically infinite, in fact they are remarkably repetitive and remain within 
certain socially agreed-upon boundaries… but, first, people tend to remain, 
in the choice of their topics of conversation and in the words they choose, 
fairly restricted by societal and personal norms and, second, people tend to be 
fairly restricted in terms of the construction of their own desires and needs. 
So what we find ourselves wanting to say falls within fairly predictable and 
restricted sets of parameters. 
I found the reasons that participants gave about why they would consider AD on the surface 
aligned closely with the discourses promulgated by end-of-life choice groups around the world 
as did Revell-Dennett (2018). 
  
Not all discourses are open to all speakers, one must have the right qualifications to be able to 
speak on a subject (Foucault, 1972). Comparing the authority of lay people and doctors or 
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religious leaders on end-of-life issues corroborates the rarefaction among speaking subjects. 
Religious leaders and organisations lay claim to a moral right to lead the debate (e.g. Nathaniel 
Centre - the New Zealand Catholic Bioethics Centre, n.d.; Penk, 2019; Presbyterian Church of 
Aotearoa New Zealand, 2018; Williams, 2019). A lay person’s only claim to knowledge is 
experiential and often limited (even with the growing ‘consumer’ voice and co-design 
approaches) to one or two deaths whereas doctors draw on their vast experiences of the end of 
life and formal qualifications to speak authoritatively. Rarefaction is deeply moral as it casts 
others as wrong and/or irrelevant, or excludes them from the discourse through various 
mechanisms. 
  
Games of Truth 
Exclusion and rarefaction give rise to another Foucauldian concept; that of ‘games of truth’ or a 
politics of truth (Foucault, 1980). “Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of 
truth—that is, the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault, 1980, p. 
131). When challenging normative discourses, participants are questioning the truth claims the 
discourses are based on. Truth is linked to power and knowledge (Foucault, 1980) which 
explains why individual participants lack the power to define the truth about dying. Combining 
participants’ perspective in this research may lend some more authority to their claims. However, 
there is a “contemporary heterogeneity of truth” (Weir, 2008, p. 375). As Weir described, 
“discourses with irreducible truth formulae co-exist in our present. In our contemporary truth 
regime, discourses of truth may enter into stable relations, or may engage in contests for 
domination” (Weir, 2008, pp. 368-369). The points of contradiction highlighted throughout the 
chapter could be attributed to the multiple coexisting truths around dying. They may explain how 
participants lived with conflicting views. The most apparent contradiction is the desire to live 
and WTHD. Another contradiction is the way the same discourses get used for incongruous 
aims. For example, both sides of the debate draw on compassion, beneficence, dignity and harm 
for different aims. In this way it is possible to see that truth is practised (Weir, 2008). Truth 
claims are related to ontology and therefore ontology concerns what it is right, true and correct. I 
return to these ideas in the following chapter in the Epistemic Injustice and Contest section. 
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Foucault was fascinated by the systematic ways in which discourses go through sudden shifts so 
making one set of things thinkable, sayable, and others not. The first reading of the End of Life 
Choice Bill, soon after my interviewing began, represented a possibility that individuals might be 
given the power over their death that had previously not been available. Participants’ challenges 
to the status quo of dying might be symptomatic of a shift in the regulatory power over death by 
medicine, law and government. 
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the normative and counter discourses around dying that circulate and 
were drawn on as reasons why one would consider hastening death. The overarching argument in 
this chapter is that participants both took up, resisted and negotiated the normative discourses 
around AD. In doing so, they positioned AD as appropriate and sought to normalise it. 
Participants sought to redefine and contest what it means to die within normal bounds. I have 
shown how these discourses come together to refute the meaning and benefit of living out the 
dying period. I suggest that AD is challenging because it confronts normative discourses about 
what is a good life and a good death, and how should we die. 
  
By examining the dominant and counter discourses available to participants to explain their 
desire for hastened death, it sheds light on which institutions, individuals and practice shape 
dying in contemporary ANZ. The End of Life Choice Bill has produced an emerging discourse 
contesting the current dominant discourse drawing on medical, religious and other ideologies and 
values. Participants were able to assert their own interpretations of discourses and sought to 
reconstruct their own normative version of a good death. However, they lacked sufficient 
power/knowledge to influence public debate and the wider structures that shape death. The 
discursive limitations and exclusions (Foucault, 1972; Mills, 2004) of participants’ perspectives 
on dying from public discourses affects what is accepted as legitimate or correct practices, 
knowledges and subjectivities. In conclusion, I suggest the normative discourses around AD 
conceal particular knowledges, ways of knowing and speaking, experiences, affect and relations. 
They make some ways of being and dying possible and others unacceptable. 
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Chapter Seven: Intersections of Agency and Power, 
Authority and Uncertainty 
  
Introduction 
Having analysed the experiences of 14 people approaching the end of life who would consider 
AD (and six of their family members), what the participants told me seemed be reasonably 
consistent with the WTHD literature (Hendry et al., 2013; Malpas et al., 2012; Monforte-Royo et 
al., 2012; Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2017; Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2016). Specifically: that unbearable 
(and embodied) suffering, in all senses and temporalities (past, present and anticipated), was a 
major reason for wanting the option of AD; the desire to have some control of the quality of their 
death and believing in a right to autonomy over their death; and a view that AD should be legally 
and morally permissible in certain circumstances such as their own. However, upon deeper 
analysis of the socio-cultural contexts and power relations inherent in their accounts, I identified 
subtle nuances around a strategic medicalisation of suffering and dying, a paradox of control and 
challenging normative discourses about how one should live and die. 
  
Each chapter employed a different theoretical approach for the analytic task—assemblage; 
biopower and freedom; discourse—to explore facets of how and why participants explained their 
WTHD the way they did. These approaches are all compatible under the umbrella of social 
constructionism paradigm (Gergen & Gergen, 2003; Schwandt, 1998). The three findings 
chapters analysed how participants engaged with the assemblage of medicalised dying, troubled 
ideas about state, religious and individual control, and contested normative ideas about the 
meaning of life and death. While the previous three chapters each contained a discussion, there 
are five overarching themes that unite them: attention to power relations and its societal 
institutions; agency and the construction of selfhood; contradictions and tensions; epistemic 
injustice; risk and uncertainty. Attention to power and agency are appropriate because this 
research sought to understand what shapes end-of-life practices in ANZ and how do the 
participants use their agency to actively shape their own deaths? The interactions of power and 
agency produce the third overarching theme of contradictions and tensions that appear to be 
 215 
inherent to AD and heightened in the experiences of people with life-limiting illness. The last 
two overarching themes that help to bring this research together are epistemic injustice 
(inequities that relate to knowledge, communication and authority (Carel & Kidd, 2014; Fricker, 
2007)) and un/certainty and risk. I conclude that the unacceptability of AD to medicine is a form 
of epistemic injustice for patients who WTHD adding to their uncertainty over dying. 
  
In this chapter, I synthesise the previous three analysis chapters and consider what these findings 
mean. This discussion takes a macro perspective to show how the praxis of AD and the dying 
body are sites where forces of power and agency intersect. As noted previously, structure and 
agency are dialogic (Giddens, 1984), mutually constitutive (Foucault, 1980) and connected (De 
Landa, 2019). Therefore, it follows that structure and agency should be discussed concurrently. 
However, for the benefit of the reader it is simpler to identify the contributions of agency and 
power to the phenomenon of wanting AD under separate headings even though I discuss power 
and agency alongside each other at times.  The intersection of agentic and structural forces 
exposes the third theme, the conceptual inconsistencies within social structures that shape the 
end-of-life. Next, I draw on the concept of epistemic injustice (Carel & Kidd, 2014; Fricker, 
2007). The fifth theme discussed is risk and uncertainty. Then, I discuss the strengths and 
limitations of the study. Lastly, I bring together the threads of this discussion with a map of an 
assemblage of AD in ANZ at this moment in time. 
  
Power and Institutional Power 
The theme of power underpins the three analysis chapters and the thesis in general. I used 
Foucault’s definition of power throughout this research. In this section I discuss the fluid power 
relations between the institution of medicine and individuals seeking AD and how these relations 
are maintained and contested. The WTHD exists within a complex web of power relations that 
give rise to normative ways of being; and within an assemblage of dying shaped largely by 
medico-legal institutions that intersect with the traditional authority of death and religion, 
particularly Judeo-Christian traditions in the context of the present research. As discussed 
throughout this thesis, AD is conceptualised within a medicalised model because medicine 
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identifies the existence of life-limiting illness and prognosis and is tasked with relieving 
suffering. 
  
AD illustrates that there are multiple competing knowledges about how one should die and who 
has the power to decide. AD and those who advocate for it confront the normative discourse of 
‘medicine as saviour’ (Good, 1994) because medicine (in the broadest sense of the word) offers 
the knowledge to achieve longevity whereas AD rejects the discourse of longevity at any cost. 
Medicine is positioned by society, and medicine positions itself, as having control over dying 
and death,52 and as moral arbiter of what is right (the sanctity of life) and deviant (wanting to 
die). There are asymmetrical power relations between patients and doctors. Concurrently, 
participants were able to subvert the power of medicine and its actors by using medicine’s own 
values of compassion and relieving suffering against medicine to achieve their own aims of 
normalising AD and seeking a good death. This framing reinforces the discourse of ‘medicine as 
saviour’ as the solution is medical intervention (AD). AD increases the power of the doctor to 
make life and death decisions (Karlsson et al., 2012a). However, the re-medicalisation of dying 
that is instigated by patients seeking AD disrupts the established power relations between doctors 
and patients and the usual flow of medicalisation from medicine to people. The capacity for 
critical thought about medicalised dying in the first place speaks to the room for ‘resistance’ and 
co-option within webs of power. 
  
Power is productive and also produces the possibility of resistance simultaneously (Foucault, 
1980), as discussed in the analyses of medicalisation, control and discourse. In this chapter my 
focus is on questions of how power is wielded and to what effect? Discourse and institutions are 
two key mechanisms. Foucault’s principles of exclusion, rarefaction and games of truth go some 
way to explain how some versions of ‘truth’ are privileged over others, indicating the 
power/knowledge nexus. Institutions, such as medicine and religion, are responsible for 
producing discourses. The individuals who lead these institutions and have conferred authority 
are responsible for implementing the mandate of their institution and enacting the 
 
52 Notwithstanding attempts to relinquish control as is case for the health professionals who aim to de-medicalise/de-
professionalise death or at least educate the public about normal dying by upskilling compassionate communities 
(Abel, 2018; Mannix, 2018). 
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philosophies/ideologies based on particular versions of truth and correctness. Institutions such as 
medicine including hospice, have their own priorities such as expedient care for the maximum 
amount of patients (Lawton, 2000; McNamara, 2001) or religious values (Wynia, 2019); 
ideologies that can impact negatively on individuals’ wishes. For example, the enactment of end-
of-life care is constrained by financial, ideological and utilitarian considerations, although these 
covert discourses are rarely acknowledged. As a result, institutions are implicated in epistemic 
injustice (Carel & Kidd, 2014; Fricker, 2007). After discussing the role of agency and 
contradictions inherent to AD, I will discuss epistemic injustice.  
  
Agency in the Making of the Self 
The theme of agency also cuts across the analysis chapters. In this section I discuss the ethical 
making of the self and technologies of the self as means to live according to one’s values. I also 
discuss the agency available to participants through the co-opting discourses, reflexivity and 
capital. Agency was defined in Chapter Two as people’s capability of doing things53 and 
distinguished from freedom in Chapter Five. Advocates of AD emphasise agency through 
autonomy, choice, and control, as do patients, carers and the public (Hendry et al., 2013). These 
values both reflect and reveal their social, political and cultural contexts. This emphasis on 
agency and autonomy in AD can overlook the ‘communal body’, that is, a society of individuals 
with shared experiences and bonds (Revell-Dennett, 2018). In this thesis I have shown how the 
values of agency and autonomy drawn on by participants are not always individualistic but are 
also embedded with relationships, including the consideration of others and society at large when 
making choices, and the systems of power that shape control (Ould Brahim, 2019). The role of 
other people in AD decision-making will be discussed in the assemblage of AD section below. 
  
The ethical construction of the self is in part dependent on the social and cultural resources 
available to individuals (Foucault, 1988, 1997). By making choices about how to live one’s life 
in accordance with their concept of a moral life, participants constituted their freedom (Foucault, 
1997). Participants were using the tools and resources available to them as a form of resistance 
 
53 New materialism de-centres human agency and reconceptualises it as more than human action, emphasising the 
affect of inanimate objects as well as animate ones (N. Fox & Alldred, 2015). 
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against the conservatism and constraints of medicine, religion, government and society. These 
included online and media activism, talking to their health professionals, equipping themselves 
with knowledge about AD, and formal means of control such as ACP. I was also one of the tools 
of resistance available to them; by participating in the research their views were amplified 
alongside others who wanted the choice of AD. To some extent, I legitimised their views. Some 
participants were active in End-of-Life Choice Society and other forms of advocacy (cf N. 
Richards, 2012), hinting at the biosociality (Rabinow, 2008) of dying. 
  
According to Foucault’s technologies of self and Rose’s ethopolitics, individuals conduct 
themselves to achieve “happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” insofar as this is 
possible in accordance with the societal structures that support or conversely, constrain them 
(Foucault, 1988, p. 18; Rose, 2001). I suggest technologies of the self in the present research 
include participants seeking AD to achieve their version of a good death. AD challenges 
biopolitics but appears to be a technology of the self that embodies it as well. The choice of AD 
in and of itself was deemed to enable more freedom. In desiring and advocating for the option of 
an assisted death, participants were seeking to die in a manner that was consistent with their 
values and the way they lived their lives. They were also extending their will beyond themselves 
into society. The basis of their reasoning for wanting AD lay in determining what makes life 
good and a life worthwhile. Quality of life at the end of life is a weighing up of the advantages of 
being alive and dead. There appeared to be a tipping point between quality of life, quality of 
dying and the state of being dead. Perhaps living had become too much of a burden on 
themselves? This point was unique to each person, and varied within each person’s moment-to-
moment lived experience.  
  
However, the exercising of freedom and agency are always limited to some degree by structures 
and inequities (Giddens, 1979, 1984). In order to exercise agency, a person must either suicide, 
use an advance directive (and EPA and ACP to lesser extents) or persuade others to assist them 
in hastening their death because AD is not legal. If AD was legal, the point is that this change in 
structure would impact agency so participants would be able to act out their WTHD if they chose 
to and were permitted to. 
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As we saw in the previous chapters, participants used the agency available to them to subvert, 
co-opt, challenge and make choices (even if choosing from hypothetical and limited options). I 
concluded that a greater understanding of agency within medicalisation is required to 
acknowledge the re-medicalisation that patients were engaging in when medicalising suffering 
and death. Strategic negotiators might be an appropriate term to capture this form of agency 
where patients re-medicalise dying to their own advantage. Although the capacities afforded by 
the assemblage of AD can be seen as recursive within systems of power, the strategic negotiation 
which is also produced by power has the potential to cultivate new ways of being and dying. The 
way participants engaged with the dominant and counter discourses available to them to explain 
their desire for the option of AD also illustrates their agency and negotiation. 
  
Participants’ agency also incorporated their capacity for reflexivity and drawing on their social 
and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) to pursue their version of a good death. They traded on 
their moral capital, by virtue of being tax-payers and therefore entitled to state-funded 
healthcare, and as people suffering and therefore entitled to relief through the choice of AD (Jaye 
et al., 2017). Participants established their deservingness in the moral economy of AD by 
drawing on moral arguments and asserting or claiming against their own moral capital 
(Dragojlovic & Broom, 2018; Jaye et al., 2017). We can see how participants’ subjectivities are 
political and social. The above is consistent with Gidden’s description of the reflexive project of 
the self (Giddens, 1991). The construction of selfhood, who I am and how I see the world, was in 
part driven by the questions I asked participants. The couple of hours I spent with each 
participant was just a small snippet of their larger life/self so they constructed their living-dying 
(T. Walter, 2017) world for me. 
  
To summarise, neither power nor agency can be conceived without the other. Moving beyond a 
binary approach to agency or structure/power has been productive. Participants constructed their 
dying self, albeit within prescribed means. Considering hastening one’s death was how 
participants sought to ethically make the self and in doing so, constitute their freedom. AD 
appears to offer agency to individuals over their life and death but this power is still regulated 
and wielded by the state and its institutions. Power is wielded by institutions and individuals, as 
well as in the interactions between the two, often mediated by an actor on behalf of the 
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institution. Even though discourses and ideologies have power, they are able to be resisted, 
contested and expanded as the participants demonstrated. The opportunities for participants to 
wield their power in the form of agency with the aim of structural and ideological reform 
(Lofland, 1978) of the system of death are short-lived. Despite their experiential authority of 
dying, their views remained relatively unheard or on the fringe of in the public debate on AD. 
My research goes some way in drawing attention to participants’ views and aims. 
  
Contradictions, Paradoxes and Tensions 
In the above section, I showed how participants exercised their agency to construct an account of 
how they arrived at wanting the option of AD. In explaining their desire for a good death, 
participants were also making sense, with the available discourses, subjectivities and cultural 
meanings around dying and the good death. It was apparent that participants had thought deeply 
about dying and the kind of death they wanted. Nevertheless, ambiguities and ambivalence 
permeated the participants’ accounts of why they wished to hasten death. This section explores 
the aporia between the state and individuals, and within individuals, the subversion of 
responsibility and the nuances contained within the WTHD. 
  
With the collision of technologies of power and technologies of self, fault lines and 
inconsistencies within structures and systems are exposed. The relationship between the state and 
individual control has changed as competing and contested discourses around the right to die 
take on more normative power. This new (hypothetical) choice of AD might exacerbate these 
contradictions by creating additional options for seeking a good life and a good death. AD 
increases some choices and ostensibly offers freedom (how, when to die and manner of that 
death); simultaneously, freedom becomes more highly regulated by the state, as described in the 
paradox of control chapter.  AD illustrates the way in which concepts of freedom can be used by 
the state to manipulate individuals as much as concepts of individualism are manipulated by 
individuals against the state. These micro (individual) and macro (state) factors are also mediated 
at the meso level by institutions, community and family. These elements are illustrated in the 
assemblage of assisted dying in ANZ below.  
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Participants may have internalised the responsibilism implicit within neoliberalism, as well as 
the self-determination that goes with autonomy. Participants insisted that as responsible citizens 
they should have the right to choose what is best for them. Participants identified this 
contradiction within the neoliberal rationalities of governance, also known as governmentality 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). Both the state and the individual want to emphasise the aspects of 
these discourses that work to their advantage but reserve the right to exclude the bits that do not. 
A few participants pointed out that AD would have the added benefit of being good for the 
state’s finances and that safeguards would protect the vulnerable, highlighting the overlap of 
state and individuals’ interests. The person who seeks choice and to take responsibility for their 
own life is the ideal citizen, according to ideologies of neoliberalism and individualism. 
Participants could be interpreted as embodying these ideals in their desire for AD. Indeed, AD is 
portrayed as a manifestation of individualism and loss of collectivism (N. Richards & Krawczyk, 
2019) and emblematic of neoliberalism (Ryan et al., 2011). Neoliberal ideology treats the 
individual as an individual decision-maker, in isolation from others, the context and wider 
structures that shape ‘free’ choice in a competitive market (Harvey, 2005; Steger & Roy, 2010). 
In some ways, the End of Life Choice Act buys into this rhetoric with its emphasis on personal 
choice and individual autonomy, reflecting the political ideology of the Bill’s sponsor.  
 
However, to read individuals’ choices to wish for an assisted death simply as a response to 
individualism or neoliberalism would be naïve. Although the WTHD manifests in this context, 
that is not to say that participants were merely cultural dupes. Participants conceived AD within 
individual and neoliberal ideologies as I described in Chapter Five. I also showed that 
participants were thinking of others—both their family, individuals within society, the health 
system and society as an imagined whole—in their consideration of AD and acceptance of a 
regulated AD regime. Neoliberal rationalities, which privilege the individual (Harvey, 2005; 
Steger & Roy, 2010), do not address the relational ontology or intersubjective experiences of our 
being-in-the-world that participants were evident in their accounts of the WTHD. 
  
Another contradiction is that the WTHD is not necessarily the same as a wish to die. The WTHD 
has many motivations including various meanings, intentions and functions (Ohnsorge et al., 
2014a, 2014b). Based on the data, I concur the WTHD fluctuates (the shifting tipping point), can 
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be a mechanism for control, an exit strategy and/or a manifestation of letting go (Coyle & 
Sculco, 2004; Monforte-Royo et al., 2012; Nissim et al., 2009; Rodriguez-Prat et al., 2019), all 
of which are technologies of self. My findings confirm the extant literature that the WTHD is an 
option of last resort, or “an ace up one’s sleeve” (Monforte-Royo et al., 2012, p. 12). The WTHD 
model (Monforte-Royo et al., 2012, p. 10) does acknowledge that a WTHD can be “a desire to 
live, but not in this way”, that is, in a state of difficult dying and limited existence. 
  
Where my findings differ is that they suggest that rather than an actual WTHD, it is more 
accurately a wish to have the option for hastened death for several reasons. Firstly, participants 
did not want to die. If given the chance they would continue to live if they had a meaningful 
quality of life, however their life-limiting illnesses altered the anticipated trajectory of their life 
and self. Secondly, a large part of their motivation to consider an assisted death was to forego a 
lengthy period of dying. They wanted the option to shorten dying rather than necessarily wishing 
to hasten death. Thirdly, all participants were willing to acknowledge that they might not choose 
AD but that the availability of the choice itself was important to them. The hypothetical nature of 
the choice of AD in ANZ at the time of research is likely to have influenced this. 
  
Although my study was mostly cross-sectional, the fluctuation of the WTHD was acknowledged 
by some participants. This ambivalence would be problematic for those who want their wish to 
be taken at face value by their health professionals. Further, some WTHD studies suggest one of 
the key findings is that patients expressing a WTHD was not necessarily a literal request 
(Pestinger et al., 2015; Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2017). For those whose wish is persistent or a literal 
request, this ambivalence is problematic because it prompts some health professionals (who may 
also have their own ambivalences) to not trust a person’s expression of a wish for AD. While this 
cautious approach might be appropriate for some, the overall effect could be construed as an 
epistemic injustice. The next section explores this idea in more depth. 
  
Before turning to epistemic injustice, it is important to interpret why the participants talked about 
death and dying in ways that appeared to be contradictory or inconsistent. For example, they 
gave reasons for considering hastening death while not wanting to actually die. I was curious to 
understand how participants accommodated these inconsistencies. There is a cultural imperative 
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to achieve autobiographical, normative coherence which is complicated by terminal uncertainty 
and anticipation (Kenny et al., 2017). In theorising the data and thinking ontologically, I realised 
participants did not need to reconcile the contradictions because making sense of everyday life or 
offering reasoned accounts of a phenomenon does not need to be fixed, coherent or singular. 
Identity/subjectivity is not fixed, coherent or singular according to many theories of the self, 
including assemblage theory (N. Fox & Ward, 2008) and Foucault (Elliott, 2001).  According to 
a “Deleuzian ontology of identity”, identity arises from the ‘confluences’ between the sense-
making capacity of the body and its relations with the material, psychological, and social world 
(N. Fox & Ward, 2008, p. 1016). De Landa (2019) explains assemblages as heterogeneous 
elements that can cohere without forming a coherent whole, particularly if the elements are not 
stable over time. Consistency is an emergent property from an assemblage of heterogeneous 
elements (Deleuze, 2007). Neither assemblages nor identity are fixed (N. Fox & Ward, 2008). 
Therefore, it follows that inconsistencies and contradictions can be tolerated by individuals. 
Another way to look at this is the seeming disparity between words and actions. It also reflects 
our responses to the structures we encounter and the knocking against the technologies of self 
and technologies of power in our lives. 
  
Further, reason is entangled with social power (Fricker, 2007). Reason and knowledge must be 
socially situated in order to account for their embeddedness within relations of power (Fricker, 
2007). To expect participants to give a coherent account of their desires idealises the rational and 
ignores emotional and relational aspects of reasoning. The contradictions and paradoxes I 
identified were examples of one truth being privileged in one moment and another truth being 
privileged in a different moment, pointing to the multiplicity of truth. In this way, participants 
were making sense (agency) with the resources and tools (structure) they have at their disposal. 
  
To recap, this section illustrated the inconsistencies between state and individual control over 
who is responsible for life and death, which are exposed when the forces of power and agency 
meet. The contradictions within individuals’ accounts and the subtleties around the WTHD were 
explored and contextualised within ANZ. Assemblage theory and its ontology of the self provide 
an account of reality and subjectivity that is neither coherent nor fixed, allowing for the 
possibility of living with contradictory experiences and views. 
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Epistemic Injustice and Contest 
In this section I use the lens of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) as an alternative interpretation 
of the power relations discussed above, notwithstanding the agency and resistance participants 
demonstrated. I suggest participants were posing an epistemic contest to the foundation of 
medical knowledge, authority and practice.  
 
At a general level, epistemic injustice is perpetrated against people with less perceived 
knowledge and credibility by those who wield more. Fricker’s (2007, p. 1) concept of epistemic 
injustice is comprised of two types: 
Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated 
level of credibility to a speaker’s word; hermeneutical injustice occurs at a 
prior stage, when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at 
an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social 
experiences. 
Injustices can range from subtle to overt.  Applying these two injustices to healthcare, Carel and 
Kidd (2014) maintain that patients are vulnerable to both types of epistemic injustices whereas 
health professionals are epistemically privileged due to their expertise, training and institutional 
support. Epistemic injustice as an analytic concept helps to explain participants’ frustration with 
institutional and medical power. The strong critique of the institution of medicine, government 
and religion from the participants and throughout this thesis endorses this approach. 
  
The injustice occurs when the privilege is unwarranted (Carel & Kidd, 2014). The testimonies of 
health professionals are more credible than that of a patient’s when it comes to AD, as Chapter 
Six illustrated by pointing to their more established access to media coverage. As Wardrope 
(2015, p. 343) stated, “when a medical perspective is voiced on a given issue, it is taken to be the 
authoritative one”. Health professionals as well as Members of Parliament, religious leaders and 
other commentators who have protested against AD in the ANZ debate are speaking from a 
position of epistemic privilege (Carel & Kidd, 2014; Wardrope, 2015). While it is reasonable for 
doctors to state they will not be involved in AD or what the impact might be on their profession, 
their privilege is being extended beyond the remit of medicine (Carel & Kidd, 2014; Wardrope, 
 225 
2015) to claim to know what is right and wrong for society (especially given that some ANZ 
health professionals are willing to be involved and that in other countries health professionals 
already practice AD). Their privilege also illustrates a moral conflation of knowing about life 
and death, where doctors have positioned themselves and been positioned as the experts of such 
matters over the last 200 years.  This critique aligns with the aim of this research, to bring 
participants’ views into the debate. 
  
Participants wanted (the option) to hasten their death; but this is a concept that sits outside of the 
dominant medical discourse and accepted practice as well as social norms, highlighting a 
hermeneutical injustice. The medical framing of AD as desecrating the sanctity of life (New 
Zealand Medical Association, 2018) renders the practice and those who want to engage in it as 
immoral and pathological. This framing is at the expense of alternative interpretations, or 
“construction of collective hermeneutical resources”, because the medical perspective is 
privileged as authoritative (Wardrope, 2015, p. 350). The psychopathologisation of the wish to 
die in elderly people (as opposed to those with life-limiting illness) runs the risk of epistemic 
transformation of human life, reducing and re-designating it to a disorder (van Wijngaarden et 
al., 2016). Moreover, it obscures the social and culture embeddedness of this wish that a 
phenomenological approach brings to the fore (van Wijngaarden et al., 2016). 
  
The desire to die can be difficult to express due to overtones of sin promulgated by religion and 
deviance by medicine. According to these interpretations, it is supposedly irrational to want to 
die, easily dismissed as ‘wrong’ or reduced to ‘depression’. This obscuring of one’s social 
experiences from collective interpretive resources has the effect of hermeneutical marginalisation 
(Fricker, 2007). The desire to hasten death is also challenging to communicate because it can be 
interpreted as an indictment of family, medicine and society as unable to provide sufficient care 
and reason to live. A WTHD becomes even more difficult to explain if one also wishes to live at 
the same time. These are hermeneutical disadvantages that people who WTHD face when 
making sense of and explaining their experiences to others (Fricker, 2007). 
  
Patients, particularly for those approaching the end of life I would argue, may be perceived by 
health professionals (who are healthy) as “emotionally compromised, or existentially unstable in 
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ways that render their testimonies and interpretations suspect” (Carel & Kidd, 2014, p. 530). This 
is part of how the WTHD came to be seen as remediable. Medicine, specifically hospice and 
palliative care, represent the WTHD as ameliorable (Australian & New Zealand Society of 
Palliative Medicine, 2017; Mak & Elwyn, 2005; New Zealand Medical Association, 2018; K. 
Smith, Harvath, Goy, & Ganzini, 2015). The WTHD has also been cast as a symptom of 
depression (therefore casting the patient as irrational) or demoralisation (Kissane et al., 2001; see 
also Parker, 2004). This denies patients testimonial credibility to state with certainty what their 
wishes are. As a remnant of the objectivity paradigm, some health professionals operate in a 
culture of dismissing patients’ WTHD as transient. The easy diagnosis is that the patient is 
depressed and therefore deviant. This forms part of the deflated credibility that health 
professionals attribute to patients. As a consequence, the dying person is epistemically devalued. 
A dying person’s capacity to speak from their own sensibilities is undermined when their 
perspective is not shared with the listener (Gunaratnam, 2015). 
  
Building on this epistemic devaluing of patients, I suggest the knowledge and credibility 
dis/advantage intersects with health privilege, as referred to by participants and myself when 
discussing my position on AD. The assumptions and invisible system confer privilege on some 
groups over others (P. McIntosh, 1988). Although insensitive, it is relatively easy for those not 
affected to diminish or discredit or just ignore the views of those affected on the grounds that 
they are affected. Perhaps epistemic injustice is the knowledge equivalent of health privilege. 
Epistemic injustices also intersect with a vulnerability discourse about dying people which 
negates their autonomy and agency because of the association of vulnerability with compromised 
ability to know oneself and wishes, that invites paternalism (Jaye et al., 2020). 
 
Credibility is tacitly assigned by health professionals to patients (Carel & Kidd, 2014); but what 
about circumstances where credibility is demanded by patients from their health professionals? 
Institutions and health professionals are epistemically privileged to shape discourse, thereby 
discrediting patients’ wishes to hasten their death. On the other hand, even in the face of 
epistemic injustices, the agency of patients to demand to be heard, taken at their word and 
advocate for AD should not go unrecognised. Participants were able to cogently argue why AD 
should be a medically available option. In Chapter Four I demonstrated how patients exercise 
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agency within medicalisation and systems of control and how they possess the ability to 
challenge medical and normative discourses. Participation in political processes and research, 
talking to their health professionals and online activism are examples that participants undertook 
to be listened to and to express themselves. Other examples of healthcare becoming more 
responsive to patients include moving from closed to open awareness of dying (Glaser & Strauss, 
1965) and, more recently, advance directives and ACPs.54  This resonates with the changes in 
healthcare, as described in the introduction. 
  
What appears to be at stake in testimonial and hermeneutical injustices are competing 
knowledges and values. Underpinning epistemic injustices are ontological claims and social 
processes. Participants’ claim to experiential knowledge of approaching the end of life                                                                                              
struggles to compete with doctors’ theoretical and practical knowledge of working with many 
dying people and witnessing death. As I described in Chapter Six on normative discourses, the 
values and authority of medicine (at the risk representing medicine as a unified entity (Rose, 
2007a)), as informed by the Hippocratic Oath (Van Hooff, 2004), are challenged by patients 
wanting assistance to die. The idea of competing knowledges connects with Foucault’s 
description of power/knowledge and the games of truth that were discussed in Chapter Six. 
There are truth claims asserted by medicine as an institution about what is true, right and correct 
at the end of life. 
 
In response to epistemic injustice, participants’ challenges to medical orthodoxy could be seen as 
an epistemic challenge to medicine. An epistemic contest is where actors advocate for competing 
understandings of reality, knowledge and reasoning (Whooley, 2013). Epistemology pertains to 
what knowledge is accepted as valid and how it is justified. Over the last 200 years, medicine has 
gained the moral authority “to define the real” or truth, and the standards of knowledge and 
objectivity (Whooley, 2013, p. 20).  
 
 
54 Although under ANZ law, the advance directive must be applicable to the circumstances that have arisen and any 
doubt is resolved in favour of the preservation of life (Professor Joanna Manning, presentation at the Citizens’ Jury 
on Euthanasia and Assisted Dying (Walker et al., 2020)). 
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A prime example is the dispute over the ethical interpretations of end-of-life practices (discussed 
in Chapter Six) involved a challenge to medicine’s foundational knowledge and logic system. 
Participants cogently argued that AD was morally equivalent to other end-of-life medical 
practices. In doing so, they were contesting the epistemic basis and discursive privileging of 
medical knowledge and interpretation of what is true. They also challenged well-established law, 
medical ethics and practice interpretations of practices that may hasten death. While the doctrine 
‘killing is bad but letting die is permissible’ is buttressed by the medico-legal institution, it is 
challenged by dying individuals and their families who assert that there is no moral difference 
between the relief of symptoms, withdrawal of life support and AD.  
 
However, what participants’ epistemic content amounts to is disputable. The link to the 
mechanisms for the circulation of discourses: truth games, exclusion and rarefaction in Chapter 
Six are clear. Participants can engage on a discursive level, challenging truth, ideology and 
interpretation. They had less capacity to engage on the epistemic (knowledge) level.  
Their epistemic claim is experiential and often limited to one or two deaths; doctors draw on 
their more extensive experiences of the end of life, scientific knowledge and formal 
qualifications to speak authoritatively. The former are discredited (injustice) in the knowledge 
hierarchy, the latter are privileged.  
 
Medicine deals with the inconsistencies that participants highlighted by drawing on doctrine, 
clinical evidence, denying or overlooking them (e.g. Materstvedt, 2020; Schofield et al., 2020). 
These responses open up an analytical space to examine the epistemic authority medicine 
possesses to define end-of-life practices. Medicine’s persuasive production of truth is supported 
by moral appeals to various forms of evidence (science, tradition, experience, common sense, 
religion) to overcome low epistemological thresholds of certainty (Neale & Boarder Giles, 
2018).  
 
This puts epistemic injustice and institutions’ claims to truth into the moral realm. Ontology is 
also moral. By constructing a particular version of truth as single and correct, what other truths 
and realities are excluded? For example, biomedicine is still largely positivist (i.e. a single reality 
that can be measured and validated), even though meta-physics challenges these traditional 
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notions of reality and truth, as discussed in the Methodology chapter. Yet as a praxis, 
biomedicine does not readily acknowledge that there might be more than one truth or that reality 
might be relativist. The same logic applies to medicine and its agents. According to a social 
constructionist epistemology, which informs this thesis, knowledge is mutually constructed and 
therefore is open to revision (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Some parts of the Oath are used to 
support truth claims while other parts have been discarded (akin to how the Bible is used by 
Judeo-Christian religions), echoing the inconsistencies identified above. The Hippocratic Oath 
forbids surgery and yet surgery is one of the essential tools of modern medicine (Hajar, 2017). Is 
it possible that “give no deadly medicine to any one if asked” (Hajar, 2017, p. 155) could be 
revised as other aspects of the Oath have been, if the patient themselves asks?  
 
I call for, as others have done, epistemic humility on the part of health professionals and others 
(Wardrope, 2015) to draw attention to prejudices on the listener’s part (Fricker, 2007). Wardrope 
(2015, p. 351) defines epistemic humility as: 
a critical self-awareness of one’s own epistemic limitations together with a 
disposition to seek out complementary and contrasting perspectives that may 
assist in overcoming these limitations; and a resolution to promote publicly 
both the awareness of those limitations, and the alternative authorities that aid 
in overcoming them. 
Without this humility or a virtue approach to justice, there is an “ever-present risk” of injustice 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 87).55 
 
In summary, there is epistemological and ontological incongruence between the traditional 
values of medicine, religion and government and the contemporary citizen. It is particularly 
striking given there is broad acceptance of AD by the general public (Young et al., 2019). 
Despite a clear majority of support by the public, there is an unwarranted privileging of 
traditional authoritative voices over public voices and a devaluing of patients’ credibility.56 
Epistemic humility is required. This incongruence can manifest as epistemic injustice and 
 
55 For some health professionals, medicine as a vocation is about service rather than power (R. L. Cruess & Cruess, 
1997). 
56 The process of law change is also conservative and constrains public demands. Issues such as AD can influence 
politicians if they perceive that public opinion is strong enough to swing a vote, in itself a manipulation of the 
structure and a technology of power. 
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frustration on the parts of people who see AD as a right over their own lives if that life is not 
worth living due to unbearable suffering. However, that is not to say participants cannot insist on 
being heard as knowers of their own needs.  To deny their agency and ability to challenge the 
foundations of medicine is paternalistic.  The differing accounts of end-of-life practices are 
contestations over knowledge and truth. 
 
Risk and Uncertainty 
The injustice and frustration of not having certainty over dying provoked uncertainty for 
participants. One of the discourses that shaped how participants thought about the end of life was 
that of risk (Beck, 1992; M. Douglas, 1990; Giddens, 1991; N. Richards & Rotter, 2013). This 
section explores the related concepts of risk, certainty, uncertainty and ontological security. 
Ontological security refers to a person’s existential sense of being and trust in the world (Hewitt, 
2010) which is called into question with a life-limiting diagnosis and prognosis.  
  
The uncertainty participants experienced related to what the dying trajectory would be like and 
how long it would take to die. The risk of long dying and dying badly were major reasons for 
participants to seek control with the option of AD. The available medical treatments and legal 
mechanisms of control were not felt to offer sufficient guarantee to participants against the risk 
of dying in a manner unacceptable to them. In Beck’s (1992) concept of a ‘risk society’, people 
are exhorted to avoid potential risks that cannot necessarily be insured against. He suggested that 
individuals are thus required to invest a great deal of energy in avoiding potential ‘risks’ and that 
a range of techniques to ‘manage’ risk have emerged.  Monitoring risk is a central tenet of the 
reflexivity that characterises modernity and intersects with the responsibilism inherent to 
neoliberalism (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991; Jaye et al., 2018; Llewellyn et al., 2017). As 
referenced in all analysis chapters, participants exemplified Kaufman’s reflexive longevity 
(2010) and Beck’s (1992) ‘reflexive modernisation’ in their calculations weighing up risk and 
time left and self-regulation of risk, respectively. 
  
As participants’ accounts exemplified, AD is one such technique to manage risk uncertainty. 
This concurs with the WTHD study by Nissim et al. (2009) that found a hypothetical exit plan 
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helped to tolerate the present or anticipated future. AD is a technique used by people seeking 
hastened death in Switzerland against the risk of protracted suffering (N. Richards & Rotter, 
2013). This search occurs within a generalised uncertainty that characterises the human condition 
(Giddens, 1991) as well as specific features of risk such as an uncertain future regarding well-
being and fear of pain (N. Richards & Rotter, 2013). These findings resonate with the 
uncertainties the participants in the present study alluded to. Where the present study differs was 
that, for participants, seeking an assisted death was only ever hypothetical, so taking action to 
remedy the uncertainty was not readily available to them. Although a couple of the present 
study’s participants mentioned that they knew they could go to Switzerland, they felt they should 
not have to leave their family or travel in that state of health and the cost was prohibitive. 
  
In the face of uncertainty and lack of control, AD offered some ontological security regarding 
dying. Ontological security, biographical continuity and reflexively planning the future are 
central to the project of the self (Giddens, 1991; Mellor & Shilling, 1993). The project of the self 
is also about controlling future risk (Giddens, 1991). Part of the uncertainty, and therefore 
perceived risk, that illness brings is related to the unfamiliarity of such experiences (Mishel, 
1988; Schroepfer et al., 2009). Certainty relies on knowledge, trust, predictability and routines of 
everyday life (Giddens, 1991; N. Richards & Rotter, 2013). Arguably, it is paradoxical that one 
gains certainty and existential reassurance by controlling the timing, manner and circumstances 
of one’s death and therefore life, including its meaning and purpose. Alternatively, the deliberate 
decision to end one's life may also be an affirmation of one's existence as a person.  
 
Participants’ uncertainty was heightened by their mistrust that medical assistance to relieve 
suffering would be available. A lack of trust in the certainty of science and knowledge (in this 
instance of biomedicine) are at play because scientific praxes are revised or do not deliver on 
what has been promised (Beck, 1992), specifically longevity (Jaye et al., 2018) and a good death 
(E. J. Emanuel & Emanuel, 1998). The uncertainty participants experienced may be informed by 
the reshaping of risk. A common understanding of risk is “risk now means danger, high-risk 
means a lot of danger” (M. Douglas, 1990, p. 3). The element of chance in conceptualisations of 
risk have been de-emphasised (M. Douglas, 1990).  
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This section has contextualised the desire for AD within a context of perceived risk and 
uncertainty that dying participants experienced. AD offers a technique of certainty against the 
threat that dying badly poses for their ontological security or one’s sense of self and one’s place 
in the world. 
  
Summary                                    
The key threads of this discussion are around the interplay of structure and agency and the 
contradictions that occur as a result of the forces of agency and power surrounding AD. 
Paradoxes and contradictions were a way to identify points of resistance by subjects within a 
discursive regime. Participants strategically engaged with these tensions and exploited the 
weaknesses to argue for their access to AD. It was productive to map the desire for AD against 
social theories of self, assemblage, truth and reason. These concepts helped to explain how 
inconsistencies cohere within individuals’ lives and how a singular ‘truth’ is privileged. 
  
Participants perceived a strong resistance to their desire for a legal means to hasten death from 
medicine, government and religion. In order to offer a higher order analysis, I drew on epistemic 
injustice to explain why patient/participants’ views possess less credibility in the public debate 
and patients’ WTHD are dismissed by many health professionals. I put forward that participants 
exercised some agency in countering their deflated credibility and mounted their own epistemic 
contest. 
 
A driver of their desire for AD was to have certainty in death. Risk of dying badly was 
prominent in participants’ accounts. The uncertainty they experienced around how and when 
they would die was countered by the choice of AD. Risk and uncertainty are dominant discourses 
that shape how AD has come to represent a technique of certainty. 
 
An Assemblage of Assisted Dying 
As another means of drawing together this research, I return to assemblage theory primarily 
employed in Chapter Four. Here I examine another assemblage that encompasses the assemblage 
 233 
of medicalised dying, that of an assemblage of AD. In mapping out this AD assemblage, I 
identify the major entanglements and points of intersections and affective flow between power, 
agency, discourse, institutions, ideologies and objects (see Figure 3). The complexity of this 
particular assemblage of end-of-life choice is salient because participants experienced their dying 
and considered hastening their death in this nexus. In this section I also compare the assemblage 





Figure 3. Map of an Aotearoa New Zealand Assisted Dying Assemblage. 
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As identified above, this ANZ assemblage of AD is an arrangement of interconnected people, 
ideas, social groupings, things and institutions. The actions, bodies and things (content) and the 
affects, words and ideas (expression) are independent of each other but imply and intersect with 
each other (Buchanan, 2015). There are also elements that are “not unknown and undecided”, 
making an assemblage a multiplicity (Buchanan, 2015, p. 385). Choices about whether, when 
and where to hasten death are considered in this web of entanglements involving partners, 
offspring (including potential kin), friends, community and society. The emergent and evolving 
properties of assemblages are especially useful as they capture the shifting landscape of end-of-
life choice in ANZ at the time of writing. The End of Life Choice Act can be thought of as an 
object that has agency and force. Law reform such as the End of Life Choice Act de-
territorialises the relations between the components identified above. The End of Life Choice 
Bill proffered hope for participants that they might be able to access an assisted death, although 
they knew it was unlikely to be in place in time for them to use it. The social and political effects 
of inanimate objects can be seen in doctors’ professional bodies that were actively resisting the 
proposed policy changes through political submissions, media commentaries and tv interviews. 
  
Beyond the elements of the assemblage, what does an assemblage do is a fundamental question 
(De Landa, 2019).57 There is fertile ground in the articulation of the micro and the macro levels 
(De Landa, 2019). The assemblage of AD combines macro-level social processes of changing 
norms about biological existence and meanings of dying, and ideologies such as rights, 
individualism and neoliberalism. These forces play out at the micro level in participants’ (and 
my own) lived and shared experiences. Assemblage theory helps by bringing together other 
theories by providing a framework to model the “irreducible social complexity characterizing the 
contemporary world” (De Landa, 2019, p. 5). This assemblage, as it is presently arranged, 
simultaneously produces a re-medicalisation of dying, a power struggle for control, uncertainty 
and epistemic injustice. Assemblage theory complemented the power, truth games, rarefaction 
and exclusion played out through discourse by examining how these processes flow together and 
against each other.  
  
 
57 In contrast, Buchanan (2015) suggests that focusing on the how, overlooks the what and its constitution. 
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In contrast to the WTHD model (see Figure 1 in the Introduction), this assemblage is dynamic. 
The wish to die (Ohnsorge et al., 2014b) (defined in Chapter Two) is relational, dynamic and 
agential weighing up of life and death. Although it is an inaccurate term for the participants in 
this study, the relationality, dynamism and agency captured by the definition is more aligned 
with the experiences of the participants in this study than the WTHD model. The WTHD models 
(Balaguer et al., 2016; Monforte-Royo et al., 2012; Ohnsorge et al., 2014b; Rodríguez-Prat et al., 
2017) construct the WTHD as linear even though it fluctuates, dissipates or evolves. The WTHD 
model (Monforte-Royo et al., 2012) posits the WTHD as influenced by factors such as fear of 
dying and imminent death, and the loss of self, mediated by the loss of meaning, hope and 
control. My analysis found that most participants did not fear being dead but were concerned 
about what dying would entail and the length. I also found that participants did not lack meaning 
in life and had found new meanings. The WTHD model only focuses on the internal life of the 
dying person whereas this assemblage connects internal to the external influences and other 
people and institutions. The assemblage identified above allows for the WTHD to occur or not 
whereas the model only applies if the WTHD evolves. Assemblages are living arrangements that 
can accommodate contradictions paradoxes and inconsistencies (Buchanan, 2015) such as the 
WTHD and the wish to live. These are crucial properties as the tipping point between a 
worthwhile life and death shifts.  
  
Strengths, Limitations and Reflections 
This section weaves together the strengths and limitations of this study, and reflections on the 
way I influenced the research and my own biases. The strengths are collecting and amplifying 
participants’ views in a non-clinical study of the WTHD and the rapport I established with 
participants. Potential limitations are my position on AD, the inclusion/exclusion criteria, 
participant characteristics, the hypothetical and the single interview nature of the study, and the 
emergent adaptations in methodological approaches. 
  
One of the primary strengths of this study, which relates to the overarching aim, was that it 
brought attention to the issue of dying peoples’ views that were previously missing from the 
discourse. I used my epistemic advantage and institutional position to try and offer a way to 
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remedy that. Because dying people have a short-lived career as activists in issues related to 
dying, this research has given their activism more of a sustained platform. This research has been 
useful for informing the political process (see Appendix D of submissions). I raised awareness of 
the lack of patient views in the ANZ debate in Young et al. (2019), Young et al. (2020) and other 
commentaries (see Appendices A, E and F that contain media coverage and commentaries; 
conferences; blog posts). Participants expressed their gratitude for the attention this research 
brought to their plight. It was partly due to being able to openly discuss considering dying sooner 
rather than later and partly due to me believing in their wish to have the choice of AD rather than 
trying to convince them otherwise as some had experienced. This was the basis of the rapport I 
was able to establish with participants and their family members who participated and reflected 
in the insightful accounts participants shared with me.  
  
Both a strength and a limitation is that my analysis is informed by my supportive position on 
AD. I tried to remain open to other points of view and kept abreast of opposing views being put 
forward, mostly by way of the media, for example those from the disability community (New 
Zealand Human Rights Commission, 2019). I also had a range of views among my supervisory 
team. At times, the critique offered in the present research may appear to fall into the divisive 
debate. However, I am advocating for a nuanced and respectful understanding of why dying 
people consider AD and societal debate, instead of vehement arguments over the binary question 
of yes or no. I made my position clear at the outset of this thesis and to participants and was 
happy to discuss this further when invited. Sharing my views with participants was an important 
consideration because it affected my relationship with them, how much they trusted me and 
shared with me. From the data I gathered it seems as if participants could express doubts about 
AD and the circumstances under which it would be acceptable to them. Sometimes I shared my 
concerns with participants about AD and other times I shared them as others’ concerns. Given 
the participants’ views, it was appropriate to take a stance of critique that amplified their views. 
Sociology and the related fields of medical anthropology, that I position myself within, have a 
strong tradition of critical thought and advocacy for social change (Bourdieu, 2015; Conrad, 
2007; Foucault, 1980; Illich, 1977; Jutel, 2011; Katz Rothman, 1993; Kaufman, 2005; C. 
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Kitzinger & Kitzinger, 2019; Lock, 2004; Lupton, 2012).58 My own social justice and 
disciplinary orientation guided my analysis. However, my stance on AD will have also blinded 
me to alternative interpretations of the data. 
 
I recognise that my interpretation is only one of a number of readings of the same data which are 
possible under a constructionist paradigm (Geertz, 1973; Gubrium & Holstein, 2013; Schwandt, 
1998). Another person with a different personal attributes, theoretical and discipline leanings 
would have produced different data and analyses. Other interpretations of my findings are 
possible depending one’s standpoint. For example, the finding that the WTHD fluctuates could 
be used to oppose legalisation or to inform how legislation should take this into account. This 
thesis is my own interpretation of others’ interpretations about the world around them and their 
inner world, or a double hermeneutic (J. Smith et al., 2009). In any assemblage there are multiple 
arrangements (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).  
 
The theoretical eclecticism of this research is also a strength. While some may see assemblage 
and discourse as incompatible, I put forward the case for why the two approaches were cogent 
and complementary in Chapter Three. I used each analysis method alongside the other. Bringing 
methodologies and theories together encouraged deep and wide-ranging insights that may have 
been closed off by adhering to one approach. Discourse analysis does not discount the material 
world or embodied experience. However, it does privilege the importance of discourse over other 
aspects of existence. While it was apparent to me that discourses were important, it was equally 
clear that other forces – including materiality, places, people including myself, technologies and 
embodied experience – were also highly significant in participants’ accounts of approaching the 
end of life.  
 
Assemblage and discourse should be thought of dialectically and along a continuum. This 
approach helped me remain attentive to the thematics I identified power and control, to the 
material, affective and non-human forces that shape and affect the stories that people tell. 
 
58 Except for some of the ANZ literature (e.g. Barclay, 2005; Malpas et al., 2017; T. McIntosh, 2001; Moeke-
Maxwell et al., 2019) I acknowledge the limitation that the authors I draw on are, for the most part, embedded 
within a Western epistemological context as this is where a lot of the foundational sociology of death and dying and 
WTHD literatures are produced. 
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Assemblages illustrated the relations between things and the dynamism of these relations or the 
de/territorialisation. Assemblage theory and discourse analysis, offered a new angle that together, 
enabled me to notice new things about this social phenomenon of people wanting to have the 
option to hasten death.  
 
In researching and writing about AD and the reasons participants considered hastening death, I 
am part of the discursive formation of the object of study. I have sought to be as reflexive as 
possible, in a dialogue with my supervisors, keeping a diary and noticing the entanglements of 
my own views, with participants’ views and with the cultural discourse. Moreover, there is the 
intersubjectivity between researcher and researched (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015; Visser, 2017). 
As Bourdieu articulated: 
how can the sociologist effect in practice this radical doubting which is 
indispensable for bracketing all the presuppositions inherent in the fact that 
she is a social being, that she is therefore socialised and led to feel ‘like a fish 
in water’ within that social world whose structures she has internalised? How 
can she prevent the social world itself from carrying out the construction of 
the object, in a sense, through her, through these unself-conscious operations 
or operations unaware of themselves of which she is the apparent subject 
(Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 235-236). 
On the other hand, questioning common sense views of the world, including my own views, is a 
challenging but necessary task. There will have been cultural blind spots that I have not 
recognised or the participants did not problematise meaning I have touched on some avenues of 
analysis and not others. 
  
I can only conduct the research and analyse the data from my own embodied, subjective 
positioning that brings with it situated knowledge. In no particular order, I am a Pākehā, middle-
class, educated, Jewish, able-bodied, heterosexual, cisgender, young female and new parent. One 
such position of note is that of my age. Compared to most of the participants, I am young and I 
am often told I look younger than my age. My age is both strength and weakness. It allowed me 
to be a naïve enquirer. It will have shaped how participants perceived me and what they chose to 
share in our conversations. H. Richards and Emslie (2000) found that compared to a young 
female GP conducting an interview, the sociologist was often perceived as a young woman 
rather than as a professional researcher and this influenced their data. A few participants and 
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others I spoke to about my research commented on my age, that I looked young to be studying 
such a serious topic that required maturity or life experience. Perhaps some youthism is at play 
when assuming a younger person will not be interested in or able to study the end of life, since 
death affects everyone. I have experienced my fair share of deaths of family and good friends 
from a young age. Of course, at any age one can never fully understand the subject matter, 
especially when studying death. Similarly, I have been fortunate to only know good health, 
limiting my understanding of embodied experiences of approaching the end of life. 
  
Another strength of this study was it was conducted with a clinical population, i.e. a cohort 
defined by their patienthood, outside of a clinical setting by a non-clinician (although I was 
enrolled through the Otago Medical School for my PhD and I worked there as a qualitative 
researcher 2012-2019). This adds a unique element that most other WTHD studies do not have. 
Given the frustration with medical professional bodies’ opposition to AD, not being a clinician 
made the relationship I established with participants possible. I tried to get to know participants 
as people not patients. I began the first few interviews using a narrative approach, “there’s some 
areas I’d like to cover but could we start, if that’s ok with you, by you telling me the story of 
your illness, the events and experiences that are important to you? Start where it makes sense to 
start for you”. I stopped using this question when I realised it prompted the participants to tell me 
their rehearsed illness/patient story. Some offered it without being asked. Their illness story 
seemed to emphasise the medical aspects of their accounts, although as the analysis in Chapter 
Four showed, medicalisation was already deeply embedded in their experiences of life and 
dying. If I was a clinician as opposed to a sociologist (H. Richards & Emslie, 2000), the 
participants may have tried to present a more persuasive, coherent account of why they wanted 
AD due to the perception that health professionals do not agree with AD and therefore they may 
have felt they needed to be convincing. A clinician interviewer may have had the effect of 
making participants feel less free to express doubt and ambiguity and more concerned with 
impression management (Goffman, 1959). 
 
The inclusion/exclusion criteria I used excluded some groups from the study. Most glaringly 
were the four people excluded who did not wish to choose AD, of whom three were strongly 
opposed to the practice altogether. While it was necessary to keep the study focussed, the lack of 
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other views is a reasonable critique of this research. However, I wanted to understand why 
participants might consider hastening their death so I deemed it a reasonable limitation in order 
to explore this phenomenon in greater depth. I used clinical criteria of approximately 12 months 
left to live because I wanted to find people who were eligible for an assisted death under various 
models of legislation. This excluded eight people who were interested to participate. I 
acknowledge 12 months is somewhat arbitrary and difficult to predict. One potential participant 
died before I was able to interview him. As I conclude this research, I believe only one of the 
participants is still alive. I focused on those who were approaching the end of life because I 
wanted to have people as close to experiencing dying as possible. This criteria of a limited life 
expectancy meant that it excluded people who may have wished to access AD on the basis of 
disability or psychiatric suffering as some jurisdictions allow. I had one person contact me who 
had a degenerative disability however they were opposed to AD and excluded on that basis. 
Some participants were experiencing decline in physical capabilities due to their illness. People 
with non-life-threatening illnesses and disabilities who were not included in the present research 
comprise important groups to study next.  
 
This research captured a snapshot of participants’ dying trajectory. I did not pursue any further 
conversations with participants unless they initiated contact. I felt this was an ethical boundary to 
establish even though I would have preferred to remain in contact. Leaving subsequent 
conversations up to participants did not work very successfully from my perspective. Louis and 
Daniel stayed in touch, Emily emailed me when she was close to death and I was contacted by 
Sylvia’s daughter when Sylvia died. One participant kept a blog that I checked regularly. It was 
clear that the WTHD persisted for these participants. It is unclear for the remaining participants 
whether they would have chosen an AD if it were available to them. Regardless, most 
participants died before AD was legalised.59 Further, the participants with motor neurone disease 
are unlikely to have been eligible due to the narrowing of the Bill by Seymour to terminal illness 
only in response to political pressure and expediency. 
  
A potential limitation of this research is that the choice of AD was only a hypothetical one. 
Although death becomes significantly more tangible after being given a limited prognosis, a 
 
59 AD in NZ is still contingent upon the referendum. 
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legal means for AD was not available to participants to potentially choose AD. Several other 
studies have been conducted in countries where legal AD was not available at the time 
(Germany, Sweden, Hong Kong, Canada etc). The option became one step closer to being a 
possibility during the interview period when the End of Life Choice Bill was voted on for the 
first time and passed. 
  
Some readers may also critique the sample size (n=14 and six family members). Information 
power, that is “the more information the sample holds, relevant for the actual study, the lower 
number of participants is needed”, is a more useful concept for this study than saturation or 
enumerable instances of a phenomenon (Malterud, Siersma, & Guassora, 2015, p. 1759). The 
richness of data and the specificity of the sample (i.e. dying people with a WTHD) fits with 
Malterud et al.’s criteria. Even if I wanted to collect more data, the Health and Disability Ethics 
Committee, who approved this research, questioned whether I needed as many as 15 participants 
from an ethical perspective. 
  
Another limitation of the data relates to the diversity of the sample. Participants’ age, educational 
and socio-economic status were varied, however there were only two Māori participants and the 
rest were Pākehā/NZ European (although this roughly equates to the proportion of Māori in the 
ANZ population). Only atheists or Christians participated. Despite reaching out to local aged 
residential care facilities, no participants resided in an aged care facility. Two participants lived 
in retirement villages which had care provisions if/when that became necessary. Over half of the 
participants had home care delivered by hospice or other support services. The participants were 
from a more privileged part of the population, that is who are literate and English-speaking, 
though not all were privileged economically. An inclusion criterion was that participants needed 
to be capable of making and communicating health care decisions for themselves. What this 
meant in practice was the ability to read/hear about my study somewhere, understand the nature 
of an interview for research and have the energy and interest to respond.   
 
While I describe the sample characteristics in terms of a ‘limitation’, the aim of qualitative 
research is not generalisation from one small representative sample to a larger group (Lincoln & 
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Guba, 1985). True representativeness is not possible. I appreciate how Mol wrote about this 
issue: 
the stories I tell are highly specific. They are local. That does not mean their 
significance is local. I will not begin to explore what can be transported from 
this particular site and situation and what cannot. But my hope is that, not 
despite, but thanks to, their specificity, these stories are strong enough to get 
across the importance of ‘good care’ (Mol, 2008, p. 2). 
I occasionally referenced participants’ age or ethnicity as a qualifying factor in their accounts of 
approaching the end of life with the aim of offering more specific stories and to bring 
participants to life off the paper.60 The transferability of findings is offered in place of 
generalisability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). While NZ is sometimes perceived as a small nation on 
the edge of the world, the specificity of New Zealander’s accounts of the wish to have the option 
of AD (WTHD) exist within a globalised world. The arguments participants proffered often 
reflected the global debate. Moreover, the global spread of pro- and anti-AD discourse is evident 
on social media from my observations of pages dedicated to this task. 
  
At the outset of the project I anticipated using interpretive phenomenological analysis, narrative 
analysis and discourse analysis so I could attend to the embodied, storied, discursive ways 
participants’ experienced dying. I began my analysis and realised I was not attending to the three 
strands of interpretive phenomenological analysis: phenomenology, idiography and hermeneutics 
(J. Smith et al., 2009). The phenomenology of those who WTHD has been well described 
internationally (e.g. Chapple et al., 2006; Coyle & Sculco, 2004; Ohnsorge et al., 2014a, 2014b; 
van Wijngaarden et al., 2016). Most qualitative research at its core interprets individuals’ 
experiences of their lived world and how each individual makes meaning. This has meant I have 
not attended to the embodied experience of dying as much as may be warranted. I wanted to take 
a different approach so I could extend the theoretical frameworks for examining dying and add 
new concepts to AD research—participants as strategic negotiators as re-medicalising dying 
within an assemblage; the paradoxes of control and freedom; contesting longevity and normative 
dying. The data mapped to the three theoretics of medicalisation, control and normative 
 
60 Whilst acknowledging that subjectivity is shaped by more than one demographic factor, the discursive context, 
their life-expectancy or patienthood; and constructed in the moment, with that specific interlocuter. There is a 
balance of giving the reader to get a sense of the person and their positionality but not suggesting that the descriptors 
are representative of them alone. 
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discourses. However due to space and time restrictions there are other themes that have not been 




This discussion pulled the three previous chapters together to explore the themes of power and 
agency, contradictions and paradoxes, epistemic injustice, and risk and un/certainty. From this 
research, I conclude that the phenomenon of New Zealanders wanting AD reflects a concern 
about the risk, certainty, lack of control and choice at the end of life. These concerns stem from 
contextual factors, changing societal beliefs about death as well as personal uncertainty about 
how they will die. The unacceptability of AD to medicine and the medical framing of the WTHD 
as demoralisation syndrome, irrational or ameliorable, is an epistemic injustice against patients.                                                                                                    
It adds to the uncertainty over dying that participants sought to manage with AD because 
participants were not able to have the death they wanted. There is an epistemic incongruence 
between person-centred care and the notion that the patient is the expert in their illness, but 
apparently not what the right decision at the end of life is for them. Participants sought to reclaim 
agency over their lives and death with AD. Although the choice of AD is situated within and 
would reinforce existing power structures, to have a choice represents some amount of freedom. 
Participants were seeking epistemic justice by engaging in moral critique of society and 
contesting the epistemic foundation of medicine by expanding the discourses around dying and 
to make their case for having a legal means for AD available to them. 
  
To avoid an ethical analysis of AD right or wrong and go beyond the familiar tropes of rights and 
suffering (although valid claims), I have critically examined the links between power, institutions 
and the way they enable and constrain participants’ agency. I identified tensions, paradoxes and 
contradictions throughout the accounts that participants offered of why they wanted AD. My 
research contributes an epistemic analysis to the literature on the end of life and adds to the 
critique of palliative care as a disciplinary regime (Lawton, 2000; Rattner, 2018; Zimmermann, 
2004, 2012), specifically around AD. My thesis brings a new theoretical perspective of 
assemblage to AD. This lens has enabled me to identify a unique NZ assemblage of AD as it is 
 245 
presently arranged. The map of an assemblage of AD represents the complexity, dynamism, 





Chapter Eight: Assisted Dying as an Agentic Choice  
  
Introduction 
In this concluding chapter, I begin with a recap of the research questions and aims guiding this 
study. Next, I summarise the previous chapters and key contributions articulated throughout this 
thesis. I then point to future research trajectories and implications of this research for policy and 
practice. Lastly, I highlight some of the conclusions that can be drawn from this project. 
  
Research Questions and Aims 
At the outset of this thesis I posed the following research questions: 
1. What does assisted dying mean to people (and their family) who are approaching the 
end of life and would consider choosing assisted dying if it were available to them? 
2. What socio-cultural values do they draw upon to frame their experience? 
3. How do these values inform their perspectives? 
These questions informed how data was collected and guided my subsequent analysis. I have not 
addressed each question singularly due to the relatedness of discourses, power and subjectivities, 
as described in the Methodology chapter and elucidated with data. Rather I have treated the 
questions as key intertwining threads throughout the analysis chapters and the discussion. Each 
chapter brought together the individual meanings (micro-level) of AD to participants and the 
socio-cultural values (macro-level) to examine how participants used these to explain their 
reasons for wanting AD. The intellectual gap I wanted to address was in what ways is it possible 
to die in NZ today and what are the discursive influences and power structures that shape the 
dying context? 
  
I set out to tell the stories of some New Zealanders who would consider AD if it were available 
to them. This research addresses a gap in what is known about this cohort. My intention was to 
focus attention on dying people’s views of AD in the NZ debate on the End of Life Choice Bill 
which was in the Members’ ballot at the time of initiating the research. I have amplified the 
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views of participants through conducting this research, publishing, presenting at conferences and 
by providing media commentaries throughout the PhD (see Appendix E). Moreover, the debate 
felt stagnant with a limited range of arguments for and against AD. I wanted to take a different 
approach so I could extend the theoretical frameworks for examining dying and add new 
concepts to AD research.  It is my hope that my contributions—the paradox of control, 
participants as strategic negotiators who re-medicalised dying and contested normative dying and 




In this section I recap the arguments presented in this thesis so far. In Chapter One I defined key 
terms, detailed the NZ political and social landscape against which this research is set, namely 
the End of Life Choice Bill (now Act). I contextualised the study with the ideologies of 
individualism and neoliberalism. In Chapter Two I reviewed the AD research conducted in ANZ 
with healthy New Zealanders, establishing the rationale for this research. I outlined the 
conceptual framework for this research, bringing together structure and agency, the sociology of 
death and dying with the WTHD literature, and the three key theoretics of medicalisation, 
control, and discourses as they related to the WTHD. These theoretics became the three themes 
for the analysis chapters; they were informed by the data, the literature and gaps I identified. 
These themes seemed to honour the perspectives of participants and critique existing power 
structures at the same time. 
  
In Chapter Three I described the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of this research-
assemblage and explained the assumptions that shaped this research: a relativist ontology and a 
subjectivist epistemology informed by a moderate constructionist paradigm. I outlined how I 
recruited participants through media stories which were then shared on social media, and how I 
collected data in an ethical manner. I was fortunate to interview 14 people with approximately 12 
months life expectancy, and six of their family members, about their experiences of approaching 
the end of life using in-depth interviews. These interviews produced 26 hours of data which I 
analysed using a thematic-immersion/crystallisation analysis. To deepen the analysis my 
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methodology was informed by discourse analysis and assemblage theory. I interpreted the data in 
Chapters Four – Six with the support of sociological theoretics including medicalisation, 
assemblage theory, control, agency, structure, biopower, freedom, technologies of the self, 
discourses and discursive processes of exclusion, rarefaction and games of truth. 
  
The first analysis chapter (Chapter Four: An Assemblage of Medicalised Dying) examined the 
assemblage of medicalised dying. Medicine was a pervasive force throughout the participants’ 
accounts of why AD was necessary to relieve their suffering, but they felt that suffering was not 
always able to be addressed by medicine under current law and practice. Medical intervention 
was both part of the problem and the solution to ‘dying badly’ and ‘long dying’, as defined in 
Chapter Four and expanded upon in Chapters Five and Six. Participants were so conversant with 
the medicalisation of life and suffering that medical intervention in dying became a logical, 
rational next step. Using assemblage theory, I identified the elements of the assemblage of 
medicalised dying, both non-organic and organic, and the affective capacities of the assemblage 
(Buchanan, 2015; De Landa, 2019; N. Fox & Alldred, 2015; Kennedy et al., 2013). I highlighted 
that participants were not passive recipients of medicalised dying. Rather they varyingly rejected, 
adopted, contested, subverted and benefited from it. Participants positioned their own suffering, 
as terminal patients, as more deserving than the suffering of non-terminally ill people. They 
unintentionally established a hierarchy of deservingness based on the types of suffering. 
Illustrating the various generative capacities of the assemblage offered insight into the 
relationship between the institution of medicine and patients. I demonstrated the ways in which 
participants strategically engaged in the re-medicalisation of dying to establish their 
deservingness of assistance in dying. This revealed the degrees of agency participants exercised 
as ‘strategic negotiators’ to mediate the power of medicine and its constituents and institutions. 
Agency is one of the key themes of this research. 
  
In the second analysis chapter (Chapter Five: Assisted Dying, A Paradox of Control) I showed 
how participants sought to gain certainty over the manner and timing of their death with 
available mechanisms such as ACPs. AD was seen as offering control over the uncertainty and 
risk of dying badly which the available formal mechanisms for control did not. Differentiating 
between the results of control and the exercise of control as an end in itself helped to clarify how 
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the choice over dying was empowering and reassuring in and of itself. Participants drew on 
notions of individualism, rights, dignity and autonomy as reasons for the right to control their 
death with the choice of AD. Participants considered family and friends in their decision-making 
as well as the altruistic reasons—reduce health spending, distributive justice, reduce families’ 
relational suffering—in their reasons for wanting the option of AD. This suggests some 
collectivist attitudes and a relational ontology are also at play in why people consider AD. I 
employed theories of biopower and freedom, as well as referring to technologies of self and 
ethopolitics, to illustrate how AD represents a paradox. Although individuals are seeking control 
over dying badly, any AD system entrenches existing power relations where doctors are in 
control of dying and freedom becomes more highly regulated. Power is another central theme in 
this research.  Although freedom and choice would be restricted by the biopolitical regime with 
doctors as gatekeepers for an assisted death, some control and limited choices are available 
through AD to those medically defined as at the end-of-life. I concluded that there was still some 
freedom within that biopolitical, ethopolitical regime for the dying person to choose how to 
ethically make the self until the very end of life (Foucault, 1997). 
  
Continuing with the theme of power, the third analysis chapter (Chapter Six: Participant 
Resistance to Normative Discourses about Dying) explored the normative discourses around 
dying that participants identified and the counter discourses they put forward. The counter 
discourses I explored in depth were: hastening death is not morally distinct from other end-of-life 
practices; a meaningful life is more important than a long life and life can be successful 
regardless of length; death no longer occurs at a ‘natural’ time and dying people will know 
if/when there is a right time for the individual to choose to die; protracted dying can exacerbate 
suffering unnecessarily for the dying person and their family; a good death can be guaranteed by 
AD. I argued that participants were aiming to normalise AD and thereby expand the boundaries 
of normal dying. I examined the power/knowledge structures that privileged some discourses, 
ideologies and groups such as health professionals over others, and the relative marginalisation 
of dying persons’ views in the public debate on AD. To do so, I drew on principles of exclusion, 
rarefaction and games of truth. I exemplified this issue using (selected) popular media, such as 
news stories and commentaries on the End of Life Choice Bill. I concluded that AD was 
challenging for society and medicine, in particular palliative care, which is the traditional 
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authority on life and death, because AD confronts normative discourses about what is a 
meaningful life and how we should die. 
  
Key Findings and Contributions 
The original contributions of this research to the sociology of death and dying and WTHD 
literatures are grouped into conceptual, empirical, methodological, theoretical and philosophical   
contributions. Conceptually, the importance of the wish to have the option of AD to hasten 
dying, rather than an actual WTHD, is a central finding of this research. Most participants 
indicated that they would not need to choose an assisted death if their dying was being 
satisfactorily managed. Although the option did not become available during the study period as 
participants hoped it might, for the few participants who remained in contact, they explicitly said 
their wish persisted until death. There was a distinction between death and dying; most 
participants were not concerned about being dead, but how they would die and how long it might 
take. What was considered dying badly and the tipping point between a life worth living (quality 
of life) and a state worse than death was unique to each participant and their experience of their 
illness. That is not to say a person considering AD necessarily finds their life meaningless as 
some of the WTHD literature suggests (Monforte-Royo et al., 2012; Rodríguez-Prat et al., 2017); 
more that they could imagine a time when being dead was preferred to living-dying (T. Walter, 
2017) in the particular form that they were experiencing. The shifting nature of the tipping point, 
or a WTHD and a wish to continue living, was one of several tensions I identified.  
  
It is clear that risk, certainty and uncertainty add to our understanding of why people would 
consider hastening their death. The option of AD offered certainty, as a last resort option against 
the risk of dying badly, as participants felt medicine could not offer them sufficient reassurance. 
It was unclear whether it was a realistic concern, a fundamental lack of trust in palliative care, or 
partly a misunderstanding of palliative care. Half of the participants were enrolled in palliative 
care at the time of the interview. The protracted nature of dying, the lack of certainty from 
medicine over dying and medicine’s rejection of AD combine to position AD as a technique for 
risk management and ontological certainty about the end of life. 
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I used the concept of epistemic injustice to analyse the ways in which patients who want AD are 
disenfranchised by medicine’s rejection of AD as a legitimate option at the end of life. The 
participants in this study were wronged by hermeneutic and testimonial injustices through the 
clinical framing of the WTHD as demoralisation, irrational or ameliorable. Demoralisation 
syndrome pathologises the normal human experience of dying and inspection of what constitutes 
a life worth living. This framing intersects with the discursive, exclusionary, rarefied games of 
truth. I suggested agency on the part of patients should be recognised as demonstrated by 
participants’ capacity for critiquing and contesting the medical framings of AD. 
  
These findings cohere around concepts of power and agency. I concluded that there is a need to 
recognise the agency of lay people to adapt and subvert discourses, in particular in relation to 
medicalisation, normative notions of dying and longevity, and to a lesser extent control, for their 
own aims within power relations. What agency means is personally, socially and culturally 
specific. AD exemplifies the tension between state and individual control, as well as the 
possibility for change as competing and contested discourses take on more power against the 
dominant, normative discourses. The epistemic foundation of medicine and medical power, 
exercised by the NZMA and World Medical Association, palliative care associations in NZ and 
internationally (Australian & New Zealand Society of Palliative Medicine, 2017; Gerson et al., 
2020; New Zealand Medical Association, 2018; Palliative Care Nurses New Zealand, 2012; 
World Medical Association, 2015), is also challenged by patients insisting on having AD 
available to them. 
  
The power relations, institutions, discourses, practices, norms and objects, as well as 
participants’ capacity for agency, that shape dying were identified through the thesis. It is clear 
that legal AD would offer a new paradigm for dying where the timing, circumstances and 
manner of death are able to be specified (from the available options) by an individual. However, 
the state, by way of its agents (doctors), exerts control over dying and death with AD. An 
assisted death would not be available to everyone, limiting the possibility of choosing death to 
those who meet certain criteria and are persuasive/convincing in their case for AD. The Act is 
only intended “to give persons who have a terminal illness and who meet certain criteria the 
option of lawfully requesting medical assistance to end their lives” (End of Life Choice Act, 
 252 
2019, p. 3, emphasis added); which is to say there is no guaranteed right to die at the time of 
your choosing.  
  
Empirically, this work has generated knowledge about a previously unstudied group, New 
Zealanders approaching the end of life who would consider choosing AD if it were available to 
them. While I am not claiming any generalisability or representation of all New Zealanders 
approaching the end of life, the argument can be made that the views put forward are unlikely to 
be isolated ones given they reflect other sources such as the WTHD death literature and social 
media analyses (Jaye et al., 2019; Jaye et al., 2020). The NZ manifestation of the WTHD is a 
wish to have the option to hasten death, perhaps reflecting the political uncertainty of whether 
the End of Life Choice Bill would progress through Parliament. 
  
In particular, the inclusion of two indigenous participants is unique within international WTHD 
research that does not represent indigenous perspectives. Tikanga around dying and death have 
major cultural significance for Māori (Moeke-Maxwell et al., 2019). Māori perspectives on end-
of-life care and related policies require additional consideration in light of historical injustices 
and te Tiriti o Waitangi responsibilities. My findings add to the only other NZ study of kaumatua 
Māori views on AD (Malpas et al., 2017) as they shed light on how Māori approaching the end 
of life reconcile the tikanga (culture) and kawa (protocols) with AD (see also Johnsen, 2019). In 
the present study, one participant did not consider tikanga Māori with respect to dying or AD. 
His connection to te Ao Māori was about his rights to whenua (land). Another participant did not 
see any inconsistencies in AD and her Māori world view. This may have been because AD was 
not a final death but a transformation to a different state, to being with her ancestors. The ways 
this participant discussed autonomy and her whānau suggested a more relational autonomy at the 
end of life. Beyond this, I have not deeply analysed their responses through an ethnicity-lens 
based on so few Māori participants and because other participants expressed similar sentiments. 
This is informed by some of my own ‘Pākehā paralysis’ (Tolich, 2002) and also recognises the 
limits of my cultural competency to interpret the data in such a way, largely stemming from 
some advice I received from a Māori researcher. I am mindful not to categorise people’s 
responses to death by their cultural background alone. The intersectionality of 
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identity/subjectivity means examining participants’ account by ethnicity or gender alone would 
fall short analytically. 
  
Methodologically, this study is unique. In essence participants were a clinical cohort, because 
they were defined by their life-limiting health status. Most previous studies are carried out in 
clinical settings; I am not a clinician so to conduct a study with a clinical cohort in the 
community without the assistance of palliative care for recruitment was a novel aspect of this 
research. This approach garnered a particular set of data, interpretation and analysis, as discussed 
in the previous chapter. Although anthropologist Dr Naomi Richards’ work on assisted dying has 
been informative, this research differs from her ethnographic study of a right-to-die organisation 
in Scotland and its members seeking to die in Switzerland by focusing on members of the public 
who mostly did not belong to the End-of-Life Choice Society (N. Richards, 2012, 2017a, 2017b). 
Further, the logistics and cost of flying to Switzerland to die was not an option any NZ 
participant had considered seriously. 
  
Theoretically, the sociological theory and assemblage approach I applied to the study of AD also 
helped illuminate the dynamism, contextual and relational elements of the WTHD overlooked by 
much of the literature (Monforte-Royo et al., 2012). The theoretical resources I used to analyse 
the data, assemblage theory and discourse analysis, seemed to offer a new angle on the 
generative capacities of the assemblage, its emergent properties and the points of resistance 
available within its elements and discourses. This approach illuminated the emergent and 
assembled character of the lived experiences in and around AD. Living with contradictions and 
ambivalence, such as the WTHD alongside a desire to live, were able to be tolerated by 
participants. These contradictions were potential points of resistance within the bio-political 
regime that could be pointed to and exploited by subjects for their own aims. 
 
Philosophically, I questioned whether casting AD as a wholly individualist and neoliberal act 
was appropriate. It is inaccurate to suggest that participants unquestioningly absorbed these 
ideologies. While the push for AD legalisation takes place against this ideological landscape, is 
the consideration of others in AD decision-making embodying the responsibilisation of 
neoliberalism or collectivism? Is AD a liberal issue of freedom or a neoliberal issue of the 
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economisation of death? If AD is embodying neoliberalism, then is the choice not to die by AD 
resistance to neoliberalism?61 Liberal and neoliberal discourses represent competing discourses 
and sets of values that are both evident. There is more thinking to be done in this area. Next I 
point to other areas that deserve further consideration. 
  
Future Research Directions 
A limitation of most qualitative research is the need to dissect or reduce participants’ experiences 
into several themes while leaving much underexplored. This section details areas I was unable to 
explore and some future research questions that arise from this research (see also Dierickx & 
Cohen, 2019). As identified in the previous chapter as a limitation of this study, New Zealanders 
who would not consider hastening death and those with non-life limiting illnesses or disabilities 
with a desire for an assisted death are the counterpart studies to this research (though only people 
with a terminal illness and a prognosis of six months would be eligible under the End of Life 
Choice Act). Studies specifically focusing on other ethnicities’ views and generational attitudes 
and their influence on the reasons for considering AD are worthwhile conducting. 
  
Some questions remain unanswered by this research, such as what happened to the participants’ 
WTHD over the course of their remaining life following their participation in the research, and 
what would have happened if AD became a legal reality? I suggest a longitudinal study of the 
WTHD in NZ because other research has shown it fluctuates; another way of thinking about it is 
the shifting tipping point, as this research discussed. Only a few studies have taken a longitudinal 
approach (e.g. Nissim et al., 2009; O'Mahony et al., 2005; Rosenfeld et al., 2014; Ruijs, Kerkhof, 
van der Wal, & Onwuteaka-Philipsen, 2011). If AD is legalised in NZ, what is the role of social, 
economic, moral and cultural capital in successfully seeking an assisted death? The equity of 
access for those with less capital will be worthy of research. This suggestion is related to the 
epistemic injustice lens drawn on in this thesis to explain how some views are privileged over 
others and what hermeneutical resources people have available to them to express their 
 
61 This stimulating question was asked of me by Professor Kevin Dew in a seminar I gave for the Sociology and 
Social Policy Department, Victoria University of Wellington, October 2019. 
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experiences. Access to AD should be contextualised within the larger context of who already has 
access to end-of-life care and who is missing out. 
  
Following on from the findings of the present study, a closer attention to the strategies 
participants used to reconcile the aforementioned contradictions would be an enlightening 
avenue of research. In a new paradigm of dying, what rituals (such as goodbye parties) might 
emerge to mark this new mode of dying? Does AD involve a new form of ‘death work’ (Chan & 
Tin, 2012)62 for patients as it does for health professionals? It would be interesting to look at re-
medicalisation of dying from the perspectives of health professionals. How do they respond, 
enact and incorporate the re-medicalisation of dying into their practice? Are health professionals 
de-medicalising dying and upskilling communities as has been mooted by various groups? 
  
I put forward in Chapter Six that AD may represent death acceptance and denial simultaneously. 
Fruitful understandings of AD would result from exploring how the binary of death anxiety / 
death acceptance as they apply to dying people considering hastening their death (Ganzini, Goy, 
& Dobscha, 2008; Templer, 1970; Zimmermann, 2012). ‘Dying anxiety’ may be a more 
meaningful concept than death anxiety as I found the wish to have the options of AD reflected an 
anticipated dying badly period. Anticipating the future and the future self are implicated in the 
anxiety around dying. Temporalities and anticipation deserve more in-depth analysis than I have 
given them (Berthod et al., 2019; Kenny et al., 2017). I plan to explore these ideas in future a 
publication. 
 
There is concern by opponents of AD about whether this control could be exerted against 
citizens deemed unproductive (Gandsman, 2016), in other words a duty to die or worse, a right-
to-make-die. AD raises ethopolitical questions about which lives are worth living and which are 
not and importantly, who decides? Those questions can and should only be determined by the 
person whose life it is, but may include others in the decision-making (relational ontology). 
Feeling like a burden to others was not a major reason for participants’ WTHD. While this may 
be beyond reasonable interpretation, could participants be interpreted as experiencing a duty to 
 
62 Death works according to Chan and Tin refers to the knowledge, practice, work-environment and competences 
(emotional and existential coping) that health professionals ideally possess to deal with matters relating to death. 
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live or survive more than a duty to die? This duty to live, born out of the hospice ethos to ‘live 
every moment’ and the Othering of choosing to hasten death instead of a ‘natural’ death, has 
links with survivorship (Broom et al., 2018). AD was an option of last resort so there was a 
desire to live until the right time to die became apparent. Is coercion to not choose AD as 
problematic as coercion to choose AD? 
  
By virtue of their health status, terminally ill people as a group (but not necessarily as 
individuals) are considered vulnerable research participants (National Ethics Advisory 
Committee, 2019).63 I would have been interested to ask participants whether they saw 
themselves as vulnerable and how AD intersects with this. The harm to vulnerable people from 
AD is raised as a major concern (New Zealand Human Rights Commission, 2019). I can see how 
ableism (Rock, 1996) implicit in the reasons for considering AD would have been a worthy 
avenue to explore. I would like to address this shortcoming in a secondary analysis. Some 
participants acknowledged that some people in society were vulnerable, only one applied this to 
themselves. If one is assumed to be vulnerable, then their agency is compromised, and decisions 
are able to be made on their behalf more easily (Jaye et al., 2020). How does vulnerability 
function as a disciplinary technology and othering device? Future work should focus on how the 
vulnerability discourse is mobilised in the AD debate and what effect does it have on those who 
are labelled vulnerable and for the people who invoke vulnerability.  
  
Implications for Practice and Policy 
Practitioners should be aware that an expression of a WTHD is not necessarily a literal request. 
For some people it is an expression of something else and others would only like the option. 
However, for others the WTHD is persistent and they will act on it if AD is not available by 
using mechanisms currently available (ACPs, DNRs etc), refusing treatment, or completing 
suicide. Thus, health professionals need to understand the nuances of the WTHD (Norwood, 
2009; Ohnsorge et al., 2014a, 2014b; Schroepfer, 2006) as well as the sociological, contextual, 
ideological and historical factors contributing to the WTHD that this research has identified. 
 
63 For a discussion on vulnerability in research ethics codes see van den Hoonaard (2020). 
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It is reasonable to conclude that palliative care professionals may field (more) enquiries about 
AD, if it becomes legal. Health professionals should be willing to openly explore any discussions 
of dying, assisted or otherwise (Llewellyn et al., 2016), before asserting their conscientious 
objection. As Norwood (2009) found, most ‘euthanasia talk’ does not lead to euthanasia; in fact 
it serves a palliative function and may prevent most assisted deaths from occurring. Although 
palliative care professionals are the most opposed of all the health professional groups (Young et 
al., 2019), participants considered them best placed, alongside general practitioners (who provide 
primary palliative care in the community) to facilitate conversations about AD. In addition, one 
Canadian study found a “trend for higher hypothetical consideration of physician-assisted death 
in those patients with prior and ongoing palliative care involvement than patients without 
palliative involvement” (Hizo-Abes et al., 2018, p. 1). While it is appropriate to explore any 
unmet needs that may be prompting the expression of a WTHD (Back et al., 2002), my analysis 
indicates that the assumption, that any WTHD will be ameliorated with the right type of care and 
that patients do not know what is right for themselves, constitutes an epistemic injustice. 
Participants’ challenge to the legal and ethical interpretation of end-of-life practices as AD 
carries implications for preferences in care, communication and palliative care practice. 
 
The End of Life Choice Act is an opportunity to open up and deepen the conversation about 
dying more broadly. Health professionals should reflect on the control they hold over access to 
end-of-life decision-making and AD and how to share that power. Organisations, particularly 
hospices, GP practices, aged care facilities and hospitals, need to think about how they would 
respond to enquiries about AD from patients, how to accommodate the diverging views of staff 
and willingness to participate in various aspects of AD (if legalised). 
  
In terms of policy, how can a piece of legislation accommodate the fluctuation of the WTHD? At 
various points in the AD process, as outlined in the End of Life Choice Act, the attending 
medical practitioner has to let the person requesting AD know that there are various end of life 
options available to them including palliative care. The attending medical practitioners must let 
the patient know they can “decide, at any time before the administration of the medication, not to 
receive the medication or to receive the medication at a time on a later date that is not more than 
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6 months after the date initially chosen for the administration of the medication” (House of 
Representatives, 2019a, p. 14). The eligible person must choose a date and time for 
administration of medication. I have some reservation, as did some of the people I interviewed, 
about having to set a time and date in advance because of the shifting tipping point, as opposed 
to having the lethal medication available as and when needed, as per the Oregon model (Oregon 
Public Health Division, 2019). Some participants preferred to take the lethal medication 
themselves if and when the time was right. While others thought it was safer for a doctor to 
inject them with a lethal medication or at least be present to avoid complications. The End of 
Life Choice Act allows the person choose either method of delivery, however a time and date 
must be chosen in advance; a doctor or nurse practitioner must be present at the time of taking 
the medication until death occurs. 
  
Conclusion   
The aim of this thesis was to understand the perspectives and reasoning of New Zealanders 
approaching the end of life who would consider choosing an assisted death if it were legal. The 
debate on legalisation benefits from a more nuanced dialogue about AD than what can be 
essentially grouped into two camps: autonomy vs sanctity of life. If the debate on AD is to be 
moved forward, attention must be paid to the complex, contextual and at times contradictory 
reasons people with limited life expectancy would consider AD. The wish to have the option of 
AD should be understood as a manifestation of changing individual, communal, medical, moral, 
ideological concepts about what is a good life, what makes a good death and the essential 
counterpart, what is dying badly in late modern society. By studying the human experience of 
illness and death, it sheds light on and clarifies other fundamental features of social life as well. 
Participants’ desire for the choice of AD indicates that we live with a generalised uncertainty and 
contradictions that characterise the human condition. The uncertainty and risk of dying badly 
was attenuated by the option of AD. Contradictions are exemplified by the two states of living a 
meaningful life and a WTHD being experienced concurrently. 
  
This thesis has empirically, theoretically and philosophically explored New Zealanders’ wish to 
have the option of AD. Specifically I have deepened the understanding of the WTHD by pointing 
 259 
to the nuance of a wish to have the option of hastening death, as opposed to a wish to die. My 
analysis strongly suggests that participants were strategic negotiators who re-medicalised dying, 
sought certainty in the face of dying badly, and contested longevity and normative dying. Having 
said that, the semblance of control offered by AD is undermined through the increasing 
regulation of dying and the re-entrenching of power relations, including the provisions of the 
Act. Within this paradox of control, there is still scope for choice, activism and a making of the 
self, although limited by the biopolitical regime, that equates to freedom (Foucault, 1997). These 
three concepts—strategic negotiators, contesting normative dying and paradox of control—
constitute the original contributions of this thesis to social science as well as to the public 
dialogue about why people would consider hastening their death. 
  
In conclusion, the medical (and paternalistic) framing of patients who want AD as demoralised, 
irrational or ameliorable with the right care is an epistemic injustice done to patients who 
WTHD, exacerbating the uncertainty over dying that participants experienced and that they 
sought to manage with AD. As an assemblage, AD is being arranged and rearranged to support 
arguments for and against AD legalisation. No matter how the End of Life Choice Act proceeds 
at the referendum, power and agency will always be produced through discursive techniques and 
be in dialogic tension, relations within the assemblage will always change, and discourses will 
always be co-opted by individuals to support their own aims because the framing of AD is 
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Otago research aims to fill gap in views on assisted dying 
Wednesday 8 November 2017 
 
A researcher at the University of Otago is hoping to ascertain, for the first time, the collective 
views about assisted dying from people who are terminally ill and nearing the end of their lives. 
 
Jessica Young, a PhD candidate from the University’s Department of General Practice and Rural 
Health, is placing an advertisement in newspapers to find people who want to take part in her 
research into the perspectives of people with a terminal, incurable, degenerative or progressive 
illness about assisted dying.  
 
“No research with this group has been conducted in New Zealand to date. I would like my 
research to fill this gap and add to the knowledge about assisted dying from the perspectives of 
people nearing the end of life,” she says. 
 
Medical aid in dying is when a person, who is terminally ill and competent to make decisions, 
requests a prescription for a lethal dose of medication which the patient ingests themselves. 
 
“Those with shortened life expectancy are an important group to talk to because they are faced 
with their own mortality and are in the best position to know how they feel about assisted dying. 
These are the people who would be directly affected by a law change.” 
 
“So I’m looking for 10-15 volunteers from around New Zealand who are approaching the end of 
life and have been diagnosed with terminal, incurable, progressive or degenerative illness with 
less than 12 months life expectancy, and who want to share their story and thoughts on assisted 
dying with me.” 
 
The interview could be completed over more than one occasion. This is because the volunteers’ 
well-being, dignity, and comfort is paramount. All information will be confidential. 
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Jessica started her PhD in February this year after closely following the debates about assisted 
dying, including the Lecretia Seales’ case in the High Court in New Zealand.  
“With the exception of people like Lecretia Seales, I found that the views of people approaching 
the end of life are startlingly absent from the debate about whether to legalise assisted dying in 
New Zealand. Whether or not there is a law change, I think these perspectives need to be heard.” 
 
She adds that over the past twenty years studies have shown that on average 71% of New 
Zealanders support patients who are suffering from an incurable illness to be able to legally 
request assistance from doctors to end their life. On average 18% oppose and 11% are unsure.   
 
“Assisted dying is of national interest because ACT Party MP David Seymour’s End of Life 
Choice bill has been drawn from the ballot.  
 
“Seymour’s proposed legislation would allow people with a terminal illness or a grievous and 
irremediable medical condition the option of requesting medical aid in dying if they are assessed 
by two doctors to meet the criteria.  
 
She says that assisted dying is also a highly topical and globally significant issue as increasing 
jurisdictions have passed aid in dying laws (California), are considering it (NSW) or in the 
process of voting on such legislation (Victoria). Laws have also not passed in other places (South 
Australia, New York) and in New Zealand twice before. 
Assisted dying refers to both voluntary euthanasia and medical aid in dying. Voluntary 
euthanasia is when a person, who is terminally ill and competent to make decisions, requests a 
lethal injection to end their life, usually given by a health professional. Medical aid in dying is 
when a person, who is terminally ill and competent to make decisions, is provided by a doctor 
with the means to ingest a lethal prescription themselves.  
 
Jessica has a Masters and Honours degree specialising in the sociology of health and illness from 
the School of Physical Education, Sport and Exercise Sciences at Otago. She has been working 
as a researcher for the past five years in the Department of General Practice and Rural Health, 
Dunedin School of Medicine. She is supervised by researchers from this department as well as 
Preventive and Social Medicine and Bioethics.  
 
“I’m grateful to have received funding from the Hope-Selwyn Foundation for Research on 
Ageing, Joe and Eve Major Trust, and a University of Otago Division of Health Sciences Pro-
Vice-Chancellor’s Discretionary PhD Scholarship,” she says. 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Health and Disability Human Ethics 
Committee. Ref: 17/NTA/90. Jessica’s supervisors are Associate Professor Chrystal Jaye, 
Department of General Practice and Rural Health, Dr Richard Egan, Department of Preventive 
and Social Medicine, Mr Tony Egan, Department of General Practice and Rural Health and Dr 
Janine Winters, Bioethics Centre. 
 
Contact: 
Jessica Young, Department of General Practice and Rural Health 
endoflifechoicestudy@otago.ac.nz  





Media Coverage  
I was interviewed by two radio stations (RadioLIVE Drive Show, Newstalk ZB) and three news 
stories published about recruiting for my PhD research in the Otago Daily Times (interacted with 
773 times on Facebook and 45 times on Twitter), Sunday Star Times / Stuff.co.nz (with 19 




3/22/2020 Views of terminally ill sought | Otago Daily Times Online News
https://www.odt.co.nz/news/dunedin/views-terminally-ill-sought 1/4
By John Gibb (/author/John%20Gibb)
Wednesday, 8 November 2017
Views of terminally ill sought
University of Otago PhD student Jessica Young is
keen to include the views of people approaching
the end of life in discussions about proposed
assisted dying legislation.
Some people considered assisted dying to be an
''incredibly controversial'' subject, but others said it
simply involved ''their right to autonomy'', she said.
The subject of assisted dying was of growing
national interest, partly because Act New Zealand
MP David Seymour's End of Life Choice Bill had
been drawn from the ballot and was likely to be
discussed in Parliament at a later stage.
His proposed legislation would allow people with a
terminal illness or a grievous and irremediable
medical condition the option of requesting medical
aid in dying if they are assessed by two doctors as
meeting the criteria.
Miss Young has worked for the past five years as a
researcher in the department of general practice
and rural health at Otago's Dunedin School of
Medicine.
Her study aimed to add to knowledge about the
''contentious issue of assisted dying''.
She was seeking 10-15 volunteers who were
approaching the end of life, ''because it's important to hear their views on this complex subject''.
She wanted to talk to people who had been diagnosed with ''terminal, incurable, progressive or
degenerative illness'', who had less than 12 months' life expectancy, and who wanted to share their
story and thoughts on assisted dying with her.
Her research was not taking sides but sought to make an ''open inquiry into the perspectives of people
with a terminal, incurable, degenerative or progressive illness'' about assisted dying.
She began her PhD study this year after closely following related debates, including those arising from
the Lecretia Seales case in 2015.






Terminally ill Kiwis to have their say on euthanasia 
 
Lucy Swinnen 05:00, Nov 19 2017, Sunday Star Times/Stuff.co.nz 
Esther Richards, 54, and Vicki Walsh, 50, both know what it's like to be given a terminal 
diagnosis.  
But the two mothers have come to very different conclusions about assisted dying. 
Richards' cancer is now in remission and she is on the committee of her local end of life choice 
group; while Walsh, who has publicly documented her journey with a terminal illness, said her 
experience changed her mind about  
In a New Zealand first, a new study is seeking the views of the terminally ill on assisted dying. 
"We should all have this choice to have a peaceful way out," Richards said. 
The Tauranga woman was diagnosed with glioblastoma - an aggressive brain tumour- in October 
2012 and underwent seven and a half months of radiation and chemotherapy. 
Richards never considered ending her life but she did hoard pills for the worst case scenario. 
Knowing there was a safe and legal option if she needed it would have relieved a huge burden, 
she said. 
"Mentally and emotionally knowing I would have had that option when it got so bad would have 
eased my mind a lot more, it would have made me a lot less stressed throughout the whole 
thing." 
"The worst thing about that is I have to do it alone, I have to not tell anyone and then someone 
has got to find me- that is going to be really hard on the people who love me." 
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In contrast, Vicki Walsh, 50 from Tokomaru, near Palmerston North, said her journey since her 
diagnosis had changed her mind about euthanasia. 
"I feel very passionate about people like myself not being put under pressure." 
 
Not long after her diagnosis of glioblastoma in June 2011, when she was very unwell,  Walsh 
decided to take her own life. 
She changed her mind at the last minute. 
"That was really life changing for me."  
"If I had not been on my own when I made that decision and had I had the option of assisted 
dying, I probably would have had family members here and loved ones and they would have 
come to be with me while I died." 
"And I wonder whether I would have backed out of it." 
"Yet I've gone on to have three more grandchildren now... I would have missed out on so much." 
 
She is concerned terminally ill people will feel like a burden and more people will feel 
compelled to end their lives if assisted dying is legalised.  
"Twenty years ago, I probably would have told you, 'Yes, I think everyone should be allowed to 
end their lives when they choose to'. 
"Where as being in this situation I actually feel very differently about it."  
Otago University student Jessica Young is canvassing the unique perspective of people like 
Richards and Walsh for her PhD. 
"There has been quite a bit of research in New Zealand around people's views but it tended to be 
with healthy adults, and I think approaching the end of life gives you a different insight into 
death and dying," Young said. 
"I think that is a really important issue to understand from their perspective, because these are the 
people who would be affected by a law change." 
She is seeking up to 15 New Zealanders of different age, ethnicity and religious belief, to take 
part in the research. 
 
It will give those with a terminal, incurable, degenerative or progressive illness a chance to have 
their say, Young said. 
"It is going to be a challenging set of interviews, I imagine." 
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David Seymour's End of Life Choice Bill - that would give people with a terminal illness or a 
grievous and irremediable medical condition the option of requesting assisted dying - is before 
Parliament. 
In Australia, Victoria's upper house held a marathon debate last week on a voluntary assisted 
dying bill.   
A similar bill was voted down in New South Wales.  
* To participate in the research, contact Jessica Young: endoflifechoicestudy@otago.ac.nz or 






Appendix B: Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Study title: END OF LIFE CHOICE PREFERENCES OF PEOPLE WITH 
TERMINAL ILLNESS 
Locality: Southern region Ethics committee ref.: 17/NTA/90 
Lead 
investigator: 
Jessica Young Contact phone number: 021 2800 837 
 
You are invited to take part in a study exploring the views of people who are nearing the end of 
life (approximately 12 months or less life expectancy) with a terminal, incurable, progressive or 
degenerative illness who would consider choosing or who want an assisted death, if it was legal in 
New Zealand.  Assisted dying is also called voluntary euthanasia, medical aid-in-dying and 
physician-assisted suicide. Voluntary euthanasia is when a lethal injection is given, usually by a 
health professional. Physician-assisted suicide is when the terminally ill person ingests lethal 
medication themselves. 
 
Whether or not you take part is your choice.  If you don’t want to take part, you don’t have to give 
a reason, and it won’t affect any care you receive.  If you do want to take part now, but change 
your mind later, you can pull out of the study at any time.   
 
This Participant Information Sheet will help you decide if you’d like to take part.  It sets out why 
we are doing the study, what your participation would involve, what the benefits and risks to you 
might be, and what happens after the study ends.  We will go through this information with you 
before you decide to participate. We are happy to answer any questions you may have at any stage.  
You do not have to decide today whether or not you will participate in this study. Before you 
decide you may want to talk about the study with other people, such as family, whānau, friends, 
or healthcare providers.  Feel free to do this. 
 
Please contact us preferably within two weeks if you are willing to take part in the study. We will 
write to you again as a follow up if we haven’t heard from you by then. Participation is entirely 
your choice. 
 
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to sign the Consent Form on the last page 
of this document.  You will receive a copy of both the Participant Information Sheet and the 
Consent Form. 
 
This document is 7 pages long, including the Consent Form.  Please make sure you have read and 
understood all the pages. 
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What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of the study is to find out the views of people nearing the end of life about assisted 
dying. There are no New Zealand studies of people in your situation. We think it’s important to 
learn more about your views regarding this issue. If you give us permission, we would also like to 
find out the views of your most important carers, for example family or health professionals. 
 
We hope to find out about the reasons why people might consider choosing or want to choose an 
assisted death, and any concerns they have about it. The study will contribute to the current debate 
about legalising assisted dying in New Zealand. We also hope to come up with recommendations 
for health professionals. 
 
This study is part of Jessica’s PhD research and is being funded through scholarships. The 
investigators are from the University of Otago. Jessica will answer any questions you may have, 
her contact details are 021 2800 837 (phone or text) or jessica.young@otago.ac.nz.  
 
This study has approval from the Health and Disability Ethics Committee (reference number 
17/NTA/90).  
 
What will my participation in the study involve? 
You are eligible to participate because you have said you meet the study’s criteria of being 18 
years or older, having a terminal, incurable, progressive or degenerative illness with a limited life 
expectancy and might consider choosing assisted dying if it were available. For participants’ 
safety, we must exclude those with cognitive impairment or severe psychiatric conditions.  
 
If you choose to participate, Jessica will interview you in person about your thoughts and feelings 
on assisted dying. Questions will be about your experiences and views around quality of life, 
suffering, autonomy, dignity, beliefs around assisted dying, past experiences with others’ death 
and dying process, planning for end of life, concerns or fears about dying. We will ask you 
questions like, ‘in your own words, can you please tell me about your attitude towards assisted 
dying and why you feel that way? Dying with dignity means different things for different people, 
what does it mean to you?’ 
 
These are sensitive issues that may be distressing. We will make sure that your well-being, 
dignity, and comfort is our priority. 
 
You are welcome to have a support person present. You can choose an individual interview, or a 
group interview with you and family/whānau members. If you choose to be interviewed with 
family/whānau members, please think about whether you can speak freely around your family 
about your views on assisted dying.  
 
The interview can take place at the time and place of your choosing. It can take place over several 
intervals if you become tired or distressed. The length of the interview will depend on your 
answers. You are encouraged to take a break or continue the interview later if you start to feel tired 
or distressed.  
 
 301 
You will be asked to name a support person. If you find the interview upsetting, Jessica will discuss 
with you if they need to be contacted and who should call them. 
 
Interviews will be digitally audio-recorded. Your interview will be transcribed as soon as possible 
by a company who have signed a confidentiality agreement.  A copy of your transcript will be sent 
to you if you wish. The interviewer may also take notes during the interview.  All of this 
information will be made anonymous by removing any personally identifying details. The 
interview audio recording and transcript will be stored on a password protected computer. They 
will only be available to members of the research team.   
 
Follow-up interviews are available at any stage if you would like to talk more. We would be 
interested to discuss your views over time. This is over to you too. 
 
What are the possible benefits and risks of this study? 
The issue of assisted dying is controversial. We will ensure confidentiality of your participation 
in the study and the information we collect about you. We will ensure that any publications 
cannot be linked back to you by removing personally identifying information. No content from 
any interviews will be disclosed to the other participants without your permission. All research 
data is subject to police investigation if there is an inquiry.  
 
There are no physical risks associated with participation. Although you may have already 
thought about these issues, the potential psychological risks are the burden of the interview 
process and content of the interview and what this might bring up for you. 
 
A possible benefit is the chance to discuss death and dying and your end of life wishes openly. 
Your participation in the research may benefit others.  
 
Who pays for the study? 
Any costs to participants as a result of participating, such as travel, will be reimbursed. No 
payments or other forms of reimbursement will be provided. 
 
What if something goes wrong? 
Jessica will contact you after the interview to check how you are. If you become seriously 
distressed as a result of participation in the study, the expenses for professional counselling or a 
GP appointment will be covered by the study. 
 
What are my rights? 
Your participation is voluntary. You have the right to decline to answer any questions you don’t 
want to, or to withdraw from the research at any time, without any disadvantage to you.  
 
You can access the information we have about you at any time. It will be stored on a password-




All data collected will be confidential to the study investigators, and anonymity is guaranteed to 
all participants. No content from any interviews will be disclosed to the other participants 
without your permission. 
 
What happens after the study or if I change my mind? 
If you decide to withdraw from the study, you can decide what happens to the information collected 
about you up to the point when you withdraw. 
 
The data collected (digital audio recordings and notes) will be securely stored (with password 
access only) on the university network. Any personal information held about you (such as contact 
details and the interview audio recording) will be deleted at completion of the research. The 
anonymised data derived from the research (e.g. the interview transcripts with identifying 
information removed) will be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely and maybe used, with 
your consent, in other publications on this topic. Anonymised data obtained as a result of the 
research will be retained for at least 10 years in secure storage. 
 
The results of the project will be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand). Every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity. 
 
Who do I contact for more information or if I have concerns? 
If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about the study at any stage, you can contact:  
 
 Jessica Young, Coordinating Investigator 
Dept. of General Practice and Rural Health 
 021 2800 837 
 jessica.young@otago.ac.nz  
 
Associate Professor Chrystal Jaye, Research Supervisor  
Dept. of General Practice and Rural Health  
03 479 5767 
chrystal.jaye@otago.ac.nz  
 
If you want to talk to someone who isn’t involved with the study, you can contact an independent 
health and disability advocate on: 
 
Phone:  0800 555 050 
Fax:   0800 2 SUPPORT (0800 2787 7678)  
Email:  advocacy@hdc.org.nz 
 
For Māori health support please contact: [If the participant has self-identified as Māori, the 
Māori Health Team in the participant’s District Health Board will be listed.] 
 
Name, position  




You can also contact the health and disability ethics committee (HDEC) that approved this study 
on: 
 
 Phone: 0800 4 ETHICS 






Please tick to indicate you consent to the following  
I have read, or have had read to me in my first language,  
and I understand the Participant Information Sheet.   
I have been given sufficient time to consider whether or not to 
participate in this study. 
  
I have had the opportunity to use a legal representative, whānau/ 
family support or a friend to help me ask questions and understand 
the study. 
  
I am satisfied with the answers I have been given regarding the 
study and I have a copy of this consent form and information sheet. 
  
I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary (my choice) 
and that I may withdraw from the study at any time without this 
affecting my medical care. 
  
I consent to the research staff collecting and processing my 
information, including information about my health. 
  
If I decide to withdraw from the study, I agree that the information 
collected about me up to the point when I withdraw may continue to 
be processed. 
Yes  No  
I understand that my participation in this study is confidential and 
that no material, which could identify me personally, will be used in 
any reports on this study. 
  
I consent to the information I share during the study to be used in 
any reports if it is de-identified (any personally identifying 
information has been removed, e.g. names). 
  
I give permission for my support person to be contacted if 
necessary; this will be discussed with me first.  
My support person (e.g. family, friend, health professional) is:  
  








Declaration by participant: 
 







Declaration by member of research team: 
 
I have given a verbal explanation of the research project to the participant, and have answered 
the participant’s questions about it.   
 







Appendix C: Interview Guide 
 
The questions are to be used responsively and flexibly. I will check in with the participant 
throughout the interview that they’re feeling ok and want to continue. 
 
Whakawhanaungatanga – general conversation, getting to know the person, connecting 
 
I’d really like to get a sense of the reasons you want or would consider an assisted death and 
other areas that relate to this. I’d like to hear your thoughts and wishes about living and dying. 
Some of these may be sensitive, difficult questions, you don’t have to answer any questions you 
don’t feel comfortable answering, just say so. Please ask if question is unclear, there’s no right 
answers, your perspective. If don’t have an answer now we can come back to it later. We can 
take a break at any time, just let me know. Everything you say is totally confidential. Do you 
have any questions? 
 
I imagine you are aware that for some, this is a controversial area. So thank you for agreeing to 
talk with me. I’m interested to know what those who support the idea think about it. Could you 
tell me a bit about why you agreed to be part of the study? 
 
There’s some areas I’d like to cover but could we start, if that’s ok with you, by you telling me 
the story of your illness, the events and experiences that are important to you? Start where it 
makes sense to start for you. I’ll take some notes too if you don’t mind so I can remember things 
I would like to ask you more about. 
 
1. There’s lots of sides to wellbeing and health, like physical, social, spiritual, and mental. 
Could you please tell me what’s life like for you these days in terms of your health and 
wellbeing? (quality of life) 
 
2. What are your thoughts about euthanasia/assisted dying [AD] (use their preferred 
words/ask if not apparent)? How does this fit with the way you see the world/think things 
should be? (attitude) 
 
3. What else influences your approach to life and death? (values) 
 
4. You mentioned (when we spoke/before) that AD as something you might want/consider if 
it was an option, when did you first start thinking about that? (genealogy) 
 
5. As your illness has progressed and you’ve had time to adapt to your changing 
abilities/prognosis, have your thoughts and feelings about AD changed in anyway? 
(fluctuations, adjusting to illness)  
 
6. Do you have any concerns or reservations about AD? Maybe not enough to lessen your 
support of AD, but concerns all the same. (concerns) 
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7. I’m curious to know if you have shared your thoughts about AD with anyone? What do 
they think about it? What was it like sharing those wishes with [named person]? (effect on 
family, shared decision-making) 
 
8. There are lots of different reasons people want the option to choose the manner and timing 
of their death, what are your reasons for considering/wanting AD if it were available? 
(reasons – main ones found in research are autonomy, joy in daily activities, loss of 
dignity, loss control of bodily functions, feeling like a burden) 
 
9. This sounds like an obvious question but is having control over your death important to 
you and why?  (autonomy/control) 
 
10. People often talk about dying with dignity, and dignity means different things to different 
people, is this something that has meaning for you? Can you describe in our own words 
for me what dignity means to you? (dignity, being as you would like to be) 
 
11. Avoiding unbearable suffering is one of the main reasons people want assisted dying, 
what does unbearable suffering mean to you? (suffering)  
 
12. Have you thought about what sort of situation would you have to be in for you to consider 
the time had come for you to die? (death better than life of suffering) 
 
13. You may or may not have already have thoughts about this and it’s a direct question, how 
do you feel about dying? What concerns do you have about your future and what dying 
might like? Do you feel ready? Accepting? (fears, anticipated agony, 
preparedness/acceptance of death) When you look ahead, what are your thoughts about 
the future?   
 
14. As you approach the end of your life, what matters most to you? What brings you purpose 
and meaning in your life? (spirituality) 
 
15. What does it feel like for you knowing you can’t legally do choose AD? (personal costs) 
 
16. Has the health care you’ve received been able to meet your needs and the suffering you’ve 
talked about? How has the health care you’ve received been? At home? At 
hospice/hospital? (unmet needs)  
 
17. Has wanting AD affected other decisions you’ve made around health care? (e.g. accepting 
hospice/palliative care)  
 
18. If you or your whānau have had experience with death and dying, could you talk about 
how that was? (previous experiences with death) 
Summarise about why you support AD, is it ok to move to talking more generally? 
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19. Do you think having AD as an option that doctors could provide patients who wanted it 
and who met the criteria would affect your views of/relationship to health professionals 
(as a person you can trust)? How so? (trust)  
 
20. Assisted dying laws have been put to parliament three times and before the high court 
once but not passed. Why do you think NZ has been reluctant to legalise AD? (NZ) 
Prompts 
Why’s that? How? Can you tell me more about that? Tell me what you were thinking? How did 
you feel? What do you mean by? If talking generally, and what is your personal experience of 
that? 
Closing the interview  
• Do you have any questions or other comments you’d like to make? What issues are 
important to you? 
• Is there anything that we have not discussed that you feel is relevant?  
• Are there any areas that you feel are just too difficult to discuss?  
• Who do you think it’s important for us to share this research with? 
Thank you for your willingness to take part and for sharing your valuable views on assisted 
dying. It’s been interesting and informative, and I hope the same for you. I’ll be in touch in a 
couple of days to touch base about the interview. You have your support person and/or other 
health professionals available to you (doctor, nurse, spiritual care) should you wish to discuss 
anything. If you feel a need to talk to anyone, I’m happy to contact anyone on your behalf and let 
them know you would like to talk; I will not share that you have taken part in an interview about 
assisted dying or your responses unless you give me permission to do that. You can contact me at 
any time, you have my contact details on the information sheet.  
Follow up after interview(s) 
• How did you find the interview? 
• What are your thoughts and feelings right now, having been interviewed? 
• Has it bought up anything you would like to discuss further with me, your support 
person or a health care professional?  
• The next step is to get our interview(s) transcribed (typed out word for word), would 
you like to read your interview in case you want to change anything or just to have a 
copy of it? 
• If you have any further thoughts, feel free to get in touch. I’ll let you decide whether 
you’d like to talk again over the coming weeks/months. I’d be happy to chat more if you 
are but I don’t want to take up too much of your time and energy. 
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Appendix D: Submissions on the End of Life Choice Bill 
 
Written Submission to the End of Life Choice Bill 
 
Jessica Young, BPhEd(Hons), MPhEd, PhD candidate 
 
I wish to speak to my submission. 
 
I wish to express my strong support for the End of Life Choice Bill. I do so on the basis of the 
experiences shared with me during my recent data collection, from what I have read in the New 
Zealand and international literature about assisted dying, many conversations with colleagues 
and friends, as well as my own personal views about bodily autonomy. My views are also 
informed by my 18 months of hospice volunteer work. 
 
My PhD research is studying assisted dying from the perspectives of dying people who would 
consider choosing an assisted death if it were available to them. The aim of my study is to 
explore the reasons people would consider or want an assisted death. I want to add to the 
knowledge about assisted dying from the perspectives of the person nearing end of life because 
no research with this cohort has been conducted in NZ to date.  
 
I have conducted in-depth qualitative interviews with 14 dying people and six of their family 
members across New Zealand. They were recruited through the media and selected according to 
the criteria: would consider assisted dying, no history of mental illness or cognitive impairment; 
that they had approximately 12 months prognosis due to a terminal or degenerative diagnosis. 
They were dying from advanced cancer; motor neurone disease; chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease; one person had a rare auto-immune kidney disease as well as cancer. The age range was 
34-82. There were eight women and six men. Most were Pākehā and two also had Māori 
whakapapa. Among this cohort there were a wide variety of educational and professional 
backgrounds. Some had religious and spiritual beliefs but the majority did not. I make note of the 
kinds of people who participated in my study to highlight that assisted dying is acceptable to 
many different groups within society. It is also worth noting that I am specifically speaking to 
the issue of assisted dying for people with terminal, incurable, progressive or degenerative 
illnesses as opposed to psychological illnesses. 
 
The questions asked during the semi-structured interviews were based on issues identified in the 
literature on the wish to hasten death as well as the fields of bioethics, palliative care, and 
medical sociology. These interviews covered all manner of things: life, death, suffering, values, 
religion, society, suicide, medicine, quality of life. They had a wide range of views on these 
important issues. 
 
Most people haven’t had to confront their own mortality, but the people in my study have. Given 
their experiential knowledge of dying, I strongly believe, as do they, that their accounts and 
views should be given great weight in this debate. 
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I note my research data has not been fully analysed at the time of submission. From an initial 
analysis of the interviews, there are many common topics that can be identified across the 14 
interviews. These have implications for a number of issues are at stake in this Bill: what is a 
meaningful life; end of life care; the doctor-patient relationship; autonomy vs paternalism 
regarding decision-making; harm prevention. I conclude with recommendations to the 
Committee. I include quotes from participants to illustrate their views on these issues.  
 
I choose to use the term assisted dying to keep the focus on the person rather than the physician 
as with physician-assisted dying, and to emphasise that the person is already dying from a life-
limiting condition as opposed to choosing to die, as is inferred from the term suicide. As 
Goldney (2012) states, “Although ‘suicide’ may be etymologically strictly correct, it hardly 
conveys the usual situation in which death occurs in those who die by suicide, particularly in 
relation to the almost invariable presence of psychiatric illness”. 
 
What is a meaningful life? 
The wish to hasten death cannot be understood out of social contexts with nuanced moral 
understandings of suffering, what a good life is, and what a good death is. Participants told me 
during their interviews that there are some ways of living that are worse than death. If their 
quality of lives no longer outweighed the prospect of death, then that is when they would 
consider an assisted death. There was a range of how people felt they were living. Most said they 
still had some quality of life including some with a very good quality of life, while some were 
not happy with their quality of life. Many had found new meaning in life as a result of their 
illness shedding light on what was important in life. If life became consumed by the unbearable 
suffering that they said they had already experienced at times and were likely to endure at the 
end of their life, it was the right time to go. Unbearable suffering is a key concept contributed to 
by medical, psycho-emotional, socio-environmental, existential, fatigue, pain, decline, negative 
feelings, loss of self, fear of future suffering, dependency, loss of all that makes life worth living, 
hopelessness, pointlessness, being tired of living, loss of function and loss of social roles (Dees 
et al., 2011; Hendry et al., 2013). In addition to these, for the people I interviewed suffering 
primarily meant no longer being able to relate meaningfully to their loved ones. To be consumed 
by pain, to no longer be able communicate, to be totally dependent on others, to be ‘out of it’ on 
pain medication was unbearable suffering. Some of the people I talked to will die by suffocating 
as a result of the disease causing their muscles and organs to deteriorate.  The physical 
deterioration, the decreased social participation in life, the loss of control and the loss of self that 
they faced was worse than death.  
 
Each person’s life is unique. What makes their life worth living, their purpose, their own version 
of a good life and on the other hand, their own definition of unbearable suffering. To my 
participants this means that we should each be able to decide what is right for us in accordance 
with our views on life, so long as it doesn’t harm anybody else. One thing all of the people I 
interviewed had in common was that they all said they would know when the time was right for 
them to choose to die.  
 
It wasn’t what I set out to find out but I was left with a sense of how well they knew themselves. 
The people I interviewed have been through so much already—multiple treatments, pain, nausea, 
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surgery, declining function, trouble breathing, shrinking physical and social worlds. As an upside 
of these difficult experiences people came to know themselves in a deeper way. They understood 
what they could tolerate and what they wouldn’t stand for. For example, participants said: 
I think that there’s a profound principle in there somewhere, that people ought to have 
some, some way of saying this is long enough (Participant 9) 
We each know our own body and what we’re capable of or not capable of (Participant 1) 
What surprised me about all of the people I talked to was how accepting they were of their own 
death. This should not be confused with welcoming death. As one woman put it “letting death 
come to you” (Participant 3). They said they had to make peace with it or they’d spend their last 
months fighting it, which was futile and a waste of precious time. Instead they chose to spend 
time with loved ones making good memories, ensuring their families were taken care of when 
they were gone and in this they found new meaning in life. By accepting and preparing for death, 
they could get on with living a meaningful life.  
 
The wish to hasten death is a form of accepting inevitable death, when “death can no longer be 
resisted” (Nissim et al., 2009). As communicated to me through a speech-generating tablet 
controlled with his head movements, by a man with advanced motor neurone disease: 
It's my life and no policy maker has greater claim over it than I do. Why should I be forced 
to suffer against my will in order to appease another person's idea of morality… I feel that 
control over the end of my life is a basic human right. Currently that human right is being 
oppressed. I feel that I am enduring considerable suffering now, but there is enough 
positive going on to make it bearable. When there is nothing left but suffering, I want the 
choice. (Participant 2) 
 
Research participants argued strongly for choosing their quality of death when they were no 
longer living a meaningful quality of life. 
 
End of life care 
My participants believed, and some had been told by their doctors that due to their type of 
cancer, that their pain may not be able to be relieved. Further, there are many forms and causes 
of suffering beyond pain identified in the wish to hasten death literature that cannot be 
ameliorated by medicine.  The prospect of a long, drawn out experience of dying was intolerable. 
The last resort palliative treatment of terminal sedation was not acceptable to participants for 
three reasons. They did not want to spend their last days drugged and unable to think; they did 
not want to wait until they have starved to death to die; they did not see the difference between 
palliative sedation and assisted dying when they outcome is the same regardless of the means. 
While doctors and ethicists may see the difference between terminal sedation and assisted dying, 
by drawing on the doctrine of double effect, the people who may be on receiving end of such 
treatment do not. When there is little doctors can do, except for comfort care, the aim of care 
becomes to relieve suffering. If the aim is not to prolong suffering then assisted dying is 
preferable for some people than what effectively amounts to a slow overdose of morphine. 
  
Others just didn’t see the point of lingering in their dying, even when it was well managed. One 
man described dying as being in limbo land:  
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I’m neither one thing nor the other. You’re not sick enough, you’re not well enough, you’re 
in limbo. So I’m not dead but I’m not well enough to participate [in activities he enjoyed 
and activities of daily living] (Participant 1) 
I wouldn’t want to linger.  Just when you get to sort of that vegetative state, it’s just like if 
I ended up a vegetable in hospital pull the plug.  You’re not that person anymore, they’re 
gone. (Participant 8) 
They didn’t want their death to be protracted if they were suffering and they didn’t want to put 
their loved ones through that either. Many of these things cannot be fixed, no matter how great 
the support or how much the care. The Hospice New Zealand’s mantra is “Living every 
moment”. This a romanticised notion of dying and places an unreasonable expectation on dying 
people to live every moment (Lawton, 2000). The notion that we must live every moment makes 
the healthy feel comfortable, but the dying people I spoke to did not necessarily want to live out 
the last dying moments of their life. “Do you want to be kept alive when you’re basically 
fucked?” participant 1 queried. In some circumstances, death is not always a bad thing. To 
suggest otherwise reflects healthist and youthist biases. 
 
There is a long standing belief in palliative care that the wish to hasten death is an expression of 
unmet need (Mak & Elwyn, 2005). I specifically enquired with participants as to whether their 
desire for assisted death was in light of unmet needs. While several had had trouble getting a 
diagnosis or received poor communication about prognosis, almost all participants responded 
they did not want euthanasia due to unmet need. Almost all had excellent support, both family, 
friends and medical. The following are typical responses from different participants to this 
question of unmet need: 
Oh no, I don’t agree with that because yeah, I guess I don’t agree with that because I have 
a view that hospice will do everything they can. And that’s when they can’t do anymore 
that then, and it's not working, that I’d then need to use it.  So no, I don’t feel like there’s 
a gap there for unmet care needs, no.  Well yeah, as in care that could be provided that 
isn’t, I’m not aware of that, yeah. (Participant 7) 
There isn’t any more support that would make a difference to my thoughts on that, and 
yeah, there again it comes back to the manner of dying and there’s, I mean, like I accept 
that there’s pain killers and stuff that can be given too. But I don’t want to lie about being 
a vegetable, not in pain, in order to say that nobody has to give me the final dose of 
something. I don’t see the point, yeah. I get pretty much all the care or medical support that 
I need, and at this stage, there’s nothing else that is going to make a difference, that I’m 
aware of. (Participant 10) 
 
The doctor-patient relationship 
Doctors in New Zealand have publicly stated concerns that patients will trust them less if 
euthanasia becomes legal. Hospice have expressed concern that patients will not access their 
services if assisted dying becomes available. In fact, the opposite is true for my participants on 
both accounts. I asked my participants about these perspectives. They saw palliative and hospice 
care as complementary to assisted dying. Many were being cared for by hospices around the 
country and had excellent things to say about them.  
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[Hospice] want to help comfort people and if that’s their choice we’ll, you know, help them 
through it. That’s what hospice should be there for, to help people through their last days, 
last weeks.  Not to go oh well, this is our opinion, we’re not going to go with it.  I don’t 
think it would harm hospice in any way. (Participant 11) 
I see assisted dying as the last, as the last gasp, as opposed to the first gasp… I think it puts 
them in a really, really difficult position and it’s like in the whole hospice scene, the idea 
that somehow accepting assisted dying is like accepting that they can’t stop all pain.  Well, 
they can’t.  They’re bloody good, but they’re not, they don’t have a magic wand…   I love 
this care, I just wanna give these people a big hug and say thank you for doing this.  But if 
it does get to that point, I do want that option and I don’t think it’s a slap in the face to 
them, but you’ve gotta be careful what you say. (Participant 14) 
 
Some participants had chosen not to share their views with their health care professionals. All 
said assisted dying would not change the doctor-patient relationship with regards to trust and a 
couple thought that it may improve the communication.  
I think the integrity of doctors wanting to save lives would ensure that the relationship 
would remain intact. (Participant 1) 
Well, as I’m in favour of it, it would enhance my trust of them, if that’s the right word. I 
wouldn’t think of it as a negative, it would be a positive if I knew that that decision or 
assistance was available. (Participant 10) 
I point the Committee to the positive effects of assisted dying in Oregon on end of life 
conversations, hospice referrals and people dying in their preferred place of death (Goy et al., 
2003; Tolle & Teno, 2017); and similarly in California more recently (see 
http://www.eoloptionacttaskforce.org/). Participants acknowledged that participating in 
euthanasia will be hard for doctors. Some also felt doctors were in the best position to arbitrate 
and safely implement any assisted dying law.  
 
Autonomy vs. paternalism 
While none of the people I interviewed wished to die—as their desire for the choice of an 
assisted death might suggest—they all ardently wanted to have a say in when they died. They are 
not choosing to die, but want to choose how and in what circumstances they die.  The 
participants believe that legalising assisted dying would give dying people the choice over 
what’s right and wrong for them. One man I interviewed summed it up, “Isn’t that the tenor of 
life, that we make our own decisions?” A participant told me from her hospice bed where she 
was receiving excellent respite care, 
Assisted dying is a degree of control, because when you get a disease like this, you lose all 
control of your life.  I didn’t choose this.  I fought it, I fought valiantly, I didn’t choose it.  
But it’s chosen me.  So, even if you’ve got the option of assisted dying, if you don’t actually 
do it, you still have the option.  You still feel like you have some control over what’s the 
right, and if the right time came up, then you could?  Having a choice is a very empowering 
thing. I think intrinsically the choice has to be mine. (Participant 14) 
When it comes to dying, especially in the circumstances of a prolonged or distressing illness, 
control is what some people need. It would help people whose choices and control have been 
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taken away from them by their disease. Control and autonomy meant to participants the choice to 
say when they’ve had enough of the pain and other forms of suffering, both physical, mental, 
social and existential. They wanted terminally ill people to be given back control and to be able 
to die on their own terms, if they chose to. Some participants reiterated what research has found 
(Monforte-Royo et al., 2012), that loss of control is a form of suffering.  
 
Not having this choice over their death was incongruent with the rest of their lives where they 
had made decisions.  
You’ve got a choice whether you choose to vote, you’ve got a choice whether you use to 
get your car licence, you’ve got to choose all sorts of choices.  You choose what you eat, 
you can choose where you want to live. You can choose to bring life into the world. And 
so you should have the choice. You should have the choice of when enough is enough, on 
that basis. And I guess, I mean when you talk about assisted dying, and that’s doing it in 
an ethical and a compassionate way. (Participant 11) 
Not only that, but they had been encouraged by medicine throughout their illness to make 
decisions about treatments and services. Healthcare professionals advocate that patients are in 
the best positions to know what medical decisions are appropriate for them and compel patients 
to choose according to their priorities in life and their values. But the decisions available to dying 
people do not extend to deciding about how and when they die.  
 
The participants felt that this decision should not be over to doctors (although doctors who are 
willing to participate would be put into the role of deciding that the person meets the strict 
criteria of an End of Life Choice Bill—a fine distinction but a distinction all the same). Having 
said that, participants also recognised the need for the doctors’ role in implementing the 
safeguards of checking that the person was of sound mind and that no one was being coerced.  
 
Participants felt that is was paternalistic for doctors, politicians or clerics to say what is right and 
wrong for dying people about their death.  The people in this study felt they should be trusted to 
think deeply about hastening their death and know what’s best for them when it comes to end of 
life decision-making. Some participants felt family should be consulted if the person wanted to 
but ultimately that assisted dying is the dying person’s decision. It is not a decision that the dying 
will make lightly in my opinion.  
 
Listening to whether doctors and other authorities think assisted dying is wrong or right, over the 
voices of patients, is another form of paternalism. Thankfully, a major shift in medicine has 
occurred over the last few decades with the rise of patient autonomy and person-centred care. 
This has replaced paternalism where the doctor knows best and acts according to their view of 
the situation without consulting with the patient and sometimes families too. While autonomy 
must have limits, I believe no issue embodies this equilibrium of paternalism and autonomy 
more than assisted dying. 
 
In some of the stories I was told about relatives’ deaths, the doctor’s intention was occasionally 
clearly to hasten death through passive means. NZ research backs up this claim, that assisted 
dying is already happening in small numbers (Malpas et al., 2015; Mitchell & Owens, 2004). So 
then why should it be a post-code lottery that you get a doctor who agrees to help you die? As 
many jurisdictions have shown, if you regulate something, it becomes equitably accessible and it 
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is much safer for everyone who is willing to be involved (and those that don’t want to be 
involved can abstain). Doctors, patients and families are at less risk with assisted dying out in the 
open—fewer careers at risk, fewer botched suicides, less trauma of bad deaths and less risk of 
assisting someone to die. As well, control becomes distributed among doctors and patients 
through a shared decision-making process.   
 
 
Harm minimisation and prevention 
Given the high rate of suicide in New Zealand, particularly among older men, I believe there is a 
harm prevention and minimisation benefit to legalising assisted dying. A study of suicide 
coronial inquests between 1990-2000 found that between 5-8% of all New Zealand suicides were 
by terminally or irremediably ill people (Weaver, 2014).  I believe some suicides will be 
prevented by way of the process people must go through to access assisted dying by opening up 
conversations about dying. This process includes referral to services that the person may benefit 
from but may not have had referrals to. Participants, and their family members with whom this 
came up in the interviews, agreed: 
 
I think you probably would, because you’d probably open up things for people to talk. 
(Participant 6) 
Yeah, at the end of their support, the support network comes in, at the end of that they 
might decide, actually I feel a lot better for having that help now, and change their mind 
about not wanting to be around. (Participant 11) 
If having found what help is available to them and possibly trying those services and still 
deciding to hasten their death, then assisted dying is a more humane, safer form of suicide. “And 
do you know, the thing about it is if I attempt it with tablets and I don’t succeed, then that’s 
hospitalisation” one woman said. Some participants also mentioned that by legalising assisted 
dying, people wouldn’t be forced to order illegal drugs off the internet. It would mean decreasing 
the trauma for the surviving family of people who suicide. The ripple effects of suicide on 
families and communities would also be lessened. In further contrast to suicide which occurs in 
isolation and often without discussion, assisted dying allows people to discuss their wishes with 
others, to say goodbye and have a peaceful, non-violent death.  
 
It has been posited that there will be suicide contagion if assisted dying is legalised. As we have 
slowly learned with suicide, talking about suicide does not cause suicide and is more likely to 
prevent it. An in-depth study in the Netherlands similarly concluded that talking about euthanasia 
prevents euthanasia most of the time (Norwood, 2009). In terms of New Zealand evidence, the 
world-renowned suicidologist, Prof Annette Beautrais’ longitudinal study of 987 25 year olds 
found they are able to hold complex and pluralistic views, and able to distinguish between 
suicide and euthanasia (Beautrais, Horwood, Fergusson, 2004). 
 
Recommendations 
I recommend that that a refined End of Life Choice Bill be passed into NZ law. 
 
While the approval of two, and in some cases three, doctors somewhat diminishes the power of 
people to decide whether assisted dying is the right choice for themselves, all of the people I 
interviewed for my study believed the safeguards were a necessary means to ensure assisted 
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dying is appropriately implemented. The Bill needs clarifying about what recourse a person has 
if they are deemed ineligible by doctors.  
 
I would also like the Bill to be clarified around who is eligible under the criteria of grievous and 
irremediable condition. The concerns of people with disabilities that they would be eligible under 
this criterion are reasonable. The Bill should also be clarified about whether people suffering 
from mental illness, who are still capable of understanding the nature and consequences of 
assisted dying, would be eligible on this condition alone. 
 
I believe that doctors who are unwilling to participate should be required to refer on to either an 
appropriate doctor or a service/organisation. I think this is important due to the limited access to 
doctors in some rural New Zealand and the likely initial conservative approach of doctors if the 
Bill passes. A Compassion and Choices type organisation will need to be created in New Zealand 
to educate the public and doctors about the process. 
 
I have some reservation as did some of the people I interviewed about having to set a time and 
date in advance as opposed to having the lethal medication available as and when needed, as per 
the Oregon model. Some participants preferred to take the lethal medication themselves if and 
when the time was right. While others thought it was safer for a doctor to inject them with a 
lethal medication or at least be present to avoid botches. 
 
Some participants were concerned that they were not able to sign an advanced directive stating 
that they would like assisted dying in certain circumstances. I would like the Committee to 
investigate how advanced directives for assisted dying operate overseas. Some wanted advanced 
directives to be added to this Bill to ensure their wishes were carried out if they were unable to 
communicate this for themselves. 
 
Many participants in my study were concerned about the length of time that a referendum will 
add to the process. Public education about the issue will be crucial if it is to be an informed 
decision. 
 
While many participants were accessing excellent palliative and hospice care, this is not 
available to all New Zealanders who may benefit from it. A major increase in funding to in 
palliative and hospice care is essential alongside any assisted dying law to ensure no one is dying 
earlier than necessary due to unmet needs. 
 
I urge the Committee to study the increasing numbers of jurisdictions that have successfully 
implemented assisted dying legislation and learn from how they have set up rigorous reporting 
systems to monitor who is accessing assisted dying as well as who is turned down in the process 
and why. The international evidence has demonstrated over a long-period that assisted dying is 
safe. As concluded in one of the latest and largest reviews of international research by highly 
respected researchers in this field, “Existing data do not indicate widespread abuse of these 
practices” (E. J. Emanuel et al., 2016, p. 88). 
Other safeguards I recommend are mandatory training in end of life conversations, clarification 
around who is eligible and support for health professionals who participate. This should go some 
way to ensure assisted dying is equitably accessible if the Bill passes the subsequent readings. As 
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we have seen in Canada with certain institutions refusing to participate, just because something 
is legal, it does not mean it’s accessible even though it is a right people are entitled to. 
 
In conclusion, the people I interviewed believe, and I wholeheartedly agree, that there should be 
space within society and the law for different people to live with different choices and values. 
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Oral Submission to the End of Life Choice Bill Sub-Committee 
Thank you for this opportunity, I wish to express my strong support for the End of Life Choice 
Bill. I do so on the basis of the international literature regarding assisted dying and my own 
research. My PhD research is studying assisted dying from the perspectives of dying people who 
would consider choosing an assisted death if it were available. Research participants argued 
strongly for choosing the quality of their death when they were no longer living a meaningful 
quality of life. Assisted dying was seen as option of last resort if they were dying badly. 
Research participants did not want to die. They wanted to choose how to die and under what 
circumstances. I’d like to remind the committee that people who would be eligible for this Bill 
and also support the Bill are also not necessarily able to come and present in front you. 
 
I’d like to thank the Justice Committee for streaming the hearings. I heard some inaccuracies 
around what drives someone to wish to hasten their death, it is not hopelessness, depression. 
International evidence shows the top two concerns were loss of autonomy and being less able to 
engage in activities that make life meaningful. Healthy people do not have the knowledge of 
suffering to fathom what it is like to die. 
 
I was also concerned to hear whole groups of people being represented homogenously. We 
reviewed 20 years of research to investigate New Zealanders’ attitudes towards 
euthanasia/assisted dying, which was published last week. It showed few statistically significant 
demographic associations with attitudes toward euthanasia/assisted dying; except religiosity, 
educational attainment, and some ethnic groups. Research shows that not all health professionals 
are opposed, despite often being presented as such and a few are palliative care professionals 
even willing to participate. To insist on unanimous agreement before changing policy is to 
prejudice policy in favour of the status quo. The law is designed to operationalise moral values. 
The majority of NZ is comfortable with the moral judgement that it in limited circumstances, is 
acceptable for people to be helped to die.  
 
I believe there is a harm prevention and minimisation benefit to legalising assisted dying. Fewer 
suicides, less trauma of bad deaths, fewer careers at risk for helping someone to die. While I 
understand the concerns people have about the risks and they are valid, however the most recent 
major international review concluded  “Existing data do not indicate widespread abuse of these 
practices” (E. J. Emanuel et al., 2016, p. 88). 
You have my full list of recommendations but I would also like the Bill to be clarified around 
who is eligible under the criteria of grievous and irremediable condition. The Bill needs 
clarifying about what recourse a person has if they are deemed ineligible by doctors. Some 
participants were concerned that they were not able to sign an advanced directive. A major 
increase in funding to in palliative and hospice care is essential alongside any assisted dying law 
to ensure no one is dying earlier than necessary due to unmet needs.  
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Appendix E: Public Engagement: Media commentaries and Blogs 
 
Media Commentaries on Assisted Dying during PhD 
 
Otago Daily Times 25 October 2019 Referendum requires balanced information 
 
NZ Herald 24 October 2019 Call for independent facts ahead of euthanasia referendum 
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12279340 
 
NewsTalk ZB 24 October 2019 Radio interview 
 




NZ Herald 11 October 2019 ‘Will the public get to decide on euthanasia? A poll of MPs’  
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12275365 
 




NewsTalk ZB 10 April 2019, Radio interview and  
https://www.newstalkzb.co.nz/on-air/early-edition/audio/euthanasia-debate-what-happens-now/ 
 
‘The euthanasia debate: Synthesising the evidence on New Zealander's attitudes’ received 
significant media attention which as the first author I provided numerous media commentaries: 
 
Television interview 
Breakfast Show https://www.tvnz.co.nz/shows/breakfast 2 November 2018 (also available 
https://www.facebook.com/Breakfaston1/videos/753258061733444/, viewed >12,000 times)  
 
News stories  
Health Central interview, 14 January 2019  
http://healthcentral.nz/euthanasia-and-assisted-dying-understanding-why-people-think-the-way-
they-do/  
Stuff.co.nz 4 December 2018, More than a moral dilemma: The religious and community views 
on euthanasia (374 comments on this story citing my research) 
https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/health/euthanasia-debate/108916922/more-than-a-moral-
dilemma-the-religious-and-community-views-on-euthanasia 




Otago Daily Times 1 November 2018  
https://www.odt.co.nz/news/dunedin/campus/university-of-otago/most-kiwis-support-some-
form-euthanasia-otago-study   
Newshub 1 November 2018  
https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2018/11/20-years-of-research-finds-most-new-
zealanders-in-favour-of-euthanasia.html?fbclid=IwAR1f1Oo1I2Gwr4GT6qhQcJ0uTsyLjuoU-
FycwXg8Fl72tMzChDuHiRLn1g0   
Voxy 1 November 2018   
http://www.voxy.co.nz/health/5/324815  
Science Media Centre 1 November 2018  
https://www.scimex.org/newsfeed/most-new-zealanders-on-board-with-euthanasia  
Otago University 1 November 2018 
https://www.otago.ac.nz/news/news/releases/otago698561.html   
 
Radio interviews  
RNZ 1 November 2018 
https://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/ninetonoon/audio/2018669299/majority-
support-some-form-of-euthanasia 
Radio LIVE Morning Show 1 November 2018 
http://mediaalertordering.isentia.com/PlayNow.aspx?ID=X28fvllPz25IHD&ID2=290499 
Radio LIVE Drive Show 1 November 2018 
http://mediaalertordering.isentia.com/PlayNow.aspx?ID=X28fvnUrz25IHD&ID2=290499 
95bFM 2 November 2018 news bulletin  
http://95bfm.com/  
Mediaworks interview with Mel Logan 
 
Sample of articles citing the review: 
The Guardian 14 November 2019 Years after her death, my wife may yet change New Zealand's 
law on euthanasia  
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/nov/14/years-after-her-death-my-wife-may-yet-
change-new-zealands-law-on-euthanasia 
End of Life Choice Bill — Third Reading Hansard, 13 November 2019 
https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-
debates/rhr/combined/HansDeb_20191113_20191113_16 
Parliamentary Library Research Paper, December 2018 
https://www.parliament.nz/media/5372/assisted-dying-new-zealand-december-2018.pdf 
NZ Herald, 13 November 2019 Parliament faces historic final euthanasia bill vote 
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12284648&fbclid=IwAR2Pz
oAGM-UiI3cYv7BTVoYL82UNaNrVL1zR5PltfbffCHR7S6rEH7uioSo 
NewstalkZB 24 October 2019 Kate Hawkesby: Cannabis and euthanasia are complicated issues 
to vote on  
https://www.newstalkzb.co.nz/on-air/early-edition/opinion/kate-hawkesby-cannabis-and-
euthanasia-are-complicated-issues-to-vote-on/ 
Otago Daily Times 23 October 2019 Key vote for referendum on voluntary euthanasia 
https://www.odt.co.nz/news/national/key-vote-referendum-voluntary-euthanasia 















Newsroom, 9 April 2019  
https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2019/04/09/527542/tensions-and-tempers-over-euthanasia-law 
ACT Media Release, Care Alliance vs Polling Science on End of Life Choice, 31 March 2019 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1903/S00171/care-alliance-vs-polling-science-on-end-of-life-
choice.htm 
Noted, Strange lessons of 2018: What goes on when we're not looking 
https://www.noted.co.nz/currently/politics/2018-politics-euthanasia-china-farmers-strange-
lessons/ 
David Seymour, Sponsor’s Report on the End of Life Choice Bill, 12 December 2018  
https://www.scribd.com/document/395592722/End-Of-Life-Choice-Sponsor-s-Report  
Kai Tiaki New Zealand, November 2018 vol 24(10), NZNO euthanasia research next year? 
ACT Party media release, 1 November 2018 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1811/S00009/time-to-legalise-assisted-dying.htm   
Euthanasia Free NZ media release, 1 November 2018  https://euthanasiadebate.org.nz/the-
majority-of-kiwis-are-confused-about-what-assisted-dying-means/  
 
Otago Daily Times 1 August 2018 Getting on with life while dying  
https://www.odt.co.nz/news/dunedin/getting-life-while-dying  
 
Channel 39 31 July 2018 Euthanasia a tough topic for a three-minute thesis 
http://www.channel39.co.nz/news/euthanasia-tough-topic-three-minute-thesis  
 
13 January 2017 Interviewed regarding latest Euthanasia research “Now That Two Thirds of New 







13 October 2019, 2nd place Sociological Association of Aotearoa NZ Student Blog Writing  
 
WALKING THE LINE BETWEEN RESEARCHER AND ADVOCATE: AMBIVALENT 
ENTANGLEMENTS BY JESSICA YOUNG 
 
Sociology has a strong tradition of critical thought and advocacy for social change. It’s why 
studying Sociology appealed to me and felt right to adopt the discipline as my academic home. I 
study assisted dying, a hot topic in New Zealand politics right now as Parliament debates the End 
of Life Choice Bill ahead of the third vote. My PhD interview participants were dying people 
who wanted the choice of assisted dying to be available to them. Having heard their stories of 
suffering and the bad dying they anticipated, I couldn’t help but feel I owed it to them to 
advocate for them. Thinking critically felt insufficient. Action needs to follow thought if any 
social change is to be forged. 
 
The month after I finished my data collection I had to the opportunity to put in a written 
submission, and later to speak to that submission, to the Justice Select Committee on the End of 
Life Choice Bill. Alongside this, I wanted to publish some media articles sharing my participants 
reasons for wanting an assisted death and to encourage others to share their views with the 
Justice Committee. Participatory democracy is a good thing, right? 
 
My supervisors were initially relatively supportive, making sure I was going to be clear that I 
hadn’t completed my analysis. However, when I told an Emerita Professor what I wanted to do, 
she was shook. She discouraged me from publishing any media articles using my data because 
what I wanted to say was not fully analysed, peer reviewed and I might compromise future 
publications. My supervisors were cautious but for different reasons. Probably rightly so. Was I, 
only one year into my thesis, ready to become the go to pro-euthanasia academic for media 
comment? Who was I to speak as an authority on this hugely complex issue? What if I ‘came 
out’ as pro and it backfired? 
 
This is the blurry line between researcher and advocate. 
 
But what about the ethical responsibilities to my participants? After all, one of the overarching 
objectives of this thesis was to bring the views of people approaching the end of life into the 
New Zealand debate on legalising assisted dying because there was a paucity of their views in 
research and public discourse. 
 
There is the complicating factor that I am working in a controversial field of assisted dying. It’s 
controversial because for some people, such as those with disabilities, the right to die 
“undermines the position of disabled and vulnerable members of our community and poses 
significant risks to them” Paula Tesoriero (Disability Rights Commissioner for the New Zealand 
Human Rights Commission). How can I advocate for one right that might disadvantage an 
already vulnerable group? How do we weigh the rights of some people against others? I don’t 
have the answers for these questions and it’s certainly beyond the scope of this blog. 
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Most people I tell about my thesis, including media and my PhD participants, ask me what my 
position is. To the attuned, the language I choose to use to describe assisted dying suggests my 
position anyway. Quite contrarily, whatever view the person I’m speaking to takes, I will often 
suggest other ways of seeing the issue. For the media, I tend not to state my views explicitly but 
suggest that based on my reading of the international data, I think that an assisted dying system 
can be implemented sufficiently safely. This feels like a good and safe stake to put in the ground 
(although still contestable according to other readings of the same data). I acknowledge that the 
risk of people feeling the need to end their life sooner than necessary out of perceived or actual 
pressure or due to insufficient care worries me, as it did my participants. What I don’t often say 
is that the normalisation of assisted dying doesn’t worry me greatly, because assisted dying is 
“the formal manifestation and legitimation of a cultural desire to shorten the dying phase” 
(Richards & Krawczyk, 2019, p.1). Assisted dying is a technique to manage the risk of bad dying 
in what Beck (1992) called ‘risk society’, where individuals are exhorted to invest a great deal of 
energy in avoiding potential ‘risks’ 
 
For participants, sharing my views was an important consideration because of how it affected my 
relationship with them, how much they trusted me and shared with me. This led me to speak 
honestly with participants that I think there should be a regulated, robust system for certain 
people in particular circumstances. Sometimes I shared my concerns and other times I shared 
them as others’ concerns. 
 
More than that, I don’t think I can separate my own views on assisted dying from my research. 
Disentangling subjectivity and objectivity is complicated due to one’s embeddedness in the 
context being studied. As Bourdieu articulates: 
 
How can the sociologist effect in practice this radical doubting which is indispensable for 
bracketing all the presuppositions inherent in the fact that she is a social being, that she 
is therefore socialised and led to feel “like a fish in water” within that social world 
whose structures she has internalised? How can she prevent the social world itself from 
carrying out the construction of the object, in a sense, through her, through these unself-
conscious operations or operations unaware of themselves of which she is the apparent 
subject (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 235-236). 
 
On the other hand, questioning common sense views of the world, including my own views, is a 
challenging but necessary task. 
 
Not to share my views feels like a disavowal of who I am and what I stand for—bodily 
autonomy. Having a philosophical grounding in Sociology gives me the courage to advocate for 
my participants and the issues we feel strongly about. Having said that, I notice my views do 
fluctuate depending on what’s happening and who I am talking to. I feel torn between doing right 
by my participants and respecting people’s concerns about assisted dying. In advocacy and 
research, it doesn’t always feel like there’s room for uncertainty. This ambivalence about 
advocacy emerges as a product of my PhD data collection and interactions with people from all 
spectrums across the assisted dying debate. 
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I share this reluctance because I think that we should make ourselves professionally and 
personally vulnerable by sharing our experiences of the ambivalent entanglements between the 





2018 Highly Commended, Science Writing Prize, Otago Medical School Research Society  
 
Is there a right time to die? 
 
Death is the common denominator that unites all living beings. Most people have never had to 
confront their own mortality but the people I interviewed have. From talking to dying people, I 
learned that they think they can, and more importantly should, be trusted to know what’s right 
and wrong for them when it comes to the end of life.  
 
New Zealand is currently considering an End of Life Choice Bill. If the Bill passes it would 
allow a person with a terminal illness (with a life expectancy of less than six months), or with a 
grievous and irremediable illness, who is in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability 
but of sound mind and who is experiencing unbearable suffering to make a voluntary choice over 
how and when they will die.  
 
But one of the major concerns with euthanasia and assisted dying is that people who have chosen 
to die may have gone on to live longer or change their minds about dying at that time. 
 
I was fortunate to get the chance to interview 14 New Zealanders from around the country, 
representing various ages, backgrounds and beliefs, all of who had a limited life expectancy due 
to illnesses such as cancer, chronic lung disease, auto-immune disease, and motor neurone 
disease. These interviews covered all manner of critical issues: life, death, suffering, values, 
religion, society, suicide, medicine, quality of life, meaning and purpose.  
 
They all shared the belief that they would know if and when the time was right for them to 
choose to die; they all wanted the option of assisted dying and euthanasia.  
 
It wasn’t what I set out to find out but I was left with a sense of how well they knew themselves. 
The people I interviewed had been through so much already—multiple treatments, pain, nausea, 
surgery, declining function, trouble breathing, shrinking physical and social worlds.  Through 
these difficult experiences people came to know themselves in a deeper way, they found new 
meaning and purpose in life. They understood what they could tolerate; as one man with 
advanced cancers said “We each know our own body and what we’re capable of or not capable 
of”. They appreciated what was right and wrong for them in terms of their medical care. An 
extension of these decisions about what care is appropriate for them was the decision to hasten 
their death. 
 
Many emphasised they were of sound mind to make this decision. They had made decisions 
about their bodies throughout their lives and they had been encouraged throughout their illness to 
make decisions about treatments, support, and services. Health professionals advocate that 
patients are in the best positions to know what medical decisions are appropriate for them and to 
choose according to their priorities in life and their values.  
 
But the decisions available to dying people do not extend to deciding about how and when they 
die. The interviewees’ views on assisted dying and euthanasia were only strengthened by their 
illness. The people I interviewed all made it very clear that they would intrinsically know if and 
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when the time was right for them to be assisted to die. As one woman put it, “I just want to hang 
in there until I can’t, and then I want to have a peaceful end”.  The time was right when you had 
made peace with death. You had prepared those you were leaving behind the best you could. 
You had your affairs in order.  
 
What surprised me about all of the people I talked to was how accepting they were of their own 
death. This shouldn’t be confused with welcoming death. As one woman with ovarian cancer 
said, “letting death come to you”. Interviewees said they had to make peace with death or they’d 
spend their last months fighting it, which was futile and a waste of precious time. Instead they 
chose to spend time with loved ones, making good memories, and ensuring their families were 
taken care of when they were gone. By accepting and preparing for their death, they could get on 
with living.  
 
Each person’s life is unique. What makes their life worth living, their purpose, their own version 
of a good life and, on the other hand, their own definition of unbearable suffering. My 
interviewees stressed that we should each be able to decide what is right for us in accordance 
with our views on life, as long as this doesn’t harm anyone else. “You should have the choice of 
when enough is enough. When there is nothing left but suffering, I want the choice”, one man 
with motor neurone disease said. 
 





5 July 2017 Invited blog post Sociological Association of Aotearoa New Zealand’s website 
 
ASSISTED DYING AND THE END OF LIFE CHOICE BILL BY JESSICA YOUNG 
 
I was already convinced that my research was important, as I’m sure every PhD student is, or I 
wouldn’t have decided to dedicate the next three years of my life to it. 
 
I started my PhD in February this year after closely following the debates around assisted dying 
that were brought to my attention by Brittany Maynard in the US and Lecretia Seales’ case in the 
High Court in New Zealand. I became fascinated by the social, cultural and moral systems 
people drew on to make sense of the arguments to fit their worldviews on life and death. So 
while I was supposed to be writing other PhD proposals, I kept reading around this issue. I soon 
found that the views of people approaching the end of life are startlingly absent from the 
continued debate about assisted dying legalisation in New Zealand. In part that’s because there’s 
been no research about their views in New Zealand. 
 
Rather than healthy adults, health professionals, and various religious groups, who are most 
vocal in this debate, it is those with shortened life expectancy facing their own mortality who are 
in the best position to know how they feel about assisted dying. 
 
My research is an open enquiry into the perspectives of people with a life-limiting condition 
(terminal or degenerative illness with less than 12 months life expectancy) who want or would 
consider an assisted death, were it legally available to them. Assisted dying is a highly topical 
and globally significant issue, and is of national interest given the current controversy over its 
legal status. However, the voice of those who want or who would consider choosing an assisted 
death (were it available to them) is missing from the discourse in New Zealand. 
 
My research just got a whole lot more important when ACT Party MP David Seymour’s End of 
Life Choice Bill was pulled out of the ballot tin (yes, it is actually a tin – see official 
government GIF) on the 8th of June. This means it’s going to get the chance to be debated and 
voted on in Parliament.  Seymour’s proposed legislation would allow people with a terminal 
illness or a grievous and irremediable medical condition the option of requesting medical aid in 
dying under certain circumstances and if they meet the criteria. 
 
In the rest of this blog post, I’d like to reflect on what the Bill being drawn means for my 
research at this early stage 
 
I’ve always known this day may come but I thought it was unlikely given the chances (1/63). My 
more immediate thoughts were about what the Parliament’s Health Select 
Committee’s recommendation was going to be after the hearings and submissions for and against 
Maryan Street’s (and 8,974 others) petition regarding medically assisted dying; we still await 
that report. 
 
It’s hard to know how the Bill will get on, how quickly any changes are likely to come about if it 
does get through the various rounds of debate and voting, and therefore how much to make of it. 
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Assisted dying bills, entitled ‘Death with Dignity’ have been debated twice before by New 
Zealand Parliament and defeated at their first reading 61-29 in 1995 (Michael Laws, National 
Party); the second attempt in 2003 (Peter Brown, NZ First) was a much narrower margin at 58-
60. Certainly, politicians are cautious about assisted dying despite consistent findings of 
numerous surveys and polls that on average 70% of respondents support legalisation change. My 
analysis of the previous NZ research on public attitudes shows support among Pākehā (72%), 
Māori (68%), and Other (67%). There is less support but still a majority among Pacific people 
(57%) and Asian (53%). Indians are least supportive (43%). 
 
The potential law change affects the landscape in which my PhD takes place. 
 
I am writing these developments into the narrative of my thesis as they occur. Up until now, the 
idea of someone being able to request to end their life was relatively hypothetical (although it 
does happen illegally in small numbers, (Malpas, 2015)). When discussing my participants’ 
desire for an assisted death, I have to add the caveat ‘were available to you’. By the end of my 
thesis, this may not be necessary, however, their attitudes to this option will remain the focus of 
my research. 
 
Many people, particularly those eligible for my study, will be relieved that this debate is going to 
happen in front of Parliament. 
 
One good thing to come out of the Bill being drawn is its stimulating public discussion. I try to 
keep abreast of the public commentary that is coming hard and fast at the moment. I’m interested 
in the discourse of what is and isn’t able to be said in this debate. I’ve become that person who 
every one associates with assisted dying and though I appreciate the recommendations, yes, 
always thinking about death and dying can be a little exhausting. 
 
The media coverage of the issue is likely to continue to receive may work in my favour for 
recruitment, as assisted dying may be on the minds of potential participants when I start 
recruiting later this year. 
 
If the Bill is voted down, it may go the other way and put people off my study as they realised 
the slim possibility of choice at the end of life has been defeated. Then what for my PhD 
research? My participants will be pissed off! I may be on the receiving end of some of this anger 
in interviews. 
 
Would that make my research less relevant? Possibly. It may be years before it comes to 
Parliament again. Regardless, I am still interested in the reasons my participants want or would 
consider an assisted death, even if they can’t legally be medically assisted to die. 
 
Whichever way the Bill goes, it’s not just about me and my research, but the suffering of people 
approaching the end of life. Sociological concepts such as medicalisation, death awareness, 
epistemic injustice, biopower and rarefaction will help to understand how people make sense of 
their experiences of death and dying and of choices at the end of life. Research that explores 
New Zealanders’ explanations and motivations for considering an assisted death will help to 
shed light on our unique local context and inform societal and political debate.  
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on euthanasia/assisted dying: Confronting normative discourses. Verbal presentation at the 
Sociological Association of Aotearoa New Zealand (SAANZ) Conference: The Future in the Past, 
Wellington, New Zealand. 
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at the Otago Medical School Research Society Scientific Meeting, Dunedin, New Zealand. 
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for Ageing Research Excellent Student Symposium for higher degree students. Dunedin, New 
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Young, J. Assisted dying: paradox of control? (2019, October). School of Social and Cultural 
Studies Seminar Series, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. 
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